

A HISTORY OF WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS

A History of Women Philosophers

1. Ancient Women Philosophers, 600 B.C.–500 A.D.
2. Medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment Women Philosophers, 500–1600
3. Modern Women Philosophers, 1600–1900
4. Contemporary Women Philosophers, 1900–today



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A History of Women Philosophers

Volume 4

Contemporary Women Philosophers
1900–today

Edited by

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Professor Alice Ambrose was kind enough to take my telephone call during Christmas holiday of 1991. She allowed me to read to her the contents of an entire file drawer containing the names of those women philosophers who are discussed in the final chapter, or who are mentioned in the Appendix. She graciously filled in details she remembered about the lives and works of many of those women. Often, when my research staff could find no published information about a subject's life, education, professional experience, or even a date of death, Professor Ambrose was able to provide me with personal remembrances. I have indicated in the text and notes to Chapter 14, information that Professor Ambrose provided. Speaking with her gave me an odd sensation of work completed and of times changed. After our conversation ended, I recollected the feeling that had come over me that day, more than a decade ago, when I "found" the first work I located by an ancient woman philosopher. I remember standing in the library stacks, poring through page after page of Stobaeus, looking for the fragment by Aesara of Lucania *On Human Nature* which from Wolff's Latin translation, was clearly a work of philosophy. I did not read Greek (and still don't), but had transliterated Wolff's Greek for Aesara of Lucania. And suddenly, there it was, staring back at me from the pages of Stobaeus. Tears came to my eyes. And now, a decade later, I was actually speaking to someone who personally had known a woman philosopher about whom I was writing. The millennia bridged from the time of Aesara to the time about which I spoke with Alice Ambrose contained our entire history, the history of women philosophers. Summarizing that history could not have been possible

without Professor Ambrose's assistance, nor without the assistance of many others.

Professor Jane MacIntyre of the Philosophy Department of Cleveland State University was kind enough to spend several hours tracking down a few details regarding E. E. Constance Jones. I wish to thank her for her successful efforts on my behalf during what otherwise would have been a more relaxing time in Great Britain.

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I have had great and valuable research efforts made by Ms. Samantha Cicero, my undergraduate Research Assistant. Ms. Cicero generated nearly all of the biographical and bibliographical information that ultimately would become entries about the women subjects of the final chapter. She spent hundreds of hours over the course of an academic year, manually searching through volume after volume of early years of *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, *Mind*, and other journals for works by and information about women philosophers. She was untiring, enthusiastic and a thorough investigator. Like a later-day Agatha Christie, Ms. Cicero pieced together seemingly unrelated fragments of biographical data until we had a fair picture of the life and work of a previously unheard-of philosopher. Sometimes, we would find numerous articles whose author's surname alone was given. In later volumes there might be a casual reference to the work of "Miss" so-and-so. The surname would be recognized, and Samantha would backtrack through the journals for the earlier articles. The problem was not simplified by the fact that many of our subjects married and began writing under their husband's name with no indication whatsoever that "Mrs. Stephen," for example was the former "Miss Costelloe." This meant that we at times had two files on one person until a reference to the "Mrs." would mention her former name. It was Ms. Cicero who first came across E. E. Constance Jones' rather delicate reminder to the philosophic community of Cambridge that Bertrand Russell had used her ideas without attribution.

At the time that the final chapter in this volume was in preparation, the *Philosophers' Index* was, if memory serves, available on CD-ROM for dates from the later 1940s onward. Unfortunately, no indices ever identified women authors *qua* women, so unless Ms. Cicero had a name to begin with, automated indices were not useful for locating works by

women whose names were not known. In order to identify those names, we relied on information supplied to me by others, and especially on the bibliography prepared by the former Nancy Weber, who now writes under the name Morgan G. Willow. Morgan had generously permitted me to use her bibliography for the last two volumes of this series. Many of the names of women philosophers who are mentioned in the final chapter or in the Appendix originated with the Weber bibliography. Still other names were to be found in Kersey's *Women Philosophers: A Bio-Critical Sourcebook*.

My graduate Research Assistant, Ms. Jenny Heyl was part of the team that worked so hard on the Bibliography for this volume. She has two loves: the philosophy of Ayn Rand, and biomedical ethics. Although she normally undertakes research in ethics on my behalf, she regularly assisted with proofreading, finding missing citations, and diplomatically persuading our Interlibrary Loan Department to obtain for my review literally hundreds of works by women philosophers. I want also to thank that department for allowing me to substantially increase its workload during 1991 and 1992.

I want also to thank Ms. Colleen Carmigiano Palko for her efforts to standardize entries in the early drafts of the bibliography for this volume. In addition to much typing, she drafted summaries of the contents of some of archival materials for the profiles of many of the philosophers who are considered in the final chapter.

Cindy Kunsman is a hardworking, perfectionist of a secretary. I have no idea how many drafts of how many chapters she corrected and printed out. I also have lost count of how many revisions there were to the Bibliography and devoutly hope that she has not kept track of the number. She has an eye, not only for detail, but an uncanny ability to persuade a word processor to do things for her that it flatly refuses to do for me. Her warmth and sense of humor shined like a beacon through hundreds and hundreds of pages of second, third and fourth drafts. My thanks to her for being so flexible and for saying that she actually enjoys reading the material she is typing.

Finally, thanks to my daughter Allison. She will be ten years old by the time this volume comes to press. Although her sense of time is now more mature than it was when at age three she inquired whether Aesara of Lucania lived with Mohamar Ghadaffi (both lived in Libya) she has spent her entire life witnessing her mother writing about women philosophers. I thank her for not begrudging me the many, many times I have brought home manuscripts and proofs to correct. She may not choose

to become a philosopher, but she will always know that the history books may fail to tell us about the contributions to learning and to society that women have always made.

MARY ELLEN WAITHE

Introduction to Volume 4

MARY ELLEN WAITHE

The twentieth century marks the time in which women at last began to achieve full admission to the discipline of philosophy, as indicated by the achievement of the rank of Professor in a department of Philosophy. Although contemporary evidence of the persistence of discrimination on the basis of sex can neither be overlooked nor understated, this, nevertheless is the century that marks women's admittance to the profession. As I write this Introduction in 1992, I am aware that it is no longer a mark of extraordinary dedication and fortitude to be a woman philosopher. I recall with amazement a photograph I came upon twenty years ago while rummaging through a box of photographs in the storage room at the University of Minnesota Department of Philosophy where I was a graduate student. The black and white photograph was taken in the early 1950's. I'm not sure whether memory serves but D. Burnham Terrell, Grover Maxwell and possibly Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars were among those in the photograph, along with four women. The photo was captioned "The Philosophy Department." I remember showing the photograph to Professor Maxwell and Professor Terrell and possibly to Feigl. One of the women I recognized as my own teacher, May Brodbeck. Back then I had no idea that I would eventually be the one to reconstruct the history of women philosophers, and I admit that I failed to ask who the other women were. As Professor Terrell has recently informed me, one of the other women was Mary Shaw Kuypers.

Although discrimination in admissions to doctoral programs, in securing professional positions and in obtaining equitable salaries and equitable promotion through the ranks still faces women in philosophy, (especially lesbian women and women of color) nevertheless, women are in the profession in greater numbers than ever before. And we know that for the most part, we are not special *qua* women philosophers. Now, for the first time, with the important contributions made by Ethel

Kersey, by Sr. Prudence Hope Allen, by the American Philosophical Association's Society for the Study of Women Philosophers, by the journal *Hypatia*, and, hopefully, by this series, we know something about our foremothers: the women who truly were special *qua* women philosophers. This volume chronicles the end of two and a half millennia during which it *was* something special to be a woman philosopher.

Women philosophers at the turn of the twentieth century still had extremely limited access to formal education in philosophy. When they were admitted to co-educational institutions of higher education and completed the requirements for the Ph.D. it was not unusual for the degree to be denied. William James said that her oral examination ranked above any other he had heard, yet Harvard refused to award the Ph.D. to Mary Whiton Calkins. Women's colleges, including the Ivy League "Seven Sister Colleges" (Barnard, Radcliffe, Smith, Bryn Mawr, Wellesley, Vassar, Mount Holyoke) as well as public colleges like Hunter College of the City University of New York, and Girton College of Cambridge University provided sex-segregated education for women. It was not until 1948 that Girton became a full college of Cambridge University, and its women students became eligible to receive degrees. In 1885, Cambridge Training College was founded to prepare women for the teaching profession but did not grant the Ph.D. in Philosophy. It is not surprising therefore, to find that women philosophers' highest degrees sometimes are in mathematics, the sciences, history, and letters. It is not surprising that often they did not teach philosophy in universities, or, if they did, that it was in the sex-segregated women's colleges. Self-education, long the recourse of medieval and early modern aristocratic women, became increasingly rare in the twentieth century. Of women philosophers whom we have been able to identify, only Victoria, Lady Welby, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Elizabeth Haldane and May Sinclair were either privately or self-educated.

In determining the contents of this volume, I have again followed the practice of considering a woman as a philosopher if the content of her writings or teaching corresponds to that of any recognized philosophical subject matter of this or any other historical period. I have not excluded women from consideration in this volume on the basis that they lacked the Ph.D. in philosophy, or that they did not teach philosophy, or that they also belonged to some other profession. Thus, some women in this volume have previously also been identified as psychologists, literary writers, physicians, theologians or scientists, etc.

Professional associations frequently provided opportunities for women

to engage in philosophical discourse with their male counterparts. Women not only participated actively in reading papers before professional societies of philosophers, but also were regularly invited to comment on papers given by male philosophers who were their contemporaries. The women in this volume have participated in symposia with the pragmatists James and Dewey, and the analytic philosophers Stout, Russell, Whitehead, Bosanquet, Mace, Acton and others. By the turn of the century, professional associations including the American Philosophical Association, the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, the Mind Association and the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club admitted women as participants and as members. The opportunity to participate with men on the more nearly level playing field of professional philosophy societies provided women philosophers with leadership opportunities in our profession. By the time the century was half spent, four women, Beatrice Edgell, Hilda Oakeley, Lizzie Susan Stebbing and Dorothy Emmet had served as presidents of the Aristotelian Society, and Mary Whiton Calkins had served as President of the American Philosophical Association (as well as President of the American Psychological Association). Now in official, public, organized and recognized ways, women philosophers and their male counterparts worked closely, as colleagues.

My research indicates that it has always been this way; indeed I have identified only two women for whom no affiliation has been found with a male philosopher (Shikibu Murasaki and Julian of Norwich). But in this century, the affiliations, the “mainstreaming” into academic philosophy is by stronger connections than in the past. Rather than being participants in exchanges of correspondence, or hostesses of philosophical discussions, women philosophers hold teaching positions at major universities and elected positions in notable professional societies. Rather than publishing their work at their own expense, as did Margaret Cavendish, women philosophers are well represented in the booklists of the very best academic and intellectual presses.

Being in the company of male colleagues sometimes had its drawbacks. For example, there is troubling evidence that the theory of identity that Bertrand Russell produced in *Principles of Mathematics* (and belatedly acknowledged to have been originated by Frege in *Sinn und Bedeutung*) actually originated with E. E. Constance Jones, who was a faculty member at Cambridge when Russell was a student there. Others, like Lou Salomé, found intimate relationships with Nietzsche and Ree stifling, as Beauvoir sometimes found her relationship with Sartre to

be. Hannah Arendt briefly was lovers with Martin Heidegger (her teacher) and later, commemorated his work. But most women philosophers were not romantically involved with male philosophers.

Twentieth century women philosophers represent all schools and fields of philosophy. There are phenomenologists, logical positivists, pragmatists, feminists, objectivists, existentialists, socialists, marxists, aestheticians, anarchists, and pacifists. There are logicians, ethicists and philosophers of science, of religion, of history, of literature, of mathematics, of psychology, and of education. They write of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Mill, Sidgwick, James, Dewey, and other predecessors and contemporaries. They comment, in oral presentations and in publications, on each others' work. Some have undertaken the sad task of writing the obituary of a female colleague.

The great developments in science and in society frequently influenced the subject matters that women philosophers wrote on. Toward the end of the last century, the impact of Social Darwinism, the experimentations in medicine (especially neurology) and in physics, and the suffrage movement all influenced women philosophers to take up the pen. Developments in neurology, coupled with the tremendous impact of Freud's psychology and the growing interest in phenomenology, led turn-of-the-century philosophers like Gerda Walther, Sophie Bryant, Lou Salomé, and Evelyn Underhill to investigate the ontological status of psychic phenomena, and of mystical experience. It is not unusual to find that the women who are included in this volume are professionally trained in, for example, physics and philosophy, mathematics and philosophy, psychology or psychoanalysis and philosophy, etc. In the early and middle parts of this century, the World Wars, the development of pragmatism, analytic philosophy, and Einstein's discoveries prompted women philosophers to present their own views on everything from elasticity to the consequences of the theory of relativity for ethics.

The suffrage movement, the social work movement and the pacifist movement often had female leadership, and it was not uncommon for women philosophers to take active roles in all three of these great social movements. Often these women were gifted public speakers who wrote philosophy for academic as well as for non-academic presses. Philosophers including Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Simone de Beauvoir, Jane Addams, Helen Dendy Bosanquet, Una Bernard Sait, and May Sinclair are just a few who understood that suffrage was not the only feminist issue, but that so also was the poverty, oppression, exploita-

tion and ignorance that social work theory combatted, and so was war. Many women philosophers argued against the political philosophies that created economic and social oppression, that resulted in class differences and impoverished large populations. By and large it was women and their dependent children who suffered most from poverty, and women philosophers like Jane Addams and Helen Dendy Bosanquet worked actively to transform the charitable impulses of the wealthy into social services for the poor. When women finally had the vote, the question of divorce law reform, and the inherent ethical conflicts of duties to self, duties to children and duties to keep promises became the subject of writings by women philosophers. Some, like Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Una Bernard Sait, argued on pragmatist grounds for liberalization of educational and employment opportunities for women, and for government investment into labor-saving technologies research that would liberate women from housework. Gilman argued for parental training and later, Sait argued for the professionalization of housework, so that hired homeworkers would be adequately compensated. May Sinclair took a more radical view of feminist activism for suffrage, arguing that when oppression was so great and so long-lived, duties of non-violent protest may no longer hold.

In the twentieth century, the nature of philosophy was again changing. Pragmatists, phenomenologists, existentialists and many social and political philosophers frequently eschewed the ivory tower as an appropriate environment for philosophizing, preferring to practice instead in the “real world” of social and political activism. Many preferred to write instead in forms that “ordinary” intelligent people could understand and appreciate. May Sinclair, Ayn Rand, Jane Addams, and Simone de Beauvoir represent only a few of the women whose philosophical works are deliberately written for the average intelligent reader and presuppose no particular advance training in philosophy.

* * *

Victoria, Lady Welby (1837–1912) was self-educated and a correspondent with many leading philosophers of her day, including Spencer, Peirce, Russell, Carus, James and others. Her primary interest was in philosophy of language, and it is she who is credited with founding signifiics: the philosophy of interpretation. Her early writings reflect three central views. One, the simplest form of knowledge (and the least informative) is the physical evidence needed to test scientific hypotheses.

Two, knowledge always requires interpretation. Third, there are different levels at which interpretation occurs; the highest level of interpretation is that which reveals the ultimate significance of an idea in its broadest context. Throughout her writings Welby insisted that the study of the four levels of sense (the literal meaning of a text, treating the entire body of the text as either literal or metaphorical and thus as having the same sense, the contextual sense of a text or passage, and the import of the work as a whole), meaning and significance should be systematized as a discipline. Scientific theory, she claims employs deep metaphor and analogy which obfuscates its meaning. Without a recognition and examination of the language of science, we cannot hope to advance philosophy of science. There are three ways Welby says, in which science con-fusingly uses the word "sense." First, there is "sense" as in sensory perception; second, there is the sense or meaning of a term or the judgment about an observation, and third there is "making sense" as in the philosophical significance, social importance or moral value of a scientific generalization. The latter sense of "sense" in science is what she identifies as signifies. It is the purview of philosophy, poetry and religion and involves ideals and values. Significs, she says, emphasizes the relation of the sign to its referent, to the volitional meaning or intent of the person employing the sign, and to the moral significance, emotional force, social value or appeal of the sign.

E. E. Constance Jones (1848–1922) was a lecturer in logic at Girton College Cambridge. Her professional career began with completing the translation of the German philosopher Hermann Lotze's *Mikrocosmos* begun by Elizabeth Hamilton. Hamilton had died halfway through the translation, and Sidgwick recommended that Jones be invited to complete the translation. Jones' career-long support of Sidgwick's ethical hedonism resulted in an invitation by his widow to posthumously edit his lectures on Spencer, Martineau and Green's ethics. However, Jones' primary interests were in what would come to be called analytic philosophy. She published numerous papers and several books of logic in which she introduced the idea that if the law of identity is a significant assertion it must be an assertion of "denomination in diversity of determination." This concept would later be introduced to the English philosophical community by Bertrand Russell as "sense and reference" as if he had originated the idea and then discovered that it had been anticipated by Frege's *Sinn und Bedeutung*. It now seems plausible that Russell, who was a young mathematics student at Cambridge when Jones published

what she called her “interesting little theory” there, not only did not discover it independently of Frege, but may have relied both on Jones and on Frege. Although Jones’ publication preceded that of Frege by two years, it appears that their discoveries were, in fact, mutually independent, and perhaps were stimulated by common interests in the philosophy of Lotze. Like many English women philosophers, Jones was active in the Aristotelian Society which often provided a forum for her ideas. She was an active participant in its *symposia* along with other leading philosophers including Bosanquet, Ward, McTaggart, Sidgwick and Bradley. The Society’s *Proceedings* as well as the Mind Association’s journal, *Mind* published many of her formal papers. She was considered to be among the senior faculty of the Cambridge University Moral Sciences club. For more than a quarter of a century, “Miss E. E. Constance Jones” as she is called played a leadership role in the development of the British analytic tradition.

Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860–1935) was an American philosopher whose writings explored the sexist nature of much of philosophy, and much of society. Although she spent two years at Rhode Island School of Design, she must be considered self-taught in philosophy. She was a socialist and a Fabian Society member who advocated the abolition of class differences and collective ownership of land and of industry. Yet, she rejected marxist revolutionary methods and marxist focus on class struggle. She was a radical feminist who not only supported suffrage but economic independence for women, communal child-rearing, divorce reform, and the morality of suicide. She was a staunch critic of what she identified as androcentric philosophy which she saw as praising rationality to the exclusion of sensitivity, deductive logic to the exclusion of induction and insight, dominance to the exclusion of cooperation, and the deprecation of all that is traditionally identified with the feminine. She advocated instead a “human philosophy” committed to the social service of caring for the needs of others, promoting for example educational reform over the expansion of institutions of punishment, nurturance over mere procedural justice. Gilman believed in a deity that was an ungendered force for social good, a force that could be tapped as a source of guidance and strength. She advocated the social collective good over that of the individual and a social consciousness rather than an individual soul that would survive the deaths of individuals. She contrasted her religious views to those of androcentric religions that privilege the afterlife over the life of society, the power of the individual over the value of the group, that view life

as a fight against death, and that fail, through disvaluing and subjugating women and the nurturing emotions, to advance human needs. Gilman took issue with the social Darwinists and believed instead that advancement of the human race required the liberation of women. She defined anthropological progress in terms of the advancement of the whole through collective, liberationist action. The oppression of women, she believed, was the greatest obstacle to social progress. She called for full reform of the social institutions of marriage, family and home, called for the professionalization of homemaking, and for the understanding that the true role of motherhood is the progress of the civilization, yet most women lack anything approaching professional, scientific training in childbearing, nurturance and education. Yet for all her apparent enlightenment, Gilman was a product of the most insidious effects of social Darwinism: the belief that western culture and therefore the white race represented the most anthropologically and morally advanced. She advocated eugenics for the creation of a superior society. With her bias in favor of not only white northern European, but English culture, Gilman's social ethics was fundamentally utilitarian. Given the superiority of the English, right conduct is that which tends toward the greatest development of morally and intellectually superior humanity, and thus tends toward the good of most. In addition to advocating eugenics, Gilman also advocated euthanasia and assisted suicide, to avoid needless suffering of persons who were terminally ill, and needless draining of health care resources for the care of those who could not be helped. She believed that when death was inevitable, pain was unbearable and contributions to society were no longer possible, a Board of Health should administer euthanasia. Gilman died by chloroform inhalation three years following her diagnosis of breast cancer. Her suicide note stressed her view that an advanced, civilized society extends to its members the right to die with dignity.

Lou Andreas Salomé (1861–1937) was a Russian-born philosopher who studied philosophy, religion and theology in Zürich, and travelled extensively in Europe. Among the intellectuals in her circle were philosophers Paul Rée and Friederich Nietzsche, as well as the psychiatrist Sigmund Freud, and the poet Rainer Maria Rilke. Her primary orientation to philosophy was phenomenological, and her primary interests were religious experience, theological ethics, and what has in recent years come to be called “philosophy of sex and love” but which she considered to be the philosophy of women. In the area of the epistemological and ontological status of religious experience, Salomé explored what

she considered the essence of religion: that like art and sex it served the human need to merge with the world beyond ordinary experience. While we feel inadequate when faced with the experience of the divine, we also identify ourselves with its powers. The creative tension that this recognition gives rise to allows us to acknowledge the limits of human abilities and to revere that which extends beyond our limits. This intuitive love of the divine is accompanied by a religious joy that is revealed through narcissistic love of the divine in the knowing self. She views women as more integrated than men, capable of knowing in erotic spirituality, truths which transcend mere logic. Only male artists approximate this level of liberating, spiritual knowledge. It is in the experience of love that true self-knowledge becomes possible, love offers the means of transcending consciousness. Salomé's views on the religious and erotic context of self-knowledge explain in part her interests in psychoanalysis, and accord nicely with Freud's own demythologizing of religion and his emphasis on sexuality as the key to self-knowledge. But she differed sharply from Freud in her views of narcissism. Where Freud considered narcissism to be regressive and pathological, Salomé considers it creative and unifying, not only with self as ego, but with nature.

Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930) was one of those truly exceptional women who rose to the highest leadership positions in philosophy as well as in psychology. An American philosopher, Calkins studied under William James and Josiah Royce. Her philosophical education began in high school and continued at Smith College where she majored in classics and philosophy. Soon after graduation she began teaching Greek at Wellesley while completing her Master's degree at Smith. She studied psychology at Clark University and psychology and philosophy at Harvard (under Royce). She completed all the requirements for the Ph.D. in Philosophy at Harvard, and William James ranked her oral defense higher than any he had previously heard. Nevertheless, Harvard refused to grant the degree on grounds of sex. Years later Radcliffe offered to grant her the Ph.D. based on the work completed at Harvard, but Calkins declined. In 1905 she became the first woman president of the American Psychological Association and in 1918 the first woman president of the American Philosophical Association. In the interim, Columbia University awarded her an honorary Doctor of Letters and Smith an honorary Doctor of Laws. Upon her retirement from Wellesley in 1929, she was appointed Research Professor. Psychology was Calkins' first love, and the opportunity for a tutorial with William James whose *Principles of Psychology* had just been published provided her with a first-hand introduction to the

latest insights of one of its greatest theorists. Eventually, Calkins would publish four full-length texts in psychology and in excess of sixty articles on subjects ranging from mental association, emotions, behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Her focus often was on defining the scope of subject matter of psychology and on analyzing the nature of the self and its relation to soul and body. In exploring questions about the nature of the self conceived as psyche, and the soul conceived spiritually, and the body conceived physically, Calkins connects the psychological with the metaphysical and the biological. While philosophy attempts to settle questions about the ultimate reality of persons, psychology accepts the reality of the self as given and investigates it as an object of introspection. She wrote two original texts: *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy: An Introduction to Metaphysics through the Study of Modern Systems* (which saw five editions in twenty nine years) and *The Good Man and the Good* (which saw three editions in seven years). She revised a translation of LaMettrie's *Man a Machine* and editions of Hobbes, Locke's *Essay*, Hume's *Enquiry and Treatise* (as one work), Berkeley's *Essays, Principles, and Dialogues* and authored more than thirty articles in philosophy. She was what can be described as a personal idealist who held that mental realities exist as a self, part, or process of a self, that reality is ultimately reducible to mental entities. Some mental entities are recognizably self, and some are recognizably selves outside oneself. The universe, or Absolute Self, is one perceptive, conscious, thinking, feeling, willing, complete, all-inclusive self of which lesser selves are constituent parts. Ethics, therefore, becomes a psychology of metaphysics, a knowledge of right action by the self in its relations to other selves and to the inclusion of all selves in the Absolute Self. Since the function of ethics is not merely to know the good, but to be good, knowledge of the psychology of human behavior including perception, reason, motivation and action is an essential constituent part of ethics. Calkins denied that there were morally significant differences between the minds of women and those of men. She favored suffrage and co-education, pointing out that from infancy girls are socialized differently than boys, therefore any psychological research claiming to identify inherent differences cannot account for the effects of different nurturance given girls and boys. Indeed, her professional life as a Wellesley educator was spent in developing women's intellectual prowess, much as her professional life at the forefront of the disciplines of philosophy and psychology was spent furthering scholarship in those fields by revealing their inherent interdependence.

Lizzie Susan Stebbing (1885–1943) was an English philosopher who was educated at Girton and received the Master's Degree from the University of London in 1912. Following lectureships in philosophy at King's College and a co-directorship at Kingsley Lodge School for Girls in Hampstead she became part-time Lecturer at Bedford College of the University of London. A member of the Aristotelian Society, and an active contributor of papers to its *Proceedings*, she was elected its President in 1935. She also published extensively in *Mind*. Her primary orientation was in analytic philosophy. She was an author of several logic texts, works on philosophy of science, pragmatism, critical thinking, and social/political philosophy. Her Master's thesis, *Pragmatism and French Voluntarism* (1914) criticizes Bergsonian intuitionism as well as pragmatism on the ground that neither school of thought gives a satisfactory account of the nature of truth. *Modern Introduction to Logic* is an attempt to describe the connections between syllogistic logic and symbolic logic, summarizing and explaining recent developments in logical theory and notation, and their relationship to the Aristotelian tradition (A revised and condensed version later appeared as *A Modern Elementary Logic*). *Logic in Practice* (1935) and *Thinking to Some Purpose* (1939) emphasize the role that logic, conceived broadly as rationality, clarity and knowledge, have in non-academic areas of human endeavor. In *Philosophy and the Physicists* Stebbing debunks two popular accounts of what contemporary physics means. Written during the early part of World War II, *Ideals and Illusions* represents a departure from the more analytical works that preceded it. Using the disillusionment in Europe as an example, Stebbing explores, in a series of essays, the extent to which individuals and nations are morally responsible for the persistence of conditions of war, oppression and destruction. She examines the role of idealism and the question of the pragmatic implementation of political ideals. In this context, she examines the role of individual virtue in the development of a collective public will to implement political ideals that are morally praiseworthy. She contrasts the good of pursuing one's own happiness and the happiness or good of nations, with the good of coming to the aid of victims of aggression or of misfortune and thus seeking a greater good: the good of a wider, international community. She examines the role of rhetoric in leading others towards the implementation of one's own ideals whether those be morally good or morally evil ideals.

Edith Stein [Sr. Teresia Benedicta a Cruce, OCD] (1891–1942) was a Jew born in what is now Wroclaw, Poland. She attended the University

of Breslau and later went to Göttingen to join Husserl's students at the inception of the new philosophical movement, phenomenology. When World War I broke out, Husserl removed to Freiburg and Stein followed, completing her dissertation *On the Problem of Empathy* under his direction. Her doctorate was awarded *summa cum laude* and resulted in an offer from Husserl to become his assistant, leading his "kindergarten" and assisting him with preparing his works for publication. Unable to break with a tradition that excluded women, Husserl refused to support the efforts of Stein to habilitate and become a faculty member. Her attempts to habilitate at Göttingen were also turned back, also on the grounds of sex. After winning an appeal that overturned the legality of refusing habilitation on the basis of sex, Stein abandoned the attempt to reinstate her application for habilitation, turning instead to a study of Catholicism. For a decade following her baptism she taught as a lay teacher in a Catholic girls school, giving up philosophy. However, she soon read Aquinas, and translated his *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* into German. It was not a strict translation, however: it used the language of contemporary German phenomenology. This translation signalled the beginning of what would be her major area of interest in philosophy: a synthesis of Thomistic and phenomenological philosophy. A brief stint on the faculty of the German Institute of Scientific Pedagogy in Munster was followed by a non-renewal of her contract: her conversion to Catholicism notwithstanding, the Third Reich prohibited Jews from teaching. In October, 1933, she became a cloistered, Carmelite nun and took the name Sister Teresia Benedicta a Cruce.

After joining the convent, Edith Stein's interests in philosophy were largely in accommodating Thomism and phenomenology. She investigated the ontological structure of the human person, looking at the psychological and physical unity of self, the question of knowledge of other persons, and the nature of consciousness and of spiritual experience. In this context, she had particular interest in the nature of woman and in the experience of living in community and in society. She analyzed the nature of woman in terms of women's humanity, specifically feminine nature and also in terms of individual uniqueness. She distinguished the ideas of living in community where the individual sees others as fellow personal subjects, and living in society where the individual sees self as personal subject and others as objects. Stein noted parallels between Thomistic philosophy and German phenomenology regarding the objectively valid nature of scientific knowledge, the affirmation of

the intelligible *Logos* in all that is, and the power of reason to attain this intelligibility. Stein's final work, *Finite and Eternal Being: Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being* was typeset in 1936 when Hitler's ban on publication by non-Aryans was issued. In it Stein discusses the nature of being, and distinguishes and explores the relationship of actual and potential, act and potency. The angst of the finite "I" as it faces the potentiality of its own non-being leads it to grasp the idea of Eternal Being. Essence is constantly related to existence. A thing *is* according to its universal essence as well as its individual essence; thus Being is a unified whole resulting from the joining together of essential attributes in a determinate structure.

A transfer to a convent in Holland was insufficient to assure her safety. In July, 1942, Edith Stein was taken prisoner and murdered a month later in the gas chambers of Auschwitz. Sr. Teresia Benedicta a Cruce was declared a Saint by Pope John Paul II in 1987.

Gerda Walther (1897–1977) was born in a tuberculosis sanatorium in Germany, where her mother was a patient and her father was the Medical Director and owner. Her mother died when Gerda was five years old and Gerda was raised by her father and stepmother who was also her aunt. Her parents were active in the socialist movement in Germany and it was there that Walther learned Marxist philosophy. An avowed marxist/socialist political agitator, after four years of studies in Munich she went, at age 20 to Breisgau to join Husserl's circle. Husserl relegated her to Edith Stein's "kindergarten" but apparently on Stein's recommendation, also allowed her to enroll in his courses. Walther wanted to write her doctoral dissertation on the essence of social communities, and knew that Husserl would want to direct her elsewhere, so she returned to Munich to study under Alexander Pfander, graduating *summa cum laude*. Her dissertation *Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften* (*On the Ontology of Social Communities*) was later published in Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung*. Karl Jaspers sponsored her for habilitation (faculty status), but economic changes in Germany left her destitute, and forced her to take a series of unrewarding menial jobs. However, her interests in philosophy and in psychology inspired her to study and write, and her interests expanded to include phenomenological interests in mental and spiritual phenomena. The Nazi disapproval of phenomenology and parapsychology resulted in at least one of her publications appearing under a pseudonym, F. Johansen. While forced into employment censoring foreign-language mail, Walther committed acts of subversion: pencilling in warnings and

news of relatives prior to forwarding the very mail that she was supposed to censor.

In her doctoral dissertation, Walther argued that humans are by nature socialized, political animals who desire to live in community. In this work she analyzed the nature of living in community in terms of the epistemological question "how can we have knowledge of other minds?" Husserl and Stein's view was that it is the individual body which is given first and which then gives expression to the mental. Walther's view was that there existed some direct inner connection between humans: knowledge of the phenomenal world is merely an expression of that inner connection. A community consists of people who in at least some important part of their lives, know of each other and know that they are in relationship to the same intentional object. As a result of this knowledge there is interaction among them motivated by that intentional relation with a common intentional object, and a feeling of belonging together.

Walther's best known philosophical work *Die Phänomenologie der Mystik* (Phenomenology of Mysticism) is an outgrowth of a mystical experience. In it she gives a phenomenological account of mystical and similar parapsychological experiences. In it, Walther postulates the mystical experience as a basic, irreducible phenomenon. She offers an ontology of mystical and spiritual phenomena, and argues that common prejudices prevent most philosophers from objectively studying the phenomenology of mystical experience. These prejudices include an often unspoken assumption that human minds cannot experience the divine directly, and an empiricist bias that favors dismissing non-sensory experiences. Non-empirical spiritual data she argues, are as varied as are sensory data, and mystical, occult or other parapsychological experiences cannot merely be dismissed out of hand on the grounds that they are not empirically verifiable. She denies that mystical experience is akin to the phenomena of mental illness and is therefore, evidence of psychopathology.

Ayn Rand (1905–1982) was born in Russia and changed her name from Alice Rosenbaum upon emigration to the United States. "Ayn" was the name of a Finnish author, and "Rand" was chosen in honor of the Remington-Rand typewriter she brought with her. Following an early education at the University of Petrograd and a purge of undesirables by the Communist Party, Rand settled in Chicago with devoutly Jewish relatives. Rand's career was perhaps the most unconventional of any women philosophers of this century. Her literary writing for the

Hollywood screen gave her the notoriety needed to make a success of her philosophical novels. Perhaps the most widely read of the twentieth-century women philosophers, and I believe, the only one to have sold movie rights to her work, Ayn Rand developed a fiercely loyal following. Known as the founder of objectivist philosophy, the main theme of Rand's works is that happiness is the moral purpose of human life, productivity its highest activity, and reason its sole absolute. Her philosophical system in *We the Living* describes two archetypal figures, the Witch Doctor (faith) and Attila (force) who have conspired to issue in a morally bankrupt culture. Aquinas, by reintroducing Aristotelian ethics, and the industrial revolution, by giving value to productivity, temporarily freed the world from the conspiracy of faith and force. As the founding fathers of the American Revolution recognized, "a free mind and a free market are corollaries." But modern philosophy, because it based itself on pragmatism, portrayed the businessman as a looter rather than as a producer. Modern philosophy misunderstands the virtue of selfishness. Rand called for the rise of a "new" intellectual who will provide capitalism with a firm ethical foundation. In *The Virtue of Selfishness* Rand outlines her view that the maintenance of life and pursuit of happiness are identical; the values of reason, purpose and self-esteem correspond to the virtues of rationality, productivity and pride. Capitalism, Rand claims, is the only economic system based on individual rights, especially property rights. *Laissez-faire* capitalism, she claims, is the purest form of capitalism. In *The Romantic Manifesto* Rand addresses questions of aesthetics and the importance of art to human consciousness. This work, perhaps better than most, explains why Rand chose the artistic medium of literature as the vehicle for her philosophic views. Artistic expression solidifies what would otherwise be mere philosophic abstractions. It integrates multiple concepts and thus is a vehicle for communicating moral ideals.

The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution addresses her views on the effects of higher education in fostering conformity and socialization over the development of conceptual skills that foster individuality. *Philosophy, Who Needs It?* contains a series of articles attacking the views of philosophers from Plato to Hume, Emerson and Kant. Rand's many writings include analyses of a wide variety of philosophical issues. For example, in *Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology* she addresses the nature and status of sensory perception and its relationship to the question of human existence. In her view, sensory experience is epistemologically a first source of valid knowledge. Something exists which

is perceived; one exists consciously, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists. Rand was clearly an original thinker whose early philosophical views were reactions to Aristotle, Aquinas and Nietzsche and to communist philosophy as it was applied in the Soviet Union. The works for which she is primarily known, *The Fountainhead*, *The Virtue of Selfishness* and *Atlas Shrugged* were written to fulfill what Ayn Rand viewed to be the only useful role of philosophy: to effect a moral mobilization of ordinary people on the basis of a universal quest to seek fulfillment of individual self-interest. She brought philosophical analysis to bear on the issues that confront ordinary people in consequence of their existence in a modern, and often amoral world.

Cornelia Johanna De Vogel (1905–1986) was a Dutch philosopher whose conversion to Catholicism was revealed shortly following her unanimous election as the first woman to hold the Chair of ancient Philosophy at the Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, a major Protestant University in the Netherlands. The conversion had followed an intense religious experience of God's presence; consequently, her deep religious convictions were to enhance her professional interests in Patristic philosophy. Although her religious convictions provided much of the drive behind her interests in ancient philosophy, Cornelia De Vogel ranked as one of the foremost historians of ancient philosophy in the twentieth century. During her professional career De Vogel published more than one hundred articles and books in the area of ancient and Patristic philosophy, including an impressive three-volume series *Greek Philosophy* consisting of original texts in Greek and Latin, notes about modern interpretations and bibliographic references to important translations, commentaries and editions. De Vogel's series is known world-wide in philosophy as the standard critical edition of original texts from Thales, the Stoics, Plato, Aristotle, the Peripatetics, the Middle Academy, Hellenistic, Roman, Neoplatonic and Patristic philosophy.

De Vogel's primary interest in ancient philosophy was in Plato, specifically in the Doctrine of the Forms and its development. On De Vogel's analysis the *Parmenides* marked a real crisis in the development of that doctrine, a change or "keerpunt." Most of her professional writings other than the *Greek Philosophy* series were devoted to the analysis of two questions: (1) was the neoplatonic interpretation of Plato's metaphysical theories correct; and (2) was the *Demiurge* of the *Timaeus* equivalent to Plotinus' concept of *Nous*. To De Vogel, the *Sophist* represented the religious core of Plato's work, albeit disguised as a meta-

physical argument. And the *Sophist* provides the evidence that (especially Plotinian) neoplatonism is actually founded in Plato's written doctrines. De Vogel's earliest work anticipated much of the analysis in the later twentieth century of Plato's unwritten metaphysical doctrines and the evidence for those doctrines in the written dialogues, although she was highly skeptical of the conclusions drawn by some Plato scholars that the early dialogues also foreshadow the unwritten doctrines. De Vogel was a meticulous, exacting scholar of ancient philosophy whose commitment to philological precision saved her from making some of the more outlandish claims made by her contemporaries. She insisted that the body of Plato's work be viewed as a metaphysical system, and not as separate dialogues that were complete works in themselves. In them, rather, she saw a complex and intricate metaphysical theory that prepared the way for the later development of Plotinian *Nous* as a separate hypostasis.

Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) was born in Germany of Jewish parents. Her father died when she was only seven. She spent a year at the University of Marburg, where she became lovers with Martin Heidegger. Arendt attended the University of Freiburg for one year and came under the influence of Edmund Husserl. Her doctoral work was completed at Heidelberg, under the direction of Karl Jaspers. These three great German philosophers, and her experience as a Jewish woman in academia profoundly impacted Arendt's intellectual development. Arendt emigrated to the United States where she landed a position teaching History at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York. She spent a decade writing *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, the first of several works dealing with social and political philosophy. Her works brought her many academic awards and prizes, as well as faculty positions at Princeton University (where she became its first female full Professor) and at the prestigious New School for Social Research where she was University Professor of Political Philosophy. Two central concerns characterize her original writings. One concern is to identify the nature of human freedom and understand the nature of impediments to freedom. A second concern is to determine how human social freedom can be exercised in what she described as the "recovery" of social and political life.

The subject matters Arendt discussed in her writings covered a wide range of material from more traditional subjects in philosophy, such as her *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy* to the examination of racism, anti-semitism and imperialist domination in *Origins of Totalitarianism*. She examined at length the moral and political nature of violence in *On Violence* and wrote a moral documentary of a contemporary exemplar

of evil in *Eichmann in Jerusalem, a Report on the Banality of Evil*. She looked retrospectively to the moral, social and political foundations of the Revolutionary War in America in *On Revolution*, and explored the virtue and abuse of labor in *The Human Condition*. During the final years of her life she completed two of three planned volumes on the nature and activities of the human mind. The two completed volumes were *Thinking* and *Willing*. A third volume, *Judging* was begun the very day she suddenly died. As though these original contributions to contemporary social and political philosophy and to philosophy of mind were not enough, Hannah Arendt also was a philosopher who commemorated Heidegger's philosophy in *Martin Heidegger Ist Achtzig Jahre Alt*. In addition, Arendt edited three works by Karl Jaspers, *The Great Philosophers*, *Plato and Augustine*, and *The Future of Germany*. She was invited to write the foreword to Jaspers' final work, *Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, The Paradigmatic Individuals*.

Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986) was a French philosopher who has come to represent the origins of twentieth century feminist philosophy. Born in Paris, she studied philosophy at the Sorbonne and at the Ecole Normale Supérieure and later taught philosophy in Marseilles, Rouen and Paris. She is considered by many solely in terms of her long-lived relationship with Jean-Paul Sartre. Like him, she was a political activist and existentialist philosopher. She wrote a number of literary works including *She Came to Stay*, *The Blood of Others*, *All Men are Mortal*, *The Mandarins* (for which she was awarded the prestigious Prix Goncourt), *Les Belles Images*, and *The Woman Destroyed*. Although she repeatedly denied that she was a philosopher, we must understand that by that she meant she was not a philosopher in the traditional, academic sense. She wrote philosophy for the masses, philosophy that any intelligent, educated person could understand. She sought to write for "real people" the "metaphysical novel." There is only one reality, she claimed, and that is the real world. The world of ordinary living people who seek to understand the ambiguity of their existence through existentialist embrace of the concrete problems of moral choice and right action in a frequently immoral world. Thus *The Ethics of Ambiguity* denies that lived experience can be safely categorized by lifeless, useless philosophical systems. Other contemporary philosophies distance themselves from lived experience and thereby fail to account for the fullness of human experience. Beauvoir develops in its stead a critical methodology to articulate the plurality and difference of the experience of concrete individuals who, rather than being completed persons are,

instead, always in the process of becoming. Existentialism, rather than skeptically suspecting lived experience, valorizes it. *The Blood of Others* claims that each individual is responsible to every other human being and for everything that happens, thus recognizing both the individual power and moral duty to change social structures. Each individual is defined in relationship to others and to the world. Femininity is a cultural construct that is socially imposed on women; it is not a construct that is biological or natural in any way. Femininity therefore is a consequence of culture: of custom and education. In *The Second Sex* Beauvoir argues that the imperialism of human consciousness required consciousness to view itself as subject and all else as object, as something to dominate. Male became the archetype for consciousness, female that of the other. Because women lived among those who dominated them they were prevented from developing the concrete means for organizing themselves into a political force. Years after writing *The Second Sex* Beauvoir identified herself as a militant feminist who would take her own fate in hand in concert with other women in the movement for liberation.

Simone Weil (1909–1943) is best known for her religious mysticism. However, she was a complex thinker who brought several different traditions to bear on philosophical thought. First, was the wide scope of the humanities including philosophy and literature, second was mysticism and religious experience, third was the social and political, fourth was the mathematical and scientific. Central to her writings was a highly speculative analysis of the essential forms in aesthetics, mathematics, ethics and science. Her primary concern is to articulate and analyze the lived experience of the least well off in society in terms of the formal, structural relationships among people and institutions, particularly as they are revealed in literary works. In *The Iliad of The Poem of Force* she examines the relationship between human concepts of destiny and soul and explores the extent to which individuals can be said to have created their own destiny, and the contradictions between the ideas of “creating one’s own destiny” and the concept “destiny” itself. Thus, she also examines the nature of the beautiful, the good, duty, virtue, right action, desire, impulse, passion and imagination. A posthumously published collection of works includes her analysis of basic aesthetic concepts: the limits of artistic creativity imposed by choice of medium, by artistic ability, by time and by space. She also explores the idea of necessity of relationships between the parts of a work of art: altering one of these relationships may compromise its artistic merit, thus requiring what she labels “attention.” Attention is the focus on only that which is neces-

sary to the artistic expression of the innate form of the work of art; it requires honest expression.

Weil's writings often focus attention on the lived experience of those who are oppressed, who are made by the social hierarchy to occupy a less than fully human role in society. Oppressed peoples are treated like objects, human objects, a concept that, while defying all logic, is clearly a true depiction of social life. It is impossible for those who have never been marginalized to truly understand the effects of dehumanization. Developing the artist's discipline of attention enables us to see the world as it is. Only through such disciplined attention to the marginalization of others can we learn how to meet the needs of the oppressed. Those needs can begin to be met by viewing oppressed people as individuals, not merely members of a class, by asking them to give voice to that which they are suffering. This requires abandoning the dehumanizing detachment from the oppressed that the political life permits and entering instead into personal relationships that inspire hope and enable healing.

* * *

There are nearly one hundred women philosophers of this century named in this volume. The lives and works of thirteen of them receive chapter-length treatment here. The final chapter provides brief profiles on an additional twenty-nine. In the Appendix to this volume fifty-four others are listed. Just over a decade ago, I came to the conclusion that there were many more women philosophers throughout the course of our profession's history than could possibly be mentioned in the nice little article I had in mind for perhaps *The Journal of the History of Philosophy*. Lengthier treatment clearly was needed. I decided to proceed cautiously and include in that treatment only women philosophers who, in a colloquial sense "were history." I did not originally intend to prepare a volume on twentieth century philosophers. However, so many of my colleagues who have constituted the Project on the History of Women Philosophers felt strongly that the discipline was as much in need of this volume as it was of the first three volumes, that I was easily persuaded to agree to prepare it. However, doing so has presented me with challenges that did not arise with the earlier volumes.

I have always wanted this series to be a history. For the reason I have wanted to include only those women philosophers who were deceased, who productivity as philosophers had come to full closure.

Since a century is the longest lifetime that one usually gets, it was easier, with volumes one through three to include in the history for that period, any woman philosopher about whom sufficient information could be unearthed. There was no problem in assuming, for example, that someone who published in the sixteenth century was by now, well and truly deceased. Unfortunately, that assumption cannot be made quite so glibly with respect to someone who published in 1930, but for whom one has been utterly unable to discover a date of birth or a date of death. Not all women philosophers whose biographies appear in *Who's Who* with dates of birth in the late nineteenth century subsequently appear in *Who Was Who*. Deaths are often not recorded in the same types of source materials that record active productivity. Attempts to receive permission to cull through the records of the American Philosophical Association for obituary notices were received with the unpromising explanation that the Association itself is attempting to collect its records from the archival repositories of the universities that were homes to the former presidents of its three divisions. The records of the Association are not centrally held, but remain with those of its past presidents. My quest to eliminate from consideration in this volume women who were still living but for whom dates of death were not to be found in the usual sources was further complicated by the interesting statistic that many of us have tended to live and to be productive to an extremely ripe old age. There are several centenarians and near-centenarians amongst us. On the other hand, some women philosophers died much too young: some of our foremothers died in childbirth, or committed suicide in middle age, or were put to death in a concentration camp. In retrospect I realize that I needed the services of a private detective to conduct searches through public records of birth and death. I also needed the services of a full-time secretary to engage in correspondence with the many philosophical societies of which women philosophers were members, and the many academic institutions at which women philosophers had studied or taught. Unfortunately, I have not had these services available to me.

When dates of death have not been forthcoming, I have sometimes resorted to making two *ad hoc* assumptions (which in some cases will be wrong). The first assumption is that a date of birth precedes the first published record of professional activity (award of the doctorate, membership in a professional society, publication, or appointment to an academic post) at age twenty-five. The second assumption is that no philosopher lived more than a century. Therefore, if a *floruit* date would

be at least a century old, I have felt rather comfortable in assuming that the person is deceased. In most such cases, her philosophical writings are listed in the Bibliography. In every case, I have collected some archival information about them. Many of the names can be found in Ethel Kersey's valuable work: *Women Philosophers, a Biocritical Source Book*. Readers will perhaps have knowledge of other women who lived and wrote at the turn of the century. Some of those subjects, who perhaps can be said to have lived most of their professional lives in the nineteenth century, may be included instead in a second edition to Volume 3 of this series, should one be necessary.

Although the research for this volume began a decade ago, it may never be complete. I have collected information and unconfirmed leads on a number of other women, whom, for lack of evidence of teaching or writing philosophy, are not mentioned in these volumes. In such cases, the information is still spotty: names on membership lists of professional societies, or incomplete textual references to a person, or mere mention of a woman as a "philosopher" in works by others are insufficient evidence for me to be willing also to make such an attribution.

The selections for the main chapters reflect three things: first, my conviction that there is reason to consider the subject to be a philosopher; second, the availability of sufficient written philosophical work by the subject; and third, interest and expertise in the source language and area of philosophy on the part of scholars who compose the Project on the History of Women in Philosophy and who have offered to prepare a chapter on that subject. Relegation to the final chapter, or indeed to the Appendix, in no way indicates that a woman subject is of lesser importance than she who receives fuller treatment. Indeed, the number of women philosophers is too great to give to all those who might otherwise be identified as "important philosophers" a chapter of their own.

I realize that there are some shortcomings evident both in this volume and in the series of which it is a part. There is insufficient treatment of non-western and non-white women. That deficiency hopefully will be remedied by other scholars. I welcome hearing from others who have successfully engaged in such research. These likely shortcomings are the reason that this series is titled *A History of Women Philosophers* rather than *The History of Women Philosophers*.

In this, the final volume of the series, it is perhaps appropriate to reflect upon the conditions which gave rise to the series. A myth gave rise to it. That myth, unduly enshrined by male historians of philosophy who were either grossly incompetent or who clearly knew better, was that

philosophy is the stuff of only the greatest male intellects. By now it should be clear to those who have in the past claimed to be the custodians of our professional record (including the editors of *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*) that the historical record (much of which has been assembled in this series, as well as in the works of Allen and of Kersey) speaks otherwise. The record shows that in every historical epoch in which we have a record of men engaging in philosophy, we also have a record of women engaging in philosophy. That record shows that just as male philosophers have framed the "great questions" of philosophy, whether in logic, metaphysics, ethics, political thought, epistemology, cosmology, ontology, religion, language, or aesthetics, so too have women philosophers framed them. That record shows that just as male philosophers left a written record of their views for posterity, so too have women philosophers written. The record shows that just as male philosophers have taught philosophy and had disciples, students, followers, so too have women philosophers led academies, chaired departments, headed professional associations, and nurtured the development of other philosophers.

In the decade-long effort at recapturing our lost history I have become aware of three significant differences between male and female philosophers. First, and most obvious is the unequal access to training in philosophy. Statistics from our own professional societies indicate that although the number of women in the profession is increasing, the increase is small compared to other professions, for example, law and medicine. Unfortunately, the statistics also show that when women do receive Ph.D.s in philosophy, they neither rise through the faculty ranks as quickly as do men, nor do they receive the same compensation. A second, and perhaps more crucial difference between male and female philosophers is one that may account for the general omission of females from the received canon. That difference is the absence of women historians of philosophy. Although Cornelia De Vogel stands as an exception (at least regarding ancient philosophy) to the general rule that historians of philosophy are all male, she too, appears to have been unaware of works by women philosophers in antiquity. The third difference between female and male philosophers that I have noticed is that it is rare that male philosophers have seriously addressed arguments in support of women's equal moral, social and political status with men. For this reason, we tend to think of feminist philosophy as an invention of the twentieth century, or at best, of the late nineteenth century. One may quibble as to what precisely feminist philosophy consists in, and I do

not intend to attempt to define it here. Precise definitions notwithstanding, it is clear that women philosophers have addressed what used to be called “the woman question” ever since there have been women philosophers. I believe that the first wave of philosophical feminism began when Phintys of Sparta and Perictione I addressed the “excellences” of woman at the same time that Plato was admitting Axiothea and Lasthenia (in drag) to his lectures. The second great wave of feminism was in the woman-dominated institutions of greater learning in the medieval period: from the convents and female monasteries headed by Hildegard and Mechthild who led and educated women, right through to the writings of Christine de Pisan. The third wave of philosophical feminism came when philosophical writing accompanied political activism, from Mary Wollstonecraft through Jane Addams and Emma Goldman. If I am correct in my accounting, we represent the fourth wave of feminist philosophy: when contemporary feminist thought is taught in the academies, lived in daily life, and exercised at the polls. In every epoch, there have been women philosophers who confronted women’s issues, inquired as to woman’s nature, and exhorted their male counterparts to take them seriously.

And still, the canon remains largely unintegrated. If one wants to find the works of Locke or Kant, one has only to venture to any public or academic library and there they are, in the 100 section of the Dewey decimal system (where it has not been replaced by the Library of Congress system). If one wants to find women philosophers, one must look page by page through early philosophical journals, or through state archival material, or through “famous ladies” books, or through histories of other disciplines in which women philosophers also became proficient. I welcome, more than I can express, the important work in this area now being done by others, especially Ethel Kersey and Sr. Prudence Allen. Clearly, in volumes two and three of this series, I have missed identifying some philosophers who came to Kersey’s attention, just as she has missed some whose works I have uncovered. There is still so much to do. There are scores of major works to be translated, contemporary editions to be prepared, deeper analyses to be done, and connections between the works of different women and between their works and the works of the men to be explored. I have no doubt that there remain many women philosophers of the past whose names we have not yet learned of. It is my privilege to introduce you to some of those whose names and works we do know of: these, our immediate predecessors.

1. Victoria, Lady Welby (1837–1912)¹

WILLIAM ANDREW MYERS

All closed figures are vicious as ideals or symbols for the thinkers. Outlook itself is not enough: there must be out-way, a way out, an ever-fresh start.

Welby

I. INTRODUCTION

The life of Victoria, Lady Welby presents several anomalies: a woman with no formal education, her social position, incisive mind, and industrious correspondence enabled her to engage in probing discussion with the most important minds of the English-speaking world at the turn of the century. Her position in the Victorian English aristocracy notwithstanding, her reformist ideas on religion and language and her philosophy of interpretation place her firmly among the early twentieth century's most progressive and original thinkers. Largely unknown now except to specialists in Victorian life and letters, semioticians, and scholars of C. S. Peirce (with whom she corresponded during the last decade of her life), Welby's work on meaning was influential in its time and still merits study and development.

II. BIOGRAPHY

Victoria Alexandria Maria Louisa Stuart-Wortley was born April 27, 1837 into an aristocratic family both sides of which could claim generations of minor nobility behind them.² Her early life was marked by the fact that one of her godmothers became Queen Victoria five days after her baptismal ceremony. Her father died when Victoria was seven years

2 Victoria, Lady Welby

old, and so the most important influence on her childhood was her mother, Lady Emmeline Stuart-Wortley.³ Lady Emmeline was a writer of poems, plays, and travel narratives. Her prodigious output (“29 books of poetry, travel, and drama between 1833 and her death at the age of 49 in 1855”)⁴ is all the more remarkable for her having spent many of those years in arduous travel.

Victoria suffered from ill health in childhood, including a bout of scarlet fever, and her “weakened constitution” was deemed an appropriate reason to educate her privately at home. But, curiously, it was also deemed an appropriate reason for Victoria to accompany her mother on her travels, which after the death of Victoria’s father had become Lady Emmeline’s obsession.⁵

Thus at age 12, Victoria accompanied her mother on a long journey to North and South America, and produced her first book from the experience. *A Young Traveller’s Journal of a Tour in North and South America During the Year 1850* was written for other twelve-year-olds and illustrated with engravings made from Victoria’s sketches of such scenes as Niagara Falls and a southern cotton plantation. Appearing in 1852, the book is enthusiastic, charming, and naive, praising, for example, the cleanliness and evident happiness of the plantation slaves and their children. Yet in this can be seen seeds of what became Victoria’s habitual independence of mind, for on the issue of slavery she was willing to set her own observations against prevailing establishment opinion in England. In fact, Paul Chipchase calls the book “a little masterpiece of fresh observation”⁶ – but his examples are of natural phenomena.

They were indefatigable tourists, gathering sights and sounds voraciously. In the northeast alone Victoria records visits to Albany, Niagara Falls, the Navy Yard, Cambridge Observatory, Faneuil Hall, the Athenaeum, the Custom House, the State House, notes seeing Chantrey’s “Washington” and Hiram Powers’ “The Greek Slave,” the latter sculpture one of the most famous artworks of its time. She also was treated to audiences with numbers of illustrious Americans, including Prof. Agassiz, Daniel Webster, and President Zachary Taylor (it was his plantation the pair visited after their meeting with him in Washington). Thus it went from New York to New Orleans, Vera Cruz to Havana, Panama to Peru.⁷

Within a year of their return to England, Emmeline and Victoria made a tour of the Iberian peninsula, taking in Morocco in the process; 1853 found them travelling through northern Europe. From January to October, 1855, they toured the Middle East, the journey ending with

the death of Lady Emmeline – of dysentery and the effects of a leg broken earlier on the trip – in the desert. She died after the pair were abandoned by their escorts, and Victoria, also suffering fever, had to wait for help from Beirut.⁸

Thus orphaned, Victoria lived with various relatives and was also taken in by the Queen, becoming, in 1861, Maid of Honor to the court. While she later wrote disparagingly of the aridity of intellectual life in London,⁹ she did in the two years before her marriage encounter many of the great political figures of the time, who, according to her daughter and biographer, would “devote a thoughtful attention to her unorthodox views on foreign – above all American – policy.”¹⁰

In 1863, Victoria married Sir William Earle Welby, who after his father’s death in 1875 took the additional surname Gregory. Victoria published under the name Hon. Lady Victoria Welby-Gregory until 1890, then as Hon. Lady Welby, and from 1893 on as Victoria Welby, sometimes V. Welby.¹¹ Sir William died in 1898. Of their three children, two survived to adulthood: Sir Charles Glynn Earle Welby (1865–1938), from whom present members of the Welby family are descended, and Emmeline Mary Elizabeth (“Nina”) (1867–1955), who published two collections of her mother’s letters as well as poetry, history, and translation under the name Mrs. Henry Cust.¹²

Upon her son’s marriage in 1887, Victoria lost the use of the title, Lady, with her first name, that right passing to her new daughter-in-law, and became Victoria, Lady Welby. She frequently corrected correspondents’ understandable confusion over her proper title, explaining to Peirce in 1903:

. . . May I confess that in signing my book “V. Welby” I hoped to get rid as far as possible of the irrelevant associations of my unlucky title? I am called “V. Lady Welby” merely to distinguish me from my son’s wife, now Lady Welby; which is a custom of ours. Thus I have no right to be called Lady Victoria Welby. . . . You will understand my desire to be known as simply as possible though I cannot altogether ignore the “Hon.” conferred upon me as Maid of Honour to the late Queen. But the only honour I value is that of being treated by workers as a serious worker.¹³

Victoria Welby’s first book published in adulthood was *Links and Clues* (1881), a collection of 104 meditations and interpretive essays on religious ideas and language. The book was not well received,

although a second edition was published in 1883. But responses to the book greatly widened the circle of people who corresponded with Welby and visited her at Denton Manor. She settled into working habits during this period which she followed to the end of her life. These included writing brief essays which she then had printed and circulated to friends and acquaintances, soliciting responses. She would then enter into sometimes lengthy discussions by mail, and occasionally held small seminars at her home. Frequently she had copies made of letters from one correspondent which she would send to another in hopes of getting the two to engage in direct discussion. It was in this way that she tried, evidently unsuccessfully, to bring C. S. Peirce and Bertrand Russell together by mail.¹⁴ She thus worked as an intellectual clearing house, trying to bring together “serious workers” from disparate fields.

Notable scientists, theologians, clergy, religious sceptics, linguists, architects, philosophers, visionaries, and outright cranks entered in at one time or another. The resulting collection of letters alone occupies some eight and a half feet of shelf space in the Welby Archive at York University, Ontario, Canada. In a cursory browse of the list of 461 correspondents represented in that collection, the eye picks out such names as J. M. Barrie, Paul Carus, Francis Galton, Patrick Geddes, J. S. Haldane, Hughlings Jackson, Henry James, William James, Benjamin Jowett, Lord Kelvin, Andrew Lang, Max Muller, C. K. Ogden, Christina Rossetti, Herbert Spencer, Nicola Tesla, and H. G. Wells.¹⁵

The two volumes of letters edited by Welby’s daughter, Nina Cust, reveal preoccupations with precision in theological and religious language, care in the use of metaphor to express “higher” reality, implications of scientific discovery for the human future, and methods of interpretation. While most of her early writing is devoted to religious and theological themes ranging from discussions of religious scepticism to apologetics, by at least 1890 Welby had become fully convinced that the key to solving the vexed questions of religious knowledge and faith and the effects of scientific knowledge on our understanding of human life and the cosmos was in the development of a viable framework of interpretation. In 1897 she published *Grains of Sense*, “Dedicated to the Misunderstood,” which makes the case for linguistic reform and the importance of early education in what she tentatively called “sensifics” but later named “significs” – the study of the highest level of linguistic meaning. During the same period she produced “Meaning and Metaphor” (1893) and “Sense, Meaning and Interpretation” (1896). Whereas *Grains of Sense*, which included allegory and brief excursions

into the interpretation of metaphors for thought and meaning, was apparently aimed at a literate general audience, the latter two essays appeared in journals more directed at professional scholars and present somewhat more systematically Welby's case for developing a science of interpretation.

During this decade Welby also produced, in addition to her numerous brief papers privately circulated, two collections of quotations from scientific and philosophic publications with her commentary illustrating carelessness and incoherence in language usage and the need for reform. The first of these compendia, titled *A Selection of Passages from "Mind" (January, 1876, to July, 1892), "Nature" (1870, and 1888 to 1892), "Natural Science" (1892), Bearing on Changes and Defects in the Significance of Terms and in the Theory and Practice of Logic*, appeared in 1893, marked "For Private Circulation Only." The second collection was *The Witness of Science to Linguistic Anarchy* (1898), and here again the writing of professional scientists is held up to detailed and disapproving scrutiny.

In 1903 appeared *What is Meaning?*, the work on interpretation which brought her to the attention of C. S. Peirce and certainly her most important work philosophically. Her final book was *Significs and Language* (1911). Victoria Welby died March 19, 1912.

III. PHILOSOPHY

1. *Beginnings of a Philosophy of Interpretation*

Welby's writings during the 1880s and '90s repeat three themes: first, that the physical evidence sufficient to test scientific hypotheses is only the lowest kind of knowledge human beings require for an adequate understanding of reality; second, that all knowledge whatsoever is based upon acts of interpretation; and third, that interpretation happens at distinct levels, with the highest revealing the ultimate significance of ideas in their widest possible context. Coupled with these themes is the linguistic principle that metaphor is unavoidable in the adequate expression of meaning, but the use of any metaphor must be closely connected to the literal import of its words if it is not to be misleading, ambiguous, or just silly. Welby developed these themes and the principle of metaphor through hundreds of letters, numerous one – to two – page papers interpreting scriptural texts or religious ideas, and several essays specifically

on interpretation. Her exchange with the agnostic Lucy Clifford is typical of her approach to matters of proof and evidence.

Clifford had written, sometime between 1882 and 1885:

We start from such different standpoints, you and I . . . I feel that we know nothing, have evidence of nothing. Of all the vanished millions, could never one have given some hint of the secret in Heaven – if Heaven there be – or earth; of life that had been or life that would be, if secret there is?¹⁶

Welby replied:

What is greatness? What is goodness? What is affection? Are they real in the sense of being worth believing in, reverencing, and living for? Take intellectual or moral greatness, where is the outside evidence? Can a surveyor or civil engineer measure or weigh it? . . . I'll give you outside evidence of my "light beyond" and "nucleatic life" (a million times more delicate in grain and powerful in ray-force than any sense-known vibration, a million magnitudes beyond any microscope our eyes could use) when you give me substantial proof (such as we hang criminals by) of there being any such thing as good at all in your sense – worth striving for, because real, as well as altogether lovely and desirable. Take affection: your love for your child. What real evidence can you give me of it? The actress can give me all its outward signs; and if you appeal to life-long acts of devotion, how do I know the motive is what you say it is? It might only be the old selfishness in a new form or a mere animal instinct. . . . [sic] But more. Even if you prove your love, how can you prove that the object of love is not a mere figment of your thought, but real and worthy? What is ultimate – outside or inside, outward or inward? Is not all we know like layers of husk – outside in relation to one thing, inside to another? When you say to me "there's no proof of anything you say, it's all your fancy," may I not say "and there's no proof of there really being anything to prove it to" – no proof that the very idea of proof at all does not rest upon a fallacy (a survival of the days when a persistent Ego was postulated or assumed) and will not soon itself become an exploded superstition or obsolete fancy? . . . [sic] Of course we are far apart. I rejoice to know it. That is why we need each other.¹⁷

Welby over and over insists on distinctions between the level of literal language and the level of "sense," which she characterizes as the true

meaning of an expression. It is not too much to claim that elucidating the sense of “sense” was – intellectually, at least – her life’s work.

In *Links and Clues* she identifies four levels of scriptural interpretation, vastly different in results, given the aim that

we are looking therein for the word of God; for the highest, the deepest and purest, in one word, the most Divine truth we can bear . . . we must ask ourselves also, *Do we want to know what the Bible says only, or what it means?* . . . Do we want to know what is eternally true, and what true of certain ages and races – “temporally” true; what the Holy Scriptures would say equally and in the same terms if written now, or 2000 years hence, and what they said at certain times, and to certain people, and in certain circumstances?¹⁸

The first level is the literal, which leads to “utter shipwreck” because of the large number of clearly metaphorical texts. “Well may He say that the letter killeth; by contracting, and by deadly work of disunion, leading astray and hiding truth.”¹⁹

Next, “the equal, the level,” for example, treating all passages in the Old Testament as being on one level, and all in the New Testament as being similarly on their own level.

The principle of the higher and lower requires no Scripture broken; it requires only our Lord’s own rule of interpreting and expanding the lower by the higher, the lesser by the larger, that which “hath been said” by the greater truth which includes, and thus supercedes and replaces it.²⁰

Thirdly, context. Welby comments that considering context brings us to “truer and more wholesome ground,” but notes the difficulty of knowing “where we are to draw the line in interpreting by context; where the context ends, and where we ought rather to search for parallels.”²¹

The fourth level is the “tendency of the whole, taken as a whole.”²² But this interpretive stance leads us back to the principle of the higher and lower, because we go astray if we neglect the relationship of a “whole” to other wholes, i.e., other texts which bear on its meaning. So in the end, Welby argues, it is the principle of higher and lower which is the true principle of Biblical interpretation.

The application of this principle involves, first, asking whether a

passage or test is “attainable by man” without any special divine illumination, i.e., if it is really an expression of some merely human insight, not necessarily dependent on any higher truth. The higher, she says, is that which is “beyond and above any natural religion or standard.”²³ Second, the interpreter uses the higher thus identified “as a test and interpretation for all the rest.” Too slavish a fixation upon the literal errs by letting “the written letter of the Word interpret for us the living glory of the Logos.”²⁴

In other contexts, though, Welby is quite interested in the literal level of language. In *Grains of Sense* she argues against the claim (of Huxley and others) that the meanings of words can be quite arbitrarily assigned, so long as a writer is consistent in ensuring that meanings are “rigidly attached” to their words. “. . . [A]s if it was possible to secure such rigid attachment, especially in the very cases where perfect fitness is most needed,” Welby sniffed.²⁵ On the same ground she attacked Lewis Carroll, “a prince of humourists,” for failing “to see that such a practice [of arbitrary stipulations], become common, would strike at the heart of humour itself: and should also overlook the tremendous part that associations called up by terms and phrases play in the effect of his Wonderland books.”²⁶ Right use of language depends, Welby holds, on expanding our awareness of associative possibilities of language, dependent though they may be on a range of literal meanings. Unlike many linguistic reformers, Welby wants more expressiveness, more thoughtful metaphor in language, not more literalness and arbitrary stipulation definition. “[W]e want a much larger proportion of meaning to expression,” she says: “Then we may hope for a larger proportion of sense to meaning, and of significance to sense, bringing out untold treasures now buried in dumbness and, as we are, unspeakable.”²⁷

Welby proposes – over and over in different forums – that the study of sense, meaning, and significance should be systematized, built into a discipline, and taught to the young. “The Thinker was once called the Seer, or the Magician and the Wizard, then the Prophet, then the Philosopher, then the Mystic; whereas now he is proud to be called the Critic. Let us hope that in the future he will be called the Interpreter or the Translator, and that there will be ‘chairs of interpretation.’”²⁸ She comments that while experts have claimed that human eyes and ears could be trained to much higher acuity than is common, “that would be useless without a corresponding rise in the power to interpret, to express clearly and fully what we perceived and inferred.”²⁹ The name she proposes in *Grains of Sense* for this new science is

“sensifics” (though she later settled on “significs” for her philosophy of interpretation).

One largely sympathetic reviewer of *Grains of Sense* complained that some of Welby’s examples were strained, but proceeded to reveal in his very criticism that he had missed the message: “. . . we cannot regard the criticism of the title of ‘The Descent of Man’ as anything else than a piece of quibbling. The word ‘descent’ is not a metaphor but the description of an actual fact, and should not be contrasted with ‘ascent,’ which has a moral and theological connotation quite foreign to the objective spirit and purpose of Darwin’s inquiry.”³⁰ Welby takes lavish pains to show that it is precisely words like “descent” as used by scientists which *are* metaphors and require thoughtful reflection and careful interpretation if they are not to obscure their author’s meanings.

In her *Monist* essay of 1893 Welby argues for an awareness of figurative language which will clarify particular usages:

[W]e might begin by learning better what part symbolism plays in the rituals of expression, and ask ourselves what else is language itself but symbolism, and what it symbolizes. We should then examine anew the relations of the “symbolic” to the “real”; of image, figure, metaphor, to what we call literal or actual. For this concerns us all. Imagery runs in and out, so to speak, from the symbolic to the real world and back again.³¹

But the very terms “metaphorical” and “literal” are chaotically ambiguous, Welby says, and much misunderstanding in modern culture comes from our mistakenly “postulating an absolute Plain Meaning to be thought of, as it were, in capital letters. We have been virtually assuming that our hearers and readers all share the same mental background and atmosphere.”³² We further assume, she says, that we have clear agreement upon the application of the distinction between the figurative and the literal, so that “we may safely play upon all the chords of imagery, reserving without difficulty for serious use a body of terms which are direct expressions of ‘fact.’ . . . [T]his is precisely one of the most dangerous of presuppositions.”³³

Fully to understand the workings of figurative language requires attention to the denotative function of a particular usage – as a starting point. But it also requires, Welby proposes, awareness of the fact that such language can bring forward meanings from a realm of reality inaccessible to the merely literal. There is a superficial tension in her writing

of this period. On the one hand, she insists that we have lost control of our language and must regain it if we are to progress scientifically and philosophically; on the other hand she treats language almost as an organism with its own history and rules of natural selection. It may be, she says, the “the ordinary modern metaphor like the ordinary modern analogy is a mere rhetorical device,” yet some figurative usage are ancient and “hail from an altogether deeper and more authentic source.” The tension is resolved by recognizing that the needed control of language is not through an arbitrary power over expression, but thoughtful awareness of the expressive powers inherent in language itself.

Some of her own flights of metaphor are aimed at correcting the overuse of earthbound foundation and basis metaphors and raising the awareness of Copernican imagery of solar focus and orbit:

. . . it is conceivable that some [images] may be found to belong to that as yet mysterious energy on which natural selection plays and of which variation is the outcome or the sign. What we find in language may thus be, as it were, not merely the “scarred and weather-worn” remnant of geologic strata but sometimes the meteorite, the calcined fragment of earlier worlds of correspondence, ultra-earthly, cosmical.³⁴

She proposes that we must try the experiment of investigating the “grades of validity in metaphor and analogy in modern science” in an effort to “have recognized clearly the powerful though hidden effects upon us of organized mental picture brought in surreptitiously with verbal imagery, or by comparison; . . .”³⁵

Thus it will not do to treat figurative language as the free creation of the writer who can invent without scruple or limit any terminology desired. We will not know until we have tried the experiment of investigating hidden sources of metaphor in our language whether it will be worth the effort, but we are at the mercy of language if we do not try. “For after all, whether we like it or no, we *are* heliocentric; the world and all that is in it is cosmically generated.”³⁶ Finally, she argues, the great aim of linguistic study is enhanced significance, both in the sense that language will be richer, more significant as a result of such study, and in the sense that life itself will be more valuable, more significant to us:

. . . *meaning* – in the widest sense of the word – is the only value of whatever “fact” presents itself to us. Without this, to observe and

record appearances or occurrences would become a worse than wasteful task. Significance is the one value of all that consciousness brings, or that intelligence deals with; the one value of life itself. . . . To “signify” is the one test of the important. The significant is alone worth notice.³⁷

The realities we try to express, as well as language itself, impose limits on our powers of expression. Language usage is not arbitrary, Welby says; control of language means being mindful of the deep connections of language to thought and of thought to the world. She has a theological conception in mind when she explores the sources of significance:

A “fact” in itself as evident to the senses, *apart from its meaning and effect, from what it conveys and manifests to intelligence*, is like – the black marks upon this paper, or the noises made in speaking. But there is an undying reality which is conveyed alike through sounds, black marks, etc., or events; through the acts of an individual equally with the narration of such acts, *and most of all, with the conception of them*. That reality, that substance, that precious and eternal treasure, is the Meaning, the Object, the Gist of all we know as fact; timeless, spaceless, yet energetic, creative, fruitful. *This* is the reality of revelation spiritual and material, – and more, Divinely Natural; this is the reality of the Divine in the Human proclaimed through incarnation; the heavenly in the earthly, the holy and wholesome nature in both.³⁸

This ontological realism applied to language also shows up in her queer little allegory, “A Royal Slave” (1897), in which a convention is held of “Sign and Speech in grand array, with Talk, Scribble, a crowd of little Letters and Syllables arranged in groups, a few Colons and Commas curling and dotting gaily about, and a pompous Full Stop . . .” The Slave is Man, and the meeting is to give new orders (e.g., “you are to say ‘phenomenal’ when you mean ‘exceptional’”), all intended to keep the Slave in a perpetual state of confusion. For as Language says, “We must stand none of his nonsense, but all take care to be as ambiguous as we can, and see that he is well confused; or he will be getting some clear ideas of his own and some notion of his own power: and where should we be then?”³⁹

Despite the whimsical approach to the problem of the control of meaning in that ephemeral piece, Welby regarded the problem as the

deepest facing humanity, and she did not see solutions in any of the commonly recommended remedies. For example, we gain little by carefully setting out fixed definitions of terms, as all the logic textbooks recommended:

But surely we forget that in the first place, this is often precisely the most impossible thing to do; as a fixed meaning, the same for all, unaffected by context of any kind, applies only, if at all, to a small proportion of ordinary words: and secondly, that to define every word which needs it would at once render all important works simply unreadable.⁴⁰

Definition is no panacea, she goes on, because thus exalted it would hinder the evolution of language and thus its ability to express “changes in the psychological atmosphere.” Moreover, the problems of significance are prior to those of definition.⁴¹

In the essay just quoted, Welby proposes a classification of different meaning-terms: “Signification” refers to “the value of language itself”; “import” to the “intellectual character of the logical process.” The former is the purview of philology, the latter of logic. Next comes “sense,” which she connects to physical science.

[T]hree main current senses of the word should be borne in mind. There must certainly be some “sense” both as meaning and as judgment in observation and experiment to give them any value whatever . . . But in another “sense” Sense is the inevitable starting-point and ultimate test of scientific generalization . . .⁴²

Asking whether these three senses of “sense” might be accidental or revelatory of a deeper connection, she cites philological evidence for the latter alternative and then comments that “the word seems to give us the link between the sensory, the sensible and the significant: there is apparently a real connection between the ‘sense’ – say of sight – in which we react to stimulus, and the ‘sense’ in which we speak or act.”⁴³ Finally, “significance” carries connotations of importance or value. Something has significance “because it demands serious attention and, it may be, decisive action: or because it must modify more or less profoundly our mental attitude towards the nations or races affected by it, and towards the problems called social.”⁴⁴ Significance is in the purview of philosophy, poetry, and religion. All together, these make up the scope

of meaning (or intent, as she often parenthetically calls it). This outline and terminology is connected to fields of study; when she later regularizes her terms, the final structure is a hierarchy of interpretive functions (see below).

What she wants to argue in “Sense, Meaning and Interpretation” is her familiar thesis that scientific and philosophical writers are paying too little attention to the needs of interpretation, ignoring the conditions of meaning, and that the great need is for systematic study of meaning – i.e., signification, import, sense, and significance – and its incorporation in education.⁴⁵ Her most fully developed attempt to initiate this new study, apart from her extensive correspondence, was her book, *What Is Meaning?*.

2. *The Science of Significs*

Welby’s major philosophic work opens with a reiteration of the thesis of “Sense, Meaning and Interpretation,” but sets out the aspects of meaning in a somewhat different (and clearer) structure: “Only those trained from the first to detect (1) the sense, (2) the meaning, and (3) the significance, – that is the tendency, the intention, and the essential interest of what is brought before their notice, – can hope to emerge from the present bondage to the plausible.”⁴⁶ This triad forms the basic hierarchy of the movements of the understanding in interpretation (or, as she sometimes calls it, translation). Our whole mental life consists of translations or interpretations of the basic “facts” which are present to us (and even facts are interpreted before they can signify anything), and these interpretations take place in the three ways named in the triad.

Sense, meaning, and significance “may also be put as signification, intention, and ideal value. From this point of view, the reference of sense is mainly instinctive, of meaning volitional, and of significance moral; . . . Significs emphasises the relation of the sign in the widest sense to each of these, recognizing that there is here an ascending grade of practical importance.”⁴⁷ This structure now more clearly shows why merely careful definition will not solve the expressive problems Welby so lavishly pointed out in her collections of bad examples: definition only deals with the lowest level of understanding, the denotations of terms.

At that first level, sense, we attend to the possibilities of signification; but there is, Welby says, “strictly speaking, no such thing as the Sense of a word, but only the sense in which it is used – the circum-

stances, state of mind, reference, 'universe of discourse,' belonging to it."⁴⁸ This leads to the second level, intention or meaning, which reveals the speaker's or writer's expressive aim, to which later analysts of the pragmatics of language such as Wittgenstein and Austin were to devote so much fruitful attention.

We must understand the use (i.e., intention) because no expression can be understood properly outside its context of utterance. It is at this level that metaphor and analogy are to be understood, essentially as modifications of the sense possibilities (significations) of the terms which make them up. Context awareness is essential because meaning is not static; it is not static because linguistic signs are essentially translations, i.e., intermediaries, of world to mind, and the interrelationship of mind and world is always in flux.⁴⁹ Otherwise, we could not explain psychological progress from the primitive to the civilized.⁵⁰ At the same time, Welby frequently calls for closer connection between analogical and metaphorical usage to the sense (denotation) of the words used.

The third level of understanding is significance, the largest possible context in which we apprehend a sign:

The Significance is always manifold, and intensifies its sense as well as its meaning, by expressing its importance, its appeal to us, its emotional force, its ideal value, its moral aspect, its universal or at least social range.⁵¹

Analysis of significance, then, reveals why the content of a sign *matters*:

All science, all logic, all philosophy, the whole controversy about aesthetics, about ethics, about religion, ultimately concentrate upon this: What is the sense of, What do we mean by, What is the significance of, that is, Why do we care for, Beauty, Truth, Goodness? Why do we value experience? And why do we seek for Significance, and resume the value of innumerable observed facts under formulae of significance like gravitation or natural selection? Because we are the Expression of the world, as it were "expressed from" it by the commanding or insistent pressure of natural stimuli not yet understood.⁵²

It will not be out of place here to note that Welby's orientation to the idea of sensed "facts" – her valuable awareness that understanding

does not start with correct apprehension of a world of fixed “meanings” – made her a most appropriate correspondent of William James and the English pragmatist, F. C. S. Schiller, whom she knew personally (not to mention the famous correspondence with Charles Sanders Peirce, virtually the only thing Welby is known for – to the extent that she is known – in the United States). In 1900 she wrote to Schiller, “I have studied and noted almost every line Professor James has written; . . .” and although she was strongly critical of the idea of forced choice in James’s “The Will to Believe” (“For there must always be, in these cases, a third alternative. . . . [W]e suffer not only from myopia but also from diplopia in mental vision”),⁵³ she also wrote to James in 1905 that “Indeed, I am really an aboriginal pragmatist . . . We greatly need the distinction between (1) rigid and plastic, (2) static and dynamic – ‘truth.’ Things are just as real, and their account in symbol just as true (or untrue) in the one case as in the other.”⁵⁴

Welby borrowed her use of the term “diplopia” from the psychologist Hughlings Jackson and applied it, in good pragmatic form, to a critique of simple-minded dualism. She writes, for example (in an unfortunately unpublished letter), that the idea of darkness (evil) as the “background necessary to make the glory visible” must really be understood dialectically (although she does not use this word):

Are we not to learn that this radical dualism also is a question of stage in onward movement, and the condition of instead of the obstacle to, an ensuing synthesis? May it not depend in some true sense on that intellectual *diplopia* which should naturally develop into a higher type of vision called binocular; that our restlessness of thought, our persistent and deepening discontent under final dualisms, that increasing hunger for unity at any price which even tempts us to premature “reconciliations”, may be due to this undercurrent of predictive instinct, constantly fed by the revelation of continuity which science on all sides brings us?⁵⁵

Interpretation likewise proceeds in stages, each one recapitulating and bringing forward the previous. The levels, sense, meaning, significance, are thus rather to be thought of as movements to ever more adequate, less limited and limiting, understanding.⁵⁶ Welby several times applies her favorite analogy to the interpretive process, comparing the three levels of interpretation to the planetary, the solar, and the cosmical. While all “‘planetary’ knowledge is directly acquired . . .,” and “We are in full ‘touch’ with the world we inhabit,” knowledge at the higher

levels is increasingly inferential. Yet it is at those levels that we become conscious of the fuller contexts in which anything that has importance to us, fits into our scheme of life.⁵⁷

A developed theoretical understanding of analogy through applied signification is needed for the advance of scientific knowledge, Welby argues, because analogical thinking is at the core of any understanding and behind any attempt to communicate. Analogy is indeed “the only method we have for most of our mental work . . .”⁵⁸ Words *can* denote because we are able to perceive likenesses among the objects denoted. But considerable confusion results from our conflating different kinds of likeness. Welby gives the following classification: Casual likeness, where comparison is only “in one point, in one context, on one occasion, to one audience, etc.”; “General likeness of the whole, with unlikeness of constituents”; “Likeness in all but one point or feature”; “Valid analogy ringing true in character throughout”; “Equivalence”; and “Correspondence in each point and in mass or whole.”⁵⁹ The further significance of such study is to be seen in the fact that analogy is the “primary presupposition” in the communication of thought, “*i.e.*, the likeness between our reader’s mind and our own.”⁶⁰

Analogy and metaphor are unavoidable in expression, and indeed, a purely literal language, were it possible, would be so limiting to thought we could never communicate or even think the full range of possibilities inherent in the human interaction with the world. Likewise, linguistic ambiguity is unavoidable, and for the same reason that meaning is determined not merely by definition but also by use (the context, etc. of utterance). The issue is not elimination of these polysemic possibilities, but their proper control in thoughtful language use.

This possibility of control, of a self-conscious language mindful of the expressive powers of its terms, Welby found unaccountably ignored in works on language. She comments in her last book, *Signification and Language*, on her amazement at the absence in language studies of any sense that language is a practical tool for human development:

The writers one and all treated language, not as you would treat muscle, as a means of work to be brought under the most minute, elaborate and unfailing functional control, but as you might treat some distant constellation in space and its, to us, mysterious movements. . . . It does not seem to have dawned upon any one, either specialist or “lay,” what a tremendous absurdity all this way of regarding language involves.⁶¹

The science of significs, the systematic study of significance, is intended ultimately to remedy this bizarre treatment of language as a distant constellation and restore the indispensable instrument of interaction with the world. The fruits of such a restoration, Welby held, were to be a new access to truth and reality:

Truth is not innately mysterious. So far from trying to baffle us in order to enhance its command of us . . . , Reality throws wide her blessed arms, opens wide all ways and paths which lead to her very heart, the heart of the Real. She asks only that the word of the enigma shall become a fitting word: that the expression of Man who is to *be* her expression shall be worthily “incarnated”: that what is the very life-blood of man’s thinking shall be enriched by purification: that in such a Word, while wealth of connotation and association may be boundless, a confusing or impoverishing ambiguity shall be reckoned as intellectual disgrace, as spiritual anathema.⁶²

IV. OTHER INTELLECTUAL INTERESTS

While Lady Welby’s philosophic work began with the perception that the language of the religious orthodoxy current in her time was inadequate to express precisely enough (and suggestively enough) the deep truths of human spiritual life, and while she occupied herself for roughly thirty years working out the foundations of a theory of interpretation – and in enlisting others in that work – to reform both religious and scientific language, her correspondence and a number of papers she published are evidence of a broader range of interests than this discussion has so far indicated. Even so, her papers on folklore and mental evolution, on eugenics, and on the philosophy of time, all have at their focus issues of interpretation.

In her 1891 paper delivered to the International Folk-Lore Congress, Welby reviews trends in ethnological interpretation of aboriginal religion, arguing that there was at the time a salutary new willingness to understand primitive experience on its own merits, replacing the arrogant stance of civilized superiority common to missionary journals and travellers’ tales. The leading idea in this new ethnology that she finds congenial to her own understanding of human mental evolution is that of “continuity in link between all things at all times and in all places, continuity

both simultaneous and successive; the repudiation of all unfathomable gulfs except in the one sense of distinction, not division; . . .”⁶³ Both as content of primitive ontology and as understanding of human social evolution, this awareness of continuity, Welby believes, can be a corrective to the analytical habits of civilized ontology, and may possibly generate a further advance in human understanding of the world:

[T]he frank acceptance of ties with the most humble or despised of nature’s forms and conditions of existence, . . . may surely prove, when we have learnt to assimilate it, the starting-point of an ascent so worthy and so fruitful of all good, that it is difficult to find a word with pure enough associations to define it with.⁶⁴

The guiding conception of continuity as a cosmological principle and the attendant denial of real division in the world also guided Welby’s treatment of “mental evolution” in two papers written around the same time as the one on folklore. Her thesis in both is that the primitive belief in ghosts is incorrectly understood as a distorted world picture, because that would suppose that primitive societies had somehow adopted a world view which could not be adapted to facts of nature necessary for survival. Two alternative interpretations are, first, to “suppose an absolute break and reversal in the evolution in mind, wherein a permanently distorted picture of the universe is created, and the real and significant suddenly abdicates in favour of the baseless and unmeaning”; and, second, “to ask whether there is some reality answering to these crude conceptions, which thus form part of a continuous mental development, and may be described as faulty *translation* . . .”⁶⁵ On the principle of continuity, Welby regards the former alternative as incoherent.⁶⁶

Welby’s interest in the work of Francis Galton on eugenics produced two brief notices in 1904 and 1905 presented at meetings where Galton spoke. She had no evident interest in the technicalities of the discussion, but offered a perspective on the future of humanity; while the eugenics debate of the time centered upon proposed restrictions on marriages, Welby’s interest was in proposals which would make the most advantageous use of the latent powers in individuals – especially women – for the improvement of humanity. Women, Welby thought, express an “instinct of devotion” which displays itself in their role as mothers. But “a large proportion of civilised women find themselves from one or another cause debarred from this social service in the direct sense.”⁶⁷

Yet, she argues, "There is another kind of race-motherhood open to, and calling for, the intelligent recognition of and intelligent fulfillment by, all women." This is connected to "the specialised mental activities of women as distinguished from those of men," revealed in "the part primitively borne by women in the evolution of crafts and arts, including the important one of healing"; in the necessity "of their meeting physical coercion by the help of keen, penetrative, resourceful wits"; and finally their role "in the evolution of language."⁶⁸ While civilization tends to distort these powers by channelling them into trivial or bizarre pursuits (e.g., fortune-telling!), "We are . . . failing to enlist for true social service a natural reserve of intelligence."⁶⁹ Welby claims that she is not speaking only of the intellectual powers of biological women, noting "the common heritage of humanity which gives the man a certain motherhood and the woman a certain fatherhood of outlook, perhaps also in intellectual function,"⁷⁰ and also that "No mental function is entirely unrepresented on either side."⁷¹ Nevertheless, her proposal for the recovery of these mental powers which comfortable civilized life tends to allow to atrophy is that all *girls* should be trained "for the resumption of a lost power of race-motherhood which shall make for her own happiness and well-being, in using these for the benefit of humanity."⁷²

Welby's comments on this topic are brief and sketchy, hardly worth notice, except for their suggestiveness in showing how consistently she was concerned for the fate of humanity and believed that the function of education was to raise minds into their highest powers of discernment and expression. This consistent preoccupation apparently motivated Welby's excursion into the metaphysics of time, which she treated in two brief pieces. In "Time as Derivative" she argued that time can be defined (metaphorically) in terms of space, but space cannot be defined in terms of time; space is the prior concept. Time becomes thinkable through a process of translation "of diversity-*in*-position, through change-*of*-position, into succession."⁷³ Understanding time as an "original category," rather than as "*room for experience*" causes misunderstanding in debates over the meaning of claims about human immortality and has damaged our ability to understand the human future, because, she seems to think, such a reification of time leads to a fatalism at odds with our true freedom to control our destiny.⁷⁴

V. WELBY'S INFLUENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SIGNIFICS

In her lifetime it was primarily through her correspondence and friendships that Welby had her strongest influence. Many writers comment on the force of her personality, and her published letters are full of references to fruitful debate with a wide variety of thinkers. Yet, with a notable few exceptions, it is hard to trace a direct impact on other thinkers of her work. In the correspondence with Charles Peirce, for example, begun near the last decade of each of their lives, each thinker explains positions already arrived at and notes similarities (triadic concepts of meaning, for example), but there is little evidence that either led the other in any important new directions. Peirce in fact takes pains in one letter to Welby (March 14, 1909) to disclaim any influence on him of her triad, sense, meaning, significance:

I now find that my division nearly coincides with yours, as it ought to do exactly, if both are correct. I am not in the least conscious of having been at all influenced by your book in settling my trichotomy . . .⁷⁵

Yet a number of writers have worked out lines of development that connect Welby to all of the major movements in linguistic philosophy of the 20th century.⁷⁶ Influence tracing is a notoriously inexact historical pursuit, but two well-attested directions of signific thought are worth mentioning here. The first is in the work of Charles K. Ogden, who is best known for his co-authorship of *The Meaning of Meaning*. Ogden, a young Cambridge student, had stayed at Welby's home, and it was through her that he studied Peirce's semiotic theories, as she gave him access to Peirce's letters. After something of an apprenticeship with Welby, Ogden became an eager proponent of language study as including the psychological and sociological contexts of usage, i.e., the pragmatics of language, even though in *The Meaning of Meaning* he criticizes Welby's vagueness and lack of technical sophistication.⁷⁷

The second line of influence was through Welby's friendship with the politically radical Frederik Van Eeden. As Gerrit Mannoury points out, despite Van Eeden's extremely opposite social and political orientation from Welby's, the two felt a strong intellectual kinship, and it was through Van Eeden that significs became a movement in Holland. Moreover, Mannoury, himself one of the leaders of that movement, says, Van Eeden:

was not merely a talented and devoted disciple of Lady Welby but he added to her line of thought an element which was foreign to her work, namely, careful precision in the formulation of subtle distinctions and cautious deductions.⁷⁸

VI. CONCLUSION

Recent republication of Welby's two books on signifiacs along with a *Festschrift* celebrating the 150th anniversary of her birth⁷⁹ have made Welby's work on language accessible again after decades of neglect. Her daughter's two collections of correspondence are long out of print, and in any case are not well suited to the demands of scholars, since the chronologies are blurred and there is considerable elision. This is unfortunate because one chief aspect of Welby's value as a "serious worker," as she told Peirce she wanted to be known, transcends her intellectual work itself: her letters reveal an enthusiastic, questing personality devoted to bringing like minds together. In this she is the model of a life spent in the collaborative pursuit of the mind's best access to the true and the real.

NOTES

1. I am deeply grateful to James Newsome and Constance Holt of the College of St. Catherine Library, who with great dedication sought out and obtained copies of many of Welby's nearly inaccessible minor publications for this project. The staff at York University Archives and Special Collections, where Welby's correspondence and other papers are kept, also rendered valuable long distance assistance.
2. David Hughes, "Geneology of Victoria, Lady Welby," in H. Walter Schmitz (ed.), *Essays on Signifiacs*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 1990, pp. 3-13.
3. The most complete account of Welby's life and thought is the invaluable 200-page introduction to the reprint edition of her *Signifiacs and Language*: H. Walter Schmitz, "Victoria Lady Welby's Signifiacs: The Origin of the Signific Movement," *Signifiacs and Language*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publ. Co., 1985, pp. ix-ccvii. Schmitz also provides the most exhaustive bibliography of Welby's work available.
4. Paul Chipchase, "Some Account of the Literary Production of Lady Welby and her Family," in H. Walter Schmitz (ed.), *Essays on Signifiacs*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 1990, pp. 17-59.

5. Schmitz, "Victoria Lady Welby's Significs," p. xxii.
6. Chipchase, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
7. *A Young Traveller's Journal of a Tour in North and South America in the Year 1850*. London: T. Bosworth, 1852.
8. Schmitz, *op. cit.*, p. xxiii-xxiv.
9. *Ibid.*, p. xxvii.
10. Mrs. Henry Cust, *Wanderers: Episodes from the Travels of Lady Emmeline Stuart-Wortley and her Daughter Victoria, 1849-1855*. London: Jonathan Cape/New York: Coward-McCann, 1928. Quoted in Charles S. Hardwick (ed.), *Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977.
11. Schmitz, *loc. cit.*
12. *Ibid.*, p. xxviii.
13. Welby to Peirce, Dec. 22, 1903: Harwick, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
14. Welby to Peirce, Nov. 20, 1904: Hardwick, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
15. "Finding Aid" 1970, York University, Scott Library Archives and Special Collections; includes "Nominal List; Lady Victoria Welby Correspondence 1861-1912." Unpublished typescript.
16. Mrs. Henry Cust, *Echoes of Larger Life*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1929, p. 78. The letters in Cust's two collections (see bibliography) are not dated individually, but grouped thematically under large period headings; thus the exchange quoted here is from the period 1882-1885.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81. Marked ellipses original.
18. *Links and Clues*, p. 31.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
25. *Grains of Sense*. London: J. M. Dent and Co., 1897.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
30. "T. J. McC." [i.e., Thomas McCormack]. Review of *Grains of Sense*, in *The Open Court*: 11 (1897), p. 639.
31. "Meaning and Metaphor," *The Monist*: (1893), p. 511.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 512.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 514.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 523.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 524-525.
38. Quoted in Arnold, *Death - and Afterwards*. New York: New Amsterdam Publ. Co., 1897, p. 44. The passage is not attributed to Welby by name

- in the text but is included in Schmitz's bibliography; see "Victoria Lady Welby's Significs" in *Significs and Language*, p. ccxxvi.
39. "A Royal Slave," *The Fortnightly Review*, n.s. 62: 369 (1897), pp. 432-434.
 40. "Sense, Meaning and Interpretation," *Mind* N.S. 5: 17/18 (1896) Pt. II, p. 194.
 41. *Ibid.*
 42. *Ibid.*, Pt. I, p. 26.
 43. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
 44. *Ibid.*
 45. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
 46. *What is Meaning?*, p. 2.
 47. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.
 48. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
 49. *Ibid.*, pp. 126-127.
 50. In Ch. XXV of *What Is Meaning?* and in her earlier essay, "Is There a Break in Mental Evolution?" (1890) Welby takes up the question whether the modern mind's relationship to the world is totally discontinuous from the primitive, worrying that if it is, then both scientific and religious understandings in our day may have been severed from a real sense world more minutely apprehended, as Welby thought, by primitive peoples.
 51. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
 52. *Ibid.*
 53. Mrs. Henry Cust (ed.), *Other Dimensions*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1931.
 54. *Ibid.*, pp. 246-247.
 55. "A 'Letter' to the Author of 'An Agnostic's Apology' Feb. 23. 93." Unpublished manuscript in the York University archives; part of item no. 42 listed in the Finding Aid as "Records of Developing Thought," p. 8.
 56. *What is Meaning?*, p. 6.
 57. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
 58. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
 59. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.
 60. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
 61. *Significs and Language*. Reprint of 1911 ed. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publ. Co., 1985.
 62. *Ibid.*, pp. 92.
 63. "The Significance of Folk-Lore," in Joseph Jacobs and Alfred Nutt (ed.), *The International Folk-Lore Congress, 1891*. London: David Nutt, 1892.
 64. *Ibid.*
 65. "Is There a Break in Mental Evolution?" *British Association for the Advancement of Science*: 60 (1890), p. 973.
 66. Cf. "An Apparent Paradox in Mental Evolution," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*: 20 (May, 1891), pp. 304-329.
 67. "From V. Lady Welby," *Sociological Papers I* (1904). London: Macmillan, 1905.
 68. *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.
 69. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

- 70. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
- 71. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
- 72. *Ibid.*
- 73. "Time as Derivative," *Mind*: XVI (1907), p. 395.
- 74. "Mr. McTaggart on the 'Unreality of Time'," *Mind*, N.S.: XVIII (1909), pp. 326–328.
- 75. *Semiotic and Significs*, p. 109.
- 76. See, in the References, Schmitz's introduction to the reprint edition of *Significs and Language*; Nolan, "Anticipatory Themes in the Writings of Lady Welby"; Gordon, "Significs and C. K. Ogden: The Influence of Lady Welby"; and Mannouri, "A Concise History of Significs."
- 77. C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1923.
- 78. G. Mannoury, "A Concise History of Significs," in the reprint ed. of Welby, *What is Meaning?*, p. xl.
- 79. H. Walter Schmitz (ed.), *Essays on Significs*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publ. Co., 1990.

2. E. E. Constance Jones (1848–1922)

MARY ELLEN WAITHE and SAMANTHA CICERO

I. BIOGRAPHY

Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones was born in Wales in 1848. She was the oldest of ten children of a family of landed gentry. Her father was squire of the parish of Llangarron, in Herefordshire England. She grew up in a large house filled with maids and governesses. Jones' family lived, during her early teenage years (from 1861–1864) near a town about thirty miles outside Capetown South Africa. There she learned German and read Schiller and Goethe, learned French and read Voltaire, Moliere, Racine, and Corneille. She developed a taste for languages, literature, music, and mathematics. She says in her autobiography, *As I Remember*, that when she returned from South Africa:

I had the use of my mind. I knew how to learn, though not what to learn. It was partly at school, and from an Essay Society to which I belonged afterwards, and a Moral Science undergraduate acquaintance, but principally at College, that I learnt what to learn, or rather, what there was to learn.¹

Upon the family's return to England Constance was enrolled for about a year in a ladies' boarding school in Cheltenham. There her language studies and arithmetic were continued and supplemented with Italian. Constance was about 19 years of age when her schooling was considered to be completed. Years at home followed. A young man who was a friend or her brother and an undergraduate at Cambridge introduced her to Fawcett's *Manual of Political Economy*, stimulating her interest in moral philosophy. Constance later borrowed Mill's *Logic* from the boy's mother.²

It is to this early introduction to "Moral Science" that Jones attrib-

utes her eventual decision to pursue the Moral Science Tripos at Girton College, Cambridge. That course of study included moral and political philosophy, “mental philosophy” (psychology, metaphysics and epistemology) logic, and political economics.³ She studied under Henry Sidgwick, James Ward and John Neville Keynes. Jones’ university education was financed with some difficulty by her paternal aunt, “Mrs. Collins” who had long supported the idea of her niece receiving a higher education. Girton College was selected because it “was the only Woman’s College that we knew of at that time.”⁴ Jones began at Cambridge in October, 1875, however, despite her family’s rather advantageous circumstances, theirs was a large family, and apparently the educations of her younger brothers had priority over Constance’s own. The result was that she missed several terms, at significant detriment to her professional advancement.

Nevertheless, her reputation was substantial so that on Ward’s and Sidgwick’s recommendation she was given the opportunity to complete the half-finished translation by Elizabeth Hamilton of Hermann Lotze’s *Mikrokosmos*.⁵ The work saw four editions in Jones’ lifetime, and its first publication was given advance notice by Bernard Bosanquet in the preface to his translation of Lotze’s *Metaphysics* and *Logic*. Jones completed her studies at Girton in 1880 with a Class 1 pass in her examinations.

Four years later, in 1884, Jones was invited to return to Cambridge as Lecturer in logic at Girton College. During this period, her interests turned toward what would come to be known as analytic philosophy. She compiled her lecture notes that would much later become her *Primer of Logic*, an elementary logic text, published in 1905.⁶ Her development of her view of categorical propositions however, had begun during the late 1880’s, was completed in 1889, and published the following year as *Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions*. In it, she develops the idea that if the law of identity is a significant assertion it must be an assertion of, as she calls it, “Denomination in Diversity of Determination.” Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones appears to have been very modest about the important idea she originated. Jones’ discovery drew powerful praise from her colleagues Stout and Schiller for its importance to the field of logic and for its originality. It would influence Bradley to modify his own view of identity, and be adopted by Keynes. However, once her theory was presented as his own by a recently graduated Cambridge student, Bertrand Russell, it was some time until anyone pointed out that his views had not only been anticipated by Frege (whom

he acknowledged), but by originally by Jones (whom he did not acknowledge). The remainder of Jones' professional life was spent refining her idea, and re-issuing gentle reminders that her development of the law of identity as the law of significant assertion historically preceded and is logically prior to the sense-reference distinction of Frege and the nearly analogous distinction that Russell makes between the meaning of a term and its extension. Referring in 1910 to her 1890 and subsequent works:

I reached what I think are interesting and enlightening results (in apparent accordance with Frege, whose view seems to be endorsed by Mr. Bertrand Russell), and Professor G. F. Stout, by whom this logical adventure of mine was approved and befriended, has now, I think, reached a true solution and with a clearness of statement which leaves nothing to be desired, has steered the labouring barque of the proposition into smooth waters. (See his lecture on *The Nature of Universals and Propositions*, December, 1921.)⁷

The modest Miss Jones, who had formulated what others including giants in philosophy like Schiller and Stout recognized as an axiom of logic, volunteered for the difficult-to-fill position of Librarian at Girton from 1890 to 1893, and attended McTaggart's Hegel lectures at Cambridge. Vacations were spent travelling to Bologna and Heidelberg for philosophy conferences. Her appointment as Vice-Mistress of Girton came in 1896, and upon the retirement of Miss Welsh in 1903, Jones became Mistress of Girton College.

"Miss E. E. C. Jones" as she is often listed, was active in professional associations. At a time when philosophers had strong interests in "mental philosophy" including psychology, she was one of the earliest members the Society for Psychical Research founded by Sidgwick. She was a very active member of the Aristotelian Society and participated in symposia with such philosophers as F. C. S. Schiller, Bernard Bosanquet, G. F. Stout, and J. S. Mann. For more than twenty years she was a regular presenter of papers at Society meetings, and many of those papers were published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. For two years (1914–1916) she served on the Executive Committee of the Society. She was also a regular presenter at Mind Association meetings, and that association's journal *Mind* became a forum for many of Jones' writings. In addition, she presented her work at the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club.

II. WORKS

Jones was a prolific writer in philosophy, and almost all of her work was in analytic philosophy; however, she also published some work in ethics. We will first survey her ethical writings before turning to an exploration of her analytic philosophy.

1. *Ethics*

Jones' works in ethics include *A Primer of Ethics*⁸ and two papers on the effect of social conditions on the development of moral character. In addition, Jones was an able defender of Sidgwick's moral philosophy. She published a series of articles on Sidgwick's ethical hedonism, and edited Sidgwick's lectures on Green, Spencer and Martineau.

(a) *A Primer of Ethics*. The *Primer* she describes as:

. . . a very brief and elementary introduction into the Science of Conduct. It has no claim to originality, and is substantially a compilation from those recognised authorities on the subject whose views it reports, and with whose works I hope that it may lead the reader to make acquaintance at first hand.⁹

In the opening chapter she addresses the question: What ought I to do? How do I know what I ought to do?, and Why should I do what I see to be right? Here, she mentions the connection between ethics and politics, and the questions they have in common concerning the identification of the good for humans. Here, she identifies self-regarding and social moral theories: the virtue tradition and hedonism on the one hand, and social justice theories on the other. The former she identifies in its historical origins with what she calls Greek Common Sense Morality through the development of hedonism and *its* modern utilitarian exponents. In the second chapter she addresses the questions: What do we mean by good, right, ought? What element is it in character or conduct which is the object of moral approval and disapproval? She touches on the familiar "ought implies can" argument, the question whether something can be good in itself, the question of justified punishment for failing to do that which one ought to do and the question of exculpating circumstances, unintended and unforeseen consequences of acts, etc. In short, she has prepared an introductory level exploration of the field of moral inquiry for her students.

In the third chapter, Jones looks at moral psychology: the relationship between desire and pleasure; the nature and role of moral conscience, practical reason and the moral emotions, and an overview of the question of free will and determinism. The fourth chapter, "Greek Common-Sense Morality" begins with an overview of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* focussing on his method: following the experience of what acts are called praiseworthy, rather than the experience of what people do, and leading to an analysis of human virtue. The chapter concludes with an all-too-brief summary of Kant's criticism of Aristotelian method. Chapter five, philosophical intuitionism, is primarily an account of Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics* and its criticism of the shortcomings of intuitionism. The chapter closes with an analysis of how Bishop Butler's principle of rational benevolence can be applied to resolve the antagonisms between moral intuitionism and utilitarianism. The didactic part of the text concludes with a chapter outlining the relationship of ethics to politics and an exploration of how the methods of ethics might assist in the development of a just politic. There follows an eleven page glossary of terms, a lengthy list of published questions from Cambridge University examinations, and a list of suggested readings for students preparing for Ethics in the Moral Sciences Tripos at Cambridge.

(b) *Other Ethical Writings*. Jones has two articles by the title "Character and Circumstance." The first is a commentary on remarks by Bernard Bosanquet made in a symposium of the Aristotelian Society. The second article by that name is a discussion piece in *International Journal of Ethics* where she expands on her earlier remarks. In the first "Character and Circumstance" she takes issue with Bosanquet's position that character has more power to shape a person's circumstance than a person's circumstances have to shape his or her character. In a brief rebuttal to Bosanquet's position offered in a symposium, Jones argues that change of environment that touches consciousness has the power to effect the development of character. This, after all, she says, is what educational theory is concerned with: ". . . desperately disadvantageous circumstances, *while they last*, may make a case as hopeless as a desperately disadvantageous character. And it must not be forgotten that for any one of us 'Circumstance' includes the character of others, and that among the disadvantages of circumstances may be their deteriorating effect on the character with which they are in interaction."¹⁰

The second article by the name "Character and Circumstance" focuses on the effect that circumstance, custom, surroundings, etc. can have on

the formation of a person's moral character.¹¹ She explores the perplexing cases of those who seemingly rise above their circumstances and live lives or perform acts of extraordinary virtue. She examines also the case of those raised in the best of circumstances, with every possible benefit, whom most would find morally deficient in character. Her analysis does not seek to resolve the issue whether a person may be excused for lacking moral virtues when he or she is a "victim of circumstances." Rather, Jones attempts to address the difficulties in distinguishing a person's moral character as something independent of the forces shaping a person's consciousness of experience.

The year 1894 found Jones in a lively exchange of articles with Mary Gilliland (about whom we have found nothing further), F. H. Bradley and J. S. Mackenzie on the rationality of hedonism as a moral philosophy. She entertains and attempts to overcome a number of objections made by others to Ethical Hedonism which she defends as a rational philosophy. We will not itemize all of the objections that Jones claims to refute, rather, we direct the reader to this lively series of interchanges.¹² Jones' replies are addressed primarily to criticisms made of her view by Professor J. S. Mackenzie. The main objections to Ethical Hedonism that she refutes are

- (1) that it depends upon psychological hedonism which is universally rejected;
- (2) that pleasure is an ambiguous, impossible, irrational and undesirable end to attain, and is not intrinsically valuable;
- (3) that pleasure is what the hedonist seeks and that individual pleasures are not the same as pleasure, they differ qualitatively and therefore cannot be added and enjoyed simultaneously. Even if pleasures could be summed, the preference for a large quantity of some pleasure to smaller quantities of others is morally base;
- (4) Ethical Hedonism cannot account for individual variations in the capacity and preference of pleasure, therefore it cannot promote the general happiness, and the desire to do so is inconsistent with individual ethical hedonism.

Jones rejects psychological hedonism, and defends the role of reason in approving moral ends.¹³ Reason, she says

. . . declares that Happiness is intrinsically worth having, and conduciveness to happiness, the test of right action – it is *because* of this, that [the rational hedonist or utilitarian] adopts the so-called

“hedonistic” End. And if Reason tells us that it is Happiness – excellence of Feeling – that makes any portion of consciousness intrinsically desirable, then the Volition that promotes Happiness is good; and since we cannot have good conduct without a good will (for conduct involves Volition) it appears that the promotion of the Hedonistic End involves both the supremacy of Reason and, the conscious direction of the Will to right. We have thus, it would seem, not a mere one-sided Good, but a Good which takes into account, and gives due place to, *all* the elements of man’s complex nature.¹⁴

Jones was a champion of Sidgwick’s ethical hedonism, defending him in three articles, “Mr. Hayward’s Evaluation of Professor Sidgwick’s Ethics,”¹⁵ “Professor Sidgwick’s Ethics,”¹⁶ and “Mr. Moore on Hedonism.”¹⁷ She was also selected by Sidgwick’s widow to edit his lecture notes on the ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau.¹⁸

2. *Analytic Philosophy*

Is there reason to believe, that just as Newton and Leibniz independently discovered the differential calculus, Jones and Frege independently developed analogous views on the nature of logical identity? What is the evidence that Russell based his early view of identity on that of Jones, rather than, as he claimed, discovering it independently of Frege? Prior to addressing these questions, however, we shall explore the development of Jones’ view of categorical propositions.

(a) *Categorical Propositions.* *Elements of Logic* begins with a definition of logic as the “science of the import and relations of propositions.”¹⁹ Jones claims that names are a word or any group of words that refer to things. A thing is that which has “quantitiveness” and “qualitiveness.”

By *Quantitiveness* I mean that in virtue of which anything is something, that which is involved in calling it *something* or *anything* – *just the bare minimum of existence of some kind* which justifies the application of a name (that is, of *any name* at all). To attribute *Quantitiveness* to anything would be simply to say *that* it is.²⁰

By *Qualitiveness* I mean that in virtue of which anything is *what* it is. The Qualitiveness of a Thing includes *all* its attributes, thus completely characterizing the *kind* of its Quantitiveness; and whatever we predicate of a thing expresses *some* attribute of it.²¹

On Jones' view, a categorical proposition contains two terms, subject and predicate, and the copula of existential identity or difference (non-identity). In an affirmative categorical proposition what the predicate applies to is the object that the subject applies to, but the attributes by which the subject refers to it are different from the attributes by which the predicate refers to it. This is identity of denomination in difference or diversity of attributes or characteristics.

Jones cites those to whom she is indebted either because she has built on their ideas, or because she is critical of their ideas. In a lengthy footnote she refers to statements from De Morgan, Venn, Bradley (and others)

. . . which seem to me confirmatory or elucidatory of the view of the Import of Categorical Propositions which I advocate. De Morgan says (*Formal Logic*, pp. 49, 50), "Speak of names and say 'man *is* animal;' the *is* is here an *is* of applicability; to whatsoever (idea, object, etc.) man is a name to be applied, to that same (idea object, etc.) animal is a name to be applied. . . ." Dr. Venn (*Empirical Logic*, p. 212) says, "What the statement [Plovers are Lapwings, Clematis Vitalba is Traveller's Joy] really means is that *a certain object* has two different names belonging to it." (The italics are mine.)

The next quotation is from Mr. Bradley (*Principles of Logic*, p. 28): "The doctrine of equation, or identity of the terms, has itself grasped a truth, a truth turned upside down and not brought to the light, but for all that a deep fundamental principle."

"Turned upside down and made false it runs thus: the object of judgment is, despite their difference in meaning, to assert the identity of subject and predicate [when taken in extension]." This "upside down" doctrine – if for *despite* we read *through* – is exactly what seems to me to be the true account of the import of Categorical Propositions (explaining *identity* to mean *tantum numero*). Mr. Bradley's condemnation of this interpretation seems to me to depend on a confusion between identity and similarity, for he goes on to say (p. 29), "In ' $S = P$ ' we do *not* mean to say that S and P are identical [= ?]. We mean to say that they are *different*, that the diverse attributes S and P are united in one subject." If in *S is P* the attributions of S and P are diverse, but are "united in one subject," this is exactly what I mean by S and P being identical (where S and P are Substantive Terms).²²

Contrary to Bradley, then, Jones would hold that “the object of judgment is, through their difference in meaning to assert the identity of subject and predicate when taken in extension.” In a later work, *Appearance and Reality*, Bradley would modify his view of identity in diversity and adopt a view like Jones’ (as would John Neville Keynes, Bertrand Russell and others).

(b) *Identity of Denotation in Diversity of Intension*. Logic has traditionally been defined in terms of three axiomatic laws of thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. Familiar representations of identity and contradiction are “A is A,” and “A is not not-A.” On Jones’ view the meaning or significance of the laws of identity and contradiction are inadequately conveyed by the traditional representations. Referring to such standard statements of the above forms of identity “whiteness is whiteness” and “this tree is this tree” Jones complains:

That *whiteness* and *this tree* should be *whiteness* and *this tree* respectively seems not a significant assertion, but a presupposition of all significant assertion – as *extension* is a presupposition of *colour*, or *ears* of *sound*. And if, in perceiving *whiteness* or thinking of *this tree*, I ever *need* to assert that *whiteness is whiteness*, or that *this tree is this tree*, do I not just as much need to assert the same sentence separately for both S and P in each case? And at what point is the process to Stop? And if identity needs to be asserted for the *terms*, does it not equally need to be asserted for the *copula*? . . . Do we not also need to declare that *Is is Is*? Unless we can start by accepting terms and copula as having simply and certainly a constant signification, I do not see how we are ever to start at all.²³

The proper expression of the law of identity, Jones says is “A is B.” This is what we usually mean by non-trivially true assertions of identity, and this is precisely what traditional formulations of the laws of identity and contradiction preclude:

If *A is A* and *A is not not-A* mean that *every A is nothing whatever besides A*, i.e., if they entirely exclude difference . . . all propositions of the form *A is B* are prohibited. But we can and do constantly use propositions of the form *A is B*; no one disputes their propriety and value. Therefore, propositions of this form being admitted, the above interpretation [*A is A*] must be rejected.²⁴

If *A is A* is not a significant assertion, what then should be the way to express the law of identity? Jones says that *A is B* is significant, and the appropriate way to express the law of identity. The Law of Identity is the Law of Significant Assertion, it is the law that asserts

Identity in Diversity; for it affirms that the reference of A, under whatever diversity of occurrence, is to some thing or things quantitatively [in terms of existence or reference] identical and qualitatively [in terms of qualities, characteristics or attributes] similar [i.e., diverse, not identical].²⁵

At this point in her writing, Jones' terminology is getting in her way, and the clarity of her insight is unfortunately, not obvious.

(c) *Identity in Diversity as an Axiom of Logic*. Even in this early work, Jones has begun to see what will only be fully developed later on, that her "law" is a law of language, and, to the extent that logic is the logic of propositions, it is also a law of logic:

But it is a rule of language made possible and necessary by a Law of Identity in things, rather than the Law of Identity itself. What I regard as this Law, is a necessary condition of there being anything at all which can be named, much more therefore of there being *names* of those things.²⁶

If Jones is correct, what is the import for the other two laws of logic, the law of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle?

When the law of identity is expressed as "*A is B*" then the law of contradiction is expressed as "*If A is B, A is not non-B.*" The law of contradiction is then a law that two contradictory propositions cannot both be affirmed. When the law of identity is expressed as "*A is B*" then the law of the excluded middle is expressed as "*A is B or not-B.*" Jones prefers her formulation of the law of contradiction to the traditional formulation, "*A is not non-A*" for two reasons. First, a significant rather than a trivially true assertion has been made; and second, and most importantly,

. . . in this form the Law of Contradiction precisely corresponds to the [traditional formulation of the] Law of Excluded Middle, which is seen to be complementary to it, and may be thus expressed – *A is either B or not B*, or – Two contradictory propositions cannot both be denied.²⁷

Stated as Jones has formulated it, the law of identity is a principle of significant assertion of numerical referential sameness; the law of contradiction expresses a principle that numerical referential sameness precludes numerical referential difference; and the law of the excluded middle expresses the principle that referential numerical sameness entails non-contradiction.²⁸ "The three might, I think, be appropriately called the Axioms of Logic."²⁹

Three years after completing, and two years after publishing *Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions*, Jones published *An Introduction to General Logic*³⁰ in order to present a more systematic account of the views of the first book. A review of her explication of the law of Identity in Diversity shows increased clarity over the explanation offered in her previous work. She says:

In the Proposition, Snow is White, the Application of *snow* and *white* is the same – the object which I refer to, and call *snow*, is the very same object that I refer to and call *white*: *white* is what the snow is – the application of P is limited by the application of S. But the Signification of *snow* and *white* is different – the two words signify different characteristics or qualities, and would be differently defined.³¹

We note the introduction of a new piece of terminology "Signification," to be followed by explanation of the relationship to the laws of logic of her claim that what every categorical proposition affirms or denies is identity in diversity. She formulates as a law of logic, the Law of Identity in Diversity:

Everything which can be thought of or named is an Identity in Diversity – (a Diversity of interdependent characteristics).

This implies that every nameable thing has a plurality of characteristics, and may be referred to by more than one name; hence that any name may be the Subject of a Categorical Proposition of the form *S is P*. It implies further, that in order that anything should be regarded as having a character of its own, as being one thing rather than a multiplicity of things, its characteristics must be regarded as interdependent.³²

Her *précis* in the table of contents explains:

The primary form of Proposition is the Categorical; hence we need in the first place a Principle of Categorical Assertion. We find such a Principle in the Axiom of Identity in Diversity, which may

be formulated thus: – Everything which can be thought of or named is an Identity in Diversity. This law may be represented by the symbolical statement A is B ; A signifying any name whatever, and B signifying any *other* name which has the same application as A .

III. THE ORIGINALITY OF JONES' THOUGHT

1. *Does Jones Anticipate Frege?*

In his earlier works, *Begriffsschrift*³³ and *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*³⁴ Gottlob Frege analyzed quantified sentences based upon simpler sentences, but had not yet analyzed the distinction that he later became famous for. In 1892 Frege published the article “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”³⁵ (“On Sense and Reference”); in a prestigious German philosophy journal. There he articulated a view of identity analogous to Jones’ “identity in diversity.” The following year in *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet*³⁶ Frege expanded on some of the more technical aspects of the view that he believed he had originated. Frege is usually credited with being the first to develop a theory of meaning of propositional identity that offers an account of sense and reference, or in Jones’ evolving taxonomy: qualitiveness and quantitiveness (1890), connotation and denotation (1892), intension and extension (1898), intension and denotation (1905, 1908). Frege asks whether identity is a relationship between things, or between the meanings of the names or signs of things, or between the names of things and the referent (denotation) of the names? The famous example he uses is that of the evening star and the morning star. The sense of “the evening star” is different from the sense of “the morning star.” Moreover, the names “evening star” and “morning star” are different. Yet, “evening star” and “morning star” have the same referent. Both names have different meanings but have the same referent, the planet Venus. Clearly, the “evening star” is not identical to “the morning star” if what we are asking is a question about the names (or signs). As symbols, “the evening star” and “the morning star” also connote different meanings. To paraphrase what Jones wrote in 1890: “There is a relationship of identity of denotation (the planet Venus) in diversity of intension (the ‘evening star’ and ‘morning star’).”

2. Does Jones Anticipate Russell?

Russell's focus in *Principles of Mathematics* is on demonstrating the logical foundations of mathematics. Where Jones would have referred to names standing in a proposition and having denotation and connotation, or intension and extension, Russell referred instead to class-concepts:

Two class concepts need not be identical when their extensions are so: *man* and *featherless biped* are by no means identical, and no more are *even prime* and *integer between 1 and 3*.³⁷

Or, as Jones might have said it: two terms can be understood to express non-identical qualities even though they have the same extension. To assert that man is identical to a featherless biped is to assert identity of denotation in diversity of intension. More important, it is to make a significant assertion that cannot be made by saying *man is man* or *featherless bipeds are featherless bipeds*. The correspondence between Jones' theory of identity as identity of denotation in diversity of intension, and Russell's view in *Principles of Mathematics* is clear. Russell says:

But the question arises: Why is it ever worth while to affirm identity? This question is answered by the theory of denoting. If we say "Edward VII is the King," we assert an identity; the reason why this assertion is worth making is, that in the one case the actual term occurs, while in the other a denoting concept takes its place.³⁸

It is clear that at this time in his philosophical development, Russell sees identity as significant ("worthwhile" is what he says) when an identity statement is of the form $A = B$. But Russell also acknowledges that the traditional formulation of the law of identity as $A = A$ is also necessary for logic.³⁹ (Jones never denies this; however her focus is on the "significant" assertion of identity in $A = B$.)

How might Russell's theory of identity have developed into one that was analogous to that repeatedly previously articulated in depth by Jones? Jones and Russell had numerous mutual connections. Most obvious of these is that she was a faculty member at Girton College, Cambridge while he was a student at Trinity College, Cambridge. Bertrand Russell began studying at Cambridge in October 1890, the year that Jones,

while as Lecturer in Moral Sciences at Girton College published her *Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions*. Both worked on matters of common interest: the law of identity and the philosophy of Lotze. Both attended McTaggart's lectures: Jones, the widely reviewed⁴⁰ co-translator of Lotze's *Mikrocosmos*, attending McTaggart's Hegel Lectures; Russell attending McTaggart's 1898 Lotze lectures. Both had close professional relationships with the same philosophers at Cambridge including Stout, Keynes, Sidgwick, Ward, and McTaggart. With this much in common, could Russell, who forsook Mathematics for Philosophy, who abandoned geometry for logic and philosophy of language, be not the least intrigued by the ideas of a Cambridge analytic philosopher whose work was so admired by his own philosophical mentors (especially Ward, Sidgwick and McTaggart), and who held the respect of some of the greatest philosophers at Cambridge? Jones had become a member of the Aristotelian Society in 1892. Her works and her ideas must have been exceptionally well-received there, for item eight on the Society's published list of a dozen suggested subjects for papers for its sixteenth session (1894) reads:

Lotze's theory of Thought and Reality (with Jones' "Philosophy of Lotze").

In 1896, Jones was named Vice-Mistress of Girton College. Her *Elements of Logic* had become so well known beyond England that a copy of it was acquired by Miami University of Ohio that same year, the year that Bertrand Russell joined the Aristotelian Society. An advertisement for the Aristotelian Society Proceedings Old Series Volume IV, No. 2, 1896 lists both Jones and Russell as giving papers that were published in that issue. This usually means that both papers were given at the same session. However, that issue was never published as part of the *Proceedings*, rather, its papers appeared in *Mind* which incorporated the *Proceedings* for a brief time.

In 1897 Russell, back from Germany and the United States, completed his dissertation "An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry." In it, he adopts a view regarding measurable and non-measurable theoretical geometry that holds that in order to make judgments about geometric projections we must be able to apprehend the projection as the simultaneous presentation of diverse content. According to Griffin and Lewis:

Russell follows Bradley in holding that all judgment (and thus all knowledge and belief) involves identity-in-diversity, though he differs from Bradley in thinking that this requires a plurality of diverse *things* or contents.⁴¹

But what of Bradley is Russell following? Certainly not the early Bradley whom Jones quoted, who conflated equation and identity. According to Russell in *My Philosophical Development*,⁴² his early ideas on identity in diversity are from page 519 of the second edition of Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. The first edition of this work was in 1893, and the second, revised edition appeared in 1897. This means that the second, revised edition, appeared in time for Russell to take Bradley's views into account while preparing his dissertation. And it is the second edition that Russell specifically cites as influencing him towards identity in diversity. Yet, both editions of Bradley appeared long following Jones' initial publication of her view on identity in diversity in 1890, and following her second expression of it in 1892. Bradley's second edition appeared after Jones' reiteration of her view at the Aristotelian Society Symposium (with Mann and Stout) in 1893.⁴³ Was Bradley indebted to Jones, and Russell through him? That is possible, for the correction Jones made to Bradley is more on the order of urging Bradley to clear up some confusion between equality and identity that would then permit Bradley to adopt identity in diversity as an analysis of logical identity. He followed her suggestion.

No account would be complete of the many opportunities for Russell to know of Jones' work while he was at Cambridge unless we consider the participation of both in the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club (hereafter as CUMC). Three years following the publication of *Elements of Logic* and only one year following the publication of *An Introduction to General Logic*, Jones attended Miss Sidney Webb's presentation of "The Economic Basis of Trade Unionism," to the CUMC. This is the first recorded instance of women presenting papers at the CUMC (indeed, the first recorded mention of women attending as guests). The records of the club are erratic and from what is reported of them by Pitt⁴⁴ attendance by Jones and Russell may well have coincided. Both were concurrently active (she as guest and presenter, he as member and presenter). According to Pitt, who included Jones among three "senior people" (along with Moore and Johnson) of CUMC, the available records show that Jones attended one meeting in 1894, and at least

three in 1895. Russell was travelling in Europe and the United States during this period. The records also show that Jones presented a paper in 1899 on Ward's naturalism and agnosticism in McTaggart's rooms with Sidgwick in the chair, a paper on Moore's view of Ward in November of 1900, and a paper on Moore's account of hedonism on February 16, 1906. In "Monistic Theory of Truth" written in 1906 Russell was still defending identity in diversity.⁴⁵

A letter to Russell dated August 28, 1909 from his friend and former student Philip Jourdain, apparently remarked that Russell's earlier ideas on identity expressed in *Principles of Mathematics* had been anticipated not originally by Frege's distinction between sense and reference in 1892 "Über Sinn und Bedeutung," (as acknowledged by Russell in *Principles*), but by Jones in 1890,⁴⁶ as evidenced by Keynes in his *Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic*, 1906. On September 5, 1909, as he is frantically tying up loose ends on *Principia Mathematica* where he will revise the earlier view, Russell responds:

It would seem, from what you say in your letter, that Miss Jones's distinction of signification and denotation must be much the same as Frege's Sinn and Bedeutung. But of course *some* such distinction is a commonplace of logic, and everything turns on the form given to the distinction. I have neither Keynes nor Miss Jones here, or I would have looked up the point.⁴⁷

This remark is clever for it suggests that Russell was ignorant of Jones's 1890 and 1892 books as well as of her later papers and Keynes' citation to her work. On closer reading, however, what Russell *says* is that he doesn't have the books with him. On that account, a proper response to Jourdain would have been that he would have someone else "look up the point." Even if we allow the former possibility, it is conceivable that, as a regular contributor to *Mind*, he would have overlooked Jones' 1898 article, "The Paradox of Logical Inference."⁴⁸ Likewise, it is conceivable that he remained ignorant of her views when, as a member of the Aristotelian Society, he would have received copies of the *Proceedings* containing her papers "The Meaning of Sameness" (1900/1901)⁴⁹ as well as her widely discussed "The Import of Categorical Propositions" (1901/1902)?⁵⁰ And even if Russell had vowed never to look at anything written by Jones, would he not have been familiar with Keynes' *Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic* of 1906, where Keynes, too, as Jones later mentioned "... has practically adopted it"?⁵¹

The earlier publications by Jones afforded Russell an opportunity to acknowledge her as the originator of the law of identity in diversity by the time of the publication in 1903 of his *Principles of Mathematics*. The Keynes book and Jones' works presented between 1903 and October, 1909 when the manuscript of *Principia Mathematica* was delivered to press, would have afforded Russell opportunity to mention Jones' (as well as Frege's) anticipation of views on identity that he and Whitehead were about to revise.

In a 1907 article "Logic and Identity in Difference" (in the *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*) Jones offers brief, but stinging criticisms of the lack of clarity in Russell's "On the Nature of Truth." In her 1908 article "Precise and Numerical Identity," (in *Mind*) she gives a passing nod to Russell and Moore. But it was not until 1910 that Jones really decided to take on the Hon. B. Russell in print. She published a criticism of Russell, "Mr. Russell's Objections to Frege's Analysis of Propositions" where she defended Frege's view, which she recognized as consistent with her own.⁵² Next, on December 2, 1910, Jones read "Categorical Propositions and the Law of Identity" before the CUMC. Jones' 1910 paper to the CUMC came just at the time of Russell's final preparation for publication of *Principia Mathematica* with Whitehead, where Russell's earlier view is definitely revised. As far as we have determined, Jones never published a paper by this title, but from her later mention⁵³ of Russell's reply to it, it appears to have been published in *Mind*, as "A New 'Law of Thought' and its Implications."⁵⁴ In that article, she made mention of Russell's newly revised view of propositional identity. In March of the following year, Russell replied, and according to summaries of CUMC meetings then kept by G. H. Geach, made

. . . specific reference to certain opposing views of E. E. C. Jones as to whether the denotation of a term is a constituent of the proposition in which it occurs.⁵⁵

The references by Russell to Jones were made in his oral version of "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," presented before the comparatively small audience of the CUMC, but Jones' name disappeared from his written version of the paper soon afterwards presented to the wider audience of the Aristotelian Society and published in its *Proceedings*.⁵⁶ Undaunted, Jones replied before the Aristotelian Society, criticizing Russell's retreat from his earlier view in *Principles of Mathematics* of identity in diversity to that offered (with Whitehead)

in *Principia Mathematica*.⁵⁷ Referring to their famous “Scott is the author of *Waverley*” example, she accused Russell of philosophical *double entendre*:

When it is said that *the author of Waverley* cannot *mean* the same as *Scott*, [the word] *meaning* signifies intension or connotation; plainly, intension (or connotation) of *the author of Waverley* and of *Scott*, cannot be *the same*. But when it is said that *the author of Waverley* cannot *mean* anything other than *Scott*, or *Scott is the author of Waverley* would be false, “mean anything other than *Scott*” must be understood of denotation; if *Scott* and *the author of Waverley* are two distinct persons, clearly *Scott is the author of Waverley* must be false. (My identity-in-diversity theory removes the difficulty at once.)⁵⁸

Jones summarizes the “admissions” that Russell has made both in *Principia Mathematica* and in “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.” These admissions are that “Scott is the author of *Waverley*” is a proposition asserting an identity; that the identity cannot be one of connotation/meaning/intension of Subject “Scott” with connotation of the predicate “is the author of *Waverley*”; and that “Scott is Scott” is an identity of denotation, but that the proposition is trivially true. Jones says that “I take it to be involved that the ‘triviality’ is due to the circumstance that there is no difference of intension as between Subject and Predicate.”⁵⁹ Trivial assertions are uninformative, on Jones’ view. In ordinary language, no one ever needs to assert that “Scott is Scott” or that $A = A$ because identity propositions of the form $A = A$ are trivially true and uninformative. $A = A$ may be axiomatic and necessarily true for logic, but if logic constitutes the formalization of rules for expressing linguistic truths, then $A = A$, although true, is far less informative than the usual identity propositions that take the form $A = B$. Indeed, $A = B$ is the type of identity proposition most commonly found in ordinary language and most interesting precisely because it is a significant assertion. This, Jones notes is the kind of assertion of identity that we usually try to prove. The criminal prosecutor is called upon to prove that the intension of “the accused” and the intension of “the criminal” have the same denotation.⁶⁰ She says

It is the names of things which have denotation and intension, and not the things themselves.⁶¹

In 1911, Philip Jourdain moved to Girton. Wild speculation might have it that it is Jourdain to whom Jones, who is now sixty-three years old, refers in *A New Law of Thought and its Logical Bearings* (1911), when she remarks that:

. . . I have recently had my attention draw to the fact that Professor Frege's analysis of Categoricals (published in 1892) was apparently the same as my own, and that a similar view was adopted by Mr. B. Russell (1903) in his *Principles of Mathematics*, where Frege's theory of the import of propositions is expounded with sympathetic approbation.⁶²

3. *Could Russell Not Have Read Frege?*

The occasion of Russell's response to Jourdain that he has "neither Keynes nor Miss Jones here" does not represent the only incident in which Russell seems to have feigned ignorance of the theory of identity in diversity first published by Jones in 1890, and then by Frege in 1892, only to have it appear as Russell's own.

In a letter to Jourdain of November 22, 1902, and again in his Appendix to *Principles of Mathematics* in 1903, Russell indicated that he was unaware of the all-important *Grundgesetze* of 1893 until after he had completed his lectures of 1901–1902 that had formed the basis of *Principles*. Referring to Cantor's logical definition of numbers, Russell states:

This definition however (as I have learnt since giving my lectures) is quite explicitly set forth by Frege, *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, Breslau, 1884; see also his *Grundzüge* [sic] *der Arithmetik*, Jena, 1893. He is a very able man: I have been corresponding with him for some time about my paradox.⁶³

Grattan-Guinness offers an astounding explanation for a discrepancy that demands further inquiry. Grattan-Guinness remarks:

Russell's confession of ignorance of Frege's work seems to contradict the opening of his first letter to Frege, dated 16 June 1902. There he claimed to have been acquainted with the *Grundgesetze* for eighteen months, well before the presentation of his lectures . . . Presumably his initial understanding of the book had been slight; he hinted as much to Jourdain later . . .⁶⁴

Grattan-Guinness' willingness to draw the inference that Russell couldn't understand Frege well enough to read the book relies on a letter to Jourdain of April 15, 1910. This was Russell's accounting:

I was led to buy Frege's *Grundgesetze* by an unfavourable review . . . by Peano in RdM, accusing Frege of unnecessary subtlety. The introduction struck me as admirable *but I could not understand Frege's use of Greek, German, and Latin Letters, and I put him away for nearly two years, by which time I had discovered for myself most of what he had to say, and was therefore able to understand him.* I must have first got *Grundgesetze* late in 1900.⁶⁵

It is a commonplace among Frege scholars that Frege's notation was unnecessarily complex or overly subtle as Peano would remark.⁶⁶ But Russell was raised by a series of German nurses and governesses; he studied economics and politics in Berlin for a year, and he read Cantor's *Zur Lehre vom Transfiniten*. Russell at age fourteen kept a journal in Greek letters. Are we to believe that the man who was perhaps the greatest logician and mathematician of his time, was so stymied by Frege's logical notation that he put the book back on the shelf after struggling through the much admired introduction, and, miraculously over the next two years intuited "most of what Frege had to say" and presented it as his own? In a footnote to Russell's April 15, 1910 letter, Grattan-Guinness summarizes:

Russell meant only the first volume of Frege's *Grundgesetze* . . . Note that he possessed the volume during part of the period of preparation of *The Principles* . . . but apparently did not read it.⁶⁷

We confess some difficulty in sharing Grattan-Guinness's conviction that Russell's explanation is perfectly genuine. The disclaimer, in the Appendix to *Principles of Mathematics* must have shocked Frege, who, five months earlier, in a letter from Russell dated June 16, 1902 had been told by Russell that he, Russell, had been acquainted with the *Grundgesetze* for some eighteen months. Unless the early (1902) letter to Frege is spurious, Russell's dating (in the 1910 letter) of the 1900 purchase of *Grundgesetze* fairly coincides with the time frame that he indicated to Frege was the date he became acquainted with the work that is, late 1900/early 1901. Russell's acquaintance with *Grundgesetze* therefore would appear to precede his 1901–02 lecture series, and therefore the composition dates of the lecture-drafts of what would become

Principles of Mathematics. In effect, from Russell's own pen we have reason to be concerned that the *apologia* to Frege in the Preface (written in December, 1902) and Appendix of *Principles of Mathematics* is disingenuous.

We have further, the evidence of Peano's review of Frege – a review Russell acknowledges having read. The “review” is far more than the typical cursory assessments of merits and demerits. It is more on the order of a “reader's guide” to reading *Grundgesetze*. Peano includes what can only be called a taxonomy of terms and notation that constitutes five of the six and one-half pages of the “review”. Peano introduces numerous examples of Frege's notation, followed by an operational explanation and “translation” into his own notation which was then widely known amongst mathematicians and philosophers. This means that prior to obtaining Frege's book, Russell had in hand a taxonomy of Frege's notation *including (on pages 126–127) a partial guide to deciphering Frege's perplexing combination of alphabets for reference to classes, members of classes and functions*. Peano's review provided the key to reading Frege and to deciphering his cumbersome and idiosyncratic notation. Russell acknowledges that he had that key in hand before acquiring a copy of Frege's *Grundgesetze*. How could he therefore claim agnosticism with respect to the content of *Grundgesetze*, and therefore innocence with respect to appropriation of Frege's views? Curiously, Russell does not claim agnosticism with respect to the 1892 publication of “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*.

4. *Might Frege Have Relied on Jones?*

Might Frege have relied on Jones? We think not. Aside from common interests in Lotze's philosophy and in the subject matter of predication of identity, and aside from the remote possibility that Jones and Frege may have met while she was attending a philosophy conference in Heidelberg, there is no reason to suspect Frege of any direct reliance on Jones. True, he might have been interested in the subsequent work of the woman who had co-translated a major work by Lotze. Rather, we suspect that it was their mutual acquaintance with the philosophy of Lotze that led them to follow through in like manners on questions suggested by Lotze. We have uncovered nothing to suggest that their discovery of the law of identity in diversity as the law of significant assertion was not mutually independent, with Jones preceding Frege by two years.

IV. CONCLUSION

Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones was a faculty member at Girton College, Cambridge who in 1890, published *Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions*. It attracted sufficient attention among Cambridge philosophers to gain her membership in and an invitation to present to the Aristotelian Society. Although *Elements'* taxonomy of "quantitiveness" and "qualitiveness" was clumsy, its articulation of a theory of "identity in diversity" was not. There followed an unbroken string of full-length works and formal papers in which Jones' theory was refined, defended and further explained. Many of these papers were given before the Aristotelian Society and were published in their *Proceedings*. Jones' papers appeared in the first volume of *Mind* and continued to do so through the turn of the century. Perhaps Russell scholars will have greater insight into the questions we raised here. Some will mention, as Professor Ambrose did, that "Russell was known for his photographic memory; he may have picked up someone else's ideas and not have a clue as to where he first learned them."⁶⁸ If so, this might explain how he assimilated Jones' and later, Frege's ideas free of any recollection of the process by which he acquired them. Russell might therefore be considered morally innocent of what in contemporary academic circles otherwise would be considered a lack of academic integrity. The colleagues with whom Jones is associated, Sidgwick, Schiller, Stout, Bosanquet, Ward, Keynes and McTaggart were among the giants in philosophy. Her many works in both hedonistic ethics and analytic philosophy received considerable positive assessment from her peers who are counted among the great philosophers of that era. It is our pleasure to introduce you to her.

NOTES

1. Jones, E. E. Constance, *As I Remember*. London: A. & C. Black, Ltd., 1922, p. 35.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 45.
3. *Op. cit.*, p. 53.
4. *Op. cit.*, p. 49. It was not until 1948 that Girton became a full college of Cambridge University, and its women students became eligible to receive degrees. In 1885, Cambridge Training College was founded to prepare women for the teaching profession.
5. *Op. cit.*, p. 56.

6. Jones, E. E. Constance, *A Primer of Logic*. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1905. (The University of Texas at El Paso Library has a copy of this volume donated by Patrick Romanell.)
7. *Op. cit.*, p. 72.
8. Jones, E. E. Constance, *A Primer of Ethics*. London: John Murray, 1909.
9. *Op. cit.*, prefatory note.
10. Jones, E. E. C. "Symposium: Character and Circumstance." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series* 3 (1902/1903): (Part II, 115–117 by E. E. C. Jones).
11. Jones, E. E. Constance, "Character and Circumstance," *International Journal of Ethics* 9: 504–511.
12. Jones, E. E. Constance, "Rational Hedonism," *International Journal of Ethics* 5 (1893–1894): 79–97; "'Rational Hedonism' – A Rejoinder," *International Journal of Ethics* 5 (1893–1894): 231–240 and "'Rational Hedonism' Concluded," *International Journal of Ethics* 5 (1893–1894): 384–386.
13. Jones, E. E. Constance, "The Rationality of Hedonism," – *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Old Series* 3, 1 (1894/1895): 29–45.
14. *Op. cit.*, p. 34–35.
15. E. E. C. Jones, "Mr. Hayward's Evaluation of Professor Sidgwick's Ethics," *International Journal of Ethics* 11 (1899–1900): 354–360.
16. Jones, E. E. C., "Professor Sidgwick's Ethics," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series* 4 (1903–1904): 32–52.
17. Jones, E. E. C., "Mr. Moore on Hedonism," *International Journal of Ethics* 16 (1904–1905).
18. Jones, E. E. Constance, Editor, *Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr. Herbert Spencer and J. Martineau by Henry Sidgwick*. London and New York: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1902 and New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1968.
19. Jones, E. E. Constance, *Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions*. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1890, p. 1.
20. *Op. cit.*, p. 6.
21. *Op. cit.*, p. 7.
22. *Op. cit.*, p. 49–50, n. 1.
23. *Op. cit.*, p. 52.
24. *Op. cit.*, p. 176 [bracketed material supplied].
25. *Ibid.* [bracketed materials supplied].
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Op. cit.*, p. 177 [bracketed material supplied].
28. This is not how Jones expresses it. She says: "If this formulation is adopted, it appears that the Law of Identity is the principle of the possibility of significant assertion, while the Law of Contradiction is the principle of consistency, and the Law of Excluded Middle may be regarded as a principle of inter-relation or reciprocity" (*op. cit.*, p. 178).
29. *Ibid.*
30. Jones, E. E. Constance, *An Introduction to General Logic*. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1892.

31. *Op. cit.*, p. 20.
32. *Op. cit.*, p. 203.
33. Frege, Gottlob, *Begriffsschrift*. Halle, 1879.
34. Frege, Gottlob, *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*. Breslau, 1884.
35. Frege, Gottlob, "Über Sinn und Bedeutung," *Zeitschrift für Phil. und phil. Kritik*, Vol. 100 (1892).
36. Frege, Gottlob, *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet*. Jena, 1893.
37. Russell, Bertrand, *Principles of Mathematics*, 2nd edition. London and New York: Norton, 1967. Section 24.
38. *Op. cit.*, section 64.
39. *Op. cit.*, section 95.
40. In addition to the advance notice given Jones' translation of Lotze's *Microcosmus* by Bernard Bosanquet in his own translation of Lotze's *Metaphysik* and *Logik*, advertisements for Jones' translation quote favorable reviews in *Athenaeum*, *Scotsman*, *Andover Review*, *Evangelical Magazine* and *Baptist Magazine*.
41. Griffin, Nicholas and Albert C. Lewis (eds), *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell Volume 2: Philosophical Papers 1896–1899*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990, p. xvi.
42. Russell, Bertrand, *My Philosophical Development*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959, p. 56.
43. Jones, E. E. Constance, Mann, J. S., and Stout, G. F., "Symposium: The Relation Between Thought and Language," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Old Series*: Vol. 2 (1892–1894) No. 3 (1893), 108–123 (Part I, pp. 108–113 by Miss E. E. Constance Jones).
44. Pitt, Jack, "Russell and the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club," *Russell*: Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter, 1981–1982): 103–118.
45. The most interesting analysis of this we have found is Morris' Weitz' "Analysis and the Unity of Russell's Philosophy," in Paul Schlipp's *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, 3rd edition. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951, pp. 57–121.
46. According to the editor, no mention was made that the same concept had been reiterated by Jones in 1892, 1893, and again in 1898 and 1900. Jones, E. E. C., "The Paradox of Logical Inference," *Mind*: 7 (1898): 205–218. Jones, E. E. C., "The Meaning of Sameness," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series* 1 (1900–1901): 167–173.
47. Grattan-Guinness, I., *Dear Russell – Dear Jourdain*, Vol. 1. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, p. 119 quoting Russell's letter to Jourdain of 5 September 1909 mentioning Jones' *Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions*, 1890.
48. Jones, E. E. C. "The Paradox of Logical Inference," *Mind*: 7 (1898): 205–218.
49. Jones, E. E. C., "The Meaning of Sameness," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series* 1 (1900–1901): 167–173.
50. Jones, E. E. C., "Import of Categorical Proposition," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series* 2 (1901/1902): 35–45. See also: Klein,

- Augusta, "Negation Considered As a Statement of Difference in Identity," *Mind*: 20 (1911): 521–529, and Klein, Augusta, "A Proposed New Classification of Terms," *Mind*: 23 (1914): 542–549. (We have found nothing further on Klein.)
51. Jones, E. E. C., *A New Law of Thought and its Logical Bearing*, Girton College Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911, p. 11.
 52. Jones, E. E. C., "Mr. Russell's Objections to Frege's Analysis of Propositions," *Mind* 19 (1910): 379–386.
 53. Jones, E. E. Constance, "A New Law of Thought," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series* 11 (1910–1911): 166–186.
 54. Jones, E. E. Constance, "A New 'Law of Thought' and Its Implications," *Mind* 20 (1911): 41–53.
 55. Pitt, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
 56. *Ibid.*, n. 21.
 57. Jones, E. E. Constance, "A New Law of Thought," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series* 11 (1910–1911): 166–186.
 58. *Op. cit.*, pp. 175–176.
 59. *Op. cit.*, p. 177.
 60. *Op. cit.*, p. 167.
 61. *Op. cit.*, p. 176.
 62. Jones, E. E. C., *A New Law of Thought and its Logical Bearings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911, p. 12.
 63. Grattan-Guinness, *op. cit.*, at 17, quoting Russell's letter to Jourdain of 22 November, 1902. In a note accompanying the text, the editor remarks on the misspelling of "Grundgesetze."
 64. *Ibid.*
 65. *Op. cit.*, p. 133.
 66. Peano, G. in *Rivista di Matematica* (1895).
 67. *Ibid.*, at note 4.
 68. Professor Ambrose to Professor Waithe, personal communication, December, 1991.

3. Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860–1935)

JULIEN S. MURPHY

Charlotte Perkins Gilman was an American social philosopher at the turn of the century, a socialist and a feminist, a visionary. She was known both for her far-reaching philosophy of humanity and her radical reforms. The eminent sociologist, Lester Ward, said she was “the only person, who, to my knowledge, has clearly brought out this cosmological perspective, not merely in things human, but in the vast reaches of organic evolution.”¹ Commonly seen as an optimist reformer, she saw herself as a philosopher.

I worked for various reforms, as Socrates went to war when Athens needed his services, but we do not remember him as a soldier. My business was to find out what ailed society, and how most easily and naturally to improve it.²

For society to advance, it needed to be recast without the domestication of women. Throughout fifty years of writing and lecturing, Gilman developed sharp critiques of the central institutions of modern society: the home, motherhood, the family, work, and religion. Through her work, she hoped to edge the world toward, not a “man-made culture,” but a culture of free human beings with a sense of purpose, and an ethic for the advancement of humanity. Her vision would prove unrelenting. Her reputation as an intellectual leader in America pursuing radical changes in the social structure of society, continues into our present day, her social philosophy still radical and original.

I. BIOGRAPHY

Gilman’s prolific career as a philosopher and political activist continued the legacy of women in the Beecher family. Gilman was born in 1860

to Mary Westcott and the renowned librarian, Frederick Beecher Perkins. Her great-grandfather, Lyman Beecher, was famous for his preaching and for his daughters, Charlotte's great aunts, Isabella Beecher Hooker, abolitionist and suffragist, Catherine Ward Beecher (see Volume 3 of this series), founder of the Hartford Female Seminary and co-author of *Principles of Domestic Science* (1870) with her sister Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. Stowe was particularly a source of great inspiration, demonstrating how fiction might affect politics and was cited by Charlotte in her major work. Charlotte's second husband, Houghton Gilman, was also a Beecher, son of Charlotte's aunt, Katherine Beecher Perkins Gilman. It is through the Beecher family that Charlotte saw her own abilities for leadership and intellectual development.

Despite the Beecher lineage, Charlotte and her brother were raised in poverty by her mother who earned small amounts of money as a teacher of young children. Her father left the family when she was seven, providing negligible child-support and maintaining infrequent correspondence with her. Her mother's life, Gilman would write in her autobiography, "was one of the most painfully thwarted I have ever known."³ She became "a deserted wife . . . forced to move nineteen times in eighteen years, fourteen of them from one city to another."⁴ After a long thorough musical education, developing unusual talent, her mother sold her piano when Charlotte was two to pay the butcher's bill, and never owned another. She hated debt, yet debts accumulated forcing her to frequently move the family.

Gilman's own life was one of struggle against the social system she would critique. Her childhood, despite her passionate desire to develop herself, offered her little assistance. She was not given more than four years of formal education as a child. Her efforts at self-education were fruitful primarily because she was a voracious reader with tremendous self-determination. She read biology, anthropology, ethnology, sociology, and especially history and evolution. While her father sent her brother to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Charlotte received only two years of advanced education studying painting at the Rhode Island School of Design. Her formal education was insufficient for one who, as early as seventeen, decided to help humanity by studying history and theory.

Gilman married twice. First, in 1884 to artist Charles Walter Stetson with whom she had her only child, Katherine Beecher Stowe, and her first nervous breakdown, fictionalized in *The Yellow Wallpaper* (1892). In 1894 she divorced Stetson. By that time, she had already become a

public figure through her poems and lectures for the Nationalist Movement. Her divorce from Charles was a social scandal, outdone only by her continued friendship with him and his second wife, Grace Channing, her life-long friend and soon the primary mother of Charlotte's daughter, Katherine. Gilman received much criticism for giving up her child while lecturing about Nationalist views of child-rearing which held that the best teaching for children could be given not merely by the parents but by the social community.

Gilman's second marriage to New York patent lawyer Houghton Gilman in 1900 apparently was peaceful and happy, lasting thirty-four years. Her autobiography, interestingly enough, hardly mentions Houghton, demonstrating her own vision that her philosophical career would eclipse romantic relationships.

Her politics and activism began as early as age twenty-one when, out of her belief for women's physical fitness and strength, she founded the first women's gym in Providence. She became heavily involved in the Nationalist Movement in her early years. The Nationalists were inspired by Edward Bellamy's novel, *Looking Backward* (1888), which presented a socialist America in the twenty-first century. Nationalists advocated the disappearance of social classes and the collective ownership of land and industry. Gilman was an influential lecturer and Nationalist poet for many years. She also was a socialist, and a member of the Fabian Society, which included such English socialists as G. B. Shaw. She was not a member of the Socialist Party for she rejected Marxist political methods and the Marxist concepts of economic determinism and class struggle. She supported the Labor Movement throughout her life, fighting for reduced hours, increased wages, and improved working conditions. As a feminist, her politics were radical. She supported suffrage but believed that economic independence was needed as well as the vote, claiming,

Women whose industrial position is that of a house-servant, or who do no work at all, who are fed and clothed, and given pocket-money by men, do not reach freedom and equality by the use of the ballot.⁵

She worked for the vote while lecturing on radical social reforms and insisting on economic independence for women. One suffrage leader told her, "I think you will do our cause more good than harm, because what you ask is so much worse than what we ask that they will grant our

demands to escape yours.”⁶ While radical on women’s issues, she was conservative on sexual issues, a member of the Social Purity Society.

Gilman’s philosophical life was filled with an immense passion for social reform through a prolific writing and speaking career. Her creativity was overwhelming. She wrote six books of philosophy in twenty-five years: *Women and Economics*, *Human Work*, *The Home*, *Concerning Children*, *His Religion and Hers*, and *The Man-Made World or Our Androcentric Culture*. She also wrote over four hundred poems, many short stories, five novels including *Herland*, essays for newspapers and magazines, and edited two magazines, the *IMPRESS* (1893–1895), and her own magazine, the *Forerunner* (1909–1916). She started the *Forerunner* when her work became harder and harder to publish, saying, “if the editors and publishers will not bring out my work, I will!”⁷ She ran the *Forerunner* from 1909–1916, writing an estimated 21,000 words per month or the equivalent of 28 books. By 1930, all of her philosophical books were out of print. Yet, she continued to write until her death in 1935, producing a detective story, *Unpublished*; her autobiography, *The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman*; and a manuscript, “A Study in Ethics”.

Her income from her books, which sold widely and were translated into several languages, was meager. She never held an academic position. The academic journal most receptive to her work was not a philosophy journal, but rather *The American Journal of Sociology*. She earned her money by selling articles and poems to magazines and preaching to churches and social groups. Her life was lived at the edges of poverty. She routinely suffered from exhaustion, and, despite her optimism, melancholia and depression. Her pace was phenomenal, considering her paradoxical cycles of optimism and depression. For instance, her first book was written in seventeen days: “3500 words I wrote this morning, in three hours,” she wrote in her diary.⁸ Periods of speedy writing and high productivity were counter-balanced by periods of total inertia and depression. Her health was weak, yet she travelled extensively, lecturing across the United States and abroad. Her socialist and feminist politics brought her to the International Socialist and Labor Congress in London in 1894, lecturing in England, Holland, Germany, Austria and Hungary in 1905, and the International Women’s Suffrage Congress in Budapest in 1913. She visited Hull House at the invitation of Jane Addams and may have met John Dewey there. Her friends included the suffragists Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, Lucy Stone, Elizabeth Blackwell, America’s first woman physician, and Antoinette

Brown Blackwell, American's first woman minister, also a philosopher. (See Volume 3 of this series.)

Gilman's life was guided by her philosophical views, believing in convention only when it was useful, taking the freedom to write and lecture, to divorce as well as to remarry, to give up her daughter without guilt, to write, collapse, and write again. She ended her life by chloroform inhalation in 1935 at the age of seventy-five after a three and a half year fight with breast cancer. Her suicide note said, "I prefer chloroform to cancer."⁹ Her life and her death were marked by vibrant courage, tremendous hard work and diligence, and abundant creativity.

II. GILMAN'S PHILOSOPHICAL WORK

Gilman's life philosophy sought the advancement of humanity. She was a believer in social service and hard work. "The one predominant duty is to find one's work and do it," she wrote in her autobiography. "The religion, the philosophy set up so early have seen me through."¹⁰ She critiqued male-bias in philosophy and religion, and advanced a theory of social evolution that incorporated her feminist and socialist politics. Her greatest contribution to socialist feminist theory and social philosophy was her critique of domestic industry. *Women and Economics*, her most famous work, began her career as a philosopher and was translated into French, German, Dutch, Italian, Hungarian, and Japanese shortly after its appearance in 1898. Yet it was the subsequent book, *Human Work*, more difficult to publish, that she was proudest of. "This is the greatest book I have ever done, and the poorest – that is, the least adequately done."¹¹ Like all of her theoretical books, *Human Work* was bold in its critique and vision. Her most theoretical, and also amusing work (by her own estimation) was *The Home*.

The main thesis of Gilman's social philosophy is that we must guide humanity's transition from its current ego-androcentric system, with its sexuo-economic relation, to a socio-gynocentric system with advanced-economic relations, much as "in astronomy we had to change from the geo-centric to the solar-centric theory of our planetary system."¹² She develops this philosophy through her critical discussion of androcentric philosophy and religion, social evolution, free labor, social ethics, suicide and euthanasia.

1. *Androcentric Philosophy*

Gilman saw the history of philosophy as a massive study in patriarchal philosophy which attempts to function as an "anti-toxin" to the oppression of women that it perpetuates. She summed up the history of philosophy in terms of its corresponding diseased conditions:

The self-torturing savage is the precursor of the Stoic philosopher; the self-indulgent savage, of the Epicurean. The submissive and long-oppressed Oriental produces his philosophy of resistance and progress, crying "Never say die!" and "You can't keep a good man down!" The morbid woman-hating Schopenhauer gives us a philosophy of grisly pessimism, followed by a worse degree of Nietzsche. In more modern times we have the pragmatic philosophy of William James, and the more esoteric work of Bergson.¹³

Gilman critiqued the male-biased philosophy of her own time.

Dominant early thinkers being men, and having in their minds as premises the common errors as the nature and power of women, naturally incorporated these errors in their systems of philosophy. When the women thought, is not recorded, any more than the lion has erected a statue to the victor in the hunt.¹⁴

Androcentric philosophy or male-biased philosophy is inadequate for affecting the progress of humanity because it is cut off from women's insights and sensibilities. The emergence of androcentric philosophy was "natural" for humanity:

It was natural enough that the mind of man should evolve a philosophy of sex calculated to meet his desires, and as a philosophy, serenely indifferent to the facts.¹⁵

Yet, androcentric philosophy is no longer appropriate for humanity because its "woman-hating" posture is destructive for the world. Androcentric philosophy, predicated on sexual difference and male dominance, culminates, for Gilman, in Freudianism, with its "belated revival of phallic worship." Gilman saw Freud's "perverted sex-philosophy," "the last effort on the part of man to maintain the misuse of the female."¹⁶

Gilman preferred human philosophy to androcentric philosophy. A human philosophy and its corresponding free and healthy society, would only exist at a future time when female philosophers were fully recognized. Human philosophy ought to be committed to social service. It is women who excel at caring for others, a capacity integral to collective health and freedom,

Her philosophy will so differ, her religion must so differ, and her conduct, based on natural impulses, justified by philosophy and ennobled by religion will change our social economics at the very root.¹⁷

Women's philosophy must differ, for Gilman, because there is a central difference between the masculine and feminine attitudes toward life, with the feminine superiority adapted toward the development of social consciousness and social service. Human philosophy, shaped largely by women, would assume basic tenets of social evolutionary theory, advancing a theory of social motherhood necessary to preserving and advancing humanity:

A rational and strengthening philosophy of life will come to us through thinking motherhood. It is time.¹⁸

A gynocentric social philosophy would promote certain social changes. It would see motherhood not as domestic service but as fundamental to the race, would specialize currently consolidated motherly tasks, advocate educational reform over prison expansion, and emphasize human life and birth over fear of death.

2. *Androcentric Religion*

Gilman was a deist believing in God as a being "not limited by personality, inescapable, an everacting force to be used".¹⁹ God was gender-neutral, an energy force that one could use for strength and guidance in social service. Through the power of God, humans could advance society. "As to power," she wrote, "that was God. There is plenty of God. Enough for us all. We have but to help ourselves to that illimitable force."²⁰ Just as God was impersonal, Gilman privileges the social group over the individual. It was social consciousness and not individual consciousness that would survive. She held no hope for

personal immortality, nor did she fear death. Rather she saw herself as part of the collective consciousness which was immortal: In her seventies, she wrote,

My life is in Humanity – and that goes on. My contentment is in God – and That goes on. The Social Consciousness, fully accepted, automatically eliminates both selfishness and pride.²¹

Androcentric religion, in contrast to Gilman's own religious views, privileges the individual over the group, the afterlife over social life, it is full of "baseless dogmas" and morbid anxiety for a belief in personal immortality. Androcentric religion has not promoted human happiness for society. Further, its masculist bias has been preoccupied with fear of death seeing life as a hunt, man as the hunter and fighter, and death as the ultimate crisis.

Androcentric religion further failed to advance humanity by assuming that women were "private servants" and not the rightful mothers of the human race. How different religion would be if women shaped it, Gilman believed, for women are not hunters and fighters, nor do they have a perverse concern with death. It is women's duty and responsibility to guide religion by expanding motherhood to social service. Social motherhood would maintain and improve humanity.

3. *Philosophy of Social Evolution*

Gilman's human philosophy was envisioned in terms of social evolution. As a Reform Darwinist she believed that human beings could understand and play an active role in their evolutionary course, taking issue with the deterministic stance of Herbert Spencer and the Social Darwinists. As a feminist, she believed that social evolution required the liberation of women for the race to truly advance. As a socialist, she held that "progress" entailed the advancement of the whole, through collective action.

Gilman's theory of social evolution is, by her own admission, largely indebted to the sociologist Lester F. Ward, whose gynocentric theory provided a suitable alternative to androcentric thinking. Gilman called his theory "the greatest single contribution to the world's thought since Evolution,"²² and in her dedication of *Man-Made World*, she said of Ward that "nothing so important to women has ever been given to the world."²³ Ward's gynocentric theory appeared in an article, "Our Better Halves,"

(1888), where he claimed that the female human was superior to the male, and her capacities for nurturance and altruism would be necessary for preserving the human race:

Woman is the unchanging trunk for the great genealogical tree; while man, with all his vaunted superiority, is but a branch, a grafted scion, as it were, whose acquired qualities die with the individual, while those of woman are handed on to futurity. Woman is the race, and the race can be raised up only as she is raised up.²⁴

Inspired by Ward, Gilman believed that the oppression of women was the greatest obstacle to social progress, yet was, for a time, necessary. Like Ward, she claimed that it was natural to the course of social evolution that a sex distinction be established, making a wide gap between males and females. The male evolved for sex only, having but one function, to fertilize the female. "The superiority of men to women is not a matter of sex at all; it is a matter of race." Yet social evolution brought about a reversal in the relationship between the sexes. It was necessary for the male to rule over the female for a long period of evolutionary history. In order for the male, the inferior sex, to achieve race equality with the female, the superior sex, males needed to advance which meant becoming more like females and to incorporate female traits in their nature. This could only be accomplished by restricting the abilities of females. By encroaching steadily upon women's freedom, men reduced women to economic dependence elevating themselves to be women's providers. As such, men were compelled to completely provide for women's needs, "to fulfill in his own person the thwarted uses of maternity."²⁵ Hence men began evolving female characteristics, becoming men-mothers and partaking in the most powerful of female qualities, creativity, creating the social world. Gilman claimed that "the subjection of woman has involved to an enormous degree the maternalizing of man. Under its bonds he has been forced into new functions, impossible to male energy alone. He has had to learn to work, to serve, to be human."²⁶ Thus, the greatest source of productivity in the world, maternal energy, was usurped by men closing the major gap between the sexes by adopting the feminine capacity for self-preservation and race preservation to balance out the masculine capacity for destruction. "The naturally destructive tendencies of the male have been gradually subverted to the conservative tendencies of the female".²⁷ Through natural selection and training, superior habits of females have been bred into males.

Contemporary feminists are not only critical of the sociobiological assumptions of Gilman's philosophy of social evolution, but many find cause for anger at the oppression of women. Gilman left the assumption of social evolution unchallenged and saw female oppression as a source of pride. Women have been patient through the ages. Superior from the beginning, "she has waited and suffered, that man might slowly rise to full racial equality with her. She could afford to wait. She could afford to suffer."²⁸ The positive result of female oppression is the evolution of a civilized man. Hence, while women were in a state of slavery and treated with injustice and cruelty, nature was blending opposing sex-tendencies of females into the males for a triumphant race. Again by Gilman's account, the blending has not been reciprocal. Women, the race archetype have remained unchanged, but allowed their own oppression by men to enable men to evolve to beyond merely fragile, sexual beings.

Gilman's philosophy of social evolution provided an economic analysis of androcentric culture. Androcentric economics has made the relation between the sexes an unequal sexuo-economic relation, based on men as primary to production in the social world, and women as non-productive consumers. Marriage was central to the maintenance of the sexuo-economic relation. It demanded that a man support a woman. Marriage was shameful employment for women for in it, they must fulfill wife-and-mother duties in exchange for being provided for. Marriage was therefore a form of economic beggary. The causes and uses of marriage under the sexuo-economic relation have become outgrown. Gilman believed that it was detrimental to humanity to continue confining women to the home and domestic service. One sign of the outdatedness of marriage as an institution of male rule over the female, was the emergence of the woman's movement, which for Gilman also emerged under the forces of social evolution. She claimed that every woman born into this oppressive structure, "has had to live over again in her own person the same process of restriction, repression, denial; the smothering 'no' which crushed down all her human desire to create, to discover, to learn, to express, to advance."²⁹ Gilman's analysis of the economics of the sex-based system showed how the sexual market and the economic market were one and the same.

The girl must marry: else how live? The prospective husband prefers the girl to know nothing. He is the market, the demand. She is the supply. And with the best intentions the mother serves her child's

economic advantage by preparing her for the market. This is an excellent instance. It is common. It is most evil.³⁰

The social institutions of marriage, the family, and the home would need to be revised if female oppression were to be eradicated. Gilman's most original contribution to social philosophy is her critical analysis of these current social institutions and her proposals for reform. She believed in marriage, finding the monogamous relationship the most advanced. Yet, she did not believe that marriage ought to be directly tied to the home. The comfort of humanity and shelter should not be dependent on marriage. Many men, women, and children may choose not to be married either temporarily or as a permanent choice. Under the current institutions of marriage, the family and the home, single people are, she claimed, unfairly deprived the comforts of home. The family is suffering in modern times, requiring a sort of military rule to function at all. In her view, many tasks should be replaced by professionals. Most specifically, motherhood needs rethinking.

According to Gilman, the goal of motherhood ought to be the progress of civilization. However, she found that the practice of motherhood had been thoroughly domesticated. The domestication of mothers, she argued, was outdated and inefficient. The mother has been primarily a domestic servant, cooking, cleaning, educating the children. Yet, to leave these duties in the hands of individual mothers is inefficient for society because mothers are untrained, confined to private industry, and society is deprived of their talents for social service. Gilman gave three reasons why mothers are unfit to take care of children: not every woman has the special talents for child-rearing; no women get any professional training for child-rearing; and each mother, if she takes care of only her own children, is inexperienced. Children, which are an important resource for transmitting social advances, "pass under the well-meaning experiments of an endless succession of amateurs."³¹ The home would be a place for the development of human relations among family members provided that cooking, cleaning, and education of children were specialized tasks for professionals:

When parents are less occupied in getting food and cooking it, in getting furniture and dusting it, they may find time to give new thought and new effort to the care of their children.³²

Though women are taught that their maternal instinct warrants a sacrifice of all their social service to their ill-trained abilities with

children, humanity does not profit from their sacrifice. Instead, trained professionals should clean the home and assist mothers in the care of children.

Gilman was highly critical of the home which epitomized the sexuo-economic relation. Man's world was the market place, woman's the home. The home became a private industry in which women were confined. Gilman advocated the elimination of "housework" freeing women up for social service. The occupation of the home should not be house-keeping but rest. She proposed that the kitchen should be taken out of the home, leaving a room available for other pursuits. The home "costs three times what is necessary to meet the same needs. It involves the further waste of nearly half the world's labor. It does not fulfill its functions to the best advantage, thus robbing us again."³³

If it were not for her socialist theory of work, Gilman's theory of the "undomesticated home" could appear classist, available only to the middle and upper class while enslaving the working class into domestic duties. Gilman was not in favor of domestic service for wages, because she knew that since most domestic servants were young girls, the same problems would ensue as for mothers. Further, she supported the ideas of Thorstein Veblen against class distinctions because they were inefficient for society. She believed that work itself was evolving in stages: first, female labor; second, slave labor; third, wage labor; and the fourth stage would be free labor.

Work, for Gilman, ought to be a matter of social-cooperation, not competition and exploitation. She redefined private property believing that what an individual needs, he or she should have a right to. Each person should be entitled to all the clothing, food, education, tools, he or she could consume. The products of labor belong to the consumers, not the producers, and should be distributed to them as widely, swiftly, and freely as possible; so adding to the social good. The mistake has been to attach ownership rights to the producer. Gilman advocated an economic system of cooperative exchange in which the workers would "own" the means of production but not the products they produce, i.e., a weaver would own her own loom but the wearer would own the cloth.³⁴

The activity of work needed reform as well. The worker should be well-nourished, physically and socially, well-educated, and aligned with work he or she prefers. Work should be a joy, a source of strength for the individual and the society, not a physical drain. Work ought to be social service. Women and men should share in work equally.

4. *Gilman's Eugenics*

Gilman's philosophy of social evolution presupposed an ultimate standard of progress that was not free of racism or ethnocentrism. Like other Darwinists, she believed that civilizations could be ranked from superior to inferior levels of advancement. It was tacitly assumed that white Euro-American cultures were the "most advanced," that non-Western cultures were "savage" and "inferior". Yet, because social evolutionists believed behavior can be improved by transmission of advanced traits over generations, "inferiors" could be improved through education and socialization. "It is easily within our power to make this world such an environment as should conduce to the development of a noble race, rapidly and surely improving from generation to generation, and so naturally producing better conduct."³⁵

For Gilman, although humanity was "in the making," and history was the story of progress, the development of our human-ness was merely presupposed. On the one hand, "advancement" in her view meant qualities favorable to most liberal reformers: more education, good health, free labor, ease from needless suffering. Yet, Gilman, in practice, was xenophobic in ways that overlapped with goals of the Eugenic Movement. The American Eugenics Society, founded in 1926, proposed concrete strategies for accomplishing the goals of Darwinists, specifically the sterilization of "inferiors" and the restriction of immigration. Although not a member of the Eugenics Society, Gilman was biased against immigrants, particularly non-white immigrants, and was favorable toward eugenics in her work. Her racism is evident in the article, "A Suggestion on the Negro Problem" in which, while recognizing the exploitation of Black people in post-abolitionist America, she nonetheless referred to Black people as "aliens", and the Black race as an "inferior" or backward race. She believed that Black people need to "attain" the level of white cultural civilization. She stated the problem explicitly, synthesizing racism with eugenics: "how can we best promote the civilization of the Negro? He is here: we can't get rid of him; it is all our fault; he does not suit us as he is; what can we do to improve him?"³⁶ She suggested the formation of a Black labor army for all non-self-sufficient Black men, women, and children that would provide food and education in exchange for farm and factory labor.

Her eugenics position is also found in her theories of improving children through better breeding. She claimed that to improve humanity we must have better children born:

If you are buying babies, investing in young human stock as you would in colts or calves, for the value of the beast, a sturdy English baby would be worth more than an equally vigorous young Fuegian. With the same training and care, you could develop higher faculties in the English specimen than in the Fuegian specimen, because it was better bred. The savage baby would excel in some points, but the qualities of the modern baby are those dominant today.³⁷

Theories of social evolution may be inherently laden with the oppressions derivative of eugenics to the degree that the “superior” society, or “advanced individual” is specified by some standard that is intolerant of diversity. Although some forms of social progress such as advances in health, education and free-labor may be objectionable, definitions and methods for bringing about “progress” is problematic. For instance, would it be correct for an “advanced culture” to improve the health of an “inferior” culture if it did so by annihilating the customs, religion, and politics of the latter? If education and training are desirable, what “truths” should be taught? If training, to make what kind of products or perform which services? In Gilman’s social philosophy, she was unable to advocate progress without suggesting the breeding of white-Euro-American Society, albeit, presumably free of sex, class and wage exploitation. Although she consistently privileged the group over the individual, it has only by privileging individuality and diversity over the group that has enabled a tolerance of difference to exist within and between cultures. Gilman’s social philosophy, xenophobic or racist, does not overcome the conflict between respect for diversity and the primacy of the social group.

5. *Androcentric Ethics*

Gilman believed that humanity would only advance if women were liberated and if we achieved the transition from the primacy of the individual consciousness to the collective consciousness. Her economic analysis of free labor sought to promote collectivity. “The life and prosperity of each member is absolutely interwoven with that of the others, of the whole, and not to recognize this, and act accordingly, is to manifest an inferior plane of development.”³⁸ Women should have an active role in the development of social consciousness, shaping a social ethics along feminine lines. The masculine world, she claimed, has valued patriotism, as a general concept of ethical behavior, which once again

emphasizes fighting and death. But she insists that humanity needs new values. Women, she believes, have no "joy of combat," no "impulse to bang one another about, taking neither pride nor pleasure in violence."³⁹ Instead, women, as members of the superior sex, are the peacemakers of the race. Women's nature is "more human" than man's. Fighting, war, aggression, destruction are the qualities only of the male, not of humans as such. The highest value ought to be caring for others through serving society.

To attain an advanced social ethics, Gilman proposed that we change our sex-based thinking which has attributed to women the virtues of the oppressed: obedience, patience, endurance, contentment, humility, resignation, temperance, prudence, cheerfulness, modesty, gratitude, thrift, and unselfishness, and to men, virtues more social in scope: truth, justice, loyalty, generosity, patriotism, honor. Truth, for instance, is honored in men, by "keeping their word," central to their manhood, while, she notes, women are allowed to change their minds.⁴⁰ For Gilman the most important virtue women need to respect in themselves is courage. Women have been socialized not to be courageous. "Women were expected to be meek, modest, and submissive . . . Women are not ashamed of being cowards. They will own to it without a blush, even, indeed, with a sort of pride."⁴¹ Yet courage is central if women are to be active in maintaining and improving humanity.

Gilman's ethical theory was utilitarian: right conduct is that which tends toward the greatest development of humanity, wrong conduct promoted injury to human advancement. The degree of rightness or wrongness of an act, was determined by the amount of good or evil it produced for society.

6. *Suicide and Euthanasia*

As evidenced by her death, Gilman was a strong advocate of euthanasia. In her younger days, when her father was put in a sanatorium suffering from mental deterioration, she commented, "It is not right that a brilliant intellect should be allowed to sink to idiocy and die slowly, hideously. Some day when we are more civilized we shall not maintain such a horror."⁴² In order to prevent needless suffering, suicide must be seen to be a respectable choice in situations of terminal illness. To show the value of suicide, she reasoned that suicide was granted only to human beings. "So unbearable is the amount of human pain that we alone among all animals manifest the remarkable phenomenon of suicide

– a deliberate effort of a form of life to stop living because living hurts so much.”⁴³ She believed that suicide was justifiable, however, only when an individual’s usefulness to society was no longer possible. Each of us owes to the other the best service of a lifetime, she claimed, but an ill person ought to be able to request euthanasia should pain be too severe for continuing with life, and then the request should be handled not by a private physician, who might not act in the patient’s best interest, but by the Board of Health. Not only may “natural death” be painful for an individual, but it is ineffective for society, draining health resources. Gilman applied a eugenic perspective to needless suffering of terminal illness claiming that: “the millions spent in restraining and maintaining social detritus should be available for the safe-guarding and improving of better lives.”⁴⁴ When death comes naturally or is administered appropriately without unnecessary suffering, it is not an evil.

Gilman herself chose suicide after all modern treatments for her breast cancer had failed, and after she was convinced her pain would prevent her usefulness. Upon learning of her breast cancer in 1932, she asked her doctor, “How long shall I be able to type? I must finish my *Ethics*.”⁴⁵ He suspected she would last six months. She worked for three more years. Her suicide note stressed the importance of social service for an individual’s life and the right a civilized society should extend to its members: the right to die peacefully and not in unbearable pain:

Human life consists in mutual service. No grief, pain, misfortunate, or “broken heart” is excuse for cutting off one’s life while any power of service remains. But when all usefulness is over, when one is assured of unavoidable and imminent death, it is the simplest of human rights to choose a quick and easy death in place of a slow and horrible one. Public opinion is changing on this subject. The time is approaching when we shall consider it abhorrent to our civilization to allow a human being to die in prolonged agony which we should mercifully end in any other creature. Believing this open choice to be of social service in promoting wiser views on this question, I have preferred chloroform to cancer.⁴⁶

Gilman’s suicide note was her last philosophical work, a plea for service, a groping for right action in matters human.

NOTES

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6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
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9. *The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman: An Autobiography*, p. 333.
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31. *Ibid.*, p. 293.
32. *The Home: Its Work and Influence* (New York: McClure, Phillips & Co., 1903), p. 301.
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35. *His Religion and Hers*, p. 5.
36. "A Suggestion on the Negro Problem," pp. 78, 80.

- 37. *Concerning Children* (Boston: Small, Maynard & Co., 1900, 1901), p. 4.
- 38. *Human Work*, p. 133.
- 39. *His Religion and Hers*, p. 116.
- 40. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
- 41. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
- 42. *The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman: An Autobiography*, p. 215.
- 43. *Human Work*, p. 8.
- 44. "The Right to Die," p. 300.
- 45. *The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman: An Autobiography*, p. 333.
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4. Lou Salomé¹ (1861–1937)

SANDRA A. WAWRYTKO

Lou Salomé represents a unique figure in modern western thought – charismatic and cerebral, feminine and forthright, meditative and dynamic. Her extraordinary life and work is most often associated with three major figures – and areas of thought – of her period: Friedrich Nietzsche in philosophy, Rainer Maria Rilke in the arts, and Sigmund Freud in psychoanalysis. Her various liaisons with these central figures has been cause for her inclusion in historical chronicles.

At the same time, however, by being identified with and through this illustrious company, Salomé's position as a philosopher has been compromised, for she has been deprived of due consideration as a significant thinker in her own right. Indeed, her biographies usually center on her role as astute observer and cultivator of genius, most blatantly in Rudolph Binion's description of Salomé as "Nietzsche's Wayward Disciple".² Even Salomé's friend and literary executor, Ernst Pfeiffer, speaks of her as being "dominated" by various male figures at different periods of her life,³ thereby excluding the possibility of mutual influence. Following this trend, the recent resurgence of interest in Salomé's work focuses on her texts which deal with her famous contemporaries.⁴ Our discussion here gives primary emphasis to Salomé's philosophical contributions, to which other concerns, and people, are ancillary.

I. BIOGRAPHY

Louise von Salomé was born on February 12th, 1861 in Petersburg, Russia. Her father, Gustav, a general in the imperial army, had been raised to the nobility and befriended by Czar Nicholas I. Both parents had roots in Germany and Salomé grew up speaking German. The family lived within the exclusive and pampered circle of Protestant German

emigré families brought to Russia to supply professional and technical expertise. Moreover, Salomé led a charmed childhood as the youngest of six children and the only daughter. Despite these advantages and a warm family life, her autobiography reveals an early sense of isolation and loneliness, which she sought to escape through intricate fantasies.⁵

Salomé's loneliness, combined with a disillusion regarding God and religion, led her at age seventeen to seek spiritual consolation from Pastor Hendrik Gillot.⁶ In Gillot she found the religious training she sought, but in addition he displaced her childhood fantasies with a broad philosophical education emphasizing analytical thinking and metaphysics.⁷ When the student-teacher relationship became fraught with romantic overtones, Salomé fled from such attachments. Her reaction first took the form of illness, which in turn became a reason for a move beyond Russia.⁸

Another factor which freed Salomé to leave Russia and explore the intellectual opportunities of the rest of Europe, was the loss of her beloved father early in 1879. Her strong will enabled her to surmount the objections of both her mother (who feared her daughter's health was being injured by her mental exertions⁹) and her brother. In 1880 Salomé arrived in Switzerland, in the company of her mother, to begin a new life using a new name, "Lou", bestowed on her by Gillot at her confirmation.

Salomé's higher education now began in earnest, initiated by religious classes at the university in Zürich in the areas of comparative religion, theology, philosophy and art history.¹⁰ She devoted herself so fully to her studies that they were interrupted by illness. Fortuitously, this led to her subsequent travels through Italy, Germany, Austria, and France, putting her in contact with sources of vital intellectual ferment through a series of stimulating personal relationships (discussed below).

Eventually Salomé persuaded her mother to return to Russia alone, while Salomé created a scandal by living openly for several years with the philosopher Paul Rée, in a platonic mutual quest for knowledge. This arrangement, and relationship, ended in 1887 when Salomé contracted an equally unconventional marriage also devoid of sexual relations.¹¹ Her husband, Fred Charles Andreas, a philologist of exotic heritage specializing in Persia, was fifteen years her senior. Their marriage remained intact for more than forty years despite her intermittent affairs with other men, thus exemplifying her philosophy that sensual love and marital love are not to be mixed.¹² Through this separation Salomé was able to experience love without being irredeemably possessed

by it; she could protect her highly valued personal freedom by never being possessed exclusively, and in all senses, by any one man.¹³

Salomé did not so much challenge the sexist assumptions of her times, as transcend them through her own unconventional lifestyle and strength of will. She tended to regard herself as a thinker first and a woman second.¹⁴ Hence, she did not sense a need to align herself with either the feminists, or with anti-feminist forces.¹⁵ Her writings do not apologize for the “weakness” of the feminine (as compared to the masculine), they vindicate its inherent value.¹⁶

Thus, rather than pursuing the cause of women’s liberation, Salomé felt that being a woman *was* a form of liberation – namely, liberation from the social and natural constraints which burdened men. This may explain her seeming resignation to the condition of women, as reflected in her comment to Freud that ambition is “a great lack, but one which must be allowed to us womenfolk, for why should we bother with ambition?”¹⁷ In the excesses of intellect and its cultural products Salomé senses “a decline of life, a culture obtained by a deficit in life, a culture of the weak [that is, of men].”¹⁸

Despite Salomé’s advocacy of the feminine, others often described her as being possessed of masculine sensibilities and perspectives.¹⁹ This impression probably can be accounted for by her acute and unashamed intellect. Moreover, in regard to her own life, she was determined to let nothing stand in the way of her personal development – neither parental objections nor potentially-stifling love relationships; neither social convention nor religious scruples. This much is made clear in a letter to her first “love” (and first in a series of rejected suitors), Pastor Gillot, as she responds to his objections to her intention to live in platonic bliss with Paul Rée:

I can neither live according to models nor shall I ever be a model for anyone at all; on the contrary – what I shall quite certainly do is make my own life according to myself, whatever may come of it. In this I have no principle to represent, but something much more wonderful – something that is inside oneself and is hot with sheer life, and rejoices and wants to get out.²⁰

II. PHILOSOPHY

The main areas of interest to Salomé in her thought and work are religion and morality, specifically the religious experience, and the philosophy

of women, specifically the experience of love and sexuality.²¹ A strong phenomenological orientation pervades Salomé's philosophy, and is in her lifestyle.²² Thus, in her autobiography she divides her life into a series of momentous experiences – starting with the experience of God, then of her family, love (through Gillot), Russia, friendship (through Paul Rée), and Freud.²³

1. *Philosophy of Religion: The Religious Experience*

Contending against science for recognition as the ultimate arbiter of truth, the relevancy of religion was thrown seriously in doubt during Salomé's time. Endless debates were waged among Positivists (seeking to isolate religion to the misty sphere of values), those seeking to redeem religion (the Neo-Kantian for example), and Nietzsche's "death of God" faction (intent on "overcoming" religion as a barrier to the "revaluation of values"). Others, like Sigmund Freud,²⁴ exposed the myth of religion by revealing its roots in primal psychological needs. An intriguing remark is to be found among an early collection of Salomé's aphorisms – "There's no harm in being godless if you're really rid of God."²⁵ Whether she believed a state of God-riddance was possible is left unresolved here, however her subsequent writings seem to deny such a possibility.

What is both unique and valuable in Salomé's approach to religion is that she does not involve herself in the question of the source of religion nor of how this affects its credibility. To do so, in fact, amounts to a form of the Genetic Fallacy – that is, invalidly dismissing something based solely on its genesis or source. Instead, Salomé begins with the *fact* of religious experience and seeks to evaluate that fundamental human experience on its own grounds. The problem in religion for Salomé is not whether we should believe its claims, but rather what is the most effective content of that belief.²⁶ The "essence of religious thought" is for her the human need to merge "with the powers of the outer world", a need she thought was served equally by sex and art.²⁷

In effect, Salomé initiates her own phenomenology of religion, a philosophical exploration of the phenomena/experience of religion. She views the religious experience as compounded of two contrary feelings existing in creative tension, namely humility (*Demut*) and pride (*Hochmut*). The first of these is the result of our sense of inadequacy in the face of the divine, while the latter arises from our identification with its powers – "only the two together in enigmatic self-contradiction yield that friction from which suddenly, hot and vivid, the flame leaps out," amounting

to a fusion of “the knowledge of our limit, and at that limit the exaltation that grows beyond it.”²⁸

While Salomé’s religious views are often claimed to have been heavily influenced by Nietzsche,²⁹ another possible source of influence seems to have been overlooked – namely Benedict de Spinoza. Salomé became acquainted with Spinoza’s thought during her first serious lessons with Pastor Gillot.³⁰ In him she found a kindred philosophical spirit, much as Friedrich Nietzsche was to be later on in her life. Moreover, her resonance with Spinoza seems to exceed that with Nietzsche, for she carried him with her even into her relationship with Freud.³¹ An early experience recorded in her autobiography demonstrates why Spinoza, who equates God with nature, proved so attractive to her; she describes a “darkly awakening sensation, never again ceasing, conclusive and fundamental, of immeasurable comradeship – in fate . . . with everything that exists.”³²

Just as Spinoza begins his *Ethics* with God, Salomé begins her autobiography with “The Experience of God”. She even asks “What must I do to be blessed?”,³³ echoing Spinoza’s discussion of the blessedness (equivalent to salvation and freedom) which results from the intellectual love of God.³⁴ The joy which Spinoza ascribes to the ultimate intuitive love of God seems similar to Salomé’s own discussion of religious joy in her essays.³⁵

Like Spinoza, Salomé early on interpreted religion within elitist categories.³⁶ The ultimate peak experience of the elitist, however, is not the extreme individualism of Nietzsche, but rather the oneness of the Spinozistic universe: “At these heights of our self we are released from ourselves.”³⁷ Hers was the religion of a freethinker seeking not an external divinity but a return to the self (prefiguring her later doctrine of narcissism).³⁸ A contrast is made by Salomé between the construction of the divine as an anticipation of “the prospects of the future” (found in primitive religion) and as the now more common source of “compensation”: “The two kinds of faith are as sharply and precisely distinguished as creative processes are from neurotic.”³⁹ Salomé, of course, opts for the primitive and healthy form of faith.

2. *The Philosophy of Women: The Experiences of Love and Sexuality*

The nature and role of women were also consistent subjects within Salomé’s work, which naturally led her to a consideration of love and sexuality. Salomé’s concern with women is hardly to be wondered at,

for throughout her life critics could rarely say anything about her work, either to praise or condemn it, without making mention of her gender.⁴⁰ Additionally, she lived in a period when questions about the nature of women were being hotly debated. Salomé did not deny the existence of differences between the sexes, only that these differences decidedly did *not* prove women to be inferior to men. Reacting to the defeminizing tendencies of feminists which threatened these values, Salomé gained a reputation as a reactionary among some.⁴¹

An early essay on women unfortunately has been lost, but we do know that it evoked favorable comments from Nietzsche as a harbinger of things to come.⁴² The tone of that essay probably was reflected in her later writings, however, where she approvingly described woman as possessed of "a special resonance" for truth which transcends logic.⁴³ Since woman is a "more integrated being" than man, "a man as a person cannot limit her: he too will some time become an image of unities that lie beyond him."⁴⁴ The erotic spirituality of women is approximated only by men who are artists and are thus influenced by "that which darkly proceeds beneath all thoughts and will-impulses."⁴⁵

The primal element in women is brought to light in Salomé's discussion of six heroines from Henrik Ibsen's dramas.⁴⁶ Each is compared to a wild duck who has become trapped in an attic. In fact, the wild duck metaphor is a thinly veiled reference to the role of women in Salomé's own society, specifically the artificial confinement imposed by the conventions of marriage. Salomé goes on to analyze each character in terms of their individual reactions to the captivity of social conventions and the deprivation of natural freedom. For some it ends in death, for others in various degrees of liberation from self, society, or both.

Only in the experience of love, Salomé claims, does "our deepest entry into our self" become possible, where the beloved serves as the mere occasion for a return to ourselves, a spiritual homecoming.⁴⁷ So it is that "two are at one only when they remain two".⁴⁸ Describing her love for the poet Rainer Maria Rilke she says the experience was "not only without defiance or guilt-feelings, but comparable to the way you find something blessed, through which the world becomes perfect",⁴⁹ once again conjoining blessedness and perfection in a Spinozistic way. Hence, for Salomé love offered a means of transcending the boundaries of consciousness, by delving our primal depths.⁵⁰

Salomé's theory of human bisexuality (referring to the co-existence of masculine and feminine traits in each person) supports the value of love

as self-realization.⁵¹ Yet she also chooses a feminine form to represent it:

The firmest union of masculinity and femininity is comprised by motherliness, where woman conceives and bears and also generates, protects, and governs the offspring. So it is with the man when he rules and decides, but as a knight in service, i.e., on behalf of the beloved person.⁵²

For Salomé human life is suffused with eroticism – and consequently infidelity.⁵³ This she believed to be especially the case for women, as exemplified in the uniquely feminine symbol of the Madonna as possessed of sanctified sexuality, while male saints are bound to asceticism.⁵⁴

3. *Psychoanalytical Theorizing and Influence*

While many would be tempted to exclude Salomé's psychoanalytical writings from her philosophic opus, such a division of interests assuredly would have been considered artificial by Salomé herself.⁵⁵ Throughout her life Salomé recognized the legitimacy of positing a continuum between the areas of philosophy and psychology – whether in Spinoza's analysis of the emotions or Nietzsche's pronouncement that a great philosophy consists of "the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir".⁵⁶ So, although many have judged her finest work to be the fruit of her association with psychoanalysis, one ought not to forget that this trend of thought merely served as a continuation of her lifelong interests, an attempt to get to the root of philosophical experiences.⁵⁷

As ever, Salomé takes with her to the study of psychoanalysis a mind suited for synthesis. The concepts she encounters there are extended and enriched by her insights. For example, in an early entry to her *Freud Journal* she fills in what she had found lacking in a lecture by Freud:

It is of the essence of his simple and ingenious approach to make something unconscious comprehensible by grasping it in illness and kindred states. Only through pathological material could sure knowledge be won, only there where the inner life makes a detour and betrays a little of itself, is formulated through expression, and can be caught with the logical hook in the shallows between the surface and the depths.⁵⁸

What Salomé points to here are the vast riches of the unconscious of which only a warped view is obtained through psychoanalytical examination. These very riches are what she herself most valued.⁵⁹ Along these same lines, Salomé suggests that Freudian sublimation actually amounts to “our own self-realization”.⁶⁰

Salomé’s concerns with religion and the nature of woman and sexuality may well have been among her primary motivations to pursue psychoanalysis, especially in view of Freud’s demythologizing of religion and his emphasis on sexuality.⁶¹ The primacy of erotic impulses in women is asserted by Salomé when she refers to woman as one “whose spirit is sex, whose sex is spirit”.⁶² Again, Salomé emphasizes woman’s greater connection with primal unity, and thus with eroticism.⁶³

Perhaps Salomé’s greatest, and certainly most original, contribution to psychoanalytic theory comes in her exposition of narcissism as embodying the dual currents of self-love and self-surrender.⁶⁴ This too, however, was a further working out of her previous ideas. Narcissism for Salomé takes a decidedly positive turn. In contrast to Freud’s assessment of narcissism as regressive and pathological, Salomé finds in narcissism “the *creative* element, i.e., the natural and at the same time the spiritual goal of every human development, the *unity* of sex and ego.”⁶⁵ Moreover, narcissism for Salomé implies a continuity with nature, an identification of self within nature as a whole: “Bear in mind that the Narcissus of the legend gazed, not at a man-made mirror, but at the mirror of Nature. Perhaps it was not just himself that he beheld in the mirror, but himself as if he were still All”.⁶⁶ It is this primal unity that Salomé commends when she discusses narcissism.

The primal unity is disrupted by “the primal hurt of all of us . . . the uncomprehending self-abasement of becoming an individual”, which leaves us “homeless and impoverished”.⁶⁷ Thus, as explicated by Salomé, her enriched notion of narcissism ranges across three phases –

1. “a particular developmental stage to be transcended”,
2. the “creative . . . the persistent accompaniment of all our deeper experience, always present, yet still far beyond any possibility of hewing its way from consciousness into the unconscious”, and
3. the “self-knower.”

4. *Later Writings*

After 1914 Salomé undertook a new career as psychoanalyst, one of the very first women to pursue this emerging profession. Patients were

referred to her by Freud himself and others in his circle.⁶⁹ The First World War weighed heavily upon Salomé, and was often a topic of discussion in her diary, causing her to speculate upon war and its root causes.⁷⁰ The opposition of Germany and Russia in the war divided her loyalties. The Russian Revolution of 1917 also touched her deeply, and she reacted strongly against the Bolsheviks and their policies.⁷¹

The last years of Salomé's life were given over to three major works – her books on Rilke (1928), Freud (1931), and herself (published posthumously in 1951). The Rilke book incorporated her work in literary criticism along with psychoanalysis. The Freud text serves as both a tribute to the man and a forum for elaborating her own interpretations of psychoanalytic theory. Her autobiography, originally entitled *Grundriss einiger Lebenserinnerungen* ("Ground-plan of some life-recollections"), was completed in 1932, and later extended. It is written in phenomenological fashion, touching upon events and people Salomé deemed central to her life experience, rather than following an historical pattern of specific dates and facts.

The subject of old age also merited Salomé's meditations as she herself experienced this final stage of her own life: "deep down, knowing how to live and knowing how to die go together."⁷² The move into old age she compared to a move back to the expansive world of childhood.⁷³ Salomé's positive attitude is more noteworthy in view of the illnesses that beset her last years, including diabetes, heart disease, and breast cancer. She died quietly February 5, 1937, shortly before her seventy-sixth birthday. Her last recorded words: "The best is death, after all."⁷⁴

III. INFLUENCES

The philosophic currents of Salomé's time were numerous and complex, with topics ranging from Darwinism to the unconscious, from the death of God and denial of free will to the alternative of Nietzsche's *Übermensch*. Salomé participated in the debates and followed the modern trends in science very closely through her extensive, and distinguished, range of acquaintances. Many of her articles appeared in pacesetting journals such as *Die Freie Bühne*. Of the swirling currents available to her, Naturalism seemed most in accord with Salomé's way of thinking.⁷⁵ Yet it cannot be said that she subordinated herself to any school, only that she sympathized with many.

The circle of notables who successively surrounded Salomé through her life is so complex as to defy elaboration. Here we shall content ourselves with but a few such figures with philosophic significance.⁷⁶

Among the first of Salomé's contacts outside of Russia was Malwida von Meysenbug, feminist writer and political activist. Like Salomé, Meysenbug was born into the German nobility, which she abandoned to follow the cause of revolution in 1848. Having made a way for herself in the world, she was in many ways a suitable role model for Salomé, then plotting her own independence. Certainly they shared a commitment to the cause of equal education for women. Meysenbug's salon for girls in Italy was attended by Salomé in 1882, and it was there that she first met Paul Rée, who in turn introduced her to Friedrich Nietzsche (both friends of Meysenbug).⁷⁷

Among Salomé's most influential friends was the philosopher Paul Rée.⁷⁸ Rée made the connection to Nietzsche possible for Salomé, being a friend of Nietzsche's prior to this time. His relationship with Salomé was very warm and intimate, but devoid of sexuality (on her insistence). Together they explored the realm of ethics and religion, both of which Rée's positivism rejected as irrational fantasies. Their friendship lasted until her sudden marriage to Andreas, which sent Rée irrevocably away from her and into the life of a dedicated and isolated physician (his intentions toward philosophy having been thwarted by continued lack of success in the academic arena).

From the standpoint of history, the most significant philosophical acquaintance of Salomé was Friedrich Nietzsche.⁷⁹ Their actual period of contact lasted less than eight months. From all available accounts, the relationship seemed quite asymmetrical, with Nietzsche alone envisioning it as leading to a major commitment.⁸⁰ Salomé sought a "brother" for her work and studies, Nietzsche a disciple and lover. On the positive side, their relationship served as a catalyst for his major work, *Also Sprach Zarathustra* (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*). Nietzsche later admitted "of all acquaintances I have made the most valuable and full of consequence is the one with Fräulein Salomé. Only since knowing her was I ripe for my Zarathustra."⁸¹

The brief Salomé-Nietzsche relationship should be described less in terms of mutual influence than in terms of mutual confirmation. Each found in the other a validation of their deepest, and most profound, thinking and feeling about life. Hence, commenting on their long dialogues, Salomé observes in her diary – "We kept coming to those dizzying spots where one had once climbed alone to look down into the depths."⁸²

For Salomé it was another opportunity afforded by intellectual intercourse to fill the void of loneliness which was her heritage from childhood.

It seems a grave oversight that so little recognition is given to Salomé for stimulating serious discussion of Nietzsche's philosophy through her groundbreaking text, *Friedrich Nietzsche in his Works* (1894). Running through the text is her thesis, shared with Nietzsche, of the autobiographical character of any philosophy. This judgment is summarized in her statement that Nietzsche's life consisted of "a falling ill from thoughts and a getting well from thoughts," and again "Not what the spiritual history of mankind is, but how his own spiritual history is to be understood as that of the whole of mankind, that was for him the main question."⁸³

As in the case of Nietzsche and Spinoza, Salomé's relationship with Sigmund Freud was one of mutual anticipation rather than discipleship. Freud maintained the greatest respect for Salomé as both a professional and a person, numbering her among his honored "co-workers and co-fighters" rather than as inferior disciple. Moreover, he pays tribute to her "as a new weapon for the truth of the analytical teachings".⁸⁴ In tribute to her book, *Mein Dank an Freud (My Thanks to Freud)*, Freud declared it "an involuntary proof of your superiority over us all, which accords with the heights from which you came down to us."⁸⁵

Finally, mention must be made of the intimate intellectual, spiritual, and physical relationship between Salomé and the poet Rainer Maria Rilke. Although thirteen years her junior, Rilke formed a close attachment to Salomé which lasted throughout his life and significantly impacted his development as an artist.⁸⁶ Her advice to him spanned the areas of art and mental health, the two of which seemed inseparable for Salomé.⁸⁷ She in turn was influenced by Rilke in her thoughts on art and the artistic process, and came to participate in his creativity.⁸⁸ The final outcome can be seen in Salomé's work on the poet from a psychoanalytical standpoint,⁸⁹ along with her pronouncement:

Human life – indeed all life – is poetry. We live it unconsciously day by day, piece by piece, but in its inviolable wholeness it lives us.⁹⁰

IV. CONCLUSIONS

In summing up the life and work of Lou Salomé, it is somewhat paradoxically true that, despite her many relationships, she was "a woman

thinking alone”.⁹¹ Although exposed to the ideas of many of the strongest-willed and famous individuals of the age, she was able to maintain her identity as an independent spirit who refused to be trapped by conventional labels or categories. This very independence may explain why so many of her interpreters have accused her of intellectual perversity and even inconsistency. Still, the phenomenological tone of her writings is consistent with her guiding principle that “we know only that which we experience.”⁹²

Two keynotes of Salomé’s thought are her continual reference to dualities and the image of home. In fact, the two elements are intertwined in that we return home to the primal oneness (as in narcissism) after our excursion into the dualities of life. Her arguments on a myriad of subjects are outlined under the headings of dual concepts – whether humility versus pride in religious experience, the wild and domesticated animals of her Ibsen discussion, the tensions between art and illness in Nietzsche, or the conflicting temptations of surrender and assertion in sexual experience. Later Salomé adopted the psychoanalytic term “ambivalence” to convey this root reality, describing it as “nothing but the polarity or duality which life never outgrows, and all creative activity on which the culture of humanity rests flowers from it.”⁹³

Understood in her own right, Salomé has left behind invaluable critical accounts of those around her – most notably Nietzsche, Rilke, Freud. In these accounts her incisive mind is always clearly at work, shifting and analyzing one moment, synthesizing the next, extending the original thoughts above and beyond the intentions of their initiators. Speaking for Nietzsche, Binion writes “no idea, he well knew, was ever the same for having been discussed with her.”⁹⁴

Salomé is especially to be valued for her insights into questions of philosophical interest offered from the rarely heard woman’s perspective. If her comments on religion, art, love, and sexuality occasionally confound the reader, this may be due to the fact that she presents us with new phenomenological categories to complement those of masculine thinkers. For example, Spinoza’s denial of mind-body dualism breathes most expressively in her writings. Reacting to the beauties of spring while traveling northward from Italy toward Germany Salomé exclaims “*if* human receptivity were only more capable of nuance and were more deepreaching, the Immeasurable would await us in the most Earthly.”⁹⁵

Thus, when criticism is leveled at her concepts the fault may lie more in the deficiency of the interpreters than in Salomé herself. In

particular, her recognition of the limits of logic lead her to put forth contradictory statements. Yet she does so with full cognizance of the contradictoriness, which is an inevitable by-product of having transcended logical categories, or perhaps of having substituted a both/and logic for the either/or of mutual exclusivity.⁹⁶ Her statements are intended to provoke our own thinking, to challenge the reader to participate in the very process of her thought which reflects the process of life itself – “In the fundamental condition that accompanies us all our lives (and especially penetrates all creative experience) . . . megalomania *and* absolute dependence seem to flow into one another”.⁹⁷

Emphasizing these same lines of thought, future research needs to reconsider the significant impact of Spinozistic philosophy upon her overall outlook. Yet, here too, her interpretations remain provocative, as when she explains the strict determinism of the Spinozistic universe as “a principle of universal reciprocity” which takes us “from the empirical world of movement to the eternal rest of his philosophy” which is simultaneously “the most passionate ecstasy”.⁹⁸ Spinoza’s perspective is most especially evoked in the life-affirmation which pervades Salomé’s thought. Livingstone calls this Salomé’s characteristic “profound *joie de vivre*”, which stands in sharp contrast to “the strenuously achieved affirmations of Nietzsche, the lamentations and anguished acclamations of Rilke and the scepticism [sic] and final misanthropy of Freud.”⁹⁹

The criticism has been made that Salomé’s writings lack cohesiveness and that her style is problematic.¹⁰⁰ This may be accounted for in part by the sporadic nature of her formal education, especially at the university level. Nonetheless this flaw need not prevent us from realizing the brilliance of her thoughts, even when wrapped in stylistic obscurities. Instead, it should spur us on to more assiduous digging to find the treasures buried beneath. For example, the contents of the *Freud Journal* extend far beyond what the title would lead one to expect, wandering far and wide across Salomé’s own intellectual landscape, to integrate observations on epistemology, philosophical methodology, ethics, and aesthetics with the expected psychoanalytical topics.

Perhaps Salomé’s most fitting epitaphs have been written by those who knew her as both a person and an intellect. Her sometime lover and longtime friend, Rilke observes:

. . . she turns all that books and people bring her at the right moment into the most blessed comprehension, . . . she understands, and loves,

and moves fearlessly among the most burning mysteries – that do nothing to her, only beam at her with pure firelight.¹⁰¹

From the end of her life we have the comment of another acquaintance:

She loved the spirit and was at home in the world of solitude.¹⁰²

NOTES

1. At the outset we must acknowledge a conflict in terms of the very name of our subject. Often she is referred to by her birth name, Salomé. In other cases this name is combined with that of her husband, F. C. Andreas, as Andreas-Salomé. In this essay we will refer to her as Lou Salomé.
2. It has been said of Salomé that “during five decades she made acquaintances in artistic and learned circles in Berlin, Munich, Vienna, Paris and Petersburg, and the full story of them would be something approaching a history of modern European culture”; Angela Livingstone, *Salomé: Her Life and Work* (Moyer Bell Limited, 1984), p. 10. A notable exception to this general rule of subordinating Salomé’s life to that of her famous friends comes in Livingstone’s meticulously researched, yet not completely uncritical, book. Livingstone refers to Binion as “the most energetic of her [Salomé’s] posthumous detractors” (p. 12). Binion also seems to suffer from the common obsession with Salomé’s unorthodox lifestyle, especially as concerns her relationships with men. One might well ask whether the emphasis on her personal life, which severely inhibits an objective evaluation of her work, would have been practiced had she been a man.

The routine denigration of Salomé’s work is exemplified by Walter Kaufmann’s cavalier remarks in his Foreword (p. v) to Binion’s nearly six hundred page text, *Frau Lou: Nietzsche’s Wayward Disciple* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968):

The bulk of this volume is not out of proportion to the importance of its subject, for *Frau Lou* is more significant than Lou’s own books. In the case of most biographies the opposite may be taken for granted, but in this case the author’s own reach exceeds the woman whose biography he offers us. . . .

This approach is especially questionable in light of Binion’s admission that he failed to acquire unrestricted access to Salomé’s unpublished papers from the proprietor of her literary estate, Ernst Pfeiffer, a situation he chooses to interpret as an attempt at “covering up for Lou’s autobiographical aberrations” (p. 557). His chapter titles echo his distaste for the very subject of his analysis – “The Unholy Trinity”, “Super-

- Lou and Rainer", "Russia In, Rainer Out", "At Freud's Elbow", and "Revamping the Past". Significantly, Livingstone was not working under similar restrictions of access to Salomé's unpublished papers.
3. Ernst Pfeiffer in his Introduction to *Sigmund Freud and Lou Andreas-Salomé Letters*, trans. William and Elaine Robson-Scott (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc, 1972), pp. 1-6.
 4. Thus, the texts chosen for translation into English (as part of an Austrian-German Culture Series) and releases by Black Swan Press include: *Freud* (1986), *Ibsen's Heroines* (1985), *Nietzsche* (1986), *Rilke* (1986).
 5. Salomé reports that she was "miserably lonely with all of them and closely devoted to my fantasy life as my only joy". "Childhood, Ego, and World" in *The Freud Journal of Lou Andreas-Salomé*, trans. Stanley A. Leavy (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), p. 93.
 6. Hendrik Gillot (1836-1916) was a Dutch pastor who attracted a devoted following among the Petersburg elite, especially among the women, due to his engaging rhetoric and dynamic personality. In her letter of introduction to Gillot, Salomé offers a self-description:

The person writing to you, Herr Pastor, is a seventeen-year-old-girl who is lonely in the midst of her family and surroundings, lonely in the sense that no one shares her views, let alone satisfies her longing for fuller knowledge. . . . it is so bitter to close everything up in oneself because one would otherwise give offence, bitter to stand so wholly alone because one lacks that easy-going agreeable manner which wins people's trust and love.

- Unpublished letter dated May 1 (1878) and quoted by Livingstone, p. 24. Despite her lessons with Gillot, and quite possibly because of those lessons, Salomé's religious sense never returned to an orthodox expression.
7. At the time of their meeting Gillot was undertaking a translation of Otto Pfleiderer's *Philosophy of Religion on a Historical Foundation* (1878) into Dutch. Salomé's notebooks from this period reveal that her curriculum encompassed history and phenomenology of religion, comparative religion (Christianity in comparison with Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam), primitive rituals, philosophy, logic, epistemology, dogmatism, the doctrine of the Trinity, Old Testament Messianism, French theatre and literature, and German literature. Her readings included Kant, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Rousseau, Voltaire, Leibniz, Fichte, and Schopenhauer. See H. F. Peters, *My Sister, My Spouse: A Biography of Lou Andreas-Salomé* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), pp. 53-54.
 8. Later in her life Salomé enthusiastically returned to her Russian roots by studying the language and culture. This interest was shared by her then-lover, the poet Rainer Maria Rilke, and the two traveled through Russia together twice, encountering among other greats Leo Tolstoy. Her writings on Russia include:

- “Russische Dichtung und Kultur” (“Russian Poetry and Culture”), 1897
- “Das russische Heiligenbild und sein Dichter” (“The Russian Saintly Image and Its Poet”), 1898
- “Russische Philosophie und semitischer Geist” (“Russian Philosophy and Semitic Spirit”), 1898
- “Bilder aus der Geschichte und Litteratur Russlands” (“Images from the History and Literature of Russia”), 1898
- “Leo Tolstoi, unser Zeitgenosse” (“Leo Tolstoy, Our Contemporary”), 1898
- “Die Russen” (“The Russians”), 1909
- “Der russische Intelligenz” (“The Russian Intelligence”), 1919
- “Der geistliche Russe” (“The Spiritual Russian”) 1919
- “Unser Anteil an Dostoevski und Tolstoi” (“Our Share in Dostoevsky and Tolstoy”), 1920
- “Russische Romantik” (“Russian Romanticism”), 1921
- “Tendenz und Form russischer Dichtung” (“The Tendency and Form of Russian Poetry”), 1922
- “Rilke in Russland” (“Rilke in Russia”), 1928.

In addition, a Russian setting is given to three of Salomé’s novels *Fenitschka* (1898), *Ma* (1901), and *Rodinka: Russische Erinnerung* (*A Russian Reminiscence*) (1923).

9. Lest we judge Frau Salomé’s reservations to be relics of a bygone sexist era, it should be noted that Walter Kaufmann cites among the elements of the “central story line” in Salomé’s life “the pathology of brilliance.” Foreword to Binion’s biography, *Frau Lou*, p. vii.
10. In Zürich Salomé impressed one of her professors, Alois Biedermann (1819–1885), as being “a fundamentally pure being who had, however, with exceptional energy concentrated solely on mental development . . . a *diamond*” [“den innersten Grund reinen und lauern Wesens, das aber mit einer ungewöhnlichen Energie sich ganz ausschliesslich auf das Interesse der geistigen Ausbildung konzentriert hat . . . ein *Demant*.”] Letter from Biedermann to Salomé’s mother, July 7, 1883, in *Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Rée, Lou von Salomé: Die Dokumente ihrer Begegnung* (*Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Rée, Lou von Salomé: the Documents of their Meeting*), ed. E. Pfeiffer (Frankfurt, 1970), p. 319; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 27. Biedermann also presented Salomé with a copy of his book, *Christian Dogmatism* (1869), inscribed as follows: “The spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God” [Der Geist erforschet alle Dingen, auch die Tiefen der Gottheit]; quoted in trans. by Peters, p. 66 and in German by Pfeiffer in his notes to *Lebensrückblick: Grundriss einiger Lebenserinnerungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1968), p. 250.
11. The seeds for this kind of platonic marital relationship may have been planted while Salomé was still in Russia. Among her generation there were reports of “fictitious marriages” contracted by members of the intelligentsia as a social convenience “for the purpose of their mutual improvement”;

see Peters, p. 44. Also relevant is the fact that Andreas coerced Salomé into marriage through a bloody suicide attempt, stabbing himself in her presence.

12. "I have never understood why people who are in love in a predominantly sensual way get *married*" ["ich habe nie begriffen, warum Leute, die ineinander vorwiegend sinnlich verliebt sind, sich *vermählen*."] Diary note, October 31, 1888, trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 62. German original quoted by Pfeiffer in his notes to *Lebensrückblick*, p. 309.
13. By this means Salomé resolved in her own life the tensions between feminine surrender and masculine assertion which are so graphically represented in so many of the heroines in her works of fiction. See note 16 below.
14. Sigmund Freud's obituary corroborates this view of Salomé, reading in part: "Whoever came close to her received the strongest impression of the genuineness and the harmony of her being and could see, to his astonishment, that all feminine, perhaps most human, weaknesses were foreign to her or had been overcome in her course of life." Quoted by Livingstone, p. 236 (note to p. 193). Daughter Anna Freud agreed, stating "the unusual thing about her was what ought actually to be quite usual in a human being – honesty, directness, absence of any weakness, self-assertion without selfishness"; letter from Anna Freud to Ernst Pfeiffer, quoted by Livingstone, p. 11.

Binion espouses quite the opposite opinion, stating that Salomé's "trouble in being a woman was at the source – indeed, practically *was* the source – of her whole mental life", p. ix. This reputed source is minutely delved in Binion's psychobiographical sketch, in terms of Salomé's "anal-sexual cravings" and their increasingly complex manifestations against the men in her life.

15. Many close friends of Salomé were feminists nonetheless, such as Malwida von Meysenbug (born 1816–1903; author of *Mémoires d'une Idéaliste* (*Memoirs of an Idealist*), 1869), feminist writer and political activist, and Helen Stöcker (1869–1943), a key member of the radical feminist movement in Germany. Another close woman friend was Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach (1830–1916), a distinguished Viennese novelist.
16. This point will be demonstrated below in Salomé's writings on the philosophy of women. The same philosophy, and the same variation from main feminist themes of the times, appears within the unusual women characters in her works of fiction. Livingstone (p. 212) describes their general personality type:

Lou Salomé's women do not and cannot succumb. In one way or another, they get clear of their men and discover their freer self. Because she is interested in the women who can do this – by definition the extraordinary ones – she is less concerned with the social question and with the liberation of women who, even if quite gifted and vital, are weaker and tied to men. She is not concerned with the loneliness of marriage but with the acceptance of unmarried solitude.

See also Leonie Müller-Loreck, *Die Erzählende Dichtung Lou Andreas-Salomé: Ihr Zusammenhang mit der Literatur um 1900* (Stuttgart: Akademischer Verlag Hans-Dieter Heinz, 1976).

A further proof of Salomé's pro-feminine attitude is to be seen in her criticism of Alfred Adler: "I considered it unproductive that, in order for him to cling to the terms 'above' and 'below' and 'masculine protest,' the 'feminine' must always have a negative sign, while passivity as such, functioning sexually or generally, is a *positive* foundation of ego function." October 28, 1913, *Freud Journal*, p. 34. See also her letter to Adler, August 12, 1913, p. 160. To understand the import of Salomé's position, and forestall the criticism that is betrays a masculine devaluation of the feminine, the term "passivity" may be replaced by "receptivity". This interpretive approach is found in Sandra A. Wawrytko, *The Undercurrent of "Feminine" Philosophy in Eastern and Western Thought* (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1981).

17. Letter to Freud, March 18, 1919. In *Freud Salomé Letters*, p. 95. Elsewhere, noting the debates within Freud's school, Salomé observes "the tasks of the sexes in this world have been done separately and still in union. For men fight. Women give thanks."; April 2, 1913, *Freud Journal*, p. 130. As if to illustrate this truth, Salomé titled her work on Freud *My Thanks to Freud*.
18. "The Commonplace – Man and Woman", *Freud Journal*, p. 118. Salomé also notes "it is really woman's only cultural attainment that she isolates sexuality from her experiences less than a man is able to do"; January 21, 1913, *Freud Journal*, p. 80. According to Salomé it is through the "feminization" of culture that radical ideas are "permitted to be entertained and boldly stated", citing as an example the Baroque period in France, which culminated in the French Revolution; "Baroque", *Freud Journal*, p. 121. Vera Lee has written about this period in her appropriately named text, *The Reign of Women In Eighteenth-Century France* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1975).
19. This assessment of Salomé's character as "transcending" the feminine is evident in early observations of her. Thus, Professor Biedermann in his letter to Salomé's mother describes the daughter as having "a quite unchild-like, almost unfeminine, direction of her mind and independence of will" ["unkindlicher, fast unweiblicher Richtung des Geistes und Selbständigkeit des Willens"]. Letter from Biedermann to Salomé's mother, July 7, 1883, *Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Rée, Lou von Salomé: The Documents of their meeting*, p. 319; trans. and quoted by Peters, p. 66. Friedrich Nietzsche, spurned lover, still was able to muster an affirming reception for Salomé's first novel, published in 1885, *Im Kampf um Gott*, declaring "if it is certainly not the Eternal-Feminine that draws this girl onward, perhaps it is the Eternal-Masculine" ["wenn es gewiss nicht das Ewig-Weibliche ist, was dieses Mädchen hinanzieht, so vielleicht das Ewig-Männliche"]. Letter to Heinrich von Stein, October 15, 1885; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 55. German original quoted by Pfeiffer in his notes to *Lebensrückblick*, p. 262. For similar assessments of Salomé's character from other sources see Livingstone, p. 30.

20. "Ich kann weder Vorbildern nachleben, noch werde ich jemals ein Vorbild darstellen können für wen es auch sei, hingegen mein eignes Leben nach mir selber bilden, das werde ich ganz gewiss, mag es nun damit gehn wie es mag. Damit habe ich ja kein Prinzip zu vertreten, sondern etwas viel Wundervolleres, – etwas, das in Einem selber steckt und ganz heiss von lauter Leben ist und jauchzt und heraus will." A letter to Gillot written in Rome, dated March 26, 1882. She felt it significant enough to include the entire text in her *Lebensrückblick*, pp. 77–79; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 36.

Reflective of this same spirit is Salomé's poem "Lebensgebet" ("Prayer to Life") (*Lebensrückblick*, pp. 38–39; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 28), also written during this period of her life:

Truly, the way a friend loves friend
Is how I love you, riddle, life –
Whether I've rejoiced in you or wept,
Whether you've brought me joy or grief.

I love you, with your sorrow too;
And if you must destroy me, still,
I'll tear myself from your arms, as friend
Tears himself from the bosom of friend.

I clasp you with my strength entire!
May your flame kindle me, your riddle
Even in the ardour of the battle
Only more deeply plumb my depths.

Millennia-long to be! to think!
Enclose me fast in both your arms;
If you've no happiness left to give me –
Well then! you still possess your pain.

[Gewiss, so liebt ein Freund den Freund
Wie ich Dich liebe, Rätselleben –
Ob ich in Dir gejauchzt, geweint,
Ob Du mir Glück, ob Schmerz gegeben.

Ich liebe Dich samt Deinem Harme;
Und wenn Du mich vernichten musst,
Entreisse ich mich Deinem Arme,
Wie Freund sich reisst von Freundesbrust.

Mit ganzer Kraft umfass ich Dich!
Lass Deine Flammen mich entzünden,
Lass noch in Glut des Kampfes mich
Dein Rätsel tiefer nur ergründen.

Jahrtausende zu sein! zu denken!
Schliess mich in beide Arme ein:
Hast Du kein Glück mehr zu schenken –
Wohlan – noch hast Du Deine Pein.]

The piece so enthralled Nietzsche that he set it to music. Salomé retained a life-affirming attitude throughout her life, writing in 1912 "life is only truly life when it signifies not comfort but procreation, a synthesis of pain and happiness, misery and bliss." In: "Lecture: Therapy of the Neuroses – Transference – Intellect and Affect", *Freud Journal*, p. 72. See also her comments under "Sexuality and Ego", p. 85.

21. Another lifelong interest for Salomé was art, both as creative act and created product. However, with a few exceptions, her writings in this area fall somewhat short of a philosophy of art and are more appropriately to be termed literary criticism. Many of her articles were written for *Die Freie Bühne*, a literary journal advocating socialist politics and artistic naturalism. Salomé stresses the continuum between the experience of the artist and ordinary human experience, with art as a therapeutic means to the end of the spiritual blessedness she speaks of in a religious context. See Livingstone, appendix F, "Lou Andreas-Salomé's writings on Art", pp. 227–28.

These works include:

- *Henrik Ibsen's Frauen-Gestalten*, 1891
- "Ein holländisches Urteil über moderne deutsche Dramen" ("A Dutch Judgment of Modern German Drama"), 1891
- "Ibsen, Strindberg, Sudermann", 1893
- "Scandinavische Dichter" ("Scandinavian Poets"), 1896
- "Grundformen der Kunst" ("Primary Forms of Art"), 1899
- "Vom Kunstaffekt" ("On the Affect of Art"), 1899
- "Erleben" ("Experiencing"), 1899
- "Lebende Dichtung" ("Living Poetry"), 1908
- "Realität und Gesetzlichkeit im Geschlechtsleben" ("Reality and Lawfulness in Sexual Life"), 1912
- "Kind und Kunst" ("The Child and Art"), 1914
- "Des Dichters Erleben" ("The Poet's Experience"), 1919.

Additionally, there are numerous reviews of specific artists and specific works. See also Salomé's works on Russian literature, noted above.

22. The roots of Salomé's characteristic phenomenological method may perhaps be sought in her rich fantasy life as a child, recorded in her autobiographical essay "Im Spiegel" ("In the Mirror"), *Das Literarische Echo*, October 15, 1911, as well as in her *Lebensrückblick*. For Salomé the perfect technique in literature ("that old dream of mine!") would substitute "poetic creativity" for "spatiotemporal representation" and would impart an "epic" quality to the work; "Technique of Dreaming and Waking – Poetic Technique", *Freud Journal*, pp. 49–50.
23. It seems significant that Salomé does *not* use the term experience ("Erlebnis") in relation to either her husband (the section is entitled simply "F. C. Andreas") or her lover Rilke (who merits two chapters – "Mit Rainer" and "Nachtrag: 'April, unser Monat, Rainer –'"). Also, Gillot and Rée are downgraded to being a means to the end of more funda-

- mental experiences (love, "Liebeserleben", and friendship, "Freundeserleben", respectively), while God, Russia, and Freud share the same grammatical construction ("Das Erlebnis Gott", "Das Erlebnis Russland", "Das Erlebnis Freud"), which highlights their importance for Salomé.
24. Freud's work culminated in *Totem and Taboo*, which was being written around the time Salomé joined his psychoanalytical circle in Vienna.
 25. "Es schadet nichts, gottlos zu sein, wenn man Gott nur wirklich los ist." From Salomé's *Stibbe Nestbuch* (*Stibbe Nest-Book*), written during her brief relationship with Nietzsche. Included in *Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Rée, Lou von Salomé: The Documents of their Meeting*, p. 192; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 49.
 26. In "Jesus der Jude" ("Jesus as Jew") Salomé sets forth what came to be known as the "back-effect" (*Rückwirkung*) concept of religion:

If one starts from the human being instead of – as one used to – from the God, then one realizes almost involuntarily that the actual religious phenomenon comes to be present in the *back-effect* of a godhead – no matter how it arose – upon the person who believes in that godhead.

pp. 342–43. Trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 75.

Other essays on religion include:

- "Der Realismus in der Religion" ("Realism in Religion"), 1891
 - "Harnack und das Apostolikum" ("Harnack and the Apostolic Creed"), 1892
 - "Gottesschöpfung" ("God-Creation"), 1892
 - "Von der Bestie bis zum Gott (der Totemismus bei den Ursemiten)" ("From the beast to the God"), 1894
 - "Das Problem des Islams" ("The Problem of Islam"), 1894
 - "Von Ursprung des Christenthums" ("On the Origin of Christianity"), 1895
 - "Aus der Geschichte Gottes" ("From the History of God"), 1897
 - "Vom religiösen Affekt" ("On the Religious Affect"), 1898
 - "Religion und Kultur" ("Religion and Culture"), 1898
 - "Der Egoismus in der Religion" ("Egoism in Religion"), 1899.
27. January 15, 1913, *Freud Journal*, p. 78. Salomé refers to sexual intercourse as "an absolute symbol of spiritual union", "Infidelity", p. 125, and mentions "the original religious meaning of human union in the sex act" as a sharing with the divine in "the sacrificial feast", "On Libido", p. 152. With regard to ancient art, Salomé contends "not only does the spiritual manifest itself materially in the work of art (which was of course at the same time the work of religion). But matter itself is a symbol."; "Sexuality", p. 186. Elsewhere she identifies the reality underlying our experiences: "In the final analysis every object [artistic, religious, and sexual] is a substitute, and in the strict psychoanalytic sense a *symbol*,

for all that abundance of unconscious meaning, inexpressible itself, associated with it.”; “In creative art, if anywhere, we find the colors and the shapes by which the divine is approximated in earthly form.” “Narzismus als Doppelrichtung”, *Imago*, 7 (1921); trans. Stanley A. Leavy as “The Dual Orientation of Narcissism”, *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 31, #1, (1962), 10, 30.

28. “Realism in Religion”, 1028; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 76.
29. See for example Livingstone, pp. 74–86.
30. One of the most significant of the philosophers initiating the modern period, Spinoza was born and lived his life in Holland from 1632 to 1677. Although of Jewish heritage, he was ostracized from the Jewish community early on due to the provocative and radical nature of his thought, becoming the first westerner to survive without formal religious affiliations. His most important work was *The Ethics*, which encompasses metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical concerns in a sweeping system.
31. An entire section is devoted to Spinoza in the *Freud Journal*, pp. 74–76. Only the philosopher Max Scheler is accorded a similar honor in this text, although without the accompanying effusiveness of tone.

Of Spinoza, Salomé states “It is a quality of Spinoza that a few pages by him can teach us whether we are his disciples, whereas big interpretive works have been written about him based on the most erudite misunderstandings. For to think like him does not mean to adopt a system but just to think.” Further, she deems the Spinozistic system to be “the philosophical step that goes beyond Freud. . . . It delights me that the one thinker I approached in my childhood and almost adored now meets me once again, and as the philosopher of psychoanalysis. Think far enough, correctly enough on any point at all and you hit upon him; you meet him waiting for you, standing ready at the side of the road.”

It is clear from Nietzsche’s writings that he did not share Salomé’s enthusiasm for Spinoza: “. . . consider the hocus-pocus of mathematical form with which Spinoza clad his philosophy – really ‘the love of *his* wisdom,’ to render that word fairly and squarely – in mail and mask, to strike terror at the very onset into the hearts of any assailant who would dare to glance at that invincible maiden and Pallas Athena: how much personal timidity and vulnerability this masquerade of a sick hermit betrays!” [“. . . gar jener Hokuspokus von mathematischer Form mit der Spinoza seine Philosophie – ‘die Liebe zu *seiner* Weisheit’ zu letzt, das Wort richtig und billig ausgelegt – wie in Erzpanzer und maskierte, um, damit vonhereinden Mut des Angreifenden ein zuschüchtern, der auf diese unüberwindliche Jungfrau und Pallas Athene den Blick zu werfen wagen würde – wieviel eigne Schüchternheit und Angreifbarkeit verrät diese Maskerade eines einsiedlerischen Kranken!”] “On the Prejudices of the Philosophers”, 5, *Beyond Good and Evil* [“Von den Vorurteilen der Philosophen”, 5, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* in *Friedrich Nietzsche: Werke in Drei Bänden*, vol. II (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1960), pp. 570–71.

32. “[E]ine damals dunkel erwachende, nie mehr ablassende durchschlagende Grundempfindung unermesslicher Schicksals-genossenschaft mit allem,

was ist." *Lebensrückblick*, p. 22; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 22.

33. "Realism in Religion", 1029; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 77.
34. Moreover, Spinoza states that blessedness consists of "the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love toward men", *Ethics*, Part V, Corollary to Prop. xxxvi. *The Chief Works of Spinoza*, Volume II, trans. R. H. Elwes (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), p. 265.
35. See specifically "From the History of God" and "On the Religious Affect". A further parallel between Salomé and Spinoza consists in their common sense of the unity of body and soul/mind. For example, she writes "Naturally any psychic illness is also a physical illness, the sole question being whether it lies within the realm of what we can grasp and define as organic illness"; October 30, 1912, *Freud Journal*, p. 38. And later in the *Journal* she observes "we understand as 'physical' just that which is not psychically accessible, that which we do not feel to be identical with our own ego in itself, and hence that which we place at a distance from the ego, i.e., as distinct from the mental . . . the bodily processes equivalent to mental processes are hidden from us."; "Physical and Psychical", p. 54.

Unlike Spinoza, Salomé takes sexuality as the exemplification of this truth of non-dualism. "Our sexuality has no more important task than this, to unite us with the real world by the bridge of our physical nature."; "Perversions", *Freud Journal*, p. 122. "The mark of sexuality is that it may be viewed from two sides, from both the mental and the physical; it is here where all mental disorders and neuroses meet, as if at the point of intersection which exemplifies the whole."; December 9, 1912, *Freud Journal*, p. 68. See also Salomé's essay, "Gedanken über das Liebesproblem" ("Thoughts on the Problem of Love").

36. See "From the History of God", as discussed by Livingstone, pp. 81–82. Again we see here a parallel with Spinoza, who ends the *Ethics* as follows: "How could it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great labour [sic] be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare."; V, Note to Prop. xlii, p. 271.

While noting the "growing tradition of Bible criticism in nineteenth century Germany" as influential in Salomé's case (p. 233, note to p. 75), Livingstone neglects the veritable origin of such criticism in Spinoza's first work, the *Theologico-Political Treatise* (1670). The text stands as a radical (for its time) proposal for religious freedom, including a momentous rending of philosophy from its centuries-long (in the West) subjugation to religion. As a result, philosophy is given dominion over truth while to faith is relegated piety. Accordingly, religion appeals to the imagination, the level of the masses, and philosophy to reason and intuition.

As for Spinoza's influence in the German-speaking world at the time of Salomé, R. H. Elwes writes in 1883 (in his introduction to his translations *The Chief Works of Spinoza*, volume I): "The brilliant novelist, Auerbach, has not only translated his [Spinoza's] complete works, but

has also made his history the subject of a biographical romance [*Spinoza: ein Denkerleben*, 1855]. Among German philosophers Kant is, perhaps, the last, who shows no traces of Spinozism." Reprint of the original text (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1951), p. viii.

37. "On the Religious Affect", trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 83. This view is repeated in her doctrine of narcissism in psychoanalysis.
38. Writing in her 1882 Tautenberg diary on August 18, 1882 (composed during a month long stay with Nietzsche) Salomé observes: "In the free-thinker, the religious emotion cannot relate itself to some divinity or heaven outside, where those forces that give rise to religion – like weakness, fear and greed – can be accommodated. In the freethinker, the religious need . . . thrown back upon itself, as it were, can become a heroic force, an urge to sacrifice himself to some noble purpose." In this sense she saw Nietzsche as "the prophet of a new religion and it will be one that seeks heroes for disciples." ["Im Freigeiste kann das religiöse Empfinden sich auf kein Göttliches und keinen Himmel ausser sich beziehen, in denen die religionsbildenden Kräfte wie Schwäche, Furcht und Habsucht ihre Rechnung fänden. Im Freigeiste kann das durch die Religionen entstandene religiöse Bedürfen . . . gleichsam auf sich selbst zurückgeworfen, zur heroischen Kraft seines Wesens werden, zum Drang der Selbsthingabe einem grossen Ziele."] Trans. and quoted by Peters, p. 123; German original from *Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Rée, Lou von Salomé: The Documents of their Meeting*, p. 184.
39. November 12, 1912, *Freud Journal*, p. 45.
40. Commenting on Salomé's Ibsen book, Wilhelm Blösche both identifies it as the best available book on the subject and describes its author as a problematic "modern woman"; "Sechs Kapitel Psychologie nach Ibsen", *Die Freie Bühne*, 1891, vol. 2, 272–74; as trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 90. In a more enlightened vein, Fritz Mauthner notes "it is only right and delightful that it is a woman who has so well understood old Henrik's praise of women"; "Henrik Ibsens Frauen-Gestalten", *Das Magazin für Literatur*, February, 1892, 135; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 90.

The same sexism pervades both the denunciations of as well as the praise for Salomé's book on Nietzsche; see Livingstone, pp. 97–98. Representative is the following quote from Henri Albert: "Nietzsche cannot repeat often enough his low estimation of women and – cruel irony! – his work is most intimately understood – by a woman!"; *Mercure de France*, February, 1893, quoted by C. A. Bernoulli in *Franz Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche Eine Freundschaft* (Jena, 1908), p. 389; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 97.

41. Salomé is listed as one of three reactionary women by Hedwig Dohm in her article "Reaktion in der Frauenbewegung" ("Reaction in the Women's Movement"), *Die Zukunft*, November 11, 1899; 272–91. Nonetheless, Salomé did follow the literature of feminism and expressed sympathy for its views. A diary note includes her approval of a work by American feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *Women and Economics*; cf. Livingstone, p. 134.

42. Salomé reports in her diary for August 14, 1882 that, based on this essay, Nietzsche declared it would be a pity if the world were deprived of a "monument of your full and inward spirit." ["Vergessen Sie niemals, dass es ein Jammer wäre, wenn Sie nicht ein . . . *Denkmal* Ihres innersten . . . vollen Geistes setzen"] In *Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Rée, Lou von Salomé: The Documents of their Meeting*, p. 182.

Other works by Salomé in the area of women, love, and sexuality include:

- "Physische Liebe" ("Physical Love"), 1898 – an article responding to Wilhelm Bölsche's *Das Liebensleben in der Natur* (*Love-Life in Nature*) (1898–1901)
- "Missbrauchte Frauenkraft" ("Misuse of Female Strength"), a review of a book by the same name, 1898
- "Ketzerien gegen die moderne Frau" ("Heresies against the Modern Woman"), 1899
- "Der Mensch als Weib" ("The Human Being as Woman"), 1899
- "Gedanken über das Liebensproblem" ("Thoughts on the Problem of Love"), 1900
- *Die Erotik* (*The Erotic*), 1910
- "Zum Typus Weib", 1914
- "Anal" and "Sexual", 1916
- "Psychosexualität" ("Psychosexuality"), 1917.

An informal working out of Salomé's philosophy of love and sex is to be found in her opus of fiction, which invariably focuses upon the problematics of female-male relationships from a woman's point of view. By dealing with the experiential aspects of love and sexuality these works constitute a feminine phenomenology.

- *Im Kampf um Gott* (*Struggling for God*), 1883.
- *Ruth: Erzählung*, 1895, 1897
- *Aus fremder Seele: Eine Spätherbstgeschichte* (*From Alien Soul*), 1896
- *Fenitschka: Ein Ausschweifung* (*An Aberration*): *Zwei Erzählungen*, 1898
- *Menschenkinder: Novellenzyklus* (*Children of Man*), 1899
- *Ma: Ein Porträt*, 1901
- *Im Zwischenland: Fünf Geschichten aus dem Seelenleben halbwüchsiger Mädchen* (*The Land Between*), 1902
- *Das Haus: Familiengeschichte vom Ende des vorigen Jahrhunderts* (*The House*), 1919, 1927
- *Die Stunde ohne Gott und andere Kindergeschichten* (*The Hour Without God and Other Children's Stories*), 1921
- *Der Teufel und seine Grossmutter* (*The Devil and his Grandmother*), 1922
- *Rodinka: Russische Erinnerung* (*Rodinka: A Russian Reminiscence*), 1928.

43. Both Salomé and Nietzsche seem to agree on the adverse affects of rampant logic. In *Twilight of the Idols* Nietzsche criticizes Socrates for “hypertrophy of the logical faculty. . . . Honest things, like honest men, do not carry their reasons in their hands. . . . One chooses dialectic only when one has no other means”; “The Problem of Socrates”, 4, 5, 6, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and included in *The Portable Nietzsche*, pp. 475–76. The major difference between the two philosophers on this point is that Nietzsche sees this problem as a sign of decadence, while for Salomé it is merely a another sign of the inferiority of the masculine.
44. “Infidelity”, *Freud Journal*, p. 125.
45. “The Human Being as Woman”, pp. 234, 232; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, pp. 136–37.
46. *Henrik Ibsen's Frauen-Gestalten (Henrik Ibsen's Female Characters)*, 1891. The characters include Nora (*A Doll's House*), Mrs. Alving (*Ghosts*), Hedwig (*The Wild Duck*), Rebecca (*Rosmersholm*), Ellida (*The Lady from the Sea*), and Hedda (*Hedda Gabler*).
47. “Thoughts on the Problem of Love”, p. 1016, as trans. and quoted by Livingstone, pp. 138. This presents an interesting parallel with Spinoza's notion of God's self-love, which is identified with the human mind's intellectual love of God and described as a divine rejoicing in self-perfection (*Ethics*, V, xxxv, proof). No better model of positive narcissism, a key concept in Salomé's later psychoanalytic work, can be imagined.
48. “Thoughts on the Problem of Love”, 1022; quoted by Binion, p. 256.
49. “Nicht nur ohne Trotz- oder gar Schuldgefühle, sondern so, wie Geseignetes begegnet, durch die Welt vollkommen wird”; *Lebensrückblick*, p. 215, trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 100.
50. “. . . the physical representation of our affection enters at a point where we can no longer follow it of ourselves, our feeling being bounded by consciousness. A higher symbol, as it were, it contains more than our orbit can reach; and so it is with all the final transcendental mysteries of love.” “Forepleasure and Endpleasure”, *Freud Journal*, p. 119.
51. “Man and Woman – Bisexuality”, *Freud Journal*, p. 189. In this same text (“Male and Female”, pp. 60–61) Salomé remarks:

In love making itself, i.e., when the sexes are most sharply differentiated, where woman seems truly woman and man truly man, a recollection of one's own bisexual being seems to be awakened by the opposite sex, as a consequence of the other's profound approach, his understanding, and his embrace. In love and in submission we are given the gift of ourselves, we are made more actual, more encompassing, more wedded to ourselves, and this alone is the true efficacy of love, giving life and joy. That is equally true for the second side of our being (male or female, respectively) which otherwise is likely to shrivel up and be suppressed, unchampioned in the struggle for existence. If we give ourselves, we possess ourselves entirely, in the image of the beloved – a seeming modesty!

52. "Man and Woman – Bisexuality", *Freud Journal*, p. 189.
53. "[T]he natural love life in all its manifestations, and perhaps most of all in its highest forms, is based on the principle of infidelity." *The Erotic*, pp. 111, 14 (trans. and quoted by Peters, p. 261). In the *Freud Journal* Salomé even goes so far as to equate fidelity with fixation, "Infidelity", p. 126.
54. *The Erotic*. Elsewhere Salomé notes "only a man can be either ascetic or depraved; woman . . . can approach such states only to the extent that she defeminizes herself."; "Discussions on Masturbation – Female and Male", *Freud Journal*, p. 99.
55. The potential for mutual fertilization between philosophy and psychoanalysis is often noted by Salomé: "we may find in metaphysical expressions terms appropriate for aspects of living experience, which otherwise remain hidden from ego psychology, as the stars are hidden by daylight. The masters of faith, and the great philosophers possess powers of expression through which they are able, as the psychoanalyst well knows, to safeguard the impulses which derive from the primal sway of their narcissism." "Narzismus als Doppelrichtung", *Imago*, 7 (1921); trans. Stanley A. Leavy as "The Dual Orientation of Narcissism", *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 31 #1, (1962), 8.
56. In a letter to Salomé, dated September 16, 1882, Nietzsche acknowledges her contribution to this concept: "Your idea of reducing all philosophical systems to the personal lives of philosophers is truly an idea from a 'sister brain'. Trans. and quoted by Peters, p. 129. See also Salomé's remarks on "The Personal Element in Philosophy", *Freud Journal*, pp. 69–70.
57. For example, Salomé explores "an analogy with the ideas 'neurotic' and 'psychotic', existing within the confines of normal ethical behavior" in her article "The Dual Orientation of Narcissism", concluding "The ethical is a venture, the highest stake of narcissism and its sublime audacity, its exemplary adventure and the eruption into life of its ultimate courage and abandon"; 20, 22.
58. October 26, *Freud Journal*, 1912, pp. 32–33. In a later entry, dated November 21, 1912, Salomé refers to "the totality beyond the ego", p. 53.
59. Hence Salomé laments "We imagine the normal mind too exclusively as a vase of crystalline water filled with prettily arranged cut flowers, and we forget the black earth needed if roots are to grow. . . . It is such a joy to become immersed in great folk poetry, which provides us with no sterilized material but only, and unworriedly, the very stuff of human life and being."; "South Slav Ballads", *Freud Journal*, p. 66. See also December 9, 1912, p. 68, where she refers to "the mystery of the normal unconscious state". This attitude on Salomé's part accounts for her enthusiasm for Russia and its people, which she felt had so far escaped the sterilization process undergone by the west in general.
60. "Sublimation", *Freud Journal*, p. 146. In this same entry (p. 147), Salomé denounces the view which puts nature (sunlight) in opposition to culture

(shadow): "The right picture is rather that of the plant around high noon: then it casts its own shadow straight down beneath it, a self-duplication wherein it gazes on its own repeated outline, its finest safeguard from the great flame that would consume it before its fruiting." Similarly, Salomé sees "the repressing force as a concomitant of organic development, i.e., not *only* as a cultural factor or one produced by outer developments or pathologically." "Resistance – Repression", p. 190.

61. Salomé's earliest psychoanalytical article was "Vom frühen Gottesdienst" ("Of Early Divine Service"), 1913. Discussing her motivations with Freud, Salomé concludes "To begin with, it was nothing but the kind of neutral objective interest that one feels when embarking on new researches. Then the opportunity came in all its liveliness and personal urgency to stand in the presence of a new science, again and again to be at a beginning and thus related to the problems of science in an increasingly intimate way. What settled the matter for me, however, was the third and most personal reason that psychoanalysis bestowed a gift on me personally, its radiant enrichment of my own life that came from slowly groping the way to the roots by which it is embedded in the totality."; February 2, 1913, *Freud Journal*, pp. 89–90.
62. "Discussions on Masturbation – Female and Male", *Freud Journal*, p. 99. Earlier in the *Journal* ("The Nature of Punishment", p. 36) a significant observation occurs which seems to refer to sexuality: "What primitive man knew all along, that life is all we have to obey, that 'joy is perfection' (Spinoza), we rediscover only in states of untrammelled ecstasy antithetical to morality – inspired states of the noblest egoism."
63. "The Human Being as Woman", *Imago*, 1914. Salomé waxes rhapsodic when she proclaims "Woman – the fortunate animal: really just as prone to regressive narcissism as the neurotic, not really undifferentiated like animals, but a regressive without a neurosis. . . . Only in womankind is sexuality no surrender of the ego boundary, no schism. . . . 'So do thou give as giveth a woman who loves. The fruits of her giving abide in her bosom.'" In comparison to this the man is indeed, for Salomé, "the weaker sex". "The Commonplace – Man and Woman", *Freud Journal*, p. 116.
64. See especially "The Dual Orientation of Narcissism".
65. November 26, 1912, *Freud Journal*, pp. 56–57.
66. "The Dual Orientations of Narcissism", 9.
67. "The Dual Orientation of Narcissism", 5, 7.
68. March 5, 1913, *Freud Journal*, pp. 110–11.
69. Freud often had occasion to assist Salomé during the war years by encouraging her to charge patients at a reasonable rate (she tended to undercharge or charge nothing) and sending her 1000 marks from his 10,000 mark Goethe prize.
70. As evidence that Salomé did not unrealistically idealize the feminine, we have her denial that rule by women would prevent the existence of war. *Lebensrückblick*, pp. 184.
71. Writing to Freud on May 18, 1918, Salomé says "Of my own personal life I would rather say nothing, because – in consequence of having

relatives in Russia and of the tragedy of that land – it distresses me to speak of it; if I took up my pen on the subject I would simply burst into tears.” *Freud and Andreas-Salomé Letters*, p. 78.

72. Salomé’s confrontation with aging appears first in her essay (quoted here) “Alter und Ewigkeit” (“Age and Eternity”), *Die Zukunft*, October 26, 1901, p. 147. Trans. and quoted by Binion, p. 302.
73. This image appears in both “Age and Eternity” and a letter to Freud, dated May 20, 1927. Salomé defends old age. What occurs is a return to “that original identification with many of the things which made our childhood so rich an epoch and also so wise . . . [but] it is saturated with the intervening experiences, and thereby it is more consciously possessed by us.” *Freud and Andreas-Salomé Letters*, p. 166.
74. “Das Beste ist doch der Tod.” Recorded by Ernst Pfeiffer, in his “Nachwort” to *Lebensrückblick*, p. 329. Soon after her death the Gestapo descended on her home to seize “dangerous” books from her library concerning the “Jewish Science” of psychoanalysis.
75. See Livingstone, pp. 69–70.
76. Philosophers encountered early on during the period in which Salomé and Rée used their home as a salon in Berlin include:

- Paul Deussen (1845–1919), a leading exponent of Indian thought, author of *Elements of Metaphysics* (1877) and *System of the Vedanta* (1883); a friend of Nietzsche who is even quoted by the latter;
- Ludwig Haller, a public prosecutor turned philosopher, author of *Alles in Allem* (*All in All: Metalogic, Metaphysics, Metaphysics*);
- Heinrich Romundt (1845–1919), author of *Human Knowledge and the Essence of Things* (1872), known for his series of works on Kant, such as *The Establishing of the Teaching of Jesus Through Kant’s Reform of Philosophy* (1883);
- Heinrich von Stein (1857–1887), author of *Ideals of Materialism* (1877), and another friend of Nietzsche’s.

In Salomé’s later life she interacted with Fritz Mauthner (1849–1923), Martin Buber (1878–1965), and Max Scheler (1874–1938):

Mauthner, a Viennese philosopher, authored several books on language, including, *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache* (*Contributions to a Critique of Language*), 1901–03; *Die Sprache* (*Language*), 1906; and *Wörterbuch der philosophie: Neue Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache* (*Dictionary of Philosophy: New Contributions to a Critique of Language*), 1910. These works significantly influenced young Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). Mauthner wrote a laudatory review of Salomé’s *Isen* book in 1892.

Buber was a noted Jewish philosopher and theologian. Ernst Pfeiffer reports that Martin Buber encouraged Salomé to write this work in 1909; *Freud and Andreas-Salomé Letters*, p. 5. In fact, in a letter to Salomé dated March 28, 1906, Buber writes in reference to her article “The Human Being as Woman”: “Every subject, it seems to me, possesses, if at any time then in ours, a single human mind that is there to present it and express

its essence. In my eyes, such a relation obtains between this subject and you." Quoted by Binion, p. 237.

Scheler had several interchanges with Salomé, as she herself reports – "with all the interrupted leaps and bounds in his brilliant conversation – often following one another disconnectedly – the most enduring impression is really this: a tremendously logical mode of expression grounded in tremendously personal experience. . . . His philosophy acquires its allure from its transparency as a form of self-analysis and self-healing, but that is what makes it fragile." September 29–30, 1913, *Freud Journal*, pp. 175, 176.

77. And it was because of Nietzsche that the relationship between Salomé and Meysenbug was ultimately broken. Nietzsche's sister, Elizabeth, enlisted the aid of Meysenbug to seek revenge against Salomé following the unfortunate "affair" with her brother. See Peters, p. 144.
78. Paul Rée (1850–1901) was trained as a philosopher. His thought followed the lines of Positivism, and he is often described as a disciple of Auguste Comte. His study of Arthur Schopenhauer was the basis of his friendship with Nietzsche, who also was deeply influenced by Schopenhauer. Rée's works include *Psychologische Beobachtungen* (*Psychological Observations*) (1875), *Der Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen* (*The Origin of Moral Feelings*) (1877), described by the newly-formed British journal *Mind* as espousing a Darwinian sense of ethical evolution, and *Die Entstehung des Gewissens* (*The Emergence of Conscience*) (1885); Livingstone, p. 229, note to p. 33. Insight into Rée's character is given by the fact that he chose a quiet corner of St. Peter's in Rome as the place to write his book disproving the existence of God. This also happened to be the very place where Salomé and Nietzsche first met.
79. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), represents one of the outstanding minds in the history of western philosophy, being claimed variously by existentialists, nihilists, phenomenologists, and proponents of various other schools. He is best known for his unorthodox method of presentation and his ultimate end in insanity. Through Nietzsche's early connection with Richard Wagner his work was outrageously exploited by Nazi theorists in support of their racist doctrines, aided by his anti-Semitic sister Elizabeth.
80. Nietzsche writes to Franz Overbeck in September, 1882 of the unique "philosophical openness" ("*philosophische Offenheit*") existing between himself and Salomé; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 46 from *Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Rée, Lou von Salomé: The Documents of their Meeting*, p. 229. Most of all Nietzsche saw in Salomé an embodiment of his ideas: "she is prepared, as no other person is, for the hitherto unexpressed part of my philosophy." [*für den bisher fast verschwiegenen Theil meiner Philosophie vorbereitet ist, wie kein anderer Mensch*"]; letter to Franz Overbeck, November, 1882, trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 52, from *Documents*, p. 246. When the "affair" had run its course Nietzsche mused "The peculiar misfortune of the last two years consisted most strictly in the fact that I thought I had found someone who had exactly the same

task as I had." [Das eigenthümliche Unglück des letzten und vorletzten Jahres bestand in strengsten Sinne darin, dass ich einen Menschen gefunden zu haben meinte, der mit mir die ganz gleiche Aufgabe habe.]; letter to Overbeck late in 1883, trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 53, from *Documents*, p. 349.

This projection on Nietzsche's part becomes evident in his advice to Salomé, mandating against his own desires to make her his chief disciple: "go forward and seek quite independently – and never be only a learner, but learn by creating and create by learning." [gänzlich unabhängig vorwärtssuchen, – auch niemals mich bloß lernend verhalten, sondern schaffend lernen & lernend schaffen.]; entry in Salomé diary, August 18, 1882, trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 48, from *Documents*, p. 185. Salomé's plan, on the other hand, was to live with Nietzsche and Rée as a "Holy Trinity" devoted to scholarly pursuits.

81. Trans. and quoted by Livingstone p. 54. Indeed, it was in the midst of Nietzsche's suicidal grief over the bitter dissolution of their relationship in 1882 that the first book of the *Zarathustra* was penned early in 1883. In a letter some months earlier he had written "I am lost unless I succeed in discovering the alchemist's trick of turning this dirt into gold"; quoted by Peters, p. 135. The "gold" took the form of the *Zarathustra*, as attested to by Nietzsche in a letter to his mother in 1884: "You may say what you like against the girl [Salomé] . . . it still remains true that I have never found a more gifted and thoughtful person. . . . It is no accident that I have accomplished my greatest work [*Zarathustra*] in the last twelve months"; quoted by Peters, pp. 142–43.
82. "Seltsam, dass wir unwillkürlich mit unsern Gesprächen in die Abgründe gerathen, an jene schwindligen Stellen, wohin man wohl einmal einsam geklettert ist um in die Tiefe zu schauen." Diary entry dated August 18, 1882 in *Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Rée, Lou von Salomé: The Documents of their Meeting*, p. 185; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 47. In this same entry Salomé goes on to assert the differences between her and Nietzsche.
83. *Nietzsche*, pp. 17, 193; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, pp. 91, 93. Prior to compiling her book, Salomé had written several articles about Nietzsche and his work, upon which the book was based:
 - "Friedrich Nietzsche", *Vossische Zeitung*, 1891
 - "Zum Bilde Friedrich Nietzsches", *Freie Bühne*, 1891–92
 - "Ein Apokalyptiker", *Das Magazin für Literatur*, 1892
 - "Ideal und Askese", *Zeitgeist*, 1893.
84. Freud obituary, trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 236 (note to p. 193). Viktor von Weizsäcker states "because of her own originality she was entirely free of psychoanalytical dogmatism. . . . In Lou Andreas-Salomé I met the rare case of somebody who, having understood this new science profoundly, had yet remained herself. I have never again, either before or afterwards, met it as convincingly as with her"; *Natur und Geist*:

Erinnerungen eines Arztes (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1955), p. 186; trans. and quoted by Peters, pp. 293–94.

85. Letter from Freud to Salomé, July 10, 1931, in *Letters*, p. 195. *Mein Dank an Freud: Offener Brief an Professor Sigmund Freud zu seinem 75 Geburtstag*. Vienna, 1931. Salomé seem to have thought of her relationship to psychoanalysis in these same terms of comradeship rather than discipleship. Writing in her diary in December of 1911, a few months after her initial meeting with Freud, she reports: "Ceaselessly concerned with psycho-analysis, with ever-growing admiration for Freud's ruthless consistency. I am penetrating deeper into it than I did with Bjerre [a Swedish psychotherapist]. I can see where the latter stops. If one avoids that, the springs gush forth." Quoted by Pfeiffer in his ed. *Sigmund Freud and Lou Andreas-Salomé*, trans. William and Elaine Robson-Scott (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), p. 212.

Another point of divergence noticed by Freud himself occurs in a letter from Freud to Salomé, July 30, 1915, *Letters*, p. 32: "I so rarely feel the need for synthesis."

86. E. M. Butler describes Salomé as "one of those interesting and problematical women who so often beset the paths of poets"; *Rainer Maria Rilke* (Cambridge: 1946), p. 21.
87. Peters (p. 284) records a conversation on the therapeutic aspect of art for the artist which took place between Salomé and a doctor she was analyzing. Salomé mentioned her relationship with Rilke which, she stated, led to the realization of "the danger of psychoanalysis for the creative artist. To interfere here means to destroy. . . . A germ-free soul is a sterile soul."
88. Writing to Rilke (February 16, 1922); trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 170) upon the completion of his *Duino Elegies* Salomé remarks:

I sat and read and howled with joy, and it was far from being merely joy, but was something more powerful, as if a curtain were divided, torn through, and everything all at once had become quiet and certain and present and good.

And in a later letter (March 6, 1922; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 171):

Yes, these *are* the gardens of my most secret home from time immemorial, childhood and youth and all existence have always stood in the midst of these gardens and grown eternal there. *This* I shall *never* be able to tell you, what this means to me and how I have been unconsciously waiting to receive what is *yours* as *mine* like this, as life's veritable consummation. I shall be grateful to you for this as long as I live.

89. *Rainer Maria Rilke*. In fact, it has been suggested by Ernst Pfeiffer (in "Rilke und die Psychoanalyse", p. 253) that Salomé's primary motivation in her pursuit of psychoanalysis was to help Rilke. This judgment does

seem unwarranted, however, and fits the consistent *ad hominem* pattern of reducing Salomé's work to footnotes on her personal life.

90. *My Thanks to Freud*, p. 14; trans. and quoted by Peters, p. 298.
91. Livingstone, p. 13.
92. Said in regard to Freud's theories of psychoanalysis, but also noted as "holding true for all the humanities"; December 8, 1912, *Freud Journal*, p. 65.
93. "Ambivalence", *Freud Journal*, p. 148.
94. Binion, p. 70. This tendency persisted throughout Salomé's life. In the *Freud Journal*, she continually suggests corrections to what she has heard from Freud and others, and often discussed these corrections with them personally (in Freud's case, see December 8, 1912, *Freud Journal*). For example, she remarks that Freud's description of a child's pre-sexual thought process as 'archaic' is more properly to be called 'infantile' "for surely primitive people, and animals too, distinguish sharply between the sexes, in contrast to the youngster for whom the genital sphere does not yet exist." November, 16, 1912, p. 48. See also her comments on Freudian terminology, November 30, 1912, pp. 58–59.
95. "[W]enn menschliche Aufnahmefähigkeit nur nuancefähiger und tiefreichender wäre, das Unermessliche im Irischesten unserer warte." *Lebensrückblick*, pp. 108–09; trans. and quoted by Livingstone, p. 195.
96. The same misunderstanding is suffered by many non-western thinkers, such as the Taoist Chuang Tzu and various proponents of Zen Buddhism. Within the western tradition, we have the case of Nietzsche, whose contradictions are often dismissed as symptoms of his insanity, rather than being confronted seriously. Vivid concrete images also are utilized by all of these thinkers, as a means to convey that which transcends, and contradicts, language and logic.
97. "God", *Freud Journal*, p. 192. Other examples of contradictory principles abound in Salomé's writings. In discussing Freud, Salomé asks "Confronted by a human being who impresses us as great, should we not be moved rather than chilled by the knowledge that he might have attained his greatness only through his frailties?"; "On Freud", p. 163. Speaking of emotions she notes, "The more fiery the fanaticism of love, the more cooling is the effect of its distortions – until climactically fire and frost are one." "When the element of narcissism takes too strong a hold of a person, he is pushed by his all too confident assurance, his abundant vitality into painful collisions with reality. If, however, it is too weak and succumbs to realistic judgment, then no success, not even the happiest, can bring him joy. . . . The fullness of life exists in its exaggerations in both directions, in its too absolute assessments of value; it is really life only as it transcends all its fragmentations." Salomé suggests that art may function as a means to resolve these tensions, at least as they apply in the case of Narcissism: "Only the poet can make a whole picture of this unity of joy and sorrow, departure from self and absorption in self, devotion and self-assertion."; "The Dual Orientation of Narcissism", 13, 15–16, 9.

98. "Spinoza", *Freud Journal*, p. 75.
99. Livingstone, p. 163. A quote from Spinoza comes to mind here –

Even if I were once to find untrue the fruits of my natural understanding, they would make me happy since I enjoy them, and I endeavor to pass my life not in sorrow and sighing but in peace, joy and cheerfulness, and thereby I ascend a step higher.

Letter from Spinoza to William Van Blyenbergh, January 28, 1665; Letter XXI, trans., ed. A Wolf, *The Correspondence of Spinoza* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1928), p. 173. It is this predisposition to happiness which led to the parting of the ways with Rilke, when his melancholic episodes became too difficult for Salomé to endure.

One comment from Salomé which may seem to refute her link with Spinoza is to be found in the *Freud Journal*, December 11, 1912, p. 69: "Whoever, like Freud, eschews philosophy, reveals a truly philosophic mind by repudiating the whole monistic babble and laying hold of the breadth and depth of empirical reality, which is demonstrably dualistic." However, this quote is only devastating if one holds that Spinoza's system can be reduced to a form of monism. Clearly Salomé does not agree with this reduction, as her subsequent remarks on Spinoza in that same text make clear. She denies that Spinoza's theories of the physical and mental amount to "systematic parallelism" – "It is rather the conscious inward contemplation of the integrity and presentness of two worlds – as we reckon – which nowhere exclude or determine each other, because they are but one." (p. 75; see also pp. 111 and 127). A similar interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics is outlined in Wawrytko, "The Dual Character of Substance", pp. 145–64.

100. Nietzsche, supreme stylist that he was, does not let his affection for Salomé blind him to her deficiencies in this regard and urged her to correct them, as she herself noted in her Tautenberg diary of August 14, 1882, see *Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Rée, Lou von Salomé: The Documents of their Meeting*, p. 182. Little improvement seems to have been made as she matured, for Stanley A. Leavy, in his introduction to his translation of Salomé's "The Dual Orientation of Narcissism" (p. 1), describes her style almost forty years later as one "which even to Germans is turgid and cumbersome".
101. Rainer Maria Rilke, letter dated July 29, 1913 to Princess von Thurn und Taxis, quoted by Pfeiffer in *Rainer Maria Rilke-Lou Andreas-Salomé Briefwechsel*, p. 568. Note the use of the ubiquitous Spinozistic term, "blessedness", here.
102. Weizsäcker, p. 186; trans. and quoted by Peters, p. 293.

5. Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930)

BEATRICE H. ZEDLER

Mary Whiton Calkins, philosopher and psychologist, was the first woman to be elected president of the American Philosophical Association. She lived during “the golden age” of American philosophy and studied under two of the classic American philosophers, William James and Josiah Royce. Though she was influenced by both of these teachers, her philosophy has been described as a continuation and development of Royce’s idealism.¹ Yet it also takes account of her own empirical knowledge of psychology.

Since she achieved distinction in two professional fields, we shall consider her achievements in both of these fields. We shall look first at the main facts of her life, then at her work in psychology, and finally at her work in philosophy.

I. BIOGRAPHY

Mary Whiton Calkins was born on March 30, 1863 in Hartford, Connecticut. She was the oldest of the five children of Wolcott Calkins and Charlotte Whiton Calkins. She spent her childhood in Buffalo, New York, where her father was a minister at a Presbyterian church. In 1880 her father became pastor of a Congregational church in Newton, Massachusetts, which was to be her home for the rest of her life.²

After graduating from the Newton High School, she entered Smith College with sophomore standing in the fall of 1882. But the next year, after the death of her sister Maud, she stayed at home, studying Greek and tutoring two of her younger brothers. She returned to Smith College with senior standing in the fall of 1884 and graduated with the class of 1885. In 1886, while she was on a trip to Europe with her family, Miss Calkins met an instructor from Vassar College named Abby Leach, with

whom she travelled first to Italy and then to Greece, to visit places of historical interest.

In September of 1887 she began teaching in the Greek Department at Wellesley College. After receiving an M.A. from Smith College in 1888, and after being invited to teach psychology at Wellesley, she studied psychology at Clark University and psychology and philosophy at Harvard University. Although she completed all the work for a Harvard Ph.D. and though William James said her oral examination ranked above any he had previously heard, the Harvard Corporation refused to grant her the degree because Harvard University did not give degrees to women. In 1902 Radcliffe College offered her a doctor's degree as a substitute for the Harvard degree, but she declined because her work had been done at Harvard, not at Radcliffe. She was awarded the honorary doctoral degrees: Doctor of Letters from Columbia University in 1909, and Doctor of Laws from Smith College in 1910.

While continuing her interest in the field of psychology, she gradually devoted more of her time to the studying, teaching, and writing of philosophy. She was honored by her peers in both fields. In 1905 she became the first woman president of the American Psychological Association, and in 1918 she served as the first woman president of the American Philosophical Association. She was given the title of Research Professor when she retired from Wellesley College in June, 1929.

She had enjoyed good health for most of her life, but after an operation in November, 1929, she learned that she was incurably ill. She died three months later on February 26, 1930. A memorial service was held at the Wellesley College Chapel on April 13, 1930.³

Since she is remembered for her achievements in two fields, we shall take note of her work in each of those fields. We shall begin with her work in psychology.

II. PSYCHOLOGY

1. *Education, Contributions, and Publications in the Field of Psychology*

Psychology was not Mary Calkins' first choice of a field of specialization. She had been teaching Greek and she liked philosophy, but when she was invited to prepare herself to teach psychology at

Wellesley College, she accepted the invitation and sought the best possible preparation.

At that time the opportunities for a woman to do graduate work in psychology were limited, but she received permission to attend a seminar given by William James at Harvard. She says:

I began the serious study of psychology with William James. Most unhappily for them and most fortunately for me the other members of his seminary in psychology dropped away in the early weeks of the fall of 1890; and James and I were left . . . quite literally at either side of a library fire. *The Principles of Psychology* was warm from the press; and my absorbed study of those brilliant, erudite, and provocative volumes, as interpreted by their writer, was my introduction to psychology.⁴

During the fall of 1890 she also began work in experimental psychology under the guidance of Dr. Edmund Sanford, a teacher at Clark University, and for parts of three years, beginning in the Fall of 1892 she worked in the Harvard Psychology Laboratory under the direction of Hugo Munsterberg who had recently come to Harvard from Freiburg. These three men, James, Sanford, and Munsterberg, she later referred to as her "great teachers in psychology."⁵

During the 1891–1892 school year she introduced a new course in psychology at Wellesley and, with Dr. Sanford's help, she established a psychology laboratory at the college, one of the earliest psychology laboratories in the country and the first one in any college for women.⁶

In 1892 she also began her work as a publishing scholar. In the field of psychology she has published four books and more than sixty articles. Topics treated in her articles include association, dreams, mental forms, sensation, elements of conscious complexes, emotions, experimental psychology at Wellesley College, genetic and comparative psychology, structural and functional psychology, behaviorism, the Gestalt theory, self in psychoanalytic theory.⁷

Her books in the field of psychology include *Association: An Essay Analytic and Experimental* (1896) (her doctoral thesis); *An Introduction to Psychology* (first published in 1901); a summary of the teaching of the *Introduction* which she wrote in German and published under the title: *Der Doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie* (1905); and *A First Book in Psychology* (first published in 1909). Of her works in psychology the two textbooks in English were the most widely known. There were

two editions of *An Introduction to Psychology* and four editions of *A First Book in Psychology*.⁸

In both psychology textbooks Calkins discusses the nature and methods of psychology, sensation, perception, imagination, attention, association, memory, recognition, thought (conception, judgment and reasoning), emotion, will and belief, religious consciousness, and abnormal psychology. But the order of topics is different in the two works, and Calkins herself says that *A First Book in Psychology* diverges most strikingly from the earlier work by its abandonment of the "duplex conception of psychology" in favor of a "single-track self-psychology."⁹ In the "duplex approach" of the *Introduction to Psychology* she had treated psychology both as a science of ideas and as a science of selves, but in *A First Book in Psychology* she presents what she regards as a simpler, more direct and effective treatment of psychology as a study of conscious selves.¹⁰

2. *What Psychology Is and Is Not*

In both of her books and in many of her articles she is concerned with the question: What is psychology?

The early history of psychology is intertwined with the history of philosophy, but whatever differences early 20th century psychologists may have had among themselves they maintained that psychology is not a subdivision of philosophy. Calkins agreed with her fellow psychologists that their field is a science, "a systematic study of facts of phenomena; that is, of limited or partial realities, as related to each other without reference to a more fundamental reality."¹¹ Unlike philosophy, psychology does not try to study the whole of reality nor should it try to relate phenomena to ultimate reality.

Some psychologists have treated their science as a branch of physiology; some as a science of ideas; some as a science of mental functions. While trying to be as conciliatory as possible to each of these views Calkins does not think that psychology can be reduced to any one of them. Those who would reduce psychology to physiology hold that consciousness literally consists in bodily reactions. While granting that psychology rightly attempts to ascertain the bodily conditions for consciousness, she says that "it does not thereby lose its own identity as a study of conscious phenomena."¹²

She agrees that psychology can be studied as "science of ideas;" that is, it can treat "of the contents-of-consciousness as such, of psychic

phenomena, considered in abstraction from . . . any self."¹³ This was indeed one of the two approaches she has taken in her *Introduction to Psychology*, but she says that this idea-psychology, by itself, is incomplete:

If I conceive psychology as science of ideas I inevitably raise the scientifically relevant question: Whose idea? and then arbitrarily refuse to answer my own question. In other words, the "idea" is immediately experienced as idea of self. . . . To refuse to deal with this self is indeed theoretically possible, but is a needlessly abstract, an artificial, an incomplete procedure.¹⁴

She has a similar reaction to the view of psychology as science of mental functions or activities. This, too, she thinks turns out to be a needlessly abstract and inadequate view since "the conception of mental activity requires the conception of a mental actor."¹⁵ A science of mental functions must be fundamentally a science of the functioning self.

She points out that there is never perception without a somebody who perceives, and there never is thinking unless some one thinks. And this somebody is a self. For Mary Calkins psychology is therefore properly defined as "science of the self in relation to, or conscious of, its environment."¹⁶ She devoted much of her time to explaining and defending her "self-psychology," which she refers to as "a form of introspectionist psychology."¹⁷

She acknowledges that the methods of psychology are in general the methods of every science: description (analysis and classification) and explanation. But in addition she stresses that psychology has its own special method: introspection, which observes not the common, independent, externalized facts of the physical sciences, but inner facts. In this emphasis she was influenced by her teacher, William James, whom she quotes as saying in his *Principles of Psychology*: "Introspective observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always. . . ."¹⁸

3. *The Self and Its Relation to Soul and to Body*

While holding that through introspection we know the self, Miss Calkins admits that the self-psychologist cannot directly dispute the statement of the person who asserts that he never finds a self. But she points out that Hume's famous arguments are incapable of disproving the

existence of a self and that there is a naive inconsistency in the assertion of anyone who says, "I find no self." She asks:

For who . . . is this I which denies that it observed an I? In a word, I accuse my critic of assuming, in almost every paragraph, the existence of the very self whom he disbars.¹⁹

And elsewhere she reiterates that all the critics of her self-psychology imply a self "in their unguarded moments and paragraphs."²⁰

The self that she finds through introspection cannot, strictly speaking, be defined, but it can be described. It has the following characteristics or properties, all of which she is directly aware of:

- a) It is relatively persistent ("I am in some sense the same as my childhood self");
- b) It is changing being ("I the adult self differ from that ten-year old");
- c) It is complex ("I am a perceiving, remembering, feeling, willing self.");
- d) It is a unique irreplaceable self ("I am I and you are you. No one, however similar, can take the place of you or of me");
- e) It is related to objects, both personal and impersonal.²¹

Though Calkins intends to be speaking here as a psychologist, limiting her account of the self to what is immediately experienced, the philosopher might wonder: What is the relation of this self to the soul? And what is its relation to body?

Calkins carefully distinguishes between the psychologist's self and the philosopher's soul and regrets the confusion that results from assuming that they are identical. In "Self and Soul" she says that the traditional doctrine of the soul as simple spiritual substance suffers from two significant defects: (1) it conceives soul after a material analogy (since in the most primitive belief, soul was merely a shadowy sort of body) or as endowed with mere negations of bodily characteristics (such as *unextended*, *indivisible*); and (2) it lacks the concrete characteristics of the modern concept of self and leaves soul-substance as an empty abstraction.²²

What especially concerned Miss Calkins was that some psychologists refused to acknowledge the existence of the self because they had mistakenly identified it with the notion of soul which they could not accept. In "The Case of Self against the Soul" she notes that in the history

of philosophy soul has had three functions: biological (or vitalistic), meta-physical, and psychological. That is, it has been regarded as the source or explanation of life; as a simple, immaterial substance; and as a source of consciousness. But modern biologists do not think that soul is necessary to account for life-functions, and modern philosophers and psychologists regard the notion of soul as simple spiritual substance as a myth or abstraction. Because the notion of the self, that is, the conscious factor, has been associated with the other two functions which in our time have lost credibility, the self also has been rejected.

Calkins protests against the expulsion of self along with the soul. She seems to be saying: Though you may throw out the soul with its dubiously inferred characteristics, do not throw out the conscious self, which is directly experienced. Self is not soul.²³

But one may also wonder: "How is this conscious self related to body?" In one of her articles she asks: "Is the self body?" and gives a negative answer. The self is not body nor is the body part of the self. Some psychologists regard the self as a psychophysical organism, a psycho-soma or conscious body or mind-in-body or a mind-and-body complex, with the body definitely constituting part of the self. But she thinks this view implies that every function would have to be psychophysical and thus it would fail to account for the admitted distinction of functions that are just psychical (conscious functions) and those that are just physical (such as digestion and circulation). Instead of insisting on a unity of mind and body she finds it simpler and more logical to admit the existence of a psychical functioner in close relation to a physical functioner.²⁴

One psychologist attributed to Mary Calkins the view that self is mind-without-body, self unrelated to body, or pure disembodied spirit, but she says that she never held or meant to teach such a view. Her view is that self is distinct from body but related to it. Its varying experiences may in part be explained by reference to nerve excitations, to muscular contractions, and to organic accommodations.²⁵ There are certain physical facts which regularly precede or accompany certain facts of consciousness, but the reference to physical facts is subsidiary to the psychologist's description of conscious experience, since the self does not consist in body. It is not made up of body-and-mind. Rather, she says that self *has* body.²⁶

Whatever questions there might be about the precise relation of body to self in her psychology, she was a leading exponent of self-psychology. In commenting on her work, one critic said:

Her two books in the field, *An Introduction to Psychology* (1901) and *A First Book in Psychology* (1909) are, it is true, dominated by her special point of view, but are nevertheless comprehensive and authoritative works on psychology as a whole, and take careful account of the important experimental work in all fields up to the date of their publication.²⁷

The same critic pointed out that although her self-psychology received a certain amount of support, on the whole it remained a minority opinion among psychologists. But she thought that certain tendencies in psychology were moving in the direction of her view.²⁸ Between 1912 and 1927 she wrote four articles under the title, "The Self in Recent Psychology." In the fourth of these papers (published in April 1927) she was happy to observe that the self, which had been under grave suspicion among orthodox scientists fifteen years earlier had "become a fairly respectable member of psychological society."²⁹

In 1927 she was invited to speak to the British Psychological Association on her self-psychology and in 1928 she was made an honorary member of that association which had never before conferred such an honor on a woman.³⁰

4. *The Distinction and Relation between Psychology and Philosophy*

Although Mary Calkins kept up with developments in the field of psychology throughout her life, during the latter half of her career she concentrated more fully on philosophy. She was well aware of the differences between the two fields. She had said that "the psychologist as such accepts the self as object of introspection, raising no questions about its ultimate reality, whereas the philosopher must attempt to settle the question of the place of the self in the whole scheme of things."³¹ But this distinction also suggests that the data of psychology can be helpful to the philosopher. As she pointed out:

. . . the philosopher should realize that preliminary to his metaphysical treatment is the scientific observation and analysis of the facts . . . the philosopher's self, whatever else it is, is at its core, the immediately realized self of the psychologist.³²

She maintained that "the scientific study of selves is consistent with any form of philosophy,"³³ but to the reader her self-psychology may seem especially consistent with her philosophy of personal idealism.

III. PHILOSOPHY

1. *Education, Contributions, and Publications in Philosophy*

Mary Calkins showed some interest in philosophy when she was a student at Newton High School. She chose as the subject of her graduation essay: "The Apology Which Plato Should Have Written: A Vindication of the Character of Xantippe." At Smith College she majored in classics and philosophy. She was later to acknowledge her indebtedness to her first instructors in philosophy, Professor Charles E. Garman who introduced her to idealism, and Professor Harry N. Gardiner, under whom she studied Hume and Kant. At Harvard she studied metaphysics with Josiah Royce and came to be known as "the most prominent pupil of Royce."³⁴

At Wellesley College, as we have seen, she was first a teacher of Greek and then a teacher of psychology, but her freshman Greek course included the study of Plato's *Apology* and *Crito*, and in 1888 she mentioned her deep interest in philosophy to Mary S. Case, a teacher of philosophy at Wellesley. After another person who was trained in experimental psychology joined the Wellesley faculty, Mary Calkins was able to devote more time to philosophy.³⁵ The sequence of titles that she held at Wellesley College is at once a summary of her career and of her professional interests. After serving as tutor and instructor in Greek from 1887 to 1890, she held the following titles:

- Instructor in Psychology, 1890–1896;
- Associate Professor of Psychology, 1894–1896;
- Associate Professor of Psychology and Philosophy, 1896–1898;
- Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, 1898–1929;
- Research Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, 1929–1930.³⁶

The 1898 title, by mentioning philosophy first, would seem to be a public statement about her primary field of interest.

She had first taught the course in modern philosophy in 1895–1896, and through the years this course was elected by many of the best students in the college. Miss Case of the philosophy department said of it:

I . . . regard that course, with its deep and lasting influence upon hundreds of our alumnae, as her chief monument.³⁷

Her best known philosophical book, which between 1907 and 1936 appeared in five editions reflects her interest in both modern philos-

ophy and in metaphysics. Its full title was: *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy: An Introduction to Metaphysics through the Study of Modern Systems*. The modern systems she discusses are those of Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel, and some contemporary philosophers. She tries to give a fair and accurate account of their views, based on their texts, and at the same time to evaluate them from the standpoint of her own personal idealism. In commenting on her work, E. S. Brightman has said:

Few historians of philosophy have ventured to combine, as does she, objective exposition with critical evaluation. Her masterpiece, *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy* (1907), is a remarkable combination of these two factors . . . it must be conceded that Miss Calkins has shown unusual skill in making her criticisms of the various thinkers grow up out of the internal implications of the systems with which she is concerned, rather than applying any external a priori standards of evaluation. . . .³⁸

She also revised a translation of La Mettrie's *Man a Machine*; edited some of the writings of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Berkeley; and published an ethics textbook entitled *The Good Man and the Good*.³⁹ She wrote and published more than thirty philosophical articles on such subjects as time, idealism and realism, soul and self, the personalistic conception of nature, the basis of objective judgments in subjective ethics, Kant's doctrine of knowledge, Hegelian categories, Schopenhauer, Bertrand Russell, Bergson as a personalist, Royce's philosophy and Christian theism. She also wrote a statement of her own philosophical *credo*, which can serve as a guide to her main philosophical ideas.

2. *Main Philosophical Ideas*

At the beginning of "The Philosophical *Credo* of an Absolutistic Personalist" Mary Calkins clearly identifies philosophy with metaphysics. By metaphysics she means "the attempt, by reasoning, to know what is ultimately real."⁴⁰ Her philosophical *credo* consists of the following four articles:

- 1) "The universe contains distinctively mental realities; it may or may not also contain non-mental entities, but in any case irreducibly mental realities exist"

- 2) "The second article . . . embodies the conviction that mental realities are ultimately personal, that the mental phenomena which I directly observe are not percepts, thoughts, emotions, and volitions, in unending succession, but rather perceiving, thinking, feeling, and willing self or selves."
- 3) ". . . the universe is through and through mental in character, . . . all that is real is ultimately mental, and accordingly personal in nature."
- 4) ". . . the universe literally is one all-including (and accordingly complete) self of which all the lesser selves are genuine and identical parts or members."⁴¹

If we see what she meant by each of these four articles, we may be able to understand in what sense she was an idealist, a *personal* idealist, and an absolutistic personalist (or personalistic absolutist).

In holding that mental realities exist, she was associating herself not only with idealists but also with the majority of philosophers. The only metaphysical doctrine inconsistent with the first article of her creed is materialism, which reduces the mental to the non-mental. Her reason for asserting the existence of mental reality is that she directly experiences it and realizes that it is somehow different from what she observes as physical reality.⁴²

With the second article of her creed, which states that mental realities are personal or that "every mental existent is either a self or a part, phase, aspect, or process of a self,"⁴³ she separates herself from Hume. She holds with psychologist William McDougall that one cannot find an idea or sensation lying about loose in the world any more than one can find a falling or a moving without something that falls or moves. She re-affirms in this philosophical context the insight gained in her psychology, that is, that she directly experiences the self as a complex, unique, persistent yet changing entity, conscious of an environment.⁴⁴

With her third step, a step into idealism, she moves beyond many philosophers who have so far agreed with her, for here she maintains that all that is real is ultimately mental, and accordingly, personal in nature. The main question at issue here concerns the nature of the physical world. How can we conceive of rocks and dandelions as mental, and even if that is possible, how would we account for the experienced distinction between physical objects and conscious selves? The idealism of Berkeley would try to answer these questions by reducing the physical world to a system of ideas, but this would be a return to an impersonal idealism.

She prefers the position of Leibniz and Royce who conceived of the physical world as made up of selves, though of an extra-human type. Influenced by Leibniz's doctrine of bare simple monads (as distinguished from his rational monads), Miss Calkins conceived the conscious selves that constitute the infra-human world as being like herself in her "inattentive, dazed, inactive, sleepy states."⁴⁵ Since they are at a low level of consciousness, there seems no hope of getting them to talk to us, but she would explain the difference between such physical objects and persons not by saying that persons are conscious and things are not conscious, but by using Royce's distinction between communicative and uncommunicative selves. She holds that a non-human or infra-human being is still a self, though incommunicative.⁴⁶

She insists that her personalistic nature philosophy should not be regarded as a return to a pre-scientific animism. She is not personifying trees and rivers. She does not interpret every recurring sense-complex as an individual self (for example, a tree-self or a pebble-self); but, more likely as a part or aspect of a non-human self or group of such selves. She says that the modern personalist emphasizes the differences between selves of different levels and does not claim to have a definite conception of any selves with whom he has no communication.⁴⁷

But how, from her starting point, can she know that any other selves, whether human or non-human exist? She says that she bases her idealism on Berkeley's fundamental position: "that what any man unchallengeably knows . . . is himself and his experiencing." How then can one get beyond oneself and one's own ideas to a certainty of the existence of another self? Her way of escaping solipsism is by arguing:

In that direct experience of myself which is, as yet, the only immediate certainly I have admitted, I am aware of myself as, at many points involuntarily limited, thwarted, and hampered. But this direct awareness of myself as involuntarily limited involves and includes the direct consciousness of something which-is-in-some-sense-outside-me.⁴⁸

She suggests that the two seemingly contradictory assertions, that she is conscious (1) of limit, but also (2) of somewhat-beyond-the-limit, are reconcilable only if this "somewhat-other" is conceived as a greater self of which she is a part. If this be true, then in fully knowing herself, she knows the nature of that greater including self.⁴⁹

This reasoning leads to the fourth article of her philosophical *credo*:

that the universe literally is one all-including (and accordingly complete) self of which all the lesser selves are parts or members. In this view each entity constitutes a part of an ultimately all-including being, the Absolute. The main philosophical influence for her view of the Absolute was Josiah Royce, and like him she tries to clarify both the concept of the Absolute and the relation of persons and lesser selves to that Absolute.⁵⁰

In describing the Absolute Self, she explains first what is meant by the Absolute as *absolute* and secondly, what is meant by the Absolute as *self*. Insofar as the Absolute Self is absolute, it is all-including. She says:

. . . no shred of reality, however trivial, . . . however base, can be outside it. There can be no lazy motion of a moth's wing, no whirl of dust along the highway, no stab of joy, or throb of pain, or groping question which can fall outside the Absolute, the all-including being.⁵¹

By Absolute Self as absolute she also means "a One or unique Whole of parts, not a sum of ultimately independent entities." Just as a circle is not an aggregate of its sectors but defines them, "so the Absolute determines the nature of the many included within it."⁵²

Insofar as the Absolute Person is a self, it is a conscious being that perceives, thinks, feels, and wills. Although "absolute" seems to imply "unlimited," and "person" implies limitation, she sees no contradiction in the notion of an Absolute Person since she means by absolute not "unlimited," but "self-limited," that is, limited-by-nothing-external-to-itself.

But it is more difficult to explain how the Absolute can share in some of our human experiences, such as our hearing and smelling, our grieving and our yearning, and our doing of moral evil. She thinks that we must attribute sense experiences to the Absolute, but she regards him as creating, not passively receiving these experiences. She also thinks that he must experience our emotions for, in Royce's words: "Unless the Absolute knows what we know when we endure and wait, when we love and struggle, when we long and suffer, the Absolute in so far is less and not more than we are." But she follows Royce in holding that though the Absolute Person shares, he also transcends the experience of the individual selves, as a parent may feel a child's grief and yet also see the grievous happening as a factor in a larger satisfying situation.⁵³ In a somewhat similar way – though she admits that this is

harder to see, the Absolute shares the evil of the partial included selves, but he also transcends it since evil here is only a subordinate element in a wider total good, "as a chord which, taken by itself, is a discord, may yet form part of a larger harmony."⁵⁴

The relation of finite selves to the Absolute Self is not easy to explain. One might well wonder: How is the Absolute absolute if he includes finite selves? And how do the finite selves retain their individuality if they exist merely as manifestations of an including absolute self? To the first question Calkins would say again that the Absolute is not an aggregate, a sum total of separate independent finite selves, but One Whole which determines the nature of its many included parts.⁵⁵ To show how that One can keep its unity while still including many, she uses an analogy from our human experience. Each one of us experiences himself or herself as a hierarchy of partial selves: a reasoning and impulsive self, a conscientious and reckless self, a business-like and a speculative self, yet we recognize that no one of these conflicting selves, but the whole of which they are parts constitutes the human *me*; so similarly all the finite selves may be parts of the One Absolute Self.⁵⁶

To understand how the finite selves can retain their individuality we must be aware that the Absolute is not only a thinking self, but a willing self, and that will, "the supreme, assertive attitude," is "the basal relation of Absolute to partial self."⁵⁷ The Absolute is the cause of finite realities which exist as his purposes, and these purposes can be expressed both through non-human selves and through human selves.⁵⁸ Since each individual represents a different purpose of the Absolute Self, the existence of distinct individuals is not merely reconcilable with the Absolute but essential to him. Calkins tries to assure us that our human individuality will be maintained when she says:

You and I, so far from being swallowed up in the absolute self, so far from being lost or engulfed in the ultimate I, find the guarantee of our individual reality precisely herein that we are essential and unique expressions of this absolute self. . . .⁵⁹

To summarize Miss Calkins' philosophical creed we can say that she conceived the universe as not merely mental but personal, that is as constituted of selves of varying levels or grades of personality, existing as parts or members of the One Absolute Self. This metaphysical position of absolutistic personalism or monistic personal idealism also had implications for other areas of philosophy.

3. *Ethics and Other Philosophical Areas*

Implied in Miss Calkins' metaphysics is a philosophy of nature, a philosophy of God, a theory of knowledge, and, taken together with her self-psychology, a philosophy of human nature. Each of these could well be the subject of a long, separate study, as could her work in the history of philosophy as manifested in some of her articles, in her editions of modern philosophers, and in her book, *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*.

But in our limited account, we must also take note of her interest in ethics, as reflected in her book, *The Good Man and the Good*. Ethics, for Miss Calkins, was a division of psychology, yet it also was linked to metaphysics. She thought that a complete metaphysics always must concern itself with the facts of ethics, that is, "the philosopher must rightly know the moral self and his object, the good, in their relation to the rest of the universe."⁶⁰ Her purpose in her ethics textbook is to present not a science of abstractions, but a study of live men.⁶¹

The title of the book is a concise statement of its contents. Calkins begins by trying to state what a good man is (namely, one who wills the good); then she considers what the good is; and in the last few chapters she discusses how a person becomes good.

Though her description of the good as that which is willed for its own sake echoes Aristotle, its identification with the universal community of selves comes from Royce's discussion of the Great Society and the philosophy of loyalty. For Calkins, as for Royce, the good man is he who is loyal to the universe of selves of which he himself is a member. This view overcomes the opposition between egoism and altruism since the good man is indeed loyal to himself, but to himself not in isolation from, but as related to the Great Community of which he is an organic part.⁶²

Since she agrees with Aristotle that we study ethics not primarily to know the good, but in order to become good, she moves on to a discussion of good habits or virtues, linking her comments to what she has learned in psychology about instincts. She defines a virtue as "a habit of will through which a man controls his instinctive tendencies in such wise that he furthers the chief good."⁶³ Like Aristotle she holds that a virtue is a mean, a balance between two opposing vices, but she includes some new applications of that teaching in her discussion, for example, of the conformer and the non-conformer, of the controlled pugnacity of the militant man, and of justice in relation to the question about the

existence of an inherent individual right to private property. On this last point her own view is that as a member of the Great Society the just man must look upon himself as the steward, not the ultimate owner of property.⁶⁴

In stressing that each person is a member of a community of selves and in speaking, in the last chapter of the relation of the universe of selves to God, she reiterates the theme of her metaphysical creed. In the ethical context, too, God is the Greater Self who includes yet transcends the universe of selves. She links this doctrine to the Christian teaching that God is the father of men and infers that the universal community of selves thus becomes the family or the kingdom of God.⁶⁵

She had planned to write a book showing the integration of her philosophy and her religion, but though she did not live long enough to carry out this plan her brother tells us that she had worked out "a perfect synthesis between the intellectual framework of her mental world and the essence of the Christian faith."⁶⁶

It seems appropriate to speak of one more topic in this introduction of her thought. Considering the fact that she was denied a Ph.D. by Harvard University solely because she was a woman, one might wonder whether she developed a philosophy of feminism. Although she mentions that the Harvard Corporation had not approved the recommendation of the Department of Philosophy and Psychology to grant her a doctor's degree and though, as a matter of principle, she politely but firmly refused a Radcliffe degree as a substitute, she was not bitter about her Harvard experience. She wrote:

My natural regret at the action of the Corporation has never clouded my gratitude for the incomparably greater boon which they granted me – that of working in the seminaries and the laboratory of the great Harvard teachers.⁶⁷

She was, however, firmly opposed to the view that there are inherent differences between the minds of men and women. As a consequence she opposed denying women the right to vote and she also opposed establishing a distinctive curriculum for a woman's college. "Is it not as futile," she asked, "to differentiate feminine from masculine studies as to distinguish between women's and men's foods?"⁶⁸ Against the psychologist, Joseph Jastrow, she held that the question of any inherent essential differences between the masculine and feminine mind cannot be settled by psychological investigations because of our inability to eliminate

the effect of environment. In pointing out that the differences in the training of men and women begin with the earliest months of infancy and continue throughout life, she implied that nurture, rather than nature, may account for any apparent mental differences between the sexes.⁶⁹

Most of her effort, however, was spent not in arguing for women's intellectual competence, but in quietly revealing it through teaching women students at Wellesley and through her own thoughtful, scholarly writing in two professional fields.

IV. CONCLUSION

Mary Calkins was a steadfast defender of idealism. She will be particularly remembered for her special combination of personal idealism and absolute idealism. But though she wrote in a clear and orderly way, some readers have not been wholly convinced by her views. They have wondered, for example: How can things in the world of nature be "selves" even if they are described as sluggish, uncommunicative selves? And if finite selves are parts of the One Absolute Self, has she really succeeded in showing both how they retain their individuality and how the Absolute remains absolute?

Idealism, which had been a leading movement in American thought in the 19th century, was challenged by realism and pragmatism in the 20th century. Writing in 1925 Miss Calkins characterized the 20th century in philosophy as an age of revolt, and she patiently tried to answer the criticisms of what was termed "anti-empirical rationalism," "unscientific idealism," or "rigid absolutism."⁷⁰ Her explanations clarified the issues, provided a counterbalance to the new tendencies, and still constitute a key source of information on the philosophical history of the time.

Her work was appreciated by Edgar S. Brightman, the personalist philosopher who spoke at her memorial service; by her peers at the American Philosophical Association who remembered her as "an erudite scholar, a skillful teacher, an incisive thinker, a noble woman;" and by her former students who thought that her great and permanent gift to them was a reverence for personality.⁷¹

The unifying theme of Mary Whiton Calkins' work as well summarized by the colleague who said:

. . . that personalism should prevail both in psychology and in philosophy was her most passionate interest as a scholar and as a teacher.⁷²

NOTES

1. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "Mary Whiton Calkins: Her Place in Philosophy," in *In Memoriam: Mary Whiton Calkins, 1863–1930* (Boston: Merrymount Press, 1931), p. 44.
2. Raymond Calkins, "Mary Whiton Calkins," in *In Memoriam: Mary Whiton Calkins*, pp. 1–3; Laurel Furumoto, "Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930)," in *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, vol. 5 (Fall 1980), pp. 55–56; Virginia Onderdonk, "Calkins, Mary Whiton," in *Notable American Women, 1607–1950: A Biographical Dictionary* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), vol. I, p. 278. According to Mary Calkins' biographers, her ancestors on her mother's side came over on the Mayflower, and her father's earliest American ancestor migrated to America in 1638.
3. Raymond Calkins, in *In Memoriam*, pp. 3–19; the program of the memorial service is included at the end of *In Memoriam: Mary Whiton Calkins, 1863–1930*; L. Furumoto, *art. cit.*, pp. 54–64. Furumoto says that Mary Calkins died of an inoperable cancer.
4. Mary Whiton Calkins, autobiographical essay in *The History of Psychology in Autobiography*, ed. by Carl Murchison (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University Press, 1930; New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), vol. I, p. 31.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 31–33.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 35; Furumoto, *art. cit.*, p. 60; Raymond Calkins, in *In Mem.*, p. 10.
7. I wish to express my gratitude to Wilma R. Slaight, archivist of the Wellesley College Library, for the bibliographies of Mary W. Calkins' writings in psychology and philosophy.
8. The National Union Catalog, Vol. 90 (Mansell, 1970), pp. 688–689, lists 6 printings of *An Introduction to Psychology* and 9 printings of *A First Book in Psychology*.
9. M. W. Calkins in Murchison, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
10. Mary W. Calkins, *An Introduction to Psychology* (New York: Macmillan, 1901), pp. v, 49, 446; *A First Book of Psychology* (New York: Macmillan, 1927, 4th rev. ed.), p. vii.
11. *Introduction to Psychology*, pp. 4–5; *First Book of Psychology*, p. 2.
12. *Introduction to Psychology*, p. 443; *art. cit.* in Murchison, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–42; "A Personal Idealist's Concern for Psychology," *Personalist*, vol. V (1924), pp. 5–6.
13. M. W. Calkins, "Psychology as Science of Selves," *Philosophical Review*, vol. 9 (1900), p. 490.
14. M. W. Calkins, "Psychology: What Is It About?," *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 4 (1907), p. 678; also *First Book in Psychology*, p. 274.
15. M. W. Calkins, "Psychology: What Is It About?" *loc. cit.*, p. 682; *First Book of Psychology*, pp. 274–276.
16. *First Book of Psychology*, p. 1.
17. *Art. cit.* in Murchison, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 31; *First Book of Psychology*, p. 7.
19. Murchison, *op. cit.*, p. 38; *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1923 & 1925), p. 189.
20. "The Self in Recent Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. 24 (1927), p. 208.
21. On these characteristics of self, see *First Book of Psychology*, p. 3; Murchison, p. 45; "Psychology as Science of Self," *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 5 (1908), pp. 64–68; "Self and Soul," *Philosophical Review*, vol. 17 (1908), p. 272.
22. "Self and Soul," *loc. cit.*, pp. 276–277.
23. Murchison, p. 41; "The Case of Self against Soul," *Psychological Review*, vol. 24 (1917), pp. 278–280, 298–299.
24. "Psychology As Science of Self," *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 5 (1908), pp. 13–14; *First Book of Psychology*, p. 277.
25. "Psychology as Science of Self," *loc. cit.*, pp. 14, 64.
26. Murchison, pp. 43–44.
27. E. S. Brightman, in *In Memoriam: Mary Whiton Calkins*, p. 36.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 44. Brightman is referring to her article in *British Journal of Psychology*, vol. 16 (1926), pp. 171–179: "Converging Lines in Contemporary Psychology."
29. "The Self in Recent Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. 24 (1927), p. 205.
30. Raymond Calkins, *In Memoriam*, p. 12; Furumoto, *art. cit.*, p. 63.
31. "Self and Soul," *Philosophical Review*, vol. 17 (1908), p. 272.
32. "A Personalist Idealist's Concern for Psychology," *Personalist*, vol. V (1924), p. 9.
33. "Psychology as Science of Selves," *Philosophical Review*, vol. 9 (1900), p. 492.
34. *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy* (1923 ed.), p. viii; Raymond Calkins, *In Memoriam*, pp. 4, 9; Brightman, *In Memoriam*, p. 44; A. K. Rogers, *English and American Philosophy Since 1800* (New York: Macmillan, 1923), p. 298. It is interesting to note that Josiah Royce expressed his appreciation of Mary Calkins' understanding of his thought in a letter; see *The Letters of Josiah Royce*, ed. by John Clendenning (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 644–648.
35. Raymond Calkins, *In Memoriam*, pp. 6–7; Furumoto, p. 63; Murchison, p. 35. Calkins speaks of herself as having "held the fort" for her successor in experimental psychology.
36. From the program of the service in memory of Mary Whiton Calkins held at the Wellesley College Chapel on April 13, 1930. See end of the book, *In Memoriam: Mary Whiton Calkins*.
37. Quoted by Raymond Calkins, *In Mem.*, pp. 10–11. A colleague, Thomas H. Procter (in *In Memoriam: Mary Whiton Calkins*, p. 31) remembers that though Miss Calkins was an idealist, each year she invited a realist to lecture to her modern philosophy class to be sure that the realistic position would be given a just and sympathetic presentation.
38. Brightman, *In Mem.*, pp. 36–37. The National Union Catalog (Vol. 90,

- p. 689), lists 11 printings of *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, all published by Macmillan.
39. The translation of La Mettrie's *Man a Machine* (Chicago: Open Court, 1912) was originally made by Gertrude C. Bussey, but the preface says that it "has ben revised by Professor M. W. Calkins who is responsible for it in its present form." – Three of the other works that Miss Calkins edited were also published by Open Court: *The Metaphysical System of Hobbes* (1905, 1910); John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Books II and IV* (1905, 1906); David Hume's *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Selections from a Treatise on Human Nature* (1907, 1909, 1921, edited with T. J. McCormack). Her edition of George Berkeley's *Essays, Principles, Dialogues, with Selections from Other Writings* was published by Scribner's (1929). – *The Good Man and the Good: An Introduction to Ethics* was published by Macmillan in 1918, 1921, 1925.
 40. M. W. Calkins, "The Philosophical Credo of an Absolutistic Personalist," in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, ed. by George P. Adams and William Pepperell Montague (New York: Macmillan, 1930), vol. I, p. 199.
 41. *Ibid.*, pp. 200, 201, 203, 209.
 42. *Ibid.*, pp. 200–201.
 43. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
 44. *Ibid.*, pp. 201–202; see also *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 427–428.
 45. "The Philosophical Credo of an Absolutistic Personalist," in Adams and Montague, *op. cit.*, pp. 204–205; *Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 90, 95.
 46. "The Philosophical Credo of an Absolutistic Personalist," in *op. cit.*, p. 204; *Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 429–432.
 47. "The Philosophical Credo . . .," in *op. cit.*, p. 204; "The Personalistic Conception on Nature," *Philosophical Review*, vol. 28 (1919), pp. 134, 139; *Persistent Problems*, p. 435.
 48. "The Philosophical Credo . . .," in *op. cit.*, pp. 205, 208.
 49. *Ibid.*, p. 209; "The Personalistic Conception of Nature," *loc. cit.*, pp. 126–127; *Persistent Problems*, pp. 422, 452–454.
 50. The similarity of Mary Calkins' philosophy to Royce's philosophy is evident in this summary that she gave of Royce's main themes: ". . . the universe is . . . conceived as through and through ideal. This ideal world . . . is shown to be rightly viewed only as a world of interrelated selves. And each of these selves, it is argued, directly knows . . . the existence of a reality-greater-than-itself. This Greater Reality must, finally – in accordance with the personalistic premiss of the argument – be a Greater Self of which each lesser self is an identical part yet by which it is transcended." (From "The Foundation in Royce's Philosophy for Christian Theism," *Philosophical Review*, vol. 25 (1916), p. 283.) Several of Royce's works are cited here, but especially *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, *The World and the Individual*, *The Conception of God*, and *The Problem of*

- Christianity*. – She also mentions Hegel and F. H. Bradley as “personal absolutists” who have influenced her. See “The Philosophical *Credo* . . .,” in *op. cit.*, p. 212, note 2.
51. “The Philosophical *Credo* . . .,” in *op. cit.*, p. 212.
 52. *Ibid.*, pp. 212–213.
 53. *Ibid.*, pp. 213–214; *Persistent Problems*, pp. 454–460.
 54. “The Philosophical *Credo* . . .,” in *op. cit.*, p. 215; *Persistent Problems* (1923 ed.), pp. 431–434.
 55. “The Philosophical *Credo* . . .,” in *op. cit.*, pp. 212–213.
 56. *Ibid.*, pp. 215–216.
 57. *Persistent Problems* (1923 ed.), p. 429.
 58. *Ibid.*, pp. 454–456.
 59. *Ibid.*, p. 439. She also thinks that the personalist may hold that the human self is immortal. See *Ibid.* (1923 ed.), p. 456, and (1925 ed.), p. 481.
 60. M. W. Calkins, *The Good Man and the Good* (New York: Macmillan, 1921), p. 193, note 13; also “The Philosophical *Credo* . . .,” in *op. cit.*, p. 199.
 61. *The Good Man and the Good*, p. vii.
 62. *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 48–51, 65–67. See Royce’s *Philosophy of Loyalty* and *The Problem of Christianity*.
 63. *The Good Man and the Good*, p. 82.
 64. *Ibid.*, pp. 90, 93–95, 134–140, 148–163. She published a book entitled *Sharing the Profits* (Boston: Ginn, 1888). Also, her brother (in *In Mem.*, p. 17) mentions that she often voted the Socialist ticket, and that she was a friend of Jane Addams, of Norman Thomas, and of others struggling for a more humane and more just social order.
 65. *The Good Man and the Good*, pp. 173–174.
 66. R. Calkins, *In Mem.*, p. 15; Procter, *In Memoriam*, p. 32.
 67. M. W. Calkins in Murchison, p. 67.
 68. Furumoto, pp. 64–65.
 69. M. W. Calkins, “Community of Ideas of Men and Women,” *Psychological Review*, vol. 3 (1896), p. 430; Bruce Kuklick, *The Rise of American Philosophy* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 591, says of Miss Calkins: “. . . she was the early token American philosophers contributed to the feminist ideal.”
 70. *Persistent Problems of Philosophy* (1925 ed.), p. 398 ff.
 71. Brightman, *In Mem.*, pp. 35–47; Resolution adopted by the members of the Executive Committee of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association on March 22, 1930, and included in *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 8 (1930), pp. 223–224, and in *Philosophical Review*, vol. 39 (1930), p. 323; Helen Cook Vincent in *In Memoriam*, p. 26.
 72. Eleanor Gamble, quoted by R. Calkins in *In Mem.*, p. 11. A. C. Knudson said in *The Philosophy of Personalism* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1927; New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969), p. 33, that Mary W. Calkins “. . . may properly be regarded as the most conspicuous representative of personalism in the form of absolute idealism.”

6. L. Susan Stebbing (1885–1943)

MORGAN GRAYCE WILLOW

I. BIOGRAPHY

The English philosopher L. Susan Stebbing was born December 2, 1885, the youngest of six children of barrister Alfred Charles Stebbing and Elizabeth Elstob in Wimbledon, near London. Since both her parents had died by the time she was sixteen, Stebbing was raised primarily by a guardian. As a child Stebbing suffered from an illness and was not expected to live. Her health continued to be a problem and as a consequence her education was discontinuous until 1906 when she went to Girton College, Cambridge.

Even at Girton Stebbing's health affected her course of study, for though she had hoped to read classics, it was felt that doing so would involve too much physical strain. She was directed instead into history and completed her exams in 1907. During her last term at Girton, however, she chanced to read Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. Thoroughly taken by it, Stebbing decided to stay on to read moral sciences under the direction of W. E. Johnson and completed the exams in one year though she was still unable to attend many lectures.

In 1912 Stebbing received her M.A. from the University of London. Her thesis entitled *Pragmatism and French Voluntarism* was subsequently published in the Girton College Studies series. She lectured at King's College, London, from 1913 to 1915 when she, along with her sister Helen Stebbing, Hilda Gavin, a Girton friend, and Vivian Shepherd, took over the Kingsley Lodge school for girls in Hampstead. There she taught history and involved herself in the direction of the school which was to grow into a large and flourishing institution. Meanwhile, also in 1915, she became a part-time Lecturer at Bedford College, University of London. She advanced to full-time Lecturer there in 1920, Reader in 1927, and Professor in 1933.¹

Margaret Macdonald, who wrote on Stebbing for the *Dictionary of National Biography* remarked that she "was no philosophical recluse."² In addition to her teaching duties at Bedford, Stebbing lectured widely, both in philosophy at other colleges and universities, and on behalf of the League of Nations Union after the First World War. She was an active participant in the Aristotelian Society where she exchanged views with Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and A. N. Whitehead; she contributed numerous papers to the Society's *Proceedings* and in 1933 was elected its president. Also active in the Mind Association, Stebbing was elected president in 1935.

Though not an originator in formal logic, Stebbing proved herself an able exponent of the dramatic developments in the subject happening during the first third of this century. In *A Modern Introduction to Logic* (1930) she made a unique contribution by her clear presentation in a single volume of an exposition of the logical theories of the early twentieth century along with a careful account of the metaphysical difficulties dispelled or clarified by these developments. Her book has been cited as the first work on modern logic to comprehensively introduce both formalism and its related philosophical problems. John Wisdom adds to this that the book's value is greatly enhanced by its extensive and detailed examples.³

In 1931 Stebbing held a visiting professorship at Columbia University in New York. P. Magg, who attended her lectures in logic there, recalls that she was met with enthusiasm and that her lectures were characterized by a lively discussion prompted mainly by Stebbing's active encouragement of diverse views. Reflecting that the time of her visit was one of crisis on the European scene, Magg makes a special point of Stebbing's insistence that logic is purposive and useful:

Logic had been to us a field in which we were supposed to be objective, rational, neutral, scientific and even aloof from the affairs of the world. . . . But here we found a different kind of logician . . . who made it clear that reason and logic, mind and science, had important services to perform in the very problems of the relation of society to man, of man to society.⁴

These ideas she later expounded in *Logic in Practice* (1934) and *Thinking to Some Purpose* (1939) where she emphasized the importance of rationality, clarity, and knowledge in the conduct of human affairs. These works demonstrate, through the use of numerous examples

of emotional persuasion, the effects of errors in reasoning. With these books she extends her influence beyond purely academic philosophical issues.

Stebbing's interests stretched outside the metaphysical questions posed by logic and into areas of inquiry introduced by developments in the foundations of science. In *Philosophy and the Physicists* (1937) she takes Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington to task for the obscurantism and mystification embedded in their popularizations of early twentieth century scientific developments. They both argue, she suggests, that modern physics shows the world to be a very different sort of place than it indeed seems to be, both physically and metaphysically. Jeans and Eddington develop idealist views of physics to which Stebbing applies a careful rational criticism. Underpinning her attack of their arguments is an implicit faith that it is unnecessary to hide behind such intellectual smokescreens and that to engage in such evasions actually prevents the kind of appropriate adjustment to changes in the human situation that the careful use of reason and knowledge would otherwise enable.⁵

Stebbing elaborates her view that reason can, if properly used, go a long way toward delivering humans from evil and the conditions resulting from it in *Ideals and Illusions* (1941). Written during the Second World War (indeed, bearing the imprint of the British Book Production War Economy Standard), this work stresses the importance of clear thought, i.e. thought free from unnecessary and obfuscating abstractions, about ethical principles in the lives of nations as well as in the lives of individuals. Feeling that both of these are threatened by fascism and by the thinking that has led up to it, Stebbing urges that: "Amidst the ruins it is still possible to preach the ideal of freedom, truth, happiness, and love."⁶

Stebbing's final book, *A Modern Elementary Logic* (1943), is a logic text revised and condensed from the earlier logic book.

In his "Appreciation" John Wisdom mentions that at Stebbing's lectures "a stiffish breeze was usually blowing." Though her students had to withstand the very "sharp rays" of her criticism, he notes that it was not applied without kindness and patience. He suggests the character of L. Susan Stebbing in another way when he comments that:

I always wished that she would write a book, or at least a paper, free from the pressure of other duties or any promise to have it done by a certain time. But no – there was always something, if not a

committee meeting then a taxi for Ireland, and with a suitcase in her hand and a hat a trifle insecure upon her head she would be gone.⁷

II. PHILOSOPHY

1. *Pragmatism and French Voluntarism*

Stebbing's dominant concern reveals itself as early as 1914 with the publication of her master's thesis *Pragmatism and French Voluntarism*.⁸ In this volume she sets herself the task of examining the "fashion," as she calls it, of two separate movements in philosophy that, through disparate methods and opposed conclusions, both depreciate the value and efficacy of reason. In addressing this problem she takes on the French Voluntarists, most especially Bergsonian Intuitionists, and the Pragmatists. The problem, she maintains, lies finally in the inability of either group to give a satisfactory account of truth, a problem which leads both to resort to non-intellectual methods of solving metaphysical problems. In contrast, Stebbing wishes to maintain that only "by the complete working out of the demands of intellect can we obtain knowledge that is at once complete and rational, hence truly *knowledge*" (*PFV*, p. vi).

In opening her discussion Stebbing attributes the wave of unpopularity of reason in her age to the prevailing spirit of democracy in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The effect of this upon philosophy was, she claims, to call philosophy out of the "closet" and to bring it to the "plain man." Stebbing felt it unfortunate that the charge against philosophy, namely that it had become too complicated for the plain man, was not restricted to a critique of the discipline's technical terminology. Instead, the criticism had become "a plea for the recognition of other attitudes towards the Universe than that of regarding it as a 'problem-to-be-solved'" (*PFV*, p. 2). Since, it was claimed, intellect alone could not satisfy the philosopher as a person, one's entire emotional reaction had to be taken into account. Consequently new stress was laid on the active, volitional side of the human. This led to a second tendency: a revolt against the mechanical model of the universe which in turn spawned the admission of contingency into physical science. From these tendencies came French Voluntarism which adhered to a radical contingency and claimed the need for a higher form of perception than

intellect to give direct contact with reality. Similarly, Pragmatism grew from the desire to bring philosophy into the daily arena and to place knowledge in a position of lesser value than action, thus making intellect a means to the satisfaction of human needs. Though, she argues, the two schools of thought share these origins, they are nonetheless diametrically and fundamentally opposed.

Stebbing traces French Voluntarism from its founder Maine de Biran through Ravaisson and Boutroux. She concentrates in the main, however, on Henri Bergson whose profound originality emerged, she says, from the earlier Voluntarists in much the same way that "the slow slipping of the loosened surface beneath a tilted rock causes it to rush down into the valley below if but a single stone be removed, so the slow accumulation of ideas results in the gradual formation of a new way of looking at the whole and transforms it suddenly and completely" (*PFV*, p. 36). Unlike James and other pragmatists who begin by considering the nature of truth, Bergson, she explains, does not directly address the question. The theory of life that he proposes involves a view of knowledge that to Stebbing seems peculiar. Reacting to the view of reality that contradiction is inherent in change, Bergson insisted to the contrary that what we apprehend is that which does not change, i.e. duration. We fall into contradiction because, though reality is a continuous flux, we apprehend only its spatial representation. We misrepresent the real because intellect has a purely practical function, that is, it has evolved in the interests of action. Consequently, we need something else in addition to intellect, namely the intuition, in order to apprehend the real.

Stebbing holds that Bergson comes to view intellect and intuition as opposed. There are for him two ways of knowing, that of the intellect which forms concepts and that of intuition, a sympathetic insight wherein the distinction between the knower and the known is lessened. Intellect is specially adapted to deal with matter while intuition is adapted to deal with life. "The conclusion that M. Bergson draws is that the philosopher must free himself from the tyranny of practical needs since, under their sway, he can only think matter, the inverse of the living reality . . ." (*PFV*, p. 47). Bergson, then, she goes on, embraces anti-intellectualism on the grounds that intellect is one-sided because it is tied to the service of practical needs. After linking Bergson with other proponents of French Voluntarism, Stebbing concludes her examination of them with the summary remark that "So far from agreeing with the pragmatist in the identification of the true and the useful, the exponents of the

New Philosophy go to the other extreme and utterly divorce the useful from the true" (PFV, p. 73).

The anti-intellectualism of the pragmatists is rather different from that of the Bergsonians. Stebbing reviews the work of Charles Renouvier by way of building a bridge from the pragmatists to Kant. Though not himself properly considered a pragmatist, the part Kant assigns to will in establishing truth opens, in her view, an avenue for the pragmatists in developing their own criterion of truth. Renouvier finds the existence of possible doubt in all judgments in the liberty of will. Since, he argues, error and truth are distinguished one from the other, and since free decision is possible, then doubt is also possible. To will to affirm a judgment becomes, according to Renouvier, the only escape from scepticism (PFV, p. 102). Stebbing responds:

It may be granted that we cannot set out from the circle of doubt without the aid of will, and that consequently will is an element in all affirmation. But this does not involve the conclusion that will *makes* truth. We will *that*, and not *what*, the judgment may be. Hence *what* is true is independent of our willing, though *that* it is true may result from our action. (PFV, p. 102)

She concludes that his attempt to raise the status of belief to a level equivalent with that attributed to knowledge ends by degrading knowledge to the level of belief.

Tracing Pragmatism further to Kant's method of postulation, Stebbing asserts that the pragmatists overlooked the limitations Kant imposed on postulation. "Kant's much quoted phrase – 'I must therefore abolish knowledge to make room for belief' – makes a distinction between *knowledge* and *belief* that is wholly obliterated in Pragmatism" (PFV, p. 104). He is willing to admit postulation in instances where knowledge fails, but he assigns to postulates only the level of belief.

After examining the relations between Renouvier's theory of certainty and Kant's method of postulation, Stebbing turns her attention to the pragmatists. She claims that the pragmatists adopted the method of postulation for two reasons: first, in order to clarify human thought as purposive and thus to recognize the emotional and volitional aspects of humans; and, second, because they wished to carry the experimental method of science into metaphysics. In doing the latter, she asserts, the pragmatist transforms the hypothesis of science into the postulate of metaphysics. "The postulate will be proved by the way it 'works,' and its truth will be simply its utility" (PFV, p. 112).

In summing up her comparison of these two philosophical camps, Stebbing points out that Bergson and the Voluntarists condemn the intellect because it is pragmatic while the pragmatists reverse that and repudiate any view of the intellect that denies its pragmatic nature. Her own view of the relation of utility and truth is that what is true is useful because it is true and not the other way around. "The pragmatist first identifies truth with its consequences, then selects one of these, viz. utility, and substitutes one for the other. But the utility depends on the truth and not *vice versa*" (PFV, p. 140). They have confused a criterion of truth, i.e. utility, with its nature. Meanwhile, she asserts, the Bergsonian Intuitionists have gone the reverse route and claimed that the nature of truth is its own criterion by identifying truth with reality. She insists, on the other hand, that the two issues be treated separately as far as this is possible and, further, that one must address first the question of the nature of truth since it is logically prior to its own criterion (PFV, p. 157).

Stebbing expresses her own faith in reason and her sense of its role when she declares that "philosophy is essentially the affair of intellect." In calling the Intuitionists to task for resorting to means of extra-rational solution to the problems the intellect has been unable to solve, she reasserts the place of reason:

The antinomies they are supposed to solve are antinomies of reason, hence must be solved by reason. An extra-rational solution cannot be made to meet the case but is merely a confession that the problem is insoluble. Thus the problem of truth remains an intellectual problem and the attempt to solve it "livingly" results in abandoning the quest of truth as such and in substituting for it a conception of life which ignores the interest that gave rise to it. It is then the work of intellect to solve the problems that intellect raises. (PFV, p. 162)

2. *A Modern Introduction to Logic*

With the publication of *A Modern Introduction to Logic*⁹ Stebbing established her reputation as a metaphysician equal to the questions posed by logic and the foundations of science. The book's value lay not so much in its original developments in formal logic as in its clear exposition of various logical theories and in its lucid discussion of the metaphysical problems the new logical techniques raised.

Stebbing set out with this book to fill what she perceived as a major

gap in the availability of textbooks in logic that addressed more than the traditional syllogistic logic of Aristotle. At a time when A. N. Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and C. D. Broad, Stebbing's own teachers to whom she pays due credit in her preface, were making significant and, Stebbing felt, interesting advances in symbolic logic, students preparing for exams at Cambridge were only being exposed to what she calls the "elaborate trivialities" of traditional developments of the syllogism. Stebbing identifies four categories into which books on logic fall: traditional, metaphysical, pragmatic, and mathematical. And though she places her book in the last category, she nonetheless feels that the student must be introduced to the traditional syllogism for reasons beyond the immediate need to pass exams (which, she claims, were still being designed to test "proficiency in technical dodges" rather than logical principles). For the syllogism, she insists, "is a form very often exemplified in our ordinary reasoning; moreover, it is psychologically the simplest form, so that syllogistic arguments provide the easiest means of enabling the student to apprehend form as such and to realize that the validity of reasoning depends upon its form" (*MIL*, xi–xii).

But that she wishes to go beyond that is very clear for she opens her preface with the remark, "The science of logic does not stand still" (*MIL*, ix). She wants to introduce the student and the general reader to the tremendous advances in logic that had occurred during the preceding half-century:

It has not been my intention to take the student very far into mathematical logic, but only to enable him to realize that the principles of symbolic logic are not peculiar to a special kind of study but are principles exemplified in everyday reflective thinking no less than in mathematical deductions. I have not sought to write an *introduction to symbolic logic*; my purpose has been to emphasize the connexion between Aristotelian logic and symbolic logic, and thus to write a text-book which will include as little as possible that the student has subsequently to unlearn, or for the teaching of which the modern logician feels it necessary to apologize. (*MIL*, ix)

Because it will be important in later work by Stebbing, we must take note of the fact that even in this text the intent of which is to bring mathematical logic to the attention of students and readers, Stebbing has twice already mentioned "ordinary reasoning" and "everyday reflec-

tive thinking." Convinced, as we have seen, of the value of reason, Stebbing is not inclined to restrict that faculty to Cambridge or Oxford dons, and even in this logic text she opens the book with a chapter entitled "Reflective Thinking in Ordinary Life." She sketches a lively example of a idler at the beach who is suddenly roused from a leisurely reverie by shouts from people standing on a cliff overhead. He recognizes that their shouts have significance for him and looks about him only to discover that he is soon to be trapped by the incoming tide. One of the people points toward the cliff. The beach idler wonders whether there are footholds; he looks but finds none. But he does observe that there is a ledge in the direction the person on the cliff has been pointing, and he notes further that the discoloration of the rocks indicates the mark of high tide. He realizes that on that ledge he will be safe. Stebbing uses this situation to illustrate the contrast between unreflective and reflective thinking in ordinary experience (*MIL*, 1–3). With this example she drives home her point that all thinking is directed toward solving problems. Further, thinking is controlled by the conditions of the problem the process addresses, and its natural end is the solution of the problem. Thus Stebbing lays the groundwork for her introduction to symbolic logic and paves the way for the works she will write on the practical application of reason.

A Modern Introduction to Logic was met with acclaim and excitement. In a review for *Philosophy* L. J. Russell exclaimed "Here for the first time the general reader has an opportunity of studying recent developments of logical theory without being compelled to make his way through a mass of books and of articles scattered through the journals."¹⁰ Nerlich of the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1967 edition, still considers it the best introduction for a reader to the metaphysical problems of logic. It must be noted that though Stebbing addressed the volume to the student and the general reader, she did not back away from meeting difficult metaphysical problems squarely. Another reviewer, Ross Thalheimer, comments that "The volume has, for an introduction to logic, a rather marked controversial character,"¹¹ and is for this reason of special interest to both the professional logician and the non-professional reader.

The book is divided into three parts, the first of which is about deductive logic. In this section Stebbing deals with the analysis of propositions and concerns herself with the nature of symbols. She elucidates the more adequate analyses that modern developments in logic bring to the problems Aristotelian logic has attempted to address. In the second section Stebbing moves into a consideration of induction and the

scientific method. She explores what is meant by the terms “science,” “cause,” “hypothesis,” and “theory” as well as how the experimental sciences seek causes. The final section includes supplementary chapters covering the theory of definition, abstraction and generalization, a discussion of the characteristics of logical thinking, and finally a sketch of the historical development of logic.

C. A. Mace, who prepared a detailed review of the book for *Mind*,¹² vouches for the “originality and coherence” of the overall plan of the book by highlighting its points of interest. He characterizes Stebbing’s *Logic* as both lively and fresh owing largely to its abundant presentation of examples drawn from genuine problems, and to the introduction of varied and abundant illustrations. Nonetheless, the work is not without, in Mace’s view, its points of controversy and significant contribution to the ongoing discussions among the Cambridge logicians. He notes, for example, that many readers will likely disagree with Stebbing on the subject of ambiguity (Mace, p. 355), and he notes her departure from Johnson on the distinction between simple and compound propositions as well as her identification of simple propositions with Bertrand Russell’s atomic propositions (Mace, p. 357). He commends her for treating, for the first time in a general logic text, topics such as general propositions, descriptions, and existence. He credits the section on induction and scientific inquiry for bringing together the recently made contributions to the subject by Johnson, J. N. Keynes, and C. D. Broad.

Mace does, however, challenge a distinction Stebbing makes between two kinds of belief upon which scientists depend. She calls these postulates of scientific method and regulative principles. These last take the form of certain “*demands* that nature must conform to certain conditions” (*MIL*, p. 403). Mace counters:

A considerable amount of fresh air is let into the discussion of these regulative principles, but even so they remain somewhat mysterious. One is not perfectly satisfied of their *bona fides*, and of their right to associate with the dignified logical principles with which Miss Stebbing’s work is principally concerned. Must we really recognise demands – however insistent – that Nature *must* be so and so, whatever the evidence, or lack of evidence, may be? (Mace, p. 363)

He argues, rather, that propositions making the assertion that a given constitution of Nature makes induction possible may indeed assert a logical fact, but they do not place “demands” on nature.

L. J. Russell claimed that Stebbing's *Modern Introduction to Logic* had done for the Cambridge school and the works of Bertrand Russell, Whitehead, Broad, Johnson, and G. E. Moore what H. W. B. Joseph had done for Oxford thought in his *Introduction to Logic* (Russell, 110). Joseph, in fact, took advantage of the appearance of her book to launch an indirect attack on the Cambridge logicians. In a series of papers in *Mind*, Joseph's attack and Stebbing's rejoinders debate such questions as the theory of descriptions, propositions and constituents, functions and variables, and implication, as well as the question "What is really 'analysed'?"¹³ A detailed review of this dispute is beyond the scope of this introduction to Stebbing's work, though readers interested in the development of symbolic logic may find it of interest. Suffice it to say here that the debate reveals the niche the book fills in the stream of developments taking place in logic during the early third of the century.

It is also of interest that, along with Ralph Eaton of Harvard University who wrote *General Logic, An Introductory Survey*,¹⁴ Stebbing – and indeed symbolic logic itself – came under attack from another quarter. The British pragmatist F. C. S. Schiller in "The Sacrifice of Barbara"¹⁵ bemoaned the demise of Barbara, his pet name for traditional formal logic, who he claims "is falling a victim to fierce attacks, launched simultaneously from Cambridge, England, and Cambridge, Massachusetts" (*MPD*, p. 48). Schiller questions whether "Symbolic Logic is a real advance in logic, and is not rather a cruel, needless, and pernicious superstition of the Academic Grove" (*MPD*, p. 49). While accepting that symbolic logic is "a more perfectly formal form" of formal logic, Schiller questions what he sees as the fundamental abstraction of form from matter and the set of assumptions upon which symbolic logic is based (*MPD*, p. 51). Schiller criticizes proponents of symbolic logic for separating logic from empirical science and psychology, then challenges them to address the status of "truth" and "meaning" in their systems of formal logic. He asks:

Is it really possible to abstract the pure form of reasoning and to base a science on it? Is it really permissible to suppose, with Professor Stebbing . . . that by substituting symbols 'precise, *i.e.* well-defined and therefore unambiguous,' for words, the haunting wraith of ambiguity can be laid for ever? . . . Is it really possible to rule out the psychic side of thought, and to ignore the conceptions of purpose, satisfaction, selection, relevance, and the rest, which refer to it? (*MPD*, p. 56)

3. *Logic in Practice*

It is not, however, the case that Stebbing allowed no place for the purposive in her concern for logic and thinking. On the contrary, as we have seen, she opened her *Logic* with a treatment of thinking that clearly indicates the purposive nature of the process. In two other works, both written for the general reader, Stebbing elaborates on this theme to a considerable degree.

In the first of these *Logic in Practice*¹⁶ Stebbing devotes her first chapter to "Purposive Thinking." She means by this that all thinking is directed toward the solving of problems.

To be confronted with a problem is to be compelled to think. Thinking essentially consists in asking questions and attempting to answer them. To ask a question is to be conscious of a problem; to answer correctly is to have discovered its solution. Purposive thinking is thinking directed to answering a question held steadily in view. (*LIP*, p. 1)

The most highly developed form of such directed thinking is reasoning (*LIP*, p. 10). While Stebbing asserts that all thinking is purposive, she is not averse, as is Schiller, to its formal representation in symbol. On the contrary, it is her view that sound reasoning is a habit which can be more fully developed by the study of logical principles, and the intent of this slim volume is to relay these principles to the non-academic audience.

Despite the nontechnical emphasis of the book, Stebbing does still manage to emphasize the value of a formal approach to reasoning. In a chapter entitled "The Importance of Form" she illustrates the form of deductive inference through a number of examples. In one of these an investigative committee has been formed to search for the causes of a fire aboard a passenger steamer. The committee has no immediately available premises that entail an answer to their question. In lieu of data they were forced to assert and test a number of hypotheses: 1) that an unnoticed lighted match had come in contact with some combustible part of the ship and had ignited; 2) that a wire had shorted out; or 3) that someone had deliberately set the ship on fire. In hypothesis number 1) the unnoticed match, for example, the argument breaks out into the following form:

- (1) If so, then the match was dropped in a cabin or in a public part of the ship, and the fire began in the place where the match was dropped.
- (2) But, the fire broke out in the luggage-room (i.e. not in a cabin nor in a public part of the ship).
- (3) Therefore, the cause of the fire was not a lighted match. (*LIP*, p. 26)

She goes on to illustrate this symbolically:

If H1, then C1,
 but not C1,
 not H1. (*LIP*, p. 27)

Stebbing elaborates upon the example at some length in order to fill in for the lay reader exactly in what way reasoning can be said to follow a formal pattern. "The *conclusiveness* of an argument depends entirely upon its form" (*LIP*, p. 28). And once this basis is established Stebbing goes on to treat, in a similar direct way and with a minimum of technicality, the following topics: deductive forms; ambiguity, indefiniteness, and relevance; the estimation of evidence; and the grounds of belief. Although the book was not intended to be an introduction to logic, it was hailed by L. J. Russell in *Philosophy*¹⁷ as a good introduction in that he expected it would induce an interest in the subject of logic and logical problems on the part of the general reader.

4. *Thinking to Some Purpose*

In the fall of 1936 Stebbing delivered a lecture entitled "Thinking" at the annual conference of the British Institute of Adult Education. Subsequently published (along with a companion piece by C. Day Lewis on the imagination), this lecture came to form the basis for *Thinking to Some Purpose*. In the lecture Stebbing begins addressing the question whether it is possible to train others to think clearly by charging that it is misleading to speak of "clear thinking" at all. "There may be a clear *exposition*, or a clear *argument*, or a clear *speech*. . . . But there is not a clear *piece of thinking*, or a clear *thinking*, but only *thinking clearly*. . . . It is always an 'I' that thinks."¹⁸ And, further, "My thinking is determined by the sort of person I am, and the sort of person I am becoming is in part determined by how I am thinking" (*I&T*, p. 15). It

follows that others cannot be directly taught to think any more than they can be directly made into other sorts of persons than they are. What can be taught indirectly, however, is the content of thinking since all thinking is about something (*I&T*, p. 16). With her usual directness Stebbing says that though “Only a fool or a logician would suggest that we could train people to think by giving them facility in the use of the delightful language of pure logic,” students can be taught to ask themselves “What is it exactly that I am saying?” (*I&T*, p. 17).

The B.B.C. asked Stebbing to follow up this lecture with twelve talks. She was never able to accomplish the radio series, but the synopsis she submitted for the proposed talks became *Thinking to Some Purpose*.¹⁹ And it is in this book that Stebbing goes to some lengths to get students and general readers alike to ask themselves not only what they are saying but also what twisted thinking and crooked arguments they are using and/or falling prey to. While this book recaps some of the points in *Logic in Practice*, particularly with regard to thinking as a purposive activity, the two books differ primarily in that the latter deals with reasoning in its formal aspects while *Thinking to Some Purpose* is a practical guide to the numerous obstacles thrown in the paths of those who would wish to think clearly. From the prologue, intriguingly entitled “Are the English Illogical?”, to the epilogue “Democracy and Freedom of Mind,” Stebbing demonstrates through example after example – drawn from the speeches of politicians, from newspapers, and from advertising – the common fallacies, the dangers of propaganda, what she calls potted thinking, problems of statistical evidence, and potential misuses of analogy in argument.

5. *A Modern Elementary Logic*

Stebbing’s final book on logic, *A Modern Elementary Logic*,²⁰ which appeared in 1943 was in many ways a pared down version of the earlier *A Modern Introduction to Logic*. In this textbook written with the express purpose of preparing first-year students for the logic examinations, Stebbing felt free to exclude some of the “technical trivialities” she’d been constrained by the form of the exams to include in the earlier test. In addition, discussions on scientific method are more restricted. The book also differs from the earlier text in that Stebbing, keeping in mind students who, like members of the armed forces, were studying on their own without the assistance of a tutor, devised an appendix intended to answer students’ most commonly asked questions about logic.

6. *Philosophy and the Physicist*

In 1937 Stebbing's *Philosophy and the Physicists*²¹ was published. With this book Stebbing applies the commitment to rational clarity she has developed and illustrated in her works on practical logic to her long-standing interest in recent developments in the sciences. Specifically, she examines with careful attention the arguments presented to the common reader (to use the phrase she borrows from Samuel Johnson) by eminent scientists who elucidate what they believe to be the implications of developments in mathematical physics. The primary targets of her analysis are Sir James Jeans for his *The Mysterious Universe* (1930) and *The New Background of Science* (1933) and Sir Arthur Eddington for *The Nature of the Physical World* (1928), *Science and the Unseen World* (1929), and *New Pathways in Science* (1933).

Stebbing begins by paying tribute to the interest of the common reader in scientific research but charges in Part I, entitled "The Alarming Astronomers," that some scientists writing for the common reader "seek to arouse [the reader's] emotions, thereby inducing a frame of mind inimical to intellectual discernment. Popularizations of such a kind constitute a grave danger to thinking clearly" (*P&P*, p. 5). Turning specifically to Jeans and Eddington she makes the charge more direct: "Both these writers approach their task through an emotional fog; they present their views with an amount of personification and metaphor that reduces them to the level of revivalist preachers" (*P&P*, p. 6).

Stebbing disposes of Sir James Jeans rapidly. Citing first his description of the human response to the universe in *The Mysterious Universe* as "terrifying because of its vast meaningless distances" and the "material insignificance of our home in space – a millionth part of a grain of sand out of all the sea-sand in the world,"²² she accuses Jeans of stretching beyond the directly informative to the manipulative:

In accordance with the temper of an age in which men admire size and material power, Jeans insists upon the magnitude of astronomical distances, upon the smallness of the earth, and upon the shortness of the span of human history. In his purely expository writings Jeans has made brilliant use of comparative estimates of size and of distance in order to elucidate astronomical facts. Now, however, the comparison is dwelt upon simply in order to make the reader feel his own feebleness and insignificance in the material universe. (*P&P*, pp. 10–11)

Jeans has not suggested any criterion for meaning relative to distances, and, she claims, it is absurd for him to assert that distances are either “meaningless” or “meaningful.” He misuses metaphor in a similar way when he adds to the above description that “into such a universe we have stumbled” and goes on to speak of the universe as being “indifferent” or even “hostile.” Stebbing counters that these terms can only bear significance when they are predicated of living beings (*P&P*, pp. 12–13).

In *The New Background of Science* Jeans again falls prey to anthropomorphism despite his own protests about the necessity of avoiding it. Suggesting that scientific developments have led to the abandonment of the mechanical view of the universe, Jeans remarks:

We are beginning to see that man had freed himself from the anthropomorphic error of imagining that the workings of nature could be compared to those of his own whims and caprices, only to fall headlong into the second anthropomorphic error of imagining that they could be compared to the workings of his own muscles and sinews. Nature no more models her behaviour on the muscles and sinews of our bodies than on the desires and caprices of our minds. (*P&P*, p. 22)

He himself, nonetheless, continues to insist, as Stebbing points out, that nature models *herself*. Furthermore, as his argument develops he shifts with neither explicit clarification nor argument from a conception of “goddess Nature” to that of a universe consciously designed by a God who has the qualities of a Great Mathematician. After extricating the form of his argument from his ambiguous language, Stebbing concludes that Jeans has made two serious blunders. First, he’s forgotten that any given collection of objects can be brought within the scope of mathematical formulae and analysis, and second he’s failed to distinguish pure from applied mathematics:

His first blunder has prevented him from seeing that what is surprising is not that the world “obeys mathematical laws” but that terrestrial mathematicians should be competent to discover them. His second blunder leads him to impute to God the desire to make models of his mathematical creations, in fact to make “graven images”. (*P&P*, p. 26)

When Jeans goes on from there to take a position that the findings of the new physics support philosophic arguments for idealism and that materialism and matter need redefinition in light of new knowledge, Stebbing demurs: "both idealism and materialism, as understood by Jeans, are out of date." Further, "these cloudy speculations of Sir James Jeans cannot properly be regarded as affording the common reader any clear information as to the 'philosophical implications' of the new physics" (*P&P*, p. 42).

In Part II, "The Physicist and the World," Stebbing turns to the work of Sir Arthur Eddington. First she addresses Eddington's famous passage describing his entry into a room in *The Nature of the Physical World*. He stands at the threshold knowing that in order to enter he must press with a force of fourteen pounds per each square inch of his body. He must step onto a plank travelling at twenty miles per second around the sun.

I must do this whilst hanging from a round planet head outward into space, and with a wind of aether blowing at no one knows how many miles a second through every interstice of my body. The plank has no solidity of substance. To step on it is like stepping on a swarm of flies.²³

Lively as this description is, Stebbing charges that the mixing up of language appropriate for "the furniture of earth and our daily dealings with it with language used for the purpose of philosophical and scientific discussion" can only lead to confusion (*P&P*, p. 47). Adding the disclaimer that some may see her criticism of a picturesque passage as overly heavy-handed, Stebbing elaborates that the picturesqueness is not itself at issue. Rather, his conclusion is at issue, i.e. that while it is not problematic for an ordinary person to enter a room, it is problematic for a physicist to do so.

Furthermore, Stebbing examines just what Eddington claims when he denies that the plank has solidity. Here she relies on the common, ordinary usage of the word "solidity," for, she claims, we can only understand Eddington's denial of the solidity of the plank if, in fact, we do understand what it means to say that the plank is solid. Either a misuse or a figurative use of the term relies on some correct and literal use of the term. "The point is that the common usage of language enables us to attribute a meaning to the phrase 'a solid plank'; but there is no

common usage of language that provides a meaning for the word 'solid' that would make sense to say that the plank on which I stand is not *solid*" (*P&P*, p. 52).

She goes on to point out another of Eddington's illustrative passages that suffers from the same confusion of language. In this one he elaborates the "two tables" analogy. One is the familiar table that has extension, color, substance – the table at which Eddington has sat and written for years. The other is his scientific table which is really mostly empty space because it consists of electric particles and charges. About this table, he says, there is nothing substantial. Stebbing criticizes this view that there are two tables, one belonging to the external world of physics and the other to the familiar world. With this duplicate worlds theory, Stebbing charges, he has fallen into the same error that Berkeley accused the Newtonians of committing. In this case, as in others she claims, Eddington's failure to familiarize himself with philosophy before venturing into its territory has done him in. Finally she suggests "that it is as absurd to say that there is a scientific table as to say that there is a familiar electron or a familiar quantum, or a familiar potential" (*P&P*, p. 58).

Eddington gets himself in further trouble with Stebbing by asserting that the aim of science is to construct a world that is symbolic of the world of common experience. She criticizes him for failing to make clear in what way the symbolic construction of physics relates to the familiar world. He wants to suggest that the familiar world is a delusion and, hence, constructs an idealist metaphysics. Three lines of thought lead him to this: 1) his notion of physics as "world-building"; 2) his belief that physics concerns itself with "pointer readings" suggests the existence of some background of an inscrutable nature; and 3) a belief that the world of physics is symbolic of both the familiar world and this inscrutable background (*P&P*, p. 83).

Further, she chides, his metaphorical use of the word "building" leads him into some mystification. According to him the mind builds both the scientific and the familiar worlds. In building the scientific world, the scientist uses simple elements for which there is no counterpart in the everyday world. These elements, such as energy, momentum, stress, are selected or decided upon by the mind. Eddington asserts that "Ultimately it is the mind that decides what is lumber – which part of our building will shadow the things of common experience, and which has no such counterpart" (*P&P*, p. 84). Stebbing, however, watching the construction of his argument closely, notes:

But when Eddington says “the *mind* decides”, the common reader is likely to attach quite a different significance to the statement. Eddington himself does so. *The mind decides* is gradually transformed into *the mind contributes*, and then into, *the mind creates*. This transformation is all important for his metaphysics, and is utterly unwarranted. (*P&P*, p. 85)

Fundamental to Eddington’s philosophy of science and metaphysics in his view that science consists of pointer-readings. When he elects to elaborate this view he presents his common reader with the example of an examination question in which a student is asked to compute the time of descent of an elephant sliding down a grassy hillside. The student knows, in this example, that he can ignore the elephant per se; he need only work with the two-ton mass accorded to the elephant. That is, “Two tons *is* the reading of the pointer when the elephant was placed on a weighing-machine” (*P&P*, pp. 92–3). The student is then given the slope of the hill, the co-efficient for friction, and other data from which to calculate his answer. About this Eddington remarks:

And so we see that the poetry fades out of the problem, and by the time the serious application of exact science begins we are left with only pointer readings. If then only pointer readings or their equivalents are put into the machine of scientific calculation, how can we grind out anything but pointer readings? (*P&P*, p. 93)

Stebbing charges that in characterizing the situation in this way he overlooks the way physical measurements are obtained and used for prediction (*P&P*, p. 96). Here, as elsewhere, Eddington’s failure to give an adequate account of the relationship of the symbolic world of physics to the familiar world of everyday experience has led him, and along with him the common reader, into mystification and absurdity.

Another of Eddington’s analogies that Stebbing feels draws him inexorably into difficulty is that of the newspaper office. He sketches it in this way:

The inside of your head must be rather like a newspaper office. It is connected with the outside world by nerves which play the part of telegraph wires. Messages from the outside world arrive in code along these wires; the whole substratum of fact is contained in these code messages. Within the office they are made up into a presentable story,

partly by legitimate use of accumulated experience, but also with an admixture of journalistic imagination; and it is this free translation of the original messages that our consciousness becomes aware of. (*P&P*, p. 102)

This picture suggests that a perceiving part of the mind constructs the familiar world out of coded messages that come from the external world. But the story is a translation – and rather a loose one at that – and not a direct reading of the code. Indeed, since the wires only transmit the code, the story is made up so loosely from the received data that Stebbing questions whether it can be called a translation at all. On this model, “The familiar world is an illusion; it is an illusion that the perceiving part of the mind (i.e. the editor) makes for itself under the delusion that it is translating messages sent from the external world” (*P&P*, p. 103).

Again Stebbing grants that her position may be objected to on the basis of criticizing an illustration. However, as she points out, Eddington does not use the newspaper office analogy as an illustration merely. It is, in fact, fundamental to his argument. “Whenever he attempts to show how it is that we have knowledge of the external world and that this knowledge is ‘a remote inference’, he uses the parable of the decoded messages. But in stating the parable he includes the conclusions that he seeks to establish by means of the parable” (*P&P*, pp. 104–5). In other words, Eddington’s mistake, according to Stebbing, is that he does not stick to using the illustration to illustrate. He transforms the illustration into an argument, then draws inferences from it. As she continues throughout the volume to explicate his arguments, Stebbing catches him making this mistake again and again.

Next Stebbing turns her attention to the problems of causality and human freedom which some physicists of the era had taken it upon themselves to explore. In Part III of her critique she attempts to show that the use of scientific speculations and the phenomena of quantum physics “to find countenance for a theory of the interaction of human beings upon one another is an unwarranted as it is surprising” (*P&P*, p. 142). After a review of the problem as it appeared to Thomas Hill Huxley and J. S. Mill, she asks “what precisely is meant by the statement that physicists did formerly believe in determinism but that now they do not” (*P&P*, p. 156).

It was Laplace who developed the deterministic scheme that was only implicit in Newton’s cosmology, and this scheme achieved its

culmination in his conception of the supreme Calculator. Roughly, put, an intelligence that could know all the forces acting in nature at any one given time could also know the forces acting at any other time. Stebbing interprets the Laplacean Calculator to mean "that the state of the world at *any given* time determines its state at *any other* time, whether earlier or later than the given time" (*P&P*, p. 161). The Calculator could, in other words, predict the state of the world at some future time.

The conditions which render an event subject to prediction are the same as conditions that allow the application of a physical law to an event. If we know initial conditions and relevant physical laws, we are able, in a deterministic system, to predict the outcome of an event such as what path a shell will take when fired from a gun (*P&P*, p. 165). The form of reasoning is: "If the initial state of a system and the laws of its behaviour are known, then its states at any other moment can be predicted, and the prediction can be verified by measurement" (*P&P*, p. 170). The development of quantum theory in the early twentieth century, however, demonstrated that in the case of sub-atomic phenomena it is not possible to precisely determine the initial condition (*P&P*, p. 171).

Stebbing then reviews Bohr's model of the atom and Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. The latter involves the admission that the basis of quantum laws is statistical and thus disrupts the strict application of causal laws. She asserts that this development removes any reason for regarding the material universe as a machine.

The rejection of this machine-language is an important gain. It makes for clearer thinking with regard to the philosophical implications of physics. There is, however, a danger that we may reject the language whilst we continue to be influenced in our thinking by the machine-image. We need also to avoid the not uncommon mistake of supposing that the uncertainty relations show that there is anything *indeterminate* in Nature, or that science has now had to become inaccurate. (*P&P*, p. 183)

Indeterminacy in nature consequent upon uncertainty relations is just what Jeans does claim in making statements such as, "Heisenberg now makes it appear that nature abhors accuracy and precision above all things." Stebbing counters that there is, after all, nothing lawless in quantum phenomena, for the initial conditions of a given case are still deter-

mined as precisely as the limits of the Principle of Uncertainty allows. From them, the probability of subsequent states is still determined by exact laws (*P&P*, p. 183). Nonetheless, she concludes the section by claiming that the discovery of uncertainty relations does involve a change in attitude with regard to determinism. That change is, however, not what Jeans or Eddington suppose it to be.

Eddington has accepted that the Laplacean model and the deterministic scheme of law supported by classical physics created problems in the notion of human freedom of action. He further reasons that modern physics has, by virtue of shattering the deterministic model, to some extent erased the problem. Stebbing comments, "the problem that confronts Eddington is to get as much uncertainty, or 'indeterminacy', as he can out of the miserably small amount represented by Planck's constant" (*P&P*, p. 213). The first step in his argument is that human action would be completely unfree if the Laplacean model were attained. He then assigns living beings to the macrophysical system. From this he wishes to maintain that some degree of uncertainty in the realm of microphysics is sufficient to allow for human freedom. This is not at all, Stebbing urges, an adequate argument. Indeed, we must admit, she goes on, that there is a vast difference between the behaviors of inorganic bodies and human beings. "This cleavage may not do 'violence to physics' but it seems to me to leave the problem of free will just where it was before physicists became indeterminists" (*P&P*, p. 216).

Next Stebbing moves into a discussion of the human intuition of freedom, conditions of moral responsibility, and beliefs about the nature of the physical world within which actions have consequences. In addressing these issues she mentions and remarks upon attempts by John Wisdom, L. J. Russell, and C. D. Broad to wrestle with the question of responsibility.²⁴

Part of the difficulty in addressing the question of responsibility is one of terms. Stebbing clarifies that "responsibility" used in the ethical sense is not a synonym for causation. "To accept responsibility is to deny compulsion; it is not to deny causation, for not all causation is a form of being compelled" (*P&P*, p. 227). Hence when we made the statement "I did such-and-such" we are asserting that "I am responsible for such-and-such," not that "I was compelled to do such-and-such."

Heisenberg's discovery of the Uncertainty Principle, while inapplicable on the macrophysical scale of the human, nonetheless does have some bearing on the problem of free will, says Stebbing, for the problem

has been created in part by a confusion in our thinking and in our language. Discussions of free will are pervaded by the image of the Potter and the pot or by the image of the machine and its many cogs. The jumble of the theological doctrine of predestination and the scientific doctrine of determinism permeates both our thinking on the question and the language in which we express it to such an extent that we have come to believe “that we *understand* how what happens here and now is pre-determined by what happened *there* and *then*.” This makes sense to us “because we have assimilated predetermination to compulsion, natural laws to commands, causal connexions to constraining ties” (*P&P*, p. 239). In other words, we have illegitimately intruded extraneous notions into our understanding of causation and scientific determinism. In summing up this part of her discussion Stebbing elaborates:

I venture to believe that no one has ever imaginatively realized what it would be like for everything that happens to be bound together by compulsions. But under the influence of the success of the scientists we have given an intellectual assent to a scheme of deterministic law – a scheme which we understand only in so far as we concentrate attention upon this or that domain of Nature and import into the scientific terminology notions of compulsion that are extraneous to it. In this way ‘the dominance of universal causation’ is felt to be a nightmare. Heisenberg’s principle has some part to play in revealing to us what it is we thought we were accepting. (*P&P*, p. 240)

Another part of the problem arises, she continues, when we put the human “I” in what we conceive of as the material world. Stebbing argues that while “I” am in the material world, there is no strict analogy between the way “I” am set in the world and the way a billiard ball is set against another billiard ball in the world. Here again we have allowed the language and thinking of the physicists to dominate our thinking. The “I” is an embodied mind. She gives the example of an “I” who struggles to give up smoking. That struggle, then, is also an element in the world. While it is necessary for the physical scientist to abstract characteristics in the world and study them in isolation, “we create a pseudo-problem when we try to fit human beings in a world thus conceived as though it were *the* world in which human persons act” (*P&P*, p. 245). The danger for the physicist turned philosopher, as for those of us considering their impact on our thinking, is of confusing the “world of physics” with the “physical world.” “The former is to be found only in physics. . . . The

latter, the physical world or Nature, is that *which physics is about . . .*" (*P&P*, p. 281)

Stebbing's final word on the problem of freedom is that it is ultimately one of the self:

Human freedom consists in this: that we do not yet know what we shall be, not because the knowledge is too difficult to acquire, not because there are no certainties but only very great improbabilities, but because we are not yet finished. We are begun; what we have already become and are now becoming plays a part in what we shall become. (*P&P*, p. 249)

Philosophy and the Physicists was met by most reviewers, including C. D. Broad,²⁵ with enthusiasm and was praised for its thorough job of cleaning up the muddled thinking of Jeans and Eddington in their popularizations of physics. Though G. A. Paul concurs in the main with this view, he does, however, respond to the book with some very close criticism. Though it does not fall within the scope of this essay to thoroughly review his remarks, I would like to direct the reader to them and mention one, in particular, of his points. With regard to Stebbing's remarks about human freedom and the becoming self, Paul charges that here she has fallen prey to the same defect for which she criticizes Jeans and Eddington, namely that she has painted a metaphorical picture which she then takes as explanation.²⁶

The continuing legacy of this work, however, is suggested by G. C. Nerlich in his entry on Stebbing in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. He characterizes it as a solid work of rational criticism while pointing out that underlying this criticism is an "implicit faith that we need not seek protection behind intellectual smoke screens and, indeed, that this sort of evasion prevents any really dignified adjustment to the human situation based on knowledge and reason. Susan Stebbing deeply believed that such an adjustment is possible."²⁷

7. *Ideals and Illusions*

In 1941 *Ideals and Illusions*²⁸ first appeared. Written during the rising tide of World War II, this book has a different tone from her earlier work. An exercise in rational criticism of the sort Stebbing has consistently expounded and demonstrated, *Ideals and Illusions* differs from her earlier work in two respects. Somewhat loosely structured, the book seems more

a collection of essays whose arguments relate to and overlap each other, building finally to a kind of crescendo, rather than the sort of linear, single-threaded argument she develops in *Philosophy and the Physicists*. In addition, this book is more polemical than her other works. This last is due perhaps to the cultural climate in which she was working. Citing the growing awareness in England of a sense of national failure, Stebbing sets out to examine wherein that failure lies. Her contention is that much of the failure stems from muddled thinking about ideals.

In her preface she contrasts this perceived sense of failure against the very different climate out of which it grew:

At the opening of the twentieth century it may well have seemed likely that a new century of hope had begun. In fact, in no other century have so many human beings . . . suffered pain, anguish of heart, bitterness of spirit, despair, and unnecessary death. (*I&I*, p. vii)

No one in the culture, she claims, is free of some degree of responsibility for these conditions, for it is a community failure and the community is made up of the individuals who compose it. While a number of causes can be cited, Stebbing's plan in the book is to focus on "our unwillingness to make definite to ourselves what it is we believe to be worth the seeking" – a failure, in other words, "to make explicit our ideal" (*I&I*, p. viii).

First, in the chapter entitled "Ideals and Utopias," Stebbing vindicates the significance of ideals. She defends the position that having ideals does not necessarily imply having impracticable ideals, i.e. to have ideals is not equivalent to being a visionary or utopian (*I&I*, pp. 5–6). She argues against E. H. Carr, who in *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939* claims that, in the case of politicians, ideals are unattainable and, hence, that it is realist politicians who get things done. His primary example of the ineffectual idealist politician is Woodrow Wilson with his vision of a League of Nations. Stebbing claims that Carr then falls into the confusion of supposing that it is only realists, i.e. those who have no ideals in view, who get things done. Finally, she contends, the realist-idealist classification only clouds our thinking about politics. For it is not the case that Woodrow Wilson had ideals and Hitler did not. It is rather the case that both operated from ideals irrespective of their effectiveness of accomplishment. For "To say 'I have an ideal' means 'I conceive (have an idea of) a state of affairs which I judge to be good – i.e., worthy of attainment.'" This leaves open the question whether the ideal is real-

izable. It also permits the condemnation of an ideal as evil; I may wrongly judge what is good" (*I&I*, p. 21).

Next Stebbing ascertains that once the confusions and biases connected with the word "spiritual" are cleared away it can be argued that spiritual good and evil "are to be found in the daily intercourse of us men one with another in this world independently of any relation of man to God; further, that the significance of spiritual value does not depend upon God or upon the continuance of human beings after the death of the body" (*I&I*, pp. 33–34). She opposes this to the Catholic views expressed by Rosalind Murray and Cardinal Newman that spiritual excellences are those which fit an individual for heaven or that evil lies not in harm that results from human actions but in the state of mind of the sinner. It is not adequate, for example, to maintain, as Murray does, that the wrong in the slum conditions under which some people must live resides in the avarice on the part of the rich. Stebbing counters this view by saying:

There are, then, two kinds of evil, which it is important for us to distinguish. First, there are evils resulting, for instance, from living in slums, from earthquakes, from famine, and from wars. Secondly, there are those evils exemplified in the actions of men responsible for bringing about any evil of the first kind. (*I&I*, p. 38)

The third and fourth chapters are devoted, respectively, to clarifying the need for, and the role of, ideals in examining the foundations of our moral code, and to examining the efficaciousness of one such ideal, namely the pursuit of happiness. In the latter case she reviews the utilitarian doctrines of Bentham and J. S. Mill. They concern her insofar as they have put forward an ideal for action which arose from their interest in practical situations and their desire to reform social institutions. Though they failed, in her view, to exercise a careful analysis of moral consciousness, lacked dialectical subtlety, and expressed their position in vague and ambiguous language, their ideal is nonetheless to be taken seriously (*I&I*, pp. 62–63). And, she claims, it cannot be understood without being aware of the depth of their concern for the individual. In her view they were actually less concerned with the pursuit of happiness or pleasure than they were with the removal of unnecessary human misery as exemplified, among other things, by Mill's condemnation of poverty as a "great positive evil" (*I&I*, p. 76).

There are times, however, given the pursuit of happiness as an ideal,

when we must set aside our own happiness and come to the aid of our fellow-men. This is the subject of chapter V, "While Rome Is Burning." As the title suggests, Stebbing uses the example of Nero fiddling while Rome burns to illustrate a conflict between two values: the aesthetic value of music and the arts and the value of saving lives. In the course of this discussion she refers to Clive Bell's *Civilization* in which he sketches the characteristics of a "civilized man." Given qualities such as, among others, tolerance, intellectual honesty, and a taste for truth and beauty, Bell reluctantly concedes that a "civilized" person cannot fail to take note of the social conditions around him. Using this as a springboard, Stebbing draws a parallel between Nero's Rome and Europe in the years preceding World War II:

To-day, although Rome is not burning, not a few of the cities of Europe are, or have been, in flames – deliberately set on fire. What does it matter to us, if we be sensitive and intelligent men, provided that our own city is not in flames or, if it is, if we can take refuge in California and there produce masterpieces, or at least enjoy the masterpieces of others? Mr. Bell has, I think, given us the answer. We cannot remain unaware of what is happening; we may escape the danger and the discomfort; we may still, far removed to a safe place, continue our civilized pursuits; but we do so at a cost – the cost of callousness or a sense of discomfort. (*I&I*, p. 96)

Bell's "civilized society" is not, in the end, a good society, according to Stebbing, both because it was based on slaves at the bottom of a hierarchy and because Bell's "civilized man" could not, by definition, truly be aware of the suffering of others. Bell's "civilized man" might well be like Nero and fiddle while all about him burns; the ideal to which Stebbing aspires would not admit of such callousness.

Stebbing turns next to political ideals. She claims that:

the necessity is thrust upon us of making clear to ourselves our political ideal. Have we any clear, or even moderately clear, conception of what we mean by 'a better world'? We need to be definite, and to be definite is difficult. It is a grave illusion to suppose that we (the ordinary men and women of this country) can leave to our statesmen alone, or indeed chiefly, the task of making definite the conception of a better world. Upon each of us lies the responsibility of hard thinking in order to answer two questions: (1) In what ways

does the world need to be made better? (2) How is this better world to be achieved? (*I&I*, p. 110)

In the twenty-year interval between the wars, the democratic ideal has “not only been explicitly denied and vilified in certain countries, it has further faded as an ideal even in those countries where the citizens continue to admire the sound of the word ‘democracy’” (*I&I*, pp. 112–3). Stebbing makes an assessment of what it means that this is the case; in so doing she asks what must then be restored in order to achieve a better world. Among those qualities that need to be restored she lists activity of mind, aesthetic perception and a passionate need for humane feeling, discipline, desire and respect for knowledge. After laying this groundwork she proceeds to an exploration of the conflict between the political ideals of fascism and democracy. The opposition between the two is fundamental and has to do with ultimate values. While fascism values power and the State, democracy values the development of free and happy human beings. The two ideals differ, at base, with regard to their conception of the worth of human beings (*I&I*, p. 133). But it is extremely important, Stebbing insists, to recognize that fascism does present an ideal to its adherents, “that is, it is accepted as a vision of a world worth having and worth dying for in order that it may be achieved.” For that ideal, she contends, is precisely what led, along with conditions of economic distress, to the submission of the German nation to Hitler (*I&I*, p. 143).

Chapter VIII, entitled “Speaking Plainly,” presents what Stebbing calls “a digression of importance” (*I&I*, p. 217). It opens with the sentence: “Of the usefulness of abstract words there can be no doubt, but there are unnoted dangers in our use of them” (*I&I*, p. 162). From there Stebbing goes on to elaborate at some length on the uses and abuses of abstractions in our language. She proposes a principle to use as a method of distinguishing between the harmful and harmless usage of abstract words: “*If a sentence in which the main word is translated into an equivalent sentence in which this word is replaced by corresponding less abstract words, and if the new sentence thus obtained would be dissented from (or assented to) by someone who had formerly assented to (or dissented from) the original sentence, then the use of abstract words in the original sentence was harmful*” (*I&I*, p. 163). The leading example to which she applies this principle is the word “war.” She translates the word into the less abstract phrase: “organized effort of individuals to kill, injure, and hurt one another in all conceivable ways.” Then she

proposes that it would be a useful exercise to take a passage or speech that praises war and substitute this phrase for the word "war" each time it occurs. By performing such an exercise on this and other abstract terms we may, perhaps, save ourselves from "the danger of befooling ourselves with words" (*I&I*, p. 163).

In the final chapter Stebbing returns to issues of moral consciousness and its relation to ideals. She elaborates in greater detail her position that morality does not require other-worldly sanctions, and in doing so she challenges the theological position that life after death gives significance to morality as this position is expressed by Canon Peter Green in his work *The Problem of Right Conduct*. In responding to the question "What is meant by a rational justification of morality?" Stebbing proposes that:

At the outset we must clear away what is, I believe, a serious and common mistake. Morality is not to be *deduced* from anything else; the concept of moral obligation is not to be exhibited as a deduction from a system of the universe. On the contrary, the fact that we know what it is to be morally obliged is a datum that must be fitted in, if we are so ambitious as to construct a theory of the universe. (*I&I*, pp. 204–205)

Reviewers of *Ideals and Illusions* were less enthusiastic than they had been about her earlier books. John Laird both reviewed the volume for *Mind*²⁹ and wrote an essay entitled "Reflections Occasioned by *Ideals and Illusions*" for the Aristotelian Society's memorial volume *Philosophical Studies; Essays in Memory of L. Susan Stebbing*.³⁰ In the essay he laments the fact that Stebbing's defense of secular ideals led her to do battle on two fronts, i.e. first claiming that materialism was not enough and then arguing that theology was too much. Taking this approach divided her attention, in his view, and confused the organization of the book. He finds the book sharply polemical, criticizes the logical method in certain places, and disputes much in her chapter on the use of abstractions.

Space does not permit me to follow his remarks in further detail. Suffice it to say however that, despite his criticisms, Laird valued the work's achievement and considered it a memorable book. Writing as he was for a memorial volume, Laird included among his reflections on *Ideals and Illusions* some remarks about the author which seem a fitting close to this introduction to her work:

Written in some haste and under stress of deep emotion in times whose horror, even now when the worst may be over, has numbed most of us into an indefensible degree of near-acquiescence, the book is characteristic of a lady whose intellectualism, impatient of vague abstractions, was bent upon helping the lives, through the minds, of her contemporaries, whose zest for principle invariably had the purpose of social betterment. (*PS*, p. 20)

NOTES

1. John Wisdom, "L. Susan Stebbing, 1885–1943," *Mind*, NS 53 (1944), 283–285; rpt. "An Appreciation by J. Wisdom," in *Philosophical Studies; Essays in Memory of L. Susan Stebbing* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1948), pp. 1–4.
2. Margaret Macdonald, "Stebbing (Lizzie) Susan," *DNB* (1959).
3. Wisdom, p. 2; G. C. Nerlich, "Stebbing, Lizzie Susan," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1967 ed., Vol. 8, pp. 11–12.
4. P. Magg, "Homage to Susan Stebbing," *The Personalist*, 27 (1946), 165–72.
5. Nerlich, p. 12.
6. L. Susan Stebbing, *Ideals and Illusions* (London: Watts & Co., 1941; rpt. Thinker's Library, 1948), p. 218; hereafter cited as *I&I*.
7. Wisdom, p. 2.
8. L. Susan Stebbing, *Pragmatism and French Voluntarism; With Especial Reference to the Notion of Truth in the Development of French Philosophy from Maine de Biran to Professor Bergson*, Girton College Studies, No. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914); hereafter cited in text as *PFV*.
9. L. Susan Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, 2nd ed. (1930; rpt. London: Methuen & Co., 1961); hereafter cited as *MIL*.
10. *Philosophy*, 6 (1931), 110–111.
11. *The Philosophical Review*, 42 (1933), 431–2.
12. C. A. Mace, *Mind*, NS 40 (1931), 354–64.
13. The papers include: Joseph, "A Defence of Freethinking in Logistics," NS 41 (1932), 424–40; Stebbing, "Mr. Joseph's Defence of Free Thinking in Logistics," NS 42 (1933), 338–51; Joseph, "A Defence of Free-Thinking in Logistics Resumed," NS 42 (1933), 417–443; Stebbing, "A Second Reply to Mr. Joseph," NS 43 (1934), 156–169; Joseph, "A Last Plea for Free-Thinking in Logistics," NS 43 (1934), 315–320.
14. Ralph Eaton, *General Logic, An Introductory Survey* (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons: 1931). Eaton reviewed Stebbing's book in *Journal of Philosophy*, 28 (1931), 607–610.
15. First printed in the *Personalist* (1931); reprinted as Chapter V in *Must Philosophers Disagree?* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1934); hereafter cited as *MPD*.

16. L. Susan Stebbing, *Logic in Practice*, Methuen's Monographs on Philosophy and Psychology, ed. G. C. Field, 3rd edition (London: Methuen & Co., 1948); hereafter cited as *LIP*.
17. *Philosophy*, 9 (1934), 487–8.
18. *Imagination and Thinking*, Life and Leisure Pamphlets, No. 4 (London: British Institute of Adult Education, 1936), 14; hereafter cited as *I&T*.
19. L. Susan Stebbing, *Thinking to Some Purpose* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1939, rpt. 1948); hereafter cited as *TSP*.
20. L. Susan Stebbing, *A Modern Elementary Logic* (London: Methuen & Co., 1943).
21. L. Susan Stebbing, *Philosophy and the Physicists* (London: Methuen & Co., 1937); hereafter cited as *P&P*.
22. Sir James Jeans, *The Mysterious Universe*, 1930; quote taken from *P&P*, p. 9.
23. Arthur Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, 1928, as quoted in *P&P*, p. 48.
24. In his review of the book, C. D. Broad says of this section "that Miss Stebbing here confines herself to 'warming the teapot,' but that she does this with such virtuosity that we are encouraged to hope for another book in which she will make delicious tea." *Philosophy*, 13 (1938), 221–6.
25. *Op. cit.*
26. G. A. Paul, *Mind*, NS 47 (1938), 361–76.
27. Nerlich, p. 12.
28. L. Susan Stebbing, *Ideals and Illusions*, Thinker's Library, No. 119 (London: Watts & Co., 1948); hereafter cited as *I&I*.
29. John Laird, *Mind*, NS 51 (1942), 194–5.
30. John Laird, "Reflections Occasioned by *Ideals and Illusions*," in *Philosophical Studies; Essays in Memory of L. Susan Stebbing* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1948), pp. 20–30; hereafter cited as *PS*.

7. Edith Stein (1891–1942)

MARY CATHERINE BASEHEART, S.C.N.** and
LINDA LOPEZ McALISTER with WALTRAUT
STEIN*

I. BIOGRAPHY^{1*}

Edith Stein was born on October 12, 1891 in Breslau, East Silesia (now Wrocław, Poland), the youngest of the eleven children of Siegfried and Auguste Stein. She grew up in a strict Jewish home where her mother was the strong, pious, guiding figure. Her father, a businessman, died when Edith was two years old and her mother continued to run the family lumber business with the help of her children. The home, though strict, was a warm one and Edith's childhood was filled with religious observations, family celebrations, visits to and from grandparents, aunts and uncles, cousins and friends. At age thirteen Edith began to doubt her Jewish faith, and became, for all intents and purposes, an atheist.

After completing her secondary school education, Edith went to the University of Breslau where she studied German language and literature, philosophy and history. Upon discovering Edmund Husserl's philosophy in his *Logische Untersuchungen* (*Logical Investigations*), she went, in 1913, to the university at Göttingen to join the circle of students around Husserl, who were in the forefront of a new philosophical movement known as phenomenology.² She desired ardently to discover the truth, and she saw that Husserl's thought was about reality, undercutting the epistemology of the neo-Kantians. After the outbreak of World War I, many of Husserl's students were at the front, and Stein's strong nationalistic feelings moved her to volunteer as a nurse's aide for the Red Cross, but she returned to her studies after a time. When Husserl left Göttingen for Freiburg, she went with him and wrote her doctoral dissertation entitled *Zum Problem der Einfühlung* (*On the Problem of Empathy*). With the presentation of the dissertation, Stein was awarded the doctorate *summa cum laude*. Husserl was so impressed by her intellect that he offered to make her his assistant. In this capacity her duties

included teaching a course referred to as the “philosophical kindergarten” to prepare new students to work with Husserl, and putting Husserl’s manuscripts for *Ideen (Ideas)*, Vol. II in order by transcribing his shorthand notes into script so that he could work the material over. This proved to be a frustrating assignment for Stein because her hope had been that she and Husserl would be able to work together as colleagues. Husserl shared this idea in theory, but in practice he did not seem interested in their working collaboratively. He did, however, come to depend heavily on the services she provided for him. While the obvious next step for her would have been to habilitate, i.e., to become a faculty member at the university, Husserl was not supportive. He could not, “as a matter of principle,” bring himself to sponsor a woman for habilitation, which would have been a major break with tradition.³ His “solution” was for Stein to stay on as his assistant and find a suitable husband – preferably, one who could also be an assistant to Husserl. As Stein joked, presumably their children would be Husserl’s assistants, too.⁴ Obviously this situation could not continue indefinitely. Stein had her own life and work to get on with, and had come to feel that she could not bear always being at someone’s back and call, in short, belonging to another human being, even someone as respected as “the Master,” Husserl.⁵

During this period of Stein’s life other things were happening, too. Her friend, the Göttingen philosopher Adolf Reinach, was killed in the war, and she went to Göttingen to console his widow. When she got there she discovered that this woman was showing amazing strength in her bereavement, as a result of her strong Christian faith which gave her the courage to bear her loss. This example of faith made a profound impression on Edith Stein. Instead of consoling she found herself consoled.

After the winter semester of 1918 she resigned her assistantship and returned to Breslau for a time, before going to Göttingen in Fall of 1919 to attempt, unsuccessfully, to habilitate there. The official reason given for her failure was that she was a woman. In addition, she was told privately that her habilitation thesis might have been upsetting to Dr. Möller, one of the philosophy professors, so, in order to spare her any possible unpleasantness, the decision was made administratively not even to submit her thesis to the faculty for review.⁶ At this point Stein returned to Breslau, but she did not just accept this injustice without putting up a fight. She wrote an appeal to the Prussian Ministry for Science, Art and Education, and on February 21, 1920, Minister Becker issued a milestone ruling in response to her appeal, declaring for the first time that “mem-

bership in the female sex may not be seen as an obstacle to habilitation" in German universities.⁷ She did not, however, renew her attempt to habilitate at Göttingen. She wrote to a friend at the time that she did not think the ruling would be of much help to her personally, but that she had sought it as a way of thumbing her nose at "the gentlemen in Göttingen."⁸ It did, however, clear the way for women seeking a professorial career in fields other than philosophy. In philosophy it was another 30 years before the first German woman actually habilitated and took up teaching duties at a German University.⁹

Much has been written about the fact that many of the phenomenologist philosophers underwent religious conversions or an intensifying of their religious faith during this period.¹⁰ Around 1920 Stein read the autobiography of St. Teresa of Avila. When she laid down the book she said to herself, "This is the truth." She does not tell us what made her see the truth in this account, but it may be that she was searching for the meaning of her own existence. Husserl, with his method of describing the world, had not been able to show her why she was in it. She now found this content for her existence in Roman Catholicism, and on New Year's Day, 1922, at thirty-one years of age, she was baptized – a step which caused considerable concern on the part of her mother and other family members.

From 1922 until 1932 Stein worked as a lay teacher in a Catholic girls school run by the Dominican Sisters of St. Magdalena in Speyer, and became quite well-known in Catholic educational circles. During this time she wrote a number of treatises on the education of girls, and on professions for women, and other pedagogical issues. From her correspondence during that period it seems that she was very much in demand as a speaker at various conferences on Catholic education. At first she gave up her philosophical work entirely, believing that faith and reason do not mix. But she learned that she did not have to cut herself off from philosophy when she discovered the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Once more she took up the study of philosophy, this time that of scholasticism. In order to grasp St. Thomas's thought, she translated his *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* into German, using the language of phenomenology so that he would be intelligible to the contemporary German philosopher. She also wrote original works which attempted a synthesis between Thomistic and phenomenological thought.¹¹ In addition, during this period she began the preliminary work for her book *Endliches und Ewiges Sein (Finite and Eternal Being)*.

This appears from her letters to have been a full and satisfying time

of life for Stein, but that she viewed it as a time of waiting and that she believed eventually the right opportunity would emerge for her, whatever it might be. In 1931 Stein conferred with Professors Eugen Fink and Martin Heidegger about the possibility of her habilitating at Freiburg; later that year there was talk about her habilitating at the University of Breslau. Nothing came of either of these attempts. Finally, in 1932, she joined the faculty of the German Institute of Scientific Pedagogy in Munster. As a *Dozent* she held lectures and attracted some students from the university as well as her education students from the Institute.¹² Stein's career in higher education was, however, to be very brief. By the summer semester of 1933, the Nazis had come to power, and, because of her Jewish background, Stein was no longer allowed to meet her classes. Her contract was not renewed for the following year.

One would expect that this turn of events would have been devastating to Stein. One effect it had was to motivate her to write *Life in a Jewish Family*, a memoir of her childhood, youth and family, in particular her mother, as an antidote to the terrible anti-Jewish propaganda spread by the Nazis. It also moved her to political action in the sense that she appealed to the Pope to issue an encyclical condemning Facism and racism, but this did not happen. Nonetheless she seems to have experienced the loss of her position almost as a positive development. She remarked on several occasions while she was in Münster how foreign the world had become to her during the ten years she spent within the walls of the Dominican convent in Speyer, even though she had been a lay person. In late 1932 she remarked that she must seem strange to more worldly people and that she notices, now that she is out in the world, what an effort it is to be a part of it. She says, "I do not believe that I can ever really do it again."¹³ By late in May, 1933 the future course of her life had become clear to Stein and it is one which she welcomed with all her heart. In late June she informed her closest friends that she would be spending the summer in Breslau with her family. There she would have the excruciatingly difficult task of breaking the news to her mother that she intended to enter the Carmelite convent in Cologne-Lindenthal as a postulant on October 15.¹⁴ She did so, and six months later she donned the habit of a Carmelite nun and became Sr. Teresia Benedicta a Cruce, OCD.

The Carmelites are a cloistered order devoted to prayer and meditation. They may speak with the outside world only through a grille. Stein did not expect to continue her writing after entering the order, but, in fact, she was asked by her superiors to continue her work on

the manuscript entitled "Akt und Potenz," which was published posthumously as *Endliches und Ewiges Sein*.¹⁵

By 1938 the Nazi menace was becoming ever greater, and in order to ensure the safety of Stein and of her older sister Rosa, who had also converted to Catholicism and was now serving as the concierge of the convent, it was arranged that they would move to the Carmelite Convent in Echt, Holland.¹⁶ But even this was not a sufficient refuge after Hitler marched into Holland, so it was decided that Edith and Rosa must go to Switzerland. The arrangements were slowly put into place, and everything was settled except for the exit visas. But they did not come in time.

On Sunday, July 26, 1942, the Catholic Bishops in Holland issued a pastoral letter condemning the Nazi extermination of the Jews throughout Europe. As an act of revenge for their courageous stand, on August 2 the S.S. made a sweep through the country incarcerating all "non-Aryan Christians." At five in the afternoon two uniformed S.S. officers appeared at the convent and demanded to speak with Sr. Benedicta. They gave her and Rosa ten minutes to get ready to leave the convent. Sr. Benedicta took Rosa by the hand and said, "Come, we will go for our people."

They were loaded into a truck and taken, along with 10 or 15 religious and approximately 1000 others to a concentration camp at Amersfoort, and then on to Westerbork. Some of these people were later released so there were eye-witnesses to the events of the next few days. The image that emerges is of Sr. Benedicta plunging in and working to comfort the terrified children and their despairing mothers. She is reported to have remarked, "Until now I have prayed and worked, now I will work and pray." Seldom saying a word, she moved about tirelessly, doing what she could to comfort and console and to lead the others in prayer. On August 6 she was able to send a brief note to the sisters in the convent in which she asked for clothing, medicine and blankets and told of a transport that was leaving the following day for the East. Two men from Echt had gone to Westerbork to try to see the sisters, and, indeed, they were able to get into the camp and spend some time with them. Sr. Benedicta sent back word to the Convent that they were not to worry, and that she and Rosa were all right. She praised the Jewish relief organization which was working hard, but in vain, to secure the release of this group of Jewish Catholics.

All reports that we have of Sr. Benedicta during this time stress her calm, peaceful manner amidst chaos and despair. When the lists were

read of those prisoners who were to get on the train, Edith and Rosa Stein were among them. They were murdered in the gas chambers of Auschwitz on August 9, 1942.

Sr. Teresia Benedicta a Cruce was declared a Saint and martyr in the Roman Catholic church by Pope John Paul II on May 1, 1987 in Cologne.

II. PHILOSOPHY**

Edith Stein, philosopher, is not so well-known as Edith Stein, heroic German-Jewish woman, educator, lecturer, feminist, saint, and victim of the Holocaust. Yet it was philosophy that was the axis of her being as it was lived in all of these modes, and anyone who desires to know and understand Stein must know her as a philosopher. The present account attempts a developmental approach, revealing her advances in phenomenology from method to metaphysics, from the realm of mind to that of reality, and from a largely theoretical content to the inclusion of a *Weltanauschauung*. It would not do justice to her philosophizing simply to present a summary of her thought at the end of her life.

From her early years, Stein was always asking the *why* of human existence, never satisfied with the ready answers prevalent in her religious and social milieu. Her student days at Breslau, Göttingen, and Freiburg-im-Breisgau were animated by a passionate interest in philosophy and characterized by disciplined study of phenomenology under Edmund Husserl, in company with the famous scholars who engaged him in discussion and dialogue: Max Scheler, Adolf Reinach, Fritz Kaufmann, Roman Ingarden, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Alexandre Koyré, and Martin Heidegger, to name only a few. After achieving the Ph.D. at Freiburg in 1917, her own philosophy was taking a form that was basically phenomenological but often at variance with views of Husserl in substance, if not in spirit, and she was writing original works of her own. Her questioning soon moved beyond the limits of phenomenology to a broad and deep exploration of the greats in the history of philosophy, particularly Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, but extending also to Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Duns Scotus, as well as contemporary philosophers. In her efforts to construct a body of theory, there is evidence of a strong impulse toward synthesis of phenomenology with what she found true in the philosophy of other times and other schools.

Stein was a prolific writer on a broad range of philosophical subjects,

but only a few of her works were published during her lifetime, largely because of the ban on works by non-Aryan writers after the Nazis came to power. Her dissertation, *On the Problem of Empathy*, completed under Husserl at the University of Freiburg and published in 1917¹⁷ is the only full-length philosophical work of hers that has been published in English translation to date¹⁸ although others will be forthcoming as part of the project to translate her *Works* into English.

As has been indicated in the account of her life, Stein and a number of other young students had flocked to Göttingen to study with Husserl because, after reading his *Logical Investigations*, they seemed to find in his work a turning away from German Idealism toward a new form of realism.¹⁹ But in 1913 history was being made in Husserl's theory. *Ideen I*²⁰ had just appeared in the *Jahrbuch*, and many of Husserl's pupils were quick to realize and resist the impact of his emerging transcendental idealism. Edith Stein was among these.

Stein soon declared her independence implicitly in her own writings, but it should be noted that she was and remained in many ways a true disciple of Edmund Husserl. She appreciated the critical receptivity of mind that came from her philosophical training in examining presuppositions, in weighing without prejudice, and in being open to all phenomena. She used to advantage the method of descriptive analysis of the phenomena of consciousness – the turning to the “intentional object,” of which the subject, the “I” is conscious in its stream of lived experiences. She also affirmed in theory and in practice Husserl's “eidetic reduction,” that is, the thought act which proceeds from the psychological phenomena to the essence, from fact to essential universality, the process which focuses on the “things” of experience,²¹ the *cogitationes* and their *cogitata*, and probes them by way of descriptive analysis. But for Stein these “things” of experience presupposed things of the fact world, the existence of which Husserl “brackets.” She never gave assent to Husserl's transcendental reduction, the *epoché*, that is, the suspension of judgment in regard to the transcendent existence of the objective correlates of the *cogitata*.²² In the foreword to the English translation of her dissertation, Edwin W. Straus remarks on Stein's existential approach as contrasted with the predominantly epistemological interests of Husserl.²³ Although Husserl had taken his starting point from mathematics and logic, and questions relating to man were relatively far from him at this time, Stein continued her interests in literature, history, and the humanities, which she had studied at Breslau, and persisted in her desire to discover roots for the empirical science of

psychology. She had originally selected psychology as her major but found it lacking a solid foundation in intellectual principles.

1. *Personhood*

Stein's interest in the ontological structure of the human person is the thread that runs through all her work from first to last. Her work on empathy is essentially an investigation of the structure of the psychophysical individual, and the knowledge of empathy emerges as a valuable key to unlock the secrets of personhood. Perhaps this was one reason for her choice of empathy as her subject. Roman Ingarden, who was closely associated with Stein for some years, is of the opinion that she chose empathy as a way of clarifying the theoretical foundation not only of man but also of community.²⁴ She herself tells us her choice was motivated by the desire to fill the gap in the knowledge of what empathy meant when Husserl maintained in his course on *Nature and Spirit* the necessity of intersubjective experience, which Theodor Lipps termed "empathy."²⁵

This early work gives insight into the character of Stein's philosophizing and of her use of phenomenological method in arriving at knowledge not only of empathy but also of the human person. It will, therefore, be considered in some detail. Beginning with the assumption that foreign²⁶ subjects and their experience are primordially given to us, she examines the phenomenon of givenness. Like Husserl she attempts to exclude from her investigation at the outset the consideration of anything that is any way doubtful. She raises the possibility of one's being deceived in regard to the existence of the surrounding world and other subjects and even of the empirical "I." Unlike Husserl, however, she admits there are difficulties in seeing how it is possible to suspend the positing of existence and still retain the full character of perception.²⁷ One thing she holds cannot be doubted and excluded is her experiencing "I," the experiencing subject who considers the world and its own person as phenomenon; this "I" is as indubitable and impossible to cancel as experience itself. It is the "I" in the I perceive, I think, I am glad, I wish, and so.

(a) *Psycho-Physical Unity.* Stein's next step is to affirm the phenomenon of foreign psychic life, i.e., of other minds or experiencing subjects external to the "I," as given in my experiential world, clearly distinguished from mere physical things. Each is given as a sensitive living

body belonging to an "I" that senses, thinks, feels, and wills. This "I" faces "me" and my phenomenological world and communicates with "me." Her investigation proceeds from these data of foreign experience to questions about the nature of the acts in which foreign experience can be grasped: the acts which she designates as empathy. She attempts to grasp its nature by means of lengthy analyses of empathic experiences, such as the experience of another's pain and of another's joy. The experience of joy is a favorite example of Stein throughout her work.

Her directing purpose is to investigate philosophically the *nature* of empathy, but she engages in a preliminary examination of the psychological process of its genesis, comparing her theories with those of Theodor Lipps and Max Scheler. Empathy, she holds, is an act of perceiving that is *sui generis*, an act which is primordial as present experience but non-primordial in content. When the empathizing subject is living in another's joy, for example, he/she does not feel primordial joy. It does not issue from his/her "I," nor does it have the character of ever having lived as remembered joy or fancied joy; but in this non-primordial experience, the "I" is led by the primordial experience of the other subject's joy. The joy itself cannot be outwardly perceived, but its object, a joyful countenance or other outward sign, is perceived outwardly, and the joy is given "at one" with the object. In a different situation, the "I" may hear of the joyful event before meeting the other, and the "I" can have the primordial act of joy without first grasping the other's joy.²⁸

The awareness of *what* empathy is as well as *that* it is linked by Stein with the understanding of the "I" as person, and the understanding of person is aided by descriptive analyses of empathy. If one follows the line of her reflections and analyses, however, it may be seen that this is not a vicious circle but a phenomenological viewing from all sides that reveals for her the ontological structure of the person.

The awareness of one's being that is concomitant with the acts of consciousness is the awareness of the self which is simply given as the subject of experience and is brought into relief in contrast with the otherness of the other, when another is given. This "I" is empty in itself and depends for its content on experience of the outer world and of an inner world. Upon reflection it is revealed as the subject of actual qualitative experiences, with experiential content, lived in the present and carried over from the past, experiences which form the unity of the stream of consciousness. This affiliation of all the stream's experiences with the present, living "pure I" constitutes an inviolable unity. Now other

streams of consciousness are given in experience, and the stream of the "I" faces those of the "you" and the "he" or "she," each distinguished by virtue of its own experiential content and each affiliated or belonging to an "I."

Examining the unity that characterizes the stream and the persistence apparent in the duration of feelings, volitions, and conduct, Stein posits one basic experience, which together with its persistent attributes becomes apparent as the identical "conveyer" of them all, their substrate. She calls this substrate the soul (*Seele*). This substantial unity is "my" soul when the experiences in which it is apparent are "my" experiences or acts in which my "pure I" lives.²⁹

This psychic phenomenon, she adds, is incomplete, for it cannot be considered in isolation from the body: It is also body-consciousness. The body given in consciousness is sensed as "living body" (*Leib*) in acts of inner perception and in acts of outer perception. It is outwardly perceived as physical body (*Körper*) of the outer world. This double givenness is experienced as the same body. The affiliation of the "I" with the perceiving body is inescapable, since the living body is essentially constituted through sensations, and sensations are real constituents of consciousness, belonging to the "I" and received through stimuli from existing things. In addition to having fields of sensation, the living body in contrast to the physical body is characterized by being located at the zero point of orientation of the spatial world, by moving voluntarily, and by having and expressing feelings.

It is obvious that fields of sensation are inseparable from their corporeal founding. On the other hand, general feelings, such as feeling vigorous or sluggish, may seem to be capable of being somatic or non-somatic. Moods, for example, are general feelings of a non-somatic nature, but their foundation is in the phenomenon of the reciprocal action of psychic and somatic experiences.

Feelings of both types demand bodily expressions which may be external or internal, or both. It is true that verbal expression and observable bodily expression, such as smiling, groaning, and the like, can be controlled; but feeling is still expressed internally in bodily changes, such as those of heart-beat, pulse, or breathlessness, and/or in acts of reflection. Also outward expression may be stimulated. Even so-called "mental feelings," such as boredom, disgust, keenness of wit, upon analysis can be seen to have some connections of cause/effect with the living body. In all these analyses, Stein is attempting to establish that everything psychic is body-bound consciousness and that the soul together

with the living body forms the substantial unity of the psycho-physical individual.

The living body is also the instrument of the "I's" will. Experiences of will have an important meaning for the constitution of psycho-physical unity. Both willing and striving make use of psycho-physical causality, but what is truly creative is not a causal, but a motivational, effect. Will may be causally influenced, as for example, when tiredness of body prevents a volition from prevailing, but a victorious will may overcome tiredness. What is truly creative about volition is not a causal effect; the latter is external to the essence of will.³⁰

The above description shows how Stein has given in outline an account of what is meant by the psycho-physical individual. It is revealed as a unified object inseparably joining together the conscious unity of an "I" and a physical body which occurs as a living body, and consciousness occurs as the soul of the unified individual. This unity has been revealed by examining sensations, general feelings and their expression as well as the causal relationship between body and soul and the outer world. Finally, the living body has been considered as the instrument of the "I's" will.

(b) *Knowledge of Other Persons.* With a similar type of painstaking analysis, Stein examines step by step the nature of the "I's" consciousness of the foreign individual. In the popular English usage of the term *empathy*, the focus is usually on the feeling aspect. Also the German word *Einfühlung* gives primary philological reference to feeling. In Stein's theory of empathy, the unity of the "I" becomes clearly evident in the grasp of the other which occurs both cognitively and affectively. Her account shows the impossibility of separating feeling from the total complex of cognitive acts, such as perception, ideation, and insight.

Through "sensual empathy," the "I" perceives and interprets the other as sensing, living body and empathically projects itself into it. In acquiring objective knowledge of the existing outer world, empathy has an important function. Although the outer world may appear differently to different individuals to some extent because of different sense capacities and perspectives, the world appears much the same however and to whomever it appears. If the "I" were imprisoned within the boundaries of its own individuality, it would not get beyond the "world as it appears to me."³¹ Further, intersubjective experience is presented as significant in reaching knowledge of the self. Empathy and inner perception of self must work hand in hand in order to "give me myself to myself."³²

At this stage of her investigation, Stein observes intimations of the self that transcend the world of nature. She has shown that the psycho-physical individual as nature is subject to the laws of causality, but they do not account for a wide range of phenomena of consciousness. Consciousness appears not only as a causally-conditioned occurrence but as object-constructing at the same time. Thus it steps out of the order of nature and faces it. Analysis of attitudes, feelings, values, and cognition as well as volition and action reveals the human individual as being that is subject to rational laws, the laws of meaning. In every grasping of an act of feeling, she holds, the human being penetrates into what she calls the realm of *Geist*, spirit. As physical nature is constituted in perceptual acts, so a new realm is constituted in feeling. This realm is the world of values. *Geist* is further revealed in the realm of the will, which not only has an object correlate facing the volition but is also creative, releasing action, effecting whatever "man has wrought" in human relations, as well as in the arts, sciences, and all making. All these are correlates of *Geist*.³³

The word *Geist* has no adequate English equivalent, the nearest being "mind" or "spirit." Here it will be rendered by "spirit" since it appears to have the advantage in expressing Stein's comprehensive concept which includes not only intellectual cognition but also feelings, values, and volitions. It is to be understood that "spirit" in this context does not have reference to the moral or the religious. The word *geistig* is likewise difficult to translate. For consistency, it will be rendered "spiritual," in the sense of distinction from the psychical and the physical.³⁴

The manner in which Stein constitutes the knowledge of spiritual person (*geistige Person*) is highly original in that she arrives at rationality by way of analyses of feelings. She does not begin with what she calls "theoretical acts," such as perception, imagination, ideation, and inference, she says, because in these one may be so absorbed in the object that the "I" is not aware of itself. Instead she concentrates on feeling (for example, the feeling of joy), since in this the "I" is always present to consciousness. But feeling always requires theoretical acts, and involves values, and both of these lead to the rational.

Sentiments of love and hate, gratitude, vengeance, animosity – that is, feelings with other people as their object – are acts revealing spirit, which is characteristic of personal levels. In the act of loving, one experiences a grasping or intending of the value of a person. One loves a person for his or her own sake. In a feeling of value one becomes aware of the self as subject and as object, and every feeling has a certain

mood component that causes feeling to be spread throughout the “I” and can fill it completely. Feelings have different depth and reach, different intensity and duration, and these are subject to rational laws. The “I” passes from one act to another in the form of motivation – the meaning context that is completely attributable to spirit. Thus the person as spirit is the value-experiencing subject whose experiences interlock into an intelligible, meaningful whole.

Analyses of strivings, volitional decision, and willing follow. Every willing is based on the feeling of “being able.” Every act of feeling as well as every act of willing is based on a theoretical act. The act of reflection in which knowledge comes to givenness can always become a basis for a valuing. Cognitive striving and cognitive willing involve feeling the value of the cognition and joy in the realized act. Person and value-world are found to be completely correlated.

Personal attributes such as goodness, readiness to make sacrifices, the energy which I experience in my activities are conceivable as attributes of a spiritual subject and continue to retain their own nature in the context of the psycho-physical structure. They reveal their special position by standing outside the order of natural causality. Action is experienced as proceeding meaningfully from the total structure of the person. It is spirit, she holds, that is the distinctive characteristic of person and a requisite for empathy, for only the person as spirit can go beyond the self and relate cognitively and affectively to others in the full sense of these relations.³⁵

This early work of Stein builds the framework of the structure of the human person, which she expands, modifies, and enriches in subsequent writings. The detailed consideration of it here is designed to show the ways in which she attempted to implement Husserl’s methodology, viewing each object of investigation from all sides and striving to validate successive findings at each stage of the procedure. Thus she contributes to the realization of an important aim of phenomenology in providing access to universal essence in a context of concrete human experience.

Edith Stein’s next work, *Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften* (Contributions to the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology and the Human Sciences),³⁶ published five years later, in 1922, continues her search for a deeper knowledge of the human person. It was her conviction that phenomenology was the most appropriate approach to the investigation of the structure of human personality, which would ultimately supply the grounding knowledge for the structure of the human sciences.

(c) *Consciousness and Spirituality*. Her investigation again takes the form of analysis of the phenomena of consciousness, the objects in their entire fullness and concretion as well as of the consciousness corresponding to them: the noematic levels and gradations and the noetic elements in all their complexity. She examines the experience-units which rise, peak, flow into the past, often emerging again, in the unity of the stream; also the life-feelings (*Lebensfühle*), the life-states (*Lebenszuständlichkeiten*) and life-force (*Lebenskraft*) of the real "I" which come to givenness. She designates the real "I" and its qualities and conditions as the psychic. Conclusions regarding psychic causality are shown to be only approximate and non-exact, but as having practical value.³⁷

In making the transition from the psychic to the realm of spirit, Stein arrives at a radical distinction between causality and motivation. To appreciate the clarity, completeness, and even originality of her reach for understanding of these and related complex questions, one must follow her meticulous analyses – sometimes a tedious task but worth the effort; for the outcomes are valuable to the reader on many levels, including the personal and the pedagogical. The course of motivation is shown to be a series of acts that move to meaning. The "I," the center and turning point of all acts, directs its gaze on the lived ensemble of intentional objects in consciousness and grasps their connections, progressing from act to act with a constantly developing continuity of meaning. The subject can bring the act-life under the laws of reason and can regulate the course of the motivation. "Motive" is the meaning content (*Sinngehalt*) which involves perception of a thing's existence and a vague grasp of its whatness as steps in the comprehension of a value which can motivate the taking of an attitude and, possibly, a willing and a doing.³⁸ In all this, the degree of spontaneity is carefully investigated. Stein recognizes the complexity of the influence of the outer and inner situation on the decision, resolution, and execution of the will act, but she holds firmly to the freedom of the person within proper limits. She meets and finds untenable the arguments regarding determination by the strongest motive and also determinism on the basis of the principle of association.³⁹

Finally, her careful distinction between psyche and spirit in the human being should be noted. The psychic life has to do with the soul, with its constant and variable dispositions; this life refers to a subjective consciousness, monadic and closed. Spirit, on the other hand, has to do with objectifiable contents of intentional acts: thoughts, ends, values,

creative acts. This is why their bearer is an individual person with a qualitative point of view, incarnating a unique value. A true science of spirit, she states, should recognize the autonomy and individuality of the person, while recognizing at the same time that every person is subject to general laws of nature and of psychic life. Although the latter are less precise than the former, knowledge of these laws can afford the basis of a limited prevision, the eidetic possibilities, of what *can* take place, not what *must* or *will* take place. Her final view of the human person in this work is that of a totality of qualitative particularity formed from one central core (*Kern*), from a single root of formation which is unfolded in soul, body, and spirit.

Stein devotes many pages toward the end of the work to the description of psychic and spiritual faculties in the context of her treatment of community and her attempt to distinguish soul from spirit. In regard to the latter, she herself concludes that the boundaries between soul and spirit cannot be firmly drawn and strict separation cannot be made.⁴⁰ After many years of contact with the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas, she presents a modified view in her long metaphysical work, *Endliches und Ewiges Sein (Finite and Eternal Being)*.⁴¹ Following her long treatment of the structure of concrete being in terms of potency and act, essence and existence, substance and accident, matter and form, she returns to the question of *What is Menschsein?* (What is human being?) She acknowledges the mystery of human nature, since the entire conscious life, upon which she has relied for knowing what it means to be human, is not synonymous with her being. It is only the lighted surface over a dark abyss, which she must seek to fathom.⁴²

She now defines soul in the Aristotelian-Thomistic sense as the substantial form of a living body. There is a plant soul, and animal soul, and the human soul, each differing essentially from the other. As form, the soul is the principle of life and movement and gives essence-determination to the being. A person is neither animal nor angel – but is both in one. The conscious *Ichleben* gives access to the soul just as sensuous life gives access to the body. When the “I” goes beyond originary experience and makes the self an object, the soul appears to it as thing-like or substantial, having enduring characteristics, having powers or faculties which are capable of and in need of development, and having changing attitudes and activities. Each human being has not only universal essence but also individual essence.⁴³ These are not two separate essences but are a unity in which the essential attributes join together in a determinate structure. In Socrates, for example, his Socrates-

sein is distinguished from his humanity, his *Menschsein*. Humanity is part of the individual essence of Socrates.⁴⁴ His individual essence makes the whole essence and every essential trait something unique, so that the friendliness or goodness of Socrates is other than that of other men. Individual essence unfolds in the life of this man; it is not static; it can change. Not all that is grounded in essence follows necessarily; the person has freedom in forming individual essence.⁴⁵

In this work, Stein retains the two designations *soul* and *spirit*, but the distinction does not appear to be a real one. As form of the body, she writes, the soul takes the middle position between spirit and matter. She writes:

Spirit and soul are not to be spoken of as existing side by side. It is the one spiritual soul which has a manifold unfolding of being. . . . The soul is spirit according to its innermost essence, which underlies the development of all its powers.⁴⁶

The person, the "I," she holds, is a three-fold oneness: body-soul-spirit. As spirit, the human person is the bearer of his/her life – holds it in hand, so to speak. The person's knowing, loving, and serving and the joy in knowing, loving, and serving are the life of spirit, the proper sphere of freedom. And again she affirms that under spirit we understand the conscious, free "I"; free acts are the privileged realm of person. The "I" to which body and soul are proper, the same "I" which encompasses the spirit "I," is the living-spirit-person, the conscious free "I."⁴⁷

From this point on, *Finite and Eternal Being* moves beyond philosophy to theology, treating the threefold unity of body-soul-spirit in man as the image of the Triune God. In a later work also, *Welt und Person*⁴⁸ (*World and Person*), Stein takes the person from the realm of natural reason to the realm of grace.

(d) *Woman*. In the compilation of Stein's lectures on woman delivered in German cities in 1930, entitled *Die Frau*⁴⁹ (*Woman*), her philosophy of education appears directly related to her philosophy of person. Education, she states, is the formation of human personality. In each human being there is a unique inner form which all education from outside must respect and aid in its movement toward the mature, fully developed personality. The humanness is the basis of fundamental commonalities. Education must help all persons to develop their powers of knowing, enjoying, and creative making.

Intellect is the key to the kingdom of the spirit. . . . The intellect must be pressed into activity. But . . . the training of the intellect should not be extended at the expense of the schooling of the heart. The mean is the target.⁵⁰

The disciplines should be taught not in a purely abstract way but should be related to the concrete and personal as far as possible.

Her philosophy of woman likewise grows out of her philosophy of person. She presents the being of woman under three aspects: her humanity, her specific femininity, and her individuality. Her treatment of woman as a member of the human species is traditional, but she adds that within the human species there is a "double species" of man and woman. Differences in gender, rooted as they are in bodily structure, may be the basis of some personality differences, but these differences apply only in general. Some women have characteristics which are considered typically "manly," and some men have characteristics that are "womanly." There is no profession that cannot be carried on by women, she maintains, and some women have special aptitude for some professions that have been considered as belonging principally to men, such as that of doctor.⁵¹

(e) *Individual and Community*. Edith Stein presents a valuable treatment of the individual and community in the second section of the *Beiträge*,⁵² making use of phenomenological method (exclusive of the transcendental reduction) and analyses of the actual experience of community. She distinguishes between society (*Gesellschaft*) and community (*Gemeinschaft*). In a society a man regards himself as a personal subject and other men as objects; in a community the subject recognizes others as fellow personal subjects. In most social groups, there are both societal and communal features, but the dominant quality can be discerned. Three components of the experience of actual community life are: the subject of the communal experience, the experience itself, and the living stream which unifies the experience. The experience of the community has its source ultimately in the individual selves who make up the group. They share an intended common goal of activity and a unity of meaning. Thus the community lives and experiences in and through the individual persons who compose it. Personal freedom should be enhanced by the social grouping, which calls for personal participation that is both cognitive and affective. The "I" can enter into a community life with other subjects. The individual subject can thus become a member of a

supra-individual subject, and in the actual life of such a subject-community, an experience-stream is constituted. How this comes about is uncovered by means of descriptive analyses which build upon the structures treated in her previous works.

Her next work⁵³ applies the conclusions of her investigations into community to her political philosophy, considering the state as a community which also involves some societal elements; these, however, should be subordinate to the interpersonal life of members of the community. The state is, by origin, a natural community-society, not one formed by social contract. The state is characterized by sovereignty; however, it should preserve its character of community by limiting civil power to what is necessary for the common good and by promoting the freedom of its citizens. She does not think that there is any one absolutely best form of government; each has to be considered in relation to the particular circumstances. She takes issue with Fichte and Hegel in their exalting of the state and the unfolding of a dialectical process in being that fails to root the ethical order in personally free agents. Her theory of the state reminds one of Maritain's ideas of the person and the common good⁵⁴ in its insistence on the requirements of social responsibility and "amity" (to use Maritain's term) and in her refusal to grant ethical supremacy to the state. Stein appears to develop a theory that is definitely critical of the rising totalitarianism of the time at which she was writing (1925), while repudiating extreme individualism. It should be noted also that she presents historical evidence that a state need not confine itself to a single folk or race in achieving the unity of community.⁵⁵ In her open criticism of totalitarian and racist trends she appears to stand out from other German phenomenologists of the time.

2. *Theology*

(a) *Thomasism and Phenomenology*. During the period from 1922 to 1931⁵⁶ Stein extended her philosophical horizon far beyond phenomenology. She translated from English to German Newman's letters, journals, and *The Idea of a University*. Her two-volume translation from Latin to German and interpretation of Aquinas's *Disputed Questions on Truth*⁵⁷ was a work of rigorous scholarship and philosophical significance. Martin Grabmann⁵⁸ and James Collins⁵⁹ commented favorably not only on her rendering of Aquinas's Latin into a vital, philosophically pertinent German but also on her interpretation of the text. Incidentally, the

Latin-German glossary of terms which it includes is helpful to scholars who come to German phenomenology from medieval philosophy.

A long article on Husserl's phenomenology and the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, which she contributed to a supplementary volume of *Husserls Jahrbuch* in honor of Husserl's seventieth birthday in 1929,⁶⁰ gives evidence of the changes in Stein's philosophizing. In this work she compares the theories of the two philosophers regarding philosophy as science, natural and supernatural reason, essence and existence, and intuition and abstraction of essence. In September 1932, she accepted the invitation to participate in the Journée of the Société Thomiste in Juvisy on the subject of phenomenology and Thomism. The summation of the conference by René Kremer gives prominence to Stein's explanations and responses.⁶¹

In both of the above works Stein presents the parallelism between phenomenology and Thomism in regard to: the end pursued, namely scientific knowledge having objective validity; the intelligibility of being, that is, the affirmation of an essential, intelligible structure, or *logos*, in all that is; and the power of reason to attain this intelligibility. The matter of objectivity is too complex to be elaborated in the present account. It should be noted, however, that Stein recognizes that the meaning of Husserl's *objectivity* (*Gegenständlichkeit*) and *validity* (*Gültigkeit*) is problematic: Is knowledge for him objective because it is shown to be universally valid for knowers or is it universally valid because it is objective in the sense of being an adequation of the mind and reality, as Aquinas holds? Husserl's epoché, the bracketing of the question of existence, in the transcendental reduction is an issue. The Scholastic concept of intentionality, which came to Husserl by way of Brentano, was the basis of the famous "*Wende zum Objekt*" that phenomenology heralded in opposition to idealism. But the object for Husserl was always the mental, or intentional object, which might or might not have its foundation in exterior reality. The crux of the problem of Husserl's objectivity is expressed in Stein's phrasing of the question, "How is the world constructed for a consciousness which I can explore in immanence?"⁶²

Both philosophers, she emphasizes, search for knowledge of the essences of things, of *what* things are. Both begin with perception, and both, she believes, proceed in a similar manner: Husserl, by eidetic reduction; Aquinas by abstraction. Stein presents similarities in Husserl's intuition (*Wesensanschauung*) and Aquinas's *intellectus* (*intus legere*). She also raises questions. Here awareness of contrasts between Husserl

and Aquinas is evident in other sections of the article. Examples are: the differences in method, that is, emphasis on synthesis *versus* analysis; on description *versus* demonstration; "first philosophy" (the ground of principles of science) as theory of knowledge *versus* "first philosophy" as metaphysics; and the gap between the existence-bracketing phenomenology of Husserl and the existential character of Aquinas's philosophy. There is, of course, the great difference between the theo-centrism of Aquinas and the position of Husserl that knowledge of God was beyond the limits of phenomenology.

(b) *Finite and Eternal Being*. The work that represents the maturation of Edith Stein's thought, the fruition of her confrontation of Husserl's phenomenology and Thomas's philosophy was a monumental manuscript of over thirteen hundred pages entitled *Endliches und Ewiges Sein (Finite and Eternal Being)*.⁶³ It was completed in 1936 and was already set up in type at Breslau when the order against publishing non-Aryan writings was issued by Hitler. Its subtitle, *Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being* indicates that the question of being is the focal point and reminds us of Heidegger in the phrase "meaning of being;" but Stein sees the question of the meaning of being to be inextricably linked to the recognition of a First Being. *Finite and Eternal Being* is a creative work which draws on its sources but presents an original analysis of the metaphysical structure of being, with methodology and content of its own. Early in the work, the existence of the First Being is rationally inferred from the finiteness of the self, the "I." Thus, after the first chapter, which discusses the nature of philosophy, Chapter II enters upon the "ascent" to the infinite and eternal being by way of analysis of the experience of the "I" in terms of act and potency. Chapters III and IV are an extensive treatment of the structure of concrete being (potency and act, essence and existence, substance and accident, matter and form), and Chapter V, of the transcendental. Chapter VI, the central section, then treats the meaning of being. Chapter VII is a lengthy treatment of what may be the *analogy of being*, if the expression is taken in an enlarged Augustinian or Bonaventuran sense; and the final chapter is on individuation.

This brief outline of content gives some idea of the direction the work takes in presenting an ontology that leads to a natural theology, and, it should be added, a natural theology which is open to revealed theology. In the *Festschrift* article Stein had devoted some pages to the question of the difference between philosophizing with pure reason and philosophizing with faith-enlightened reason, but it is in *Finite and Eternal Being*

that her final conclusions are to be found. Between the two works, she had read Maritain's *De la philosophie Chrétienne* and had participated in the discussion of the subject of Christian philosophy at Juvisy and in other discussions of the issue, which was very much alive at the time. Stein affirms the formal distinction between belief and knowledge, stating that philosophical science remains in the sphere of human reason; religious belief and theological science rest on divine revelation, but she would not erect barriers between faith and reason, philosophy and theology. "Reason," she says, "would become unreason if it wanted to stick obstinately to what it can discover by its own light and to close its eyes to what a higher light makes visible."⁶⁴

Historically, she maintains, philosophy has received many leads from theology; it should be open to theology and can be completed by it, not as philosophy but as theology. In her opinion, the deciding factor as to whether a work is philosophical or theological is the "directing intention." Her purpose in *Finite and Eternal Being* is to keep the directing intention philosophical.⁶⁵ That she feels free to supplement the truths of reason with the truths of faith is evident, particularly in the section which considers man as the image of the Trinity. It is obvious that she considers some sort of synthesis of faith and reason desirable for the believer, but she insists that philosophy calls for completion by theology without becoming theology. The exposition of her philosophy given by her will, of course, be limited to her philosophy.

3. *Metaphysics*

(a) *Being*. It seems likely that when Edith Stein conceived the idea of *Finite and Eternal Being*, she may have had in mind the words of Père René Kremer which she heard at the Journée of the Société Thomiste at Juvisy: "The question of being," he noted, "can be resolved only by a complete system embracing finite being and infinite being."⁶⁶ He was referring in this context to the system of Aquinas. Stein may have taken his statement as indicating a desirable structure for her "ascent to the meaning of being." Undoubtedly, she determined to make the attempt to transpose traditional concepts into a contemporary key by making use of the linguistic and methodological resources of phenomenology. In locating the problem of the meaning of being primarily in the recognition of First Being, she is faced with the problem of coming to the knowledge of First Being early in her work. Since, to her mind, the existence of God is not intuited in privileged experience nor is it

rationally inferred in a formal demonstration, she initiates a train of thought which avoids the strict use of these ways and yet does not rule out completely the insights of either. As in her earlier works, the starting point of her search is the indubitable fact of one's own being, most intimately and inescapably known. As in her earlier works, this awareness leads her to the awareness of the "I" as subsistent being, distinguishable from all experience as that to which every experience belongs, the "pure I," which is empty in itself and is dependent for its content on an outer world and an inner world.⁶⁷ Her procedure is first to establish, by way of phenomenological description, the finitude of man's being; then to show that finite being demands eternal being as its ultimate ground. The being of the "I," under her reflective gaze, is first revealed in the finitude of temporality. Even as she contemplates it, its present-actual being has passed away and given place to the being of another "now." It cannot be separated from time: it is a "now" between a "no longer" and a "not yet." It has a double face: that of being and non-being.⁶⁸

Before she completes her analysis of this temporality, her thought rushes forward precipitously to the idea of pure being which has in it nothing of non-being, which is not temporal, but eternal.⁶⁹ Although it is only the ideas of eternal and temporal, immutable and mutable being that force themselves upon the mind and provide a legitimate starting point, she holds that the analogy of being is visible even at this point. Our actual being *is* only for an instant; it is not "full being" (*volles Sein*), which is the fullness of being at every instant. It is an image (*Abbild*) whose being bears a likeness to the original (*Urbild*) but much more unlikeness. The question arises whether this sudden presence to consciousness of eternal being, the plenitude of being, is philosophically premature and dependent upon faith or whether it is an instance of what Karl Rahner calls the pre-apprehension (*Vorgriff*), by way of *excessus*, of universal *esse* and the simultaneous affirmation of the existence of Absolute Being.⁷⁰ The fact that she is "philosophizing in faith" cannot be summarily dismissed. As Stein herself says in another section of the work, the believer easily leaps over the abyss between finite and eternal being; the unbeliever shrinks back again and again.⁷¹

(b) *Act and Potency*. To establish her pre-apprehension on firmer ground, Stein proceeds to extend analyses which make use of the traditional concepts of act and potency, clarified and brought to givenness in personal, conscious experience. In her analysis, the finitude of the being

of the "I" is revealed in the awareness of the continuous passage from potency to act, and the concrete awareness of becoming is uncovered in the analysis of "experience-units" (*Erlebniseinheiten*). Husserl's concept of actuality and inactuality, applied to the temporality of consciousness⁷² and Hedwig Conrad-Martius's concept of the fleeting actuality of the "ontic present"⁷³ are threaded through the doctrine of potency and act in an original way. With Husserl she stresses the inner subjective flux of consciousness and temporality as an essential property of consciousness. In Stein's development, the consciousness of time is never removed from the ambient of the real world.

The unity of the unceasing flux of consciousness is constituted by the "pure I," which alone remains constant. It belongs to the essence of the intentional experiences of this stream to be situated in the continuous time-horizon of past, present, and future, a horizon in which actuality belongs to the "fully-living" present; potentiality to the past and the future. The present, the "now," the indivisible instant, is the contact point with existence. The *Ichleben* appears as a constant going-out-of-the-past-living-into-the-future, in which the potential becomes actual and the actual sinks back into potentiality. This continually fleeting point of actuality reveals to us the opposition between actuality and potentiality in our being, but even this point is not pure actuality. In the present-actual instant, our being is both actual and potential.⁷⁴

Exploring further this composition of act and potency in our being, Stein turns to the experience-units of consciousness and their characteristic of duration.⁷⁵ The experience of joy, for example, has duration which encompasses a waxing and waning. The experience stream is a unity, not of a chain made of links, but of a stream flowing in waves that rise from the lower level of that which is not yet "full-being" to the crest of the height of being (*Seinshöhe*) and of aliveness (*Lebendigkeit*) and fall to the level of the being of retention, that which is lived and gone (*Gelebtin-Vergangen*). The experience of joy over good news is selected for detailed analysis, an experience which is conditioned both by the object, the content of the news, and the subject, the "pure I," which understands the news and recognizes its joyfulness. The "I" can anticipate future joy and can relive the past. Repetition of the experience is accompanied by the consciousness that it *is* repetition and that it is the same "I" that experiences it. The "I" can look back over the flowing sweep of its earlier life. But there are gaps in memory (occasioned by sleep, lapses of consciousness, lapses of memory, and the like), and ultimately the mind is halted before the blank of its beginning. Did

the "I" have a beginning of its being? What of its end? Did it come out of nothing? Faced with the chasms of its past and the mystery of its whence and whither, Stein concludes that the "I" could not be the source of its own life; that it could not possibly call itself into being nor sustain itself in being. Its being must be a received being; it must be placed in being and sustained in being from instant to instant. Experience-units require the "I" for their being; their being is only a coming to be (*Werden*) and a passing away (*Vergehen*), with an instantaneous height of being (*Seinshöhe*). The "I" appears nearer to being; yet its being has a constantly changing content, and it knows itself dependent not only in regard to its content, but also in regard to its very being. She calls it a "nothinged being."⁷⁶

The "I," frightened before nothingness, longs not only for the continuation of its being but also for the full possession of being, for being that can enclose its total content in a changeless present. It experiences in itself varying degrees of actuality, grades of nearness to the fullness of being. Proceeding in thought to the upper limit by canceling out all deficiencies, the "I" can attain the awareness of the all-encompassing and highest degree of being, Pure Act, of which it is only a weak image.⁷⁷

(c) *Eternal Being*. In subsequent analyses, the *Angst* of the "I," as it comes face to face with its own non-being, is countered by the experience that "I am," and "I am sustained in being from moment to moment," and "in my fleeting being I hold an enduring being." "Here in my being I encounter another, not mine, which is the support and ground of my support-less being."⁷⁸ Could man's fleeting being have its final ground in another finite being? It could not, she replies, since everything temporal and finite is, as such, fleeting and ultimately requires an eternal support. The ground of contingent being cannot be received being, but must be being *a se* (*aus sich selbst*), being that cannot be, but *is* necessarily, she concludes.

Eternal being is thus grasped at this point of her analyses as First Being, the *Urgrund* of the finite being of the "I"; Pure Act, having no potentiality; immutable (*wandellos*) being; the full possession of being (*Vollbesitz des Seins*); all-encompassing (*allumspannendes*) and highest encompassing (*hochstgespanntes*) being; being *a se*; necessary being.⁷⁹

In the section of the book which deals with the analogy of being,⁸⁰ Stein says that an infinite difference separates the human "I" from any other which lies within the range of our experience, because it is person.

From human being we come to a grasp of the divine *esse* if we take away everything of non-being that was discovered in the finite "I." God's "I" is eternally living presence, without beginning and without end, without any lacunae or obscurity. His *Ichleben* is fullness of being, in self and of self; there are no changing contents, no rising or falling of experiences, no passing from potentiality to actuality. The entire fullness of being is eternal-present. Thus God's "I am" (*sum*) says: I love, I know, I will, not as one-after-another or side-by-side acts, but fully in the unity of one divine actuality, in which all meanings of act coincide. He is his being (*Sein*) and essence (*Wesen*). He is fullness of being in every sense of the word but especially fullness of being-person.⁸¹

The question may be raised why Edith Stein did not select for the title of her book the term *zeitlich* (temporal) to parallel the term *ewig* (eternal) or perhaps *unendlich* (infinite) to parallel *endlich* (finite), rather than pairing *endlich* and *ewig* in the title *Endliches und Ewiges Sein*. Careful study of her use of these terms seems to indicate the near-equivalence of *Unendlichkeit* and *Ewigkeit* in her work. They are sometimes used interchangeably; sometimes one or the other is used to being out the movement of her thinking. It seems probable that Stein selected *ewig* as the stronger, more positive term and wished to avoid the possible construing of *unendlich* in the narrow sense of *unending*. She prefers *endlich* to *zeitlich* because she considers finitude as the more basic, as the ultimate reason for temporality. In the order of knowing, however, her method makes temporality the source of the knowledge of finitude.

Her concept of eternity reminds one of the definition formulated by Boethius and approved by Aquinas: "*Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio.*"⁸² Stein has enlarged it to signify the "perfect possession of *personal* life." The living, personal being of man is her focal point in attaining the awareness of the living, personal being of God. The meaning of the *tota simul* of the traditional definition is captured in her description of *allumspannendes und höchstgespanntes Sein*, of being that encompasses its total content in the changeless present. The indivisibility of eternity as compared with the indivisibility of man's present, the *nunc stans*, is clearly evident in her analysis. Like Aquinas, she comes to the knowledge of eternity through time. The temporality prominent in Husserl's phenomenology has afforded her a congenial starting point, and from the flux of human life registered in consciousness, from the *before* and *after* of man's *Ichleben*, she leaps to the idea of life that is immutable, that has no *before*

or *after*, no beginning or end, that is the fullness of being and of life and of personality.

From this sketch of the movement of Stein's thought, it is obvious that she did not attempt a formal demonstration *that* God is, nor did she claim a clear, conceptual grasp of *what* God is. Rather she allies herself with Augustine, who, she notes, also sought the way to God from man's inner being and emphasized man's incapacity to comprehend God. She admits that if we make the statement that God's being is his essence, we can attach a certain meaning to the statement, but in Husserlian terms, it is an intention that cannot be filled.⁸³ Hers is a "dark searching" in the effort to comprehend the Incomprehensible and to grasp True Being. Yet our dark searching, she maintains, does give us the Incomprehensible One as the Inescapably Near One, whom we encounter as the support and ground of our own finite being. It is clear that Edith Stein was willing to go beyond apodictic knowledge and to stand before mystery in philosophy, as well as in faith. At the same time, she reached for knowledge of the Infinite insofar as it seemed to her accessible to the human mind. Thus she was faithful to the nature of philosophy while acknowledging its limits. Her effort to arrive at the knowledge of God appears to avoid the dichotomy of Pascal's famous contrast between the God of the philosopher and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The thrust of her analyses is not toward God as impersonal First Mover of First Cause, but toward God as Infinite/Eternal Being Who is Person.

Edith Stein's approach may call forth the same criticism that the philosophical search for God has repeatedly encountered. Does the mind arrive at God through its own demand for intelligibility? Stein's philosophy is grounded in the conviction of the intelligibility of being and the affirmation of an essential, intelligible structure, or *logos*, in all that is. For anyone who is not willing or able to accept this principle of intelligibility and the power of reason to attain it, Stein's approach to God is meaningless – an original, curious analysis, perhaps, and that is all.

(d) *Essence and Existence*. Edith Stein's philosophy is sometimes referred to as philosophy of essence; certainly essence does hold an important place in her work. It should be added that she consistently relates it to existence.⁸⁴ Just as the opening chapters of *Finite and Eternal Being* are devoted to a search for the ultimate principle and ground of being, so the chapters that follow⁸⁵ are concerned with the ultimate ground of meaning (Sinn), and meaning is the Ariadne thread that leads to essence. Her approach to essence is twofold: (1) by way of phenomenological

analysis, in particular that of joy, she attempts to show that essences are and what they are; and (2) by way of the consideration of sensible beings of the real world, she attempts to orient her conclusions regarding essence within the Aristotelian doctrine of τὸ τῷ ᾧ εἶγα (*quod quid erat esse*), μορφή (*forma*), and οὐσία (*essentia, substantia*).⁸⁶ It is impossible to treat the intricacies of her total theory of essence in a few pages; the account would be subject to the misconceptions and oversimplification that plague its exposition in some of the biographies that have attempted to treat it in a single chapter. One of the difficulties is the multiplicity of German terms which Stein uses which have no precise translation in English and require pages of explanation; for example, *Wesen*, *Wesenheit*, *Washeit*, *Wesenwas*, *das volles Was*, and so on. It may be noted that *Wesen* is the general term used to refer to essence in its various determinations; in a narrow sense it is used to designate the actual essence or “whatness” of a concrete individual thing.

Referring to a passage in the commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, in which Aquinas speaks of the different modes of being of the thing as known and the thing *in rerum natura*, Stein explains that in the process of grasping something mentally, the intelligible in potency becomes intelligible in act. Knowing involves grasping the essence of a thing. Since each something has its universal essence (man, joy) and is also individual (this man, this joy of mine), its essence is also individual. Two objects that are similar have essences that are similar but not identically the same. The “complete what” of each is not essence in the traditional sense in which the Scholastics used it as including only essential attributes but includes also all non-essential attributes as well. In other words, a thing *is* according to its universal essence and its individual essence. These, however, are not two separate essences but are a unity, a whole, constituted by the joining together of the essential attributes in a determinate structure.⁸⁷

In her treatment of actual essence (*Wesen*), she seems to have been influenced by Husserl’s doctrine of “concrete essences”⁸⁸ and by Jean Hering, who holds that every object has one and only one essence (*Wesen*) which determines the fullness of the individuality constituting it.⁸⁹

In regard to the human mind’s grasp of essence Stein reaffirms in her own work the limitations as to the immediacy and perfection of the knowledge of essence which she had discussed in the *Festschrift* article in theory. She holds that *Anschaung* or *intellectus* does not signify that the essence of a thing is seen in an immediate, sudden intuition,

but is rather a penetration gained by rigorous activity of the powers of sense and intellect.⁹⁰ Simple essences are attained through a process of analysis that makes explicit all that is contained in the spontaneous grasp of it. Abstraction of composite essences, for example, morphological essences, is a step-by-step process of coming to know the individual characteristics.⁹¹ The imperfection of our concepts is the result of the imperfect grasp of essence.⁹²

III. CONCLUSION**

All in all, one who studies the whole corpus of Stein's work may find in it a happy reconciliation of polarities which, if dichotomized, sometimes detract from the quality of philosophizing. Examples of these are: faith and reason, the concrete and the abstract, thinking and feeling, objectivity and subjectivity, classical philosophy and contemporary phenomenology. It is evident that the above account of Stein's philosophy is expository rather than critical. It has attempted to present the overall directing lines of her thought as faithfully as possible. In every section there are positions which cry out for comparison and contrast with other philosophers as well as for careful critique. There is a rich field for studies here, and it is hoped that scholars will soon explore it more adequately than has been done in the past.

NOTES

1. The best sources of information about Stein's life are to be found in volumes VII through X of *Edith Steins Werke* (hereafter cited as ESW), namely, *Aus dem Leben einer Jüdischen familie*, the two volumes entitled *Selbstbildnis in Briefen* and *Heil im Unheil*.
2. Additional sources of information concerning the period of Stein's life as Husserl's student and later his assistant are, Roman Ingarden, "Edith Stein and her Activity as an Assistant to Edmund Husserl," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XXIII (1962); Gerda Walther, *Zum Anderen Ufer*, Ch. 20 and 25; and Hilde Graef, *The Scholar and the Cross: The Life and work of Edith Stein*.
3. Letter to Roman Ingarden of February 20, 1917, in ESW, VIII, p. 20.
4. Letter to Roman Ingarden of January 18, 1917, in ESW, VIII, p. 15.
5. Letter to Roman Ingarden of February 19, 1918, in ESW, VIII, pp. 30-31.
6. Letter to Fritz Kaufmann of November 8, 1919, in ESW, VIII, pp. 41-42.

7. Elisabeth Boedeker and Maria Meyer-Plath, *50 Jahre Habilitation von Frauen in Deutschland*, p. 5.
8. Letter to Fritz Kaufmann dated May 31, 1920, in ESW, VIII, p. 48.
9. That woman was Dr. Katharina Kanthack, who habilitated at the Free University of Berlin in 1950. She had actually completed her habilitation thesis in 1933 but was prevented by the Nazi regime from assuming her teaching duties. Boedeker and Meyer-Plath, *op. cit.*, p. 166.
10. See, for example, Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, I, pp. 172–173; Jacques Vidal, “Phenomenologie et Conversions,” in *Archives de Philosophie* (1972), 209–243, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ remarks about Edith Stein which appear as an appendix in Edith Stein, *Briefe an Hedwig Conrad-Martius*, 61–83.
11. For example, “Husserls Phänomenologie und die Philosophie des hl. Thomas,” in the Festschrift for Husserl, 1929.
12. Letter to Martin Honecker dated July 8, 1932, in ESW, VIII, pp. 113–114.
13. Letter to Sr. Callista Kopf OP dated October 11, 1932, in ESW, VIII, pp. 116–117.
14. Letter to Hedwig Conrad-Martius, in ESW, VIII, p. 142.
15. Letters to Hedwig Conrad-Martius dated December 15, 1934 and May 21, 1935, in *Briefe an Hedwig Conrad-Martius*, pp. 31, 34.
16. Additional sources of information concerning the last days of Stein’s life include Maria Bienias, *Begegnung mit Edith Stein*, pp. 113–115; Waltraud Herbstrith (Teresa a Matre Dei OCD), *Edith Stein*, pp. 49–50; Sr. Maria Baptista a Spiritu Sancto OCD, *Edith Stein*, pp. 121 ff; and Waltraud Herbstrith, *Das wahre Gesicht Edith Steins*, pp. 183–193.
17. *Zum Problem der Einfühlung* (Reprinted, Munich, 1980).
18. *On the Problem of Empathy*, translated by Waltraud Stein (The Hague, 1970). Hereafter cited as *Empathy*.
19. Teresa Renata Posselt, *Edith Stein*, translated by C. Hastings and D. Nicholl (New York, 1952), p. 34. Hereafter cited as Posselt. Stein’s own description of student life and experiences at Göttingen is given in Chapter III.
20. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie I*, edited by W. Biemel (The Hague, 1950). Hereafter cited as *Ideen I*.
21. Cf. the famous war-cry of Husserl’s phenomenology, “Zu den Sachen selbst.”
22. Cf. “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,” in *Logos*, I (1910), p. 341.
23. *Empathy*, pp. v–vi.
24. “Über die philosophischen Forschungen Edith Steins,” *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 29 (1979), p. 472.
25. Quoted in Posselt, p. 54.
26. The word *foreign* is used throughout to translate the German *fremdes*, meaning the *other* as distinguished from the self.
27. *Empathy*, p. 5.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 11–16.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 36–38.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 38–53.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 54–63.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 81–82.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 83–84.
34. Waltraut Stein, in her translation referred to above (note 18) translates *Geist* with the word *mind*.
35. *Empathy*, pp. 89–99.
36. Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1970. First published in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, V (1922), pp. 1–283. Hereafter cited as *Beiträge*.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 2–34.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 34–79.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 79–105.
40. In developing her concept of the soul, she discusses Conrad-Martius' ideas presented in the work, *Discourse on the Soul. Beiträge*, pp. 206–215.
41. *Edith Steins Werke*, II, Louvain, Freiburg (1950).
42. *Ibid.*, p. 336.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–79. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen*, I, no. 2. Also Jean Hering, "Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit, und die Idee," *Husserls Jahrbuch*, IV (1921), pp. 496 ff.
44. Cf. Aquinas' consideration of essence as part and essence as whole: *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 3; *In VII Met.*, 5, 1379; *In I Sent.*, 23,1,1.
45. *EES*, pp. 149–151; 347–349.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 423.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 425–426.
48. *Edith Steins Werke*, VI (1962).
49. *Edith Steins Werke*, V (1959).
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 80–83.
51. *Ibid.*, *passim*.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 116–267.
53. "Eine Untersuchung über den Staat," *Husserls Jahrbuch*, VII (1925), pp. 1–123. Hereafter cited as *Staat*.
54. Jacques Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good*, translated by J. J. Fitzgerald (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966).
55. *Staat*, pp. 87–88.
56. Her conversion to Catholicism occurred in 1922.
57. *Des Hl. Thomas von Aquino Untersuchungen über die Wahrheit*, 2 vol., with a preface by Martin Grabmann and an index translating the principal Latin terms into modern German (Borgmeyer, Breslau, 1931 and 1934). A posthumous edition, edited by Lucy Gelber and Romaeus Leuven, was published as Band III and Band IV of *Edith Steins Werke* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1952 and 1955).
58. *Ibid.*, 1952 edition, p. 6.
59. Collins was the first American philosopher of note to discover and write of Stein's contributions to phenomenology and the original developments of philosophical moment which she gave to it. Cf. James Collins, "Edith Stein and the Advance of Phenomenology," *Thought*, XVII (1942), pp. 685–708. Also: Collins, "Edith Stein as a Phenomenologist," *Three Paths in Philosophy* (Chicago: Regnery, 1962), pp. 85–105.

60. "Husserls Phänomenologie und die Philosophie des hl. Thomas v. Aquino," *Festschrift Edmund Husserl*, Supplementband, *Husserls Jahrbuch* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1929). Hereafter cited as *Festschrift*.
61. "La Phénoménologie," *Journée de la Société Thomiste*, I (Juvisy: Editions du Cerf, 1932). Hereafter cited as *Journée*.
62. *Festschrift*, p. 326.
63. See note 41 above.
64. *EES*, p. 23.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 12–30.
66. *Journée*, p. 36.
67. *EES*, pp. 36–52.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 36–37.
70. *Spirit in the World* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1968), pp. 181 ff.
71. *EES*, pp. 109–110.
72. *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, edited by S. Strasser for the Husserl Archives, *Husserliana* I (Louvain: Nijhoff, 1950), pp. 81 ff.; *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, Sonderdruck aus: *Husserls Jahrbuch*, IX (1928), pp. 436 ff.
73. *EES*, pp. 38–39.
74. *Ibid.*, pp. 37 ff.
75. *Ibid.*, pp. 42 ff.
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 42 ff.
77. *Ibid.*, pp. 54 ff.
78. *Ibid.*, pp. 56–57.
79. *Ibid.*, pp. 52–59, 106, 311.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 311–320.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 319. Cf. Reuben Gilead, *De la Phénoménologie à la Science de la Croix-L'Itinéraire d'Edith Stein* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1974), pp. 242 ff.
82. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 10, 1.
83. *EES*, p. 106.
84. See, for example, *EES*, p. 90.
85. *Ibid.*, c. 3, pp. 60–116; c. 4, pp. 117–256.
86. *Ibid.*, pp. 123–124. See treatment of universal essence and individual essence of human being above.
87. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–79; 128–158.
88. *Ideen*, I, no. 2, pp. 12 ff.
89. "Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit, und die Idee," *Husserls Jahrbuch*, IV (1921), pp. 496–497.
90. *EES*, pp. 61 ff.
91. *Ibid.*, pp. 101, 227–228, 302–303.
92. *Ibid.*, pp. 98, 30–39.

8. Gerda Walther (1897–1977)

LINDA LOPEZ McALISTER

I. BIOGRAPHY¹

Gerda Walther was born at Nordrach Colony, a tuberculosis sanatorium owned and directed by her father Dr. Otto Walther, in the Black Forest near Offenburg. Otto Walther and his first wife, a British physician named Hope Adams, founded the Colony in 1891 after having been forced out of Frankfurt for their illegal Socialist political activities. They were divorced in 1893 and Otto's second wife was Ragnhild Bajer, who had come to the Colony at age nineteen as a patient. She was the daughter of Danish Nobel Prize winner, pacifist, and feminist Fredrik Bajer and his wife and colleague Mathilde Bajer. Gerda Walther was the only child of this marriage and her mother died in 1902 when she was five years old. Her father then married Ragnhild's sister Sigrun.²

Gerda's childhood was spent with her father and stepmother at Nordrach and later on the Starnbarger See outside Munich. Her relationship with her stepmother was difficult and her childhood a somewhat unhappy one, especially the brief period when she was sent away to boarding school. Nonetheless, she met interesting visitors from all over the world, travelled throughout Europe, and visited frequently with her relatives in Denmark. She got her political education in Marxism at the feet of August Bebel, the Kautskys, Gustav Eckstein and other leaders of the Socialist movement, all close family friends.³

At the outbreak of World War I, Gerda was attending *Gymnasium* in Munich and was an active member of the youth group of the Munich Social Democratic Party. In 1916 she enrolled in the University of Munich and was greatly dissatisfied with that "bourgeois university," but was convinced by her advisor and her father that it was beneficial even for someone who wanted to be a Socialist agitator to learn about other peoples' points of view.⁴

In her second semester she was looking for a course that would fit into a free hour in her schedule so she enrolled in "Introduction to Psychology" taught by Alexander Pfänder,⁵ an event which was to change the entire course of her life. As she comments in her autobiography, she probably would have ended up as a minor government functionary in East Germany if it had not been for this "coincidence." The next term she took Pfänder's "Introduction to Philosophy," and attended his lectures on logic which motivated her to read Edmund Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, then his *Ideas*, and finally to want to study with him in person.⁶

She arrived in Freiburg im Breisgau in 1917 to join the circle of young philosophers around Edmund Husserl.⁷ Husserl, it seems, was not altogether overjoyed by the arrival of this spirited young Marxist who announced that her career goal was to become a political agitator. At first he rejected her outright. Then he relented and sent her to see his assistant, Edith Stein, whose opinion he apparently wanted before deciding whether to admit the Socialist Walther. Stein (see Chapter 7) was friendly to Walther and seemed amused by the situation. Walther apparently made quite a favorable impression on her because she was allowed to enroll not only in Stein's "philosophical kindergarten" but in Husserl's courses as well during her first semester. In a letter to a friend about the new group of students Stein singles out Ludwig Clauß and "Frl. Walther" as "very promising people."⁸

Among the other students with Husserl at that time in addition to Clauß were Roman Ingarden, Otto Gründler, and Karl Lowith. Martin Heidegger was already a junior faculty member and most of the students attended his lectures and courses as well, along with those of Jonas Cohn in history of philosophy. Walther studied Aristotle with the Catholic philosopher J. Geyser and, at Husserl's suggestion, she took courses in set theory and analytical geometry, courses in which she found herself the only woman. In Husserl's lectures there were about 30 to 40 students, among whom were several other women including Stein, an economist named Ilse Busse, a Frl. Lande, and another woman remembered only for her habit of smoking cigars.⁹

Walther did not complete her doctoral studies under Husserl but chose instead to return to Munich to write her dissertation under Pfänder. The primary reason for this decision was the manner in which Husserl worked with his graduate students. He was extremely directive in his approach, allowing his students little freedom to develop their own ideas. Walther wanted to write about the essence of social communities and knew that

Husserl had other ideas for her, so she told him she had already discussed her dissertation topic with Pfänder and wanted to return to Munich. It is indicative of Husserl's attitude that when she told him this, Husserl's response was that, "if the assignment has already been given to you, you must of course go back to him." Walther did so and earned her doctorate *summa cum laude* in Munich with a dissertation entitled *Zur Ontologie der Sozialen Gemeinschaften* (*On the Ontology of Social Communities*) which was later published in Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung*.¹⁰

A pivotal event in Gerda Walther's life took place in November, 1918 on a train as she was returning to Freiburg from her parents' home in Baden Baden. She underwent an intense spiritual or religious experience which, as she describes it later, was "a force, an all-consuming light, a sea of warm love and goodness" which surrounded her for most of the trip. Whatever this "something" was, it was absolutely clear to her that it had not come from within herself, but from another world. From that time on she dedicated her life to exploring this spiritual world she had been privileged to discover, and to look for signs of it in others, in order to help them, too, to explore and develop it further. This was certainly a far cry from the atheistic materialism in which she was raised. A significant result of this experience was that Walther gave up much of her political activism and decided to pursue an academic career.¹¹

In 1920 Edith Stein had paved the way for women in academia.¹² Unlike Stein, Walther was able to find an established professor, Karl Jaspers, to sponsor her for habilitation. At that time, however, only those who had an outside source of income could aspire to university teaching because a *Privat Dozent* did not receive a salary from the university, but collected small tuition payments from the students. Despite his Socialistic beliefs, Gerda Walther's father had been a man of considerable means, and when he died in 1919 he left enough money in cash and stocks for Gerda to live comfortably on the income it generated. The well-meaning executor of the estate took it upon himself to sell most of the stock and reinvest the proceeds in "gilt-edged" securities and gold-based bonds. Early in 1923, Gerda moved to Heidelberg and set to work. There she became involved with the circle of people surrounding the poet Stefan George, who came to have a very special meaning in her life.¹³ Within a few months, however, Germany was engulfed in ruinous inflation, and Walther found herself almost destitute. She was forced to go to Copenhagen to live with her relatives, only to encounter enormous anti-German feeling there.¹⁴

In Spring, 1924 she returned to Germany to take the first of a life-long series of part-time and occasional jobs which enabled her to support herself and still have time to pursue her own scholarship and writing. Among other things, Walther worked as a nurse's aide, a ghost writer for a woman politician, a clerk in a bookstore, a translator, and an administrative assistant. Probably the most frustrating experience was her job as a stenographer in the state mental hospital in Emmendingen. While there she became interested in schizophrenia and wrote a paper, "Zur innenpsychischen Struktur der Schizophrenie" which she submitted and was invited to read at a meeting of the Southwest German Psychiatric Association held in 1926. As a result she was fired. Apparently the fragile egos of the medical staff could not endure their colleagues' jokes that at Emmendingen the secretaries write the papers because the doctors are too stupid to do so.¹⁵

One of the participants at that meeting had been Dr. Hans Prinzhorn, who sought out Walther and suggested that she contact him if she ever wanted to leave Emmendingen. Sooner than either had suspected she turned to him for assistance, and she went to work for him four hours a day as a research assistant on his book series *Das Weltbild*. In just a few months, however, Prinzhorn closed his practice and moved to Saxony. Walther was again underemployed, and was reduced to taking in typing for 35 pfennigs a page. Throughout the 1920's Walther had been expanding her knowledge and experience in the spiritual realm, in astrology, mysticism, seances, and all manner of things "occult." So when she was referred by Prof. Hans Driesch to the Munich psychiatrist and parapsychologist Dr. Albert Freiherr von Schrenk-Notzing, who was seeking a secretary/assistant, it was a perfect match. Schrenk-Notzing was a typical 19th century scientist whose research paradigm was that of the scientific experiment which could be endlessly replicated. He sought to apply this model in his parapsychological research with trance mediums in seances. Because of this orientation he had a particular liking for the most concrete kinds of phenomena, and devoted much of his effort to studying "physical" phenomena such as telekinesis and materializations under the most highly controlled conditions possible. He hoped, by this means to render impossible the claims that there was any kind of fakery involved, and he regularly invited well-known scholars and researchers to attend his sessions as witnesses. In addition, detailed protocols were kept of all the proceedings. Walther's duties were to take care of his correspondence, especially that in English, to read articles submitted for publication in the journal he edited, *Zeitschrift für*

Parapsychologie, and to take part in all of the sessions with the mediums. She did not normally take the notes for the protocols during these sessions, but did so on some occasions, using a clock with an illuminated dial to make exact notations of the time each phenomenon occurred. The protocols were typed the next day and copies sent to each participant. In addition, Schrenk wrote an analysis and interpretation of the events of each session. In this position Walther's talents were appreciated and she had the opportunity to learn more about a field that had interested her for nearly ten years, but she had a premonition that it would not last and that the apparently healthy Schrenk would die. Within the year Schrenk was stricken with a burst appendix and died unexpectedly. His widow asked Walther to edit a collection of Schrenk-Notzing's writing under the title *Gesammelten Aufsätze zur Parapsychologie*, reissued in 1962 by Kohlhammer in Stuttgart as *Grundfragen der Parapsychologie*.¹⁶

After Schrenk-Notzing's death Gerda Walther expanded her involvement with those areas of particular interest to her, e.g., mental or spiritual phenomena such as telepathy, clairvoyance, and psychometry, which Schrenk-Notzing had not been interested in. And now began her long years on the lecture circuit which took her all over Northern and Central Europe. She also was asked to take on the editorship of the Dutch periodical *Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie*. She earned her living as a free-lance writer, publishing mostly in *Zeitschrift für Parapsychologie* and *Psychic Research* published by the American Society for Psychic Research, as well as from interest on the little money she had left after the inflation of 1923 had bankrupted her.¹⁷

When the Nazis came to power in 1933 those whose past included Socialist political activity and close personal relations with leaders of the socialist movement in Germany were not exactly in favor. The Third Reich's attitudes toward parapsychology and the occult were ambivalent at best.¹⁸ In the early years of the regime parapsychology was tolerated, however, and Walther was able to travel freely around Europe. In 1938, however, she was ordered to appear before the Nazi authorities because her name appeared on a list of contributors to the Dutch periodical *Mensch in Kosmos* which allegedly was published by a Jew. She was forbidden to write for the journal or even to communicate with them, and dared not do so because her mail was certainly being censored. Luckily a Dutch friend visited her at this time and was able to carry a message back. The article she had already submitted was published in April, 1939, but under the name F. Johansen, Copenhagen.¹⁹

After World War II broke out, the 43 year-old Gerda Walther was pressed into national service and assigned to work in the Foreign Postal Censorship Office, because of her knowledge of English, French, Italian, Dutch, and Danish. Here all mail to and from foreign countries was opened, read and approved or censored. In June, 1941, Walther was arrested by the Gestapo and subjected to hours of interrogation, first about her acquaintance with Kurt Eisner, who had been a leader of the abortive Socialist Revolution in Munich in 1918, and then from a list of prepared questions concerning astrology, parapsychology and the occult. While in custody her apartment was ransacked and many of her books, letters and belongings were confiscated. She remained in prison for a period of several weeks during which she was questioned periodically about her knowledge of such things as Hitler's horoscope and then released. She learned later that this was part of a nation-wide "Aktion Rudolf Hess" directed against everyone known to be involved in astrological, parapsychological or occult activities.²⁰

Ironically enough, less than a year later Walther and many other people who had been arrested in Aktion Rudolf Hess were asked to participate in a project sponsored by the German Navy which had been suffering heavy losses in their submarine fleet at the hands of the British. The Germans were attempting to locate British submarines through "radiesthesia," i.e., the use of "pendulum operators" who would hold a pendulum over a map of the Atlantic, which was supposed to move in a certain way over the spot where a British ship was located. Walther did not believe that this would work, and if it did she had no desire to engage in an activity that would result in the torpedoing of ships, so she declined, informing the Navy that the Gestapo had forbidden her from participating in any such activities. She was allowed to return to her job at the censorship office.²¹

Walther's wartime job gave her the opportunity from time to time to perform humanitarian acts by sending messages back and forth to people whom she had come to know through reading their correspondence. She would pencil in warnings or pass along news of loved ones. She had a typewriter at home and spent evenings making copies of underground documents such as the anti-Nazi sermons of the bishops in Münster. In 1944, the Gestapo took direct control of the Censorship Office and fired Walther when they became aware of her previous arrest. In the same year Walther's spiritual journey from the atheism of her youth led her to convert to Roman Catholicism, almost thirty years after that first religious experience of 1918 which had started her on her path.²²

Walther endured many hardships and was in ill health during the final months of the war. She was bombed out several times, losing all her possessions and finally found refuge with relatives of a close friend outside of the city. The post-war years were equally difficult for her, having lost her health and everything else. When she was strong enough she returned to Munich and resumed her writing and work in parapsychology. In 1955 a second, enlarged edition of *Phänomenologie der Mystik* was published, in 1960 her autobiography *Zum anderen Ufer* appeared and was designated a "Zeitdokument" which means it was placed in school libraries throughout the Federal Republic because of the insight it gives into German life in the 20th Century.²³ In the 1970's Walther was persuaded by friends to take all of her assets and purchase a tiny apartment in a retirement home in Dießen on the Starnbarger See outside of Munich. She spent her last years here, sadly cut off from the city and from friends and colleagues. Her neighbors were "only interested in fashion shows and reminiscing about the Kaiser Wilhelm days."²⁴ But she continued to write and read voluminously. In 1973 when two women philosophers, an American and a German, organized a meeting of German women philosophers, which was the beginning of *Die Assoziation von Philosophinnen in Deutschland*, Gerda Walther was the first person to respond to the announcements. Although she was too poor and too ill to travel to the meeting, her response to the idea was typically enthusiastic.²⁵ She remained mentally alert and actively engaged in correspondence with philosophers interested in preparing both German and English editions of her writings up until a few weeks before her death, three months short of her eightieth birthday.²⁶

II. PHILOSOPHY

1. *Phenomenology*

All too often the study of the history of philosophy ignores the lives of the philosophers it studies, and the cultural, social and economic contexts in which philosophers have functioned. We frequently look at a philosopher's work virtually in a vacuum. Perhaps this is because we want to believe that it is reason alone which determines the philosophical positions a person espouses. Perhaps it is because philosophy has been such an overwhelmingly masculine endeavor and for males the personal and emotional aspects of life are all too often sharply

separated from their work and their supposed ability to function in a rational manner. It is, however, undeniable that a person's life experiences and emotions have a bearing on thought processes, and that in the case of philosophical thinkers, on what their philosophy will be. It would be hard to find a better case in point than Gerda Walther. The main events in Walther's life which have been strong influences on her philosophy were her immersion throughout her childhood and youth in Marxism and socialism, her study with teachers Alexander Pfänder and Edmund Husserl, the intense mystical religious experience she underwent at age 22, her association with the psychiatrist and parapsychologist Albert von Schrenk-Notzing, and the fact that she was ostracized by most of her philosophical colleagues because of her interest and involvement in parapsychology.²⁷

Raised in a left-wing politically active family, Walther's early dogmatic, atheistic, Marxism was tempered considerably by her contact with the philosopher Alexander Pfänder at the University of Munich, especially by his teaching, in *Introduction to Philosophy*, that, "A true philosopher, at least initially, should view it as an open question whether or not there is a God, try to clarify what is meant by 'God' and what people mean when they assert God's existence, and then seek to determine whether the assertion is justified or not." To Gerda it was a revelation to learn that she could, without giving up anything, leave open the possibility that there might be a God after all, a possibility that had never been entertained in the Walther household, and had previously been scorned by her.²⁸ The openmindedness of the Pfänder approach to this question later became a characteristic of Walther's thought processes.

Nevertheless, it is clear that some aspects of Marxist thought strongly influenced Walther's first major work, her 1919 dissertation, *Zur Ontologie der Socialen Gemeinschaften* (*On the Ontology of Social Communities*).²⁹ While the style, language and approach to her subject mark her unmistakably as a phenomenologist, her understanding of the nature of community and what it is for human beings to be and feel part of a community is rooted in the Marxist view that human beings are by their very nature "socialized beings," "political animals," and not, as "bourgeois liberals" believe, essentially isolated individuals who, for more or less practical reasons, make a decision to band together with other equally isolated individuals to form a society or a community. Walther's effort in this work was to get to the essence of what a community is and what constitutes "communion" with others in this sense. The question is one which had intrigued her since her childhood,

and rests on the more basic one of how we can know one another, i.e., have knowledge of other minds (*fremde Seele*). Husserl's and Edith Stein's answer to this question was that we get this knowledge through "empathy." Others express themselves through body language and gestures, through speech, and other various sorts of communications, and, by means of these outward signs, we "empathically" grasp and understand them. So it is an individual body which is "given" first and this body, this material element, gives expression to the mental. Husserl believed that this is the only way it could be. Walther, however, believed that there must be something more, that we must somehow have some sort of more direct knowledge of other minds. Husserl views the nature of communities as a further step, in that after people "empathically" have experience of one another, they band together (either consciously or unconsciously) to form society. Therefore, on the Husserl/Stein account knowledge of the community is also based on material, external evidence. We begin with experience of the spatio-physical world and derive the inner life of others from that, and move on to the formation of society. Walther wanted to explore the possibility that the answer lay in the opposite direction: that the basic point of departure is some direct inner connection between human beings and that everything else is just an external expression of that inner connection.

It was not possible for Walther to pursue such a line of inquiry in Freiburg with Husserl. He expected his students to elaborate his viewpoints rather than develop their own theses, and certainly not theses which were contrary to his. As Karl Löwith, one of Walther's fellow students put it Husserl's way of working with students was like an architect who had not only designed a house but had already built most of the structure himself. All that he allowed the students to do was the finishing work, such as hanging the wallpaper. But even then Husserl had already picked out the pattern.³⁰

Walther, therefore, returned to Munich to complete her dissertation. Her starting point in working out these issues was Pfänder's analysis of the concept of sentiments (*Gesinnungen*) such as love and friendship, and what he refers to as inner union (*innere Einigung*). She also makes use of the work of another of her teachers, the sociologist Max Weber. But for the most part her work was original and broke new ground, delving into areas Pfänder and the others had not touched upon. She works out in careful detail the elements essential to a community. As she enumerates them, firstly there must be people who, in at least

one facet of their lives, are involved in a relationship to the same intentional object, understood in a broad sense. Secondly, they must at least know of each other if they do not actually know one another. As a result of this knowledge there must be some interaction between them, either direct or indirect. This mutual interaction, which is motivated directly or indirectly by the fact that they are both in an intentional relationship with the same object, must bring about some commonality in their lives (possibly, but not necessarily, the producing of something in common). But these conditions are not sufficient because they could all obtain and yet no community exist because of negative attitudes on the part of the people concerned. The necessary additional factor is the presence of a feeling of belonging together, an inner unity. Walther's very detailed analyses of these elements and the issues raised by them is original and creative. Spiegelberg, in *The Phenomenological Movement* calls it "unusually fruitful and suggestive . . . especially by virtue of its careful analysis of the acts of mutual inner union in Pfänder's sense as the essential basis for the feeling of belonging together. . . ." This essay might be of special interest to feminists, for whom the concept of community is an especially pertinent one and because Walther herself was a committed feminist. At the end of this long essay Walther appends a short treatment of the phenomenology, as opposed to the ontology, of communities, dealing with the experiences of pure consciousness through phenomenological reduction. Much to Walther's surprise, this work was published in Husserl's *Jahrbuch* in 1922, at a time, however, when that journal was being edited not by Husserl himself, but by Pfänder.

2. *Mysticism*

The single most significant event in Gerda Walther's life, which brought about a major redirection of her philosophical thinking was the religious conversion experience she went through in November, 1918.³¹ Her intense interest in mysticism and her best known philosophical work, *Die Phänomenologie der Mystik* (*The Phenomenology of Mysticism*), can be traced directly to this occurrence. The following year, when a friend of hers in Freiburg was in a state of despair over his inability to believe in God, she got the idea of describing in writing her own religious experience in completely objective, dry, scientific terms, without letting on that this was something she had personally experienced. The title of this early version of the manuscript was "Beitrag zur inneren bewußtseins-mäßigen Konstitution des eigenen Grundwesens als Kern

der Persönlichkeit und Gottes" (Essay on the Constitution, Through Inner Consciousness, of One's Own Basic Essence as the Core of the Personality and of God). Over the next few years she researched the experiences of a number of mystics from a variety of cultures and centuries, who had had similar experiences, expanded the text, and renamed it *Phenomenology of Mysticism*. Walther's project here was to give a phenomenological description of mystical experience and other experiences of a similar nature. The book was first published in 1923, and was reissued in a second edition after World War II. When this edition came out, people remarked to Walther that it seemed as though she were speaking from personal experience and she admitted this to be true. She was then persuaded that she should prepare a revised and expanded version of the work in which she included some of her personal spiritual experiences, both of a religious and an occult nature. This third edition was published in 1976.³²

One might wonder how it is possible, even assuming the author has herself experienced something which might be called a mystical experience, that she could write about it. After all, isn't a mystical experience one that is obscure, irrational, or in some views simply unknowable and inexpressible? Aware that this is the first reaction many will have to her project, she takes some pains to delineate what a phenomenological study of mysticism can and cannot accomplish. First of all, it cannot nor does it try to give a causal explanation of mystical events, or to reduce them to something which can be explained in accordance with the principles of natural science. Nor is its purpose to prove or disprove various opinions in mysticism by means of logical argumentation, for, according to Walther, a mystical experience is an irreducible phenomenon, a basic, ultimate fact which can no more be reduced to something else than can basic sensory phenomena such as colors, sounds, etc. The purpose of her study, then, is to examine these basic phenomena in an openminded and unprejudiced manner, as they occur in the experience of the mystics. Before doing that, however, it is necessary to identify what the essential features of these experiences are, i.e., to undertake an "ontology" of mystical and spiritual phenomena. Equally important is the question of whether mystical experiences really are what they pretend to be, i.e., real, original experiences of the Divine. Walther believes that an ontology of these phenomena can make at least some contribution to the answer to this question. For if there is an experience of God at all, if our conceptions of God, our relations to Him do not rest merely upon fantasy or a blind belief in traditional dogma (which would also be based on

fantasy if there were no original experience of God), then surely, somewhere, there must be a real experience of God, even if it is an imperfect one. If one says that we have to believe on the basis of revelation rather than on immediate experience of the Divine, it simply means that we may not experience the Divine directly but must assume that others, those who transmitted these revelations, have had such experience. So there must have been immediate, original experience of God and at least every religious prophet must have had one. Thus, we cannot avoid the immediate experience of the Divine, and, according to all mystics, we find it in its most perfect and certain form in the mystical experience.

What Walther wants to do is to examine those experiences that, according to their own inner sense, presume to be of God, or in whom, a direct expression, revelation, or appearance of God presents itself. Every experience in which this occurs is considered a mystical experience, not just "mystical ecstasy," i.e., a complete immersion and submersion of a person into the Divine Being, although such experiences come closest to the meaning and purpose of mystical experience.

Walther argues that there are several common prejudices which keep us from being able to study mystical experience with the open mind with which the philosopher should approach any subject. One is the assumption that it is impossible for the human mind to experience God directly – that the object of mystical experience is merely the deepest and innermost essence of the human soul. It is said that this innermost essence generally lies hidden in the depth of a person's being as one goes about one's daily, superficial life, and is then falsely thought to be a revelation of God when we suddenly become aware of it. Walther argues that this is nothing but psychologism, a form of thinking which has died out in other areas such as mathematics or logic, but still holds sway here. It is a position which cannot simply be assumed to be true without further investigation and thus should not be allowed to obstruct the study of mystical experience.

The second prejudice that must be overcome is the notion, stemming from the empiricist tradition, that every real thing which can be an object of our consciousness must be presented to it, directly or indirectly, by means of the five senses, i.e., that it is impossible for anything to be experienced which is not in some way or other based upon sensory data. Walther notes that some may think that the reports of the mystics confirm this, in that they frequently use such terminology as "fragrances," "perfumes," "sweet feelings," "light," "warmth," and so on. But she argues that this is the only way they can even approximately describe

that which is “essentially different” from everything else to those who have not experienced it. Again and again the mystics also insist that their use of such language is nothing more than an imperfect metaphor and that only the person who knows these things from experience could entirely understand what they are trying to signify with these terms, but a person who had had that experience would no longer need the metaphors.

To deny the existence of such experiences because we ourselves have not experienced them is unfounded. Walther points out that innumerable people have reported such experiences, and the fact that they are still a small minority of the people in the world is not adequate grounds for distrusting their claims. She draws an analogy with mathematics, pointing out that only a small portion of the human race is capable of understanding and experiencing the highest regions of mathematics, yet we do not assume that those who report such experiences are fantasizing or deluding themselves. On the contrary, it would be a sign of ignorance and prejudice if someone who could not understand mathematics were to distrust the assertions of the mathematicians just because he himself had no experience of them. Why shouldn't have the same attitude toward mystical experience?

Walther draws an important distinction between “spiritual” and “intellectual,” arguing that intellectual activity, including the whole domain of analyzing, comparing, associating, distinguishing, etc., is dependent on other sorts of experiences which give it concrete material on which to work, and without which it could not function. These experiences upon which intellect depends can be of an external, sensory nature, i.e., the perception of colors, sounds, smells, etc., and the experience of bodily objects such as people, animals, plants, stones, which is based on them. But they can also be of a spiritual nature. She maintains that these spiritual data and the experiences founded upon them are of the same fundamental importance for the intellect, and are just as different from it, as are sensory data. But for some reason people generally choose to overlook, to ignore these or to confound them with other things. Just as the intellect cannot examine the external world of nature without sense perception, it cannot examine the spiritual domain without using spiritual data and the experiences based upon them.

Skeptics might argue that mystics may simply be mistaken, and that what they take to be mystical experience is really just some other kind of experience. In response, Walther points out that all mystics seem to be agreed on one point, that when you have a mystical experience there

is no possibility of its being confused with any other kind of experience. Only those who have never had such genuine, mystical experiences could think that the entirely unique character of such experiences could be confused with anything else.

3. *Parapsychology, Mysticism and Phenomenology*

Walther, in the later editions of her book, also raises the question of the relationship between things such as extrasensory perception and other parapsychological phenomena to mystical experience. She maintains that if such phenomena are genuine and not merely expressions of the subconscious, then they, too, must come under the heading of "spiritual phenomena." It is important to realize that there are many different varieties of spiritual experience, and spiritual data are as different and varied as are the data of sensory perception. Walther uses an example to explain the relationship between mystical experience and parapsychological experience. She says it is like the case of a person who has spent his entire life in an underground mine illuminated only by dim, artificial light. Such a person would understand what light is and what colors are. Then, for the first time, he comes out into the bright sunlight and he thinks that only then is he really learning what it is to see, because the experience is so much more vivid than anything he had ever experienced before. This, Walther says, is how occult experiences are relative to mystical experiences. Yet occult experiences, insofar as they really are spiritual perceptions, are more closely related to mystical experiences than they are to external perception. Nonetheless, they may not have anything at all to do with religious experience. Someone may have had a great many occult experiences and yet not have the slightest idea what mystical experiences of the sort Walther is investigating, i.e., religious experiences are like. In spite of all the essential differences between them, however, the experience of the Divine does bear a certain likeness to "paraphysical" experience and experience of one's own innermost being, not only with respect to the inner quality of the experience, but also with respect to the way mystics generally attain these experiences. Therefore, the examination of mystical experience is prefaced by an examination of occult experience, in order better to understand the nature of the genuinely religious experience of mysticism, and to be able to distinguish between the two sorts of experience.

It is clear, then that even in Walther's early work she was moving in the direction of parapsychology. The inner connection which she posits

as operating between people in her study of community is not empathy, but a form of telepathy, as she further developed this line of investigation. But Walther's life situation determined to a large extent the course of her investigations. Unable to get work in philosophy because of the economic situation, she worked for a time in a mental hospital, in close contact with schizophrenics. She used this as an opportunity to study and compare the phenomena of mental illness with those of mysticism, and she argues that they are utterly different in kind, although people frequently claim that mystical experience is some form of psychopathology.³³ Landing a part-time job as a research assistant to the Munich psychiatrist Albert Freiherr v. Schrenk-Notzing, who was immersed in research with trance mediums and seances, led her to get involved in parapsychological research in earnest. Since mysticism and discussion of mystical experience has long had a place in the history of philosophy, a phenomenology of mysticism could be seen as a legitimate and interesting philosophical undertaking, but a serious involvement with parapsychology met with quite a different reaction from her former colleagues in philosophy. In 1933, her contribution to the *Festschrift* in honor of Alexander Pfänder's 60th birthday was rejected, almost certainly on the basis of its subject matter, "The Phenomenology of Telepathy." Although in England many respected philosophers and psychologists were interested in parapsychology and participated in the Society for Psychical Research, attitudes in Germany were much less tolerant. Walther was, in effect, drummed out of the philosophical corps for becoming interested in the phenomena of telepathy, clairvoyance and ESP, phenomena which did not fit into the limits of what were considered legitimate areas for philosophical investigation.

Walther was forced to turn more and more to writing for the popular press and other non-scholarly publications simply to earn a living, and this increased the distance between her and the philosophical establishment, although she remained on friendly personal terms with many of her philosophical contemporaries, and she never ceased to consider herself a phenomenologist. She argued in several essays for the employment of phenomenological method in parapsychological research, as well as arguing that true phenomenologists would approach the phenomena of parapsychology without prejudice and predetermined ideas. If they did they would see that parapsychological experiences are as legitimate an area of study as any others.³⁴ This question of the legitimacy of parapsychology as a possible realm of phenomenological investigation is discussed in an exchange of correspondence with Herbert Spiegelberg

in the 1950's.³⁵ Spiegelberg raises objections to Walther's suggestion that parapsychology might be an area for phenomenological investigation, i.e., a "regional ontology" like many others. He says, first of all that in order to do such research, "One would have to have not only a thorough grounding in natural science but be a Houdini as well, in order to be able to sort out the wheat from the chaff. . . ." Besides, there are so many fundamental areas of phenomenology still in need of clarification without turning ones attention to "dark" or "gray" areas such as parapsychology. Further, phenomenology is in a precarious state, and it is better, as long as there is enough work to do on established areas, not to venture into dangerous areas such as this. Finally, he has the impression that even the solid researchers in the area, such as Rhine,³⁶ have a tendency to draw unwarranted conclusions from their data.

Walther replies, firstly, that her work is based on her own personal experiences. However, she argues that this is not necessary. There are enough published descriptions of such experiences to enable other phenomenologists to compare them and to identify their essential characteristics without having had direct personal experience. In fact, however, at least one parapsychological phenomenon, telepathy, occurs much more frequently than people realize; they just do not pay attention to it and fail to identify it when it occurs. It plays a role in the way children acquire language, for example. So it is not the case that we are dealing here with such arcane phenomena. As for the matter of sticking to certain traditional areas of investigation, Walther argues that as a phenomenologist she should try to achieve clarity about whatever phenomena she encounters, not just certain predetermined ones. In fact the parapsychological experiences she has had have all been purely spontaneous in nature, nothing she has taken pains to arrange. It is merely prejudice to declare in advance which phenomena are appropriate for phenomenological investigation. As for Rhine's conclusions, Walther agrees that his methods are unable to prove such things as life after death, etc., but then she does not think that Rhine's methods are the appropriate ones for the fruitful investigation of these phenomena anyway, despite the fact that their statistical/scientific methodology impresses some people because it is thought to be scientific. While it is clear that Walther does not succeed in getting Spiegelberg interested in the phenomenology of parapsychology, she does get him to concede that phenomenological methods are as appropriate in the study of parapsychological data as they are in an area such as phenomenological psychopathology, which is an area Spiegelberg himself writes on later.³⁷

III. CONCLUSIONS

The necessity of earning a living through free-lance writing and lecturing, the hardships of World War II and its aftermath, and the disapprobation of her peers kept Walther from doing very much philosophical writing after the early 1930's. The quality of the work she did produce is such that it is clear that the field of philosophy is impoverished as a result of her absence from it. It may be, however, that history will show that the work she did do in the philosophy of parapsychology was original and important, and that she was simply ahead of her time.

NOTES

1. All information in this biographical sketch comes from Gerda Walther's autobiography, *Zum Anderen Ufer: Vom Marxismus und Atheismus zum Christiantum* (hereafter ZAU), unless otherwise indicated in the notes. Specific chapter reference are included below.
2. See ZAU, chapters entitled, "Mein Vater," "Meine Mutter" and "Die Stiefmutter."
3. ZAU, "Erinnerungen an Patienten," "Am Starnbarger See," "Ein Fremdkörper im Mädchenpensionat," "Mit dem Großvater unterwegs," "In Kopenhagen," "Die Jungsozialistin," and "In der Hochburg des Marxismus."
4. ZAU, "Ausbruch des ersten Weltkriegs," "Die Gymnasiastin," "Bei den österreichischen Genossen," "Die 'Sektion der 18-jährigen' der Münchner SDP," "Endlich auf der Universität!."
5. Alexander Pfänder (1870–1941), was one of the early phenomenologists and the leader of the Munich branch of the movement. He was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Munich. From 1904 until the mid-1920's Pfänder and Edmund Husserl were close colleagues, but when Pfänder did not follow Husserl in the later developments of his philosophy, i.e., the phenomenological reduction, they drifted apart. Another of Pfänder's students, Herbert Spiegelberg, provides a brief treatment of his philosophy in *The Phenomenological Movement*, I, 173–192.
6. ZAU, pp. 194–195.
7. ZAU, "Bei Edmund Husserl in Freiburg i. Br."
8. Edith Stein, Letter to Roman Ingarden of August 20, 1917, in *Edith Steins Werke*, VIII, p. 29.
9. ZAU, p. 209.
10. ZAU, "Promotion."
11. ZAU, "Sturz in eine andere Welt."
12. See biographical sketch of Edith Stein, pp. 157–162 of this volume.
13. ZAU, "Die Junger und sein Meister," and "Studium in Heidelberg."
14. ZAU, "Verarmt und verzweifelt – wieder in Skandinavien."

15. ZAU, "Die ersten Stellungen," "Gelegenheitsarbeiten," and "Sekretärin in der badischen Heil- und Pflegeanstalt Emmendingen."
16. ZAU, "Bei dem Münchner Parapsychologen Dr. med. A. Frhr. v. Schrenk-Notzing," "Freunde und Mitarbeiter Dr. v. Schrenk-Notzings," and "Im Braunauer Zirkel nach Dr. v Schrenk-Notzings Tod."
17. ZAU, "Vorträge."
18. For a detailed treatment of the Nazi's attitudes toward things "occult" see Ellic Howe, *Astrology and the Third Reich*, Wellingborough: The Aquarian Press, 1984.
19. ZAU, "Wetterleuchten."
20. ZAU, "In der 'Auslandsbriefprüfstelle,'" and "Hinter Schloß und Riegel."
21. ZAU, "Die Geheimnisvolle 'Gruppe SP' im OKM."
22. ZAU, "Verschlungene Fäden," "'Meine' holländischen Patres," "Die Taufe."
23. Conversation with Gerda Walther, August 15, 1976.
24. Conversation with Gerda Walther, August 15, 1976.
25. Letter from Gerda Walther to Linda L. McAlister, of December 14, 1973, in response to an invitation from Dr. Linda L. McAlister and Dr. Wiebke Schrader of the University of Würzburg to a meeting of women philosophers.
26. The last letter from Gerda Walther to Linda L. McAlister, was written December 12, 1976. It was labored but cogent; in it she remarked, "Bad stars until January." She died on January 7, 1977.
27. See biographical sketch above and Gerda Walther's ZAU.
28. ZAU, p. 190.
29. In *Jahrbuch der Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung* VI (1922), 1–158.
30. ZAU, p. 244.
31. ZAU, pp. 221–228.
32. Third edition, Walter Verlag, Olten and Freiburg im Breisgau.
33. "Zur innenspsychischen Struktur der Schizophrenie," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, CVIII, 1/3 (1927), 56–85.
34. See, e.g., "Die Bedeutung der phänomenologischen Methode Edmund Husserl's für die Parapsychologie," in *Parapsychologie*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1966, pp. 683–697.
35. The correspondence includes the following letters: Herbert Spiegelberg to Gerda Walther, February 8, 1954; Gerda Walther to Herbert Spiegelberg, February 14, 1954; Herbert Spiegelberg to Gerda Walther, August 20, 1954; and Gerda Walther to Herbert Spiegelberg, September 15, 1954. The originals are in the Walther *Nachlass* in the Bavarian State Library in Munich.
36. Dr. J. B. Rhine, well-known American researcher who worked at the Parapsychology Laboratory at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina until his retirement in 1965.
37. Herbert Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction*, 1972.

9. Ayn Rand (1905–1982)

JENNY A. HEYL

Few, if any, women philosophers have garnered both the adulation and scorn that Ayn Rand received during her lifetime and even since her death. This, perhaps, is how she would have chosen it as she intended to be a revolutionary and to create a system that would allow man to rescue himself from moral bankruptcy.¹ Her intention at the age of nine was to become a writer. She would write four novels, two of which, *The Fountainhead* and *Atlas Shrugged* have become classics. Her philosophic movement, Objectivism, was often to be called a cult, she abhorred this term because it implied a religious connotation and Rand was staunchly atheistic. Rand also eschewed academic philosophy, believing that the true test of the value in philosophy is its ability to affect the lives of the common man. In her view, "If all philosophers were required to present their ideas in novels, to dramatize the exact meaning and consequences of their philosophies in human life, there would be far fewer philosophers – and far better ones."²

It was not until the completion in 1957 of her novel *Atlas Shrugged*, which she felt best exemplified Objectivist philosophy written for non-academicians, that she was encouraged to systematize her philosophy. During that same period, Objectivism was being studied at the Nathaniel Branden Institute (NBI) in New York and popularized through audio tapes of the lectures given at NBI and broadcast around the world. By the mid 1960's the Objectivist movement was in full swing and was to have far-reaching effects. The two strongest drives in Rand's early life were her desire to write novels and her desire to escape communist Russia and show the world its evils. She was able to accomplish both of these with her fiction. Later, with the encouragement and synergistic effect of her relationship with Nathaniel Branden she was able to systematize the philosophy inherent in her fiction.

As the characters and plots in her novels were both praised and

criticized for their idiosyncratic natures, by all accounts it appears that for Ayn Rand her art imitated her life and her life imitated her art. Very few who met Ayn Rand or who have read her works remain ambivalent; neither did Rand remain ambivalent on any topic or person.

I. BIOGRAPHY

Ayn Rand was born Alice Rosenbaum on February 2, 1905 in St. Petersburg, Russia.³ By her first birthday the revolution had been suppressed with Czar Nicholas selling four million acres of land to the peasants. Alice's father was a chemist who owned his own shop. There were few openings for Jews in the University so when a position for a Jew opened in the chemistry department Rand's father took it. The family lived in a comfortable apartment with her mother spending a good deal of her time organizing formal banquets. The family was privileged enough to spend summer holidays in the Crimea. The Rosenbaums were Jewish by birth but religion had little meaning or place in their family. With a domineering mother and a soft-spoken father, Alice remembered that love and admiration were purchased by the exhibited qualities of her mind. Alice learned to read before attending school and soon became a voracious reader. While vacationing in London in 1914 at the age of nine, Alice decided that she would become a writer, an ambition from which she never wavered. At a young age she saw problems with Communism, she saw living for the state as wrong. She would be dramatically affected at seeing her father's chemist shop become nationalized.

Alice remembered a change in the method of her thinking at the age of twelve – she began “thinking in principles.” At this time she discovered the works of Victor Hugo and became fascinated with his sense of life. It was also noted that she was able to break down complex ideas into easily graspable parts. The family had moved to the Crimea to seek safe haven in 1918 and in her last two years of high school there, Alice took classes in American history learning about the Declaration of Independence and the American form of government. Now she realized that the stories she had planned to write in Russian would have to be written in English; America would become her adopted country.

In 1921 Alice entered the University of Petrograd to obtain a degree in history. She did not choose literature because she did not want to read writers who bored her and whom she despised; neither did she

choose philosophy because she was convinced that it would be “mystical chaos.”⁴ At the university she was introduced to the philosophy of Nietzsche whom she admired for his reverence of the heroic man, individualism and his contempt of altruism. However, she was bothered by his defense of psychological determinism, his equivocal use of the issue of power, and especially his stated position of anti-reason. Her studies were threatened by a “purge” of the university of any undesirables to the Communist Party, but a visit by British team of scientists protested and her studies were saved. This scenario would later be played out in her novel *We the Living*.

In 1925 the Rosenbaum family received correspondence from relatives in Chicago. Alice knew that this was her chance to get to America. Shortly before this she had enrolled in a school in Petrograd to study for a career in Russian movies; she also found a teacher of English. In January, 1926 before she embarked for America a family friend whispered to her, “tell them that Russia is a huge cemetery and that we are all dying slowly.”⁵ Alice wanted a new name as she entered America: disembarking from the ship she chose Ayn (rhymes with “mine”), the name of a Finnish writer whose work she had not read but whose name she liked.⁶ Later in Chicago she would change her last name to Rand, after the Remington-Rand typewriter she carried with her from Russia.

Ayn Rand’s relatives in Chicago described her as thoughtless, from choosing the movies they would all see to typing all night to running the water endlessly in the bath (a strange habit carried over from Russia, hoping to rid the water of germs she would keep it running. She was also known to use scalding water to wash her dishes later).⁷ Later in life Rand was always appreciative of what her relatives had done for her, but she found that she had very little in common with them. They were interested in their Judaism and held values that Rand found to be anti-intellectual; she also could not appreciate their sense of “family” because it was a condition in life not chosen by the individual.

In mid 1926, with a letter from her aunt who worked for a Chicago movie director, Rand set off for Hollywood to become a screenwriter. Coincidence placed her on a street corner where she saw Cecile B. DeMille who noticed her intense stare and invited her to view some shootings. He would later offer her a job as an extra.

On the set of “The King of Kings” Rand tripped Frank O’Connor whom she had spotted on a bus and to whom she was attracted because of his face. During their courtship Rand was impressed at this strong silent man who shared her values. When the DeMille Studios closed,

she was forced to work as a waitress, which she did outside Los Angeles so that O'Connor would not see her.

In 1929, Ayn Rand married Frank O'Connor. Several friends remarked that the marriage was prompted by her expiring visa. O'Connor continued to dabble with acting jobs while Rand got a job working in the wardrobe department at RKO movie studios. While she loathed the work, the money was a godsend. During this time Rand continued work on her writing.

In 1935 Rand went to New York with O'Connor to produce her play *Night of January 16th*. In 1940, with \$700 left to their names she went to work on Wendell Wilkie's presidential campaign. Rand saw Wilkie as the candidate who embraced her philosophy but she was soon to be disappointed by his political compromises. Although she never enjoyed public speaking, she took the stage at the Gloria Swanson Theatre on 14th Street to answer questions about Wendell Wilkie. Through these political activities she met many prominent conservatives. Isabel "Pat" Paterson, at the time a columnist for the New York Herald Tribune and later the author of *The God of the Machine*, was to be Rand's first and last important friendship with a contemporary. In a strange twist it was Paterson the guru and Rand the willing student. Rand did have serious differences with Paterson, who always maintained an element of religion in her writing, to which Rand responded that religion is the first enemy of the ability to think. Several of Rand's difficult personality traits were becoming quite apparent by this time. Her inflated sense of self-responsibility left her astonished at friends' offers to help. Friends were afraid that help would be viewed by Rand as a pitying insult to her independent spirit. Later, Rand would claim that she achieved all her successes on her own, obviously forgetting the generosity and breaks extended to her. She also became suspicious of humor and voiced contempt at the suggestion that one should be able to laugh at oneself.⁸

The Fountainhead was published in 1943. Warner Bros. soon offered an unheard of amount of \$50,00 for the movie rights. Rand was also called on to write the screenplay for the adaptation. By December 1943 Rand and O'Connor were on their way back to Hollywood. With part of the proceeds from *The Fountainhead* they invested in a ranch in the San Fernando Valley with a house of steel and glass, fitting for the author of *The Fountainhead*. It was at the ranch that O'Connor began raising peacocks and growing acres of citrus and flowers for commercial sale. While completing the script for *The Fountainhead*, Rand was hired by Hal Wallis to write screenplays.

In 1946 Rand wrote "Screen Guide for America" for the Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American Ideals, an anti-communist organization.⁹ A friend, Isabel Paterson told Rand that she had a duty to write more fiction. Rand replied, "What if I went on strike?" O'Connor suggested that the theme of all the world's great thinkers going on strike would make a great novel. Thus was the conception of *Atlas Shrugged*.

In 1950 Rand received a letter from a young man who would greatly influence her writing as well as the dissemination of her philosophy. Nathan Blumenthal wrote his favorite author with questions concerning *The Fountainhead*. Rand was so impressed with the insight of his questions that she invited the young man to her home. This meeting was to be the first of many evenings of intellectual discourse. At their next meeting, Nathan asked to bring a friend, a woman whom he would later marry and who would become one of Rand's closest associates for the next eighteen years, Barbara Weidman. Many young intellectual admirers were soon to follow. Among the group known as "The Collective," a name facetiously chosen because of its obvious antithetical nature to Rand's philosophy, were Leonard Peikoff, Joan Mitchell, Alan Greenspan and other friends and family. Rand affectionately called them "the children" or "the class of '43" (the year *The Fountainhead* was published). These disciples would popularize Rand's Objectivist philosophy. When questioned by one of her young followers why she would give so much of her time to them she replied, "The pleasure of dealing with active minds outweighs any differences in our age or knowledge."¹⁰ One of the privileges "The Collective" enjoyed was reading chapters of *Atlas Shrugged* as they were written.

Nathaniel Branden (as Blumenthal was now known) studied psychology at New York University and brought its influence to Rand's writing. By 1955 the relationship between Rand and Branden had developed into more than a friendship. Both Nathaniel Branden in his memoirs, *Judgment Day* and Barbara Branden in her biography of Rand, *The Passion of Ayn Rand* tell of the passionate and loving relationship that developed between Rand and Branden. This relationship was first realized through a platonic and highly intellectual phase, but soon was consummated sexually. To Rand, Branden was the epitome of her heroic characters in looks, epistemology and ethics. At this time both Nathaniel and Barbara Branden had admitted that their marriage was less than ideal. When Rand and Branden confronted their respective spouses for their consent to the affair, according to Barbara Branden, Rand said,

You know what *I* am, you know what Nathan is . . . By the total logic of who we are – by the total logic of what love and sex mean – we *had* to love each other . . . It's not a threat to you, Frank, or to you, Barbara . . . It's something separate, apart from both you and from our normal lives . . . Nathan has always represented the future to me – but now it's a future that exists in the present . . . Whatever the two of you may be feeling, I know your intelligence, I know you recognize the rationality of what we feel for each other, and that you hold no value higher than reason . . . There's nothing in our feeling that can hurt or threaten either of you . . . there's nothing that alters my love for my husband, or Nathan's love for his wife. . . .¹¹

The affair began during one of the most crucial periods of the writing of *Atlas Shrugged*, John Galt's speech, in which Rand explicates the tenets of her philosophy. Branden assisted her in fleshing out the psychological aspects. It was during this time that Rand and Branden would apply the term "social metaphysician" to those who had abandoned the universe of reason and facts and lived in the universe of people. This was the psychological interpretation of the second-handers, such as Peter Keating in *The Fountainhead*. This verdict was meted out occasionally to members of "The Collective" and frequently to outsiders as if it were the diagnosis of cancer. It was reported that Rand and Branden were most vicious in their condemnations and that these purges were often conducted as a trial with Branden the prosecutor.¹²

By March 1957 *Atlas Shrugged* was completed and Rand would dedicate it to Frank O'Connor and Nathaniel Branden. It was after the well-expected savage reviews that Rand slipped into a deep depression. It was not that the reviews affected her so, but moreover that there was no one with a public voice that would repudiate these attacks. It was then she must have felt that her association with young intellectuals did not serve her well.

Rand said several times publicly that Nathaniel Branden was qualified to speak for her at any time, he was uniquely qualified to be her intellectual heir.¹³ For the young man who idolized the mind of Rand, this was the ultimate compliment, but would also become the ultimate and most repressive responsibility. He now had to see Rand through her depression while furthering the cause of Objectivism. He reports that their sexual relationship was suspended by Rand's choice during this period of depression. Branden suggested the idea of developing a series of lectures that would explain Objectivism and answer the questions of

the ever-growing number of Rand's admirers. Rand endorsed this venture hesitantly, not foreseeing commercial success in disseminating such radical ideas. Within two years this idea, beginning under the guise "Nathaniel Branden Lectures," would be incorporated into the Nathaniel Branden Institute with audio cassettes of these lectures distributed throughout the world. Ayn Rand organizations began springing up on campuses around the country and Leonard Peikoff would give a course on "Objectivism's theory of Knowledge" in the graduate college of the University of Denver.

When Branden later refused Rand's request to resume their sexual relationship, she retaliated. Rand publicly repudiated both Nathaniel and Barbara Branden in the May 1968 issue of *The Objectivist*. She also removed Branden's name from the dedication page of all future printings of *Atlas Shrugged*. The schism pitted friend against friend and divided families. Those who took Rand's side were made to swear their continued loyalty.¹⁴ Leonard Peikoff was named Rand's intellectual heir and would be the executor of her estate after her death. The Nathaniel Branden Institute was closed shortly after the rift.

In 1981, Rand gave her final public talk at the convention of the National Committee for Monetary Reform in New Orleans. Her topic was, "The Sanction of the Victim." In March of 1982, she died in New York, never recovering from a respiratory illness contracted on her trip to New Orleans.¹⁵ Rand's wake was open to the public. There was a six-foot high floral arrangement in the symbol of the dollar sign, a gold brooch in the shape of a dollar sign was worn at Rand's neck, and the "tiddlywink" music that she loved so much was playing on the phonograph.¹⁶

II. LITERARY WORKS

1. *The Early Ayn Rand (1984)*

Rand's earlier works were published posthumously by her "intellectual heir," Leonard Peikoff. Her short stories, "The Husband I Bought," "Good Copy" and "Her Second Career" show her quick mastery of the English language. Some literary themes that foreshadow her later philosophical themes include the intelligent woman worshipping the man who brings out the best in her, the individual who does not look back, the often unrealistic happy endings with the hints of Russian pessimism. Rand's

characters would often be described as Rand “in a good mood” or Rand “in a bad mood.” “Red Pawn,” a screenplay, was purchased by Universal Studios. It showed her strong flair for the dramatic and her antisocialist bias which she believed hampered the later success of *We the Living*.

2. *Night of January 16th* (originally titled *Penthouse Legend*) (1936)

In 1935 Rand was offered a contract to produce her play *Penthouse Legend* on Broadway. The work had been renamed *Woman on Trial* when it was performed. *Night of January 16th* is the story of a woman on trial for pushing her wealthy boss-lover from a Manhattan penthouse. The play employed the novel convention of selecting the jury from the audience with two different endings written pending the decision of the jury. This early work pits passionate self-assertiveness, self-confidence, audacity and independence from social norms against conventionality, servility, envy, hatred and lust for power over people.¹⁷

III. OBJECTIVIST PHILOSOPHY

Rand is reported as saying that she held the same philosophy for as long as she remembered. It could be summarized, “Man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute.”¹⁸ Once when asked by a group of Random House salesmen to give the essence of her philosophy while standing on one foot, she complied and said, “Metaphysics – objective reality; Epistemology – reason; Ethics – self-interest; Politics – capitalism.”¹⁹

Rand would credit Aristotle for his formulation of the laws of logic and his development of a metaphysics of objective reality. She acknowledged Thomas Aquinas for a return to Aristotelian ethics during the renaissance and would condemn Immanuel Kant for the return of the Witch Doctor (mysticism) and Attila (physical force). There are strong influences of Nietzsche apparent in her philosophy although she disavowed an uncertainty in reason and use of physical force. In a later edition of *We The Living*, with what Rand described as “merely editorial line-changes”²⁰ she changes the tone of a paragraph to reflect her belief regarding the use of physical force; the original clearly showed the influence of Nietzsche.

There are many points of Rand's philosophy which her detractors expound on. Many see contradictions within her system and find her characters unbelievable and hence, her philosophy implausible. It is often charged that her philosophy encourages followers to repress their emotional side. Rand publicly said that she didn't have an emotion that could not be accounted for rationally. This was to have deleterious effects on many in "The Collective," Nathaniel Branden the most noteworthy. Her view of women was often questioned. In the world proclaiming rational self-interest as a moral code and denouncing self-sacrifice, Rand claims that the ideal love is that of a woman surrendering to the man whom she worships. Her ideal woman finds pleasure in this surrender.

1. *For The New Intellectual: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (1961)*

After suffering from depression in the years following the publication of *Atlas Shrugged* and following numerous requests from disciples, Rand proceeded to lay out her philosophy in nonfiction form. In 1961, Random House published *For The New Intellectual: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand*. A sixty-five page original essay introduced the philosophy of Objectivism. Key excerpts from *We the Living*, *Anthem*, *The Fountainhead*, and *Atlas Shrugged* were selected to illustrate the points in the original essay. (See discussion of each of these works below.)

Rand states in the preface that this book is for "those who wish to assume the responsibility of becoming the new intellectuals."²¹ She outlines her philosophical system by introducing the archetypal figures of the Witch Doctor and Attila who have reigned throughout history and whose reign led to what she sees as the moral bankruptcy of culture. The Witch Doctor, by relying on faith, and Attila, by relying on force, have oppressed people's ability to reason. Two events that saved man temporarily from the Witch Doctor and Attila were the reintroduction of Aristotelian ethics and the industrial revolution. Thomas Aquinas was credited with ending the rule of the Witch Doctor by reintroducing Aristotle and freeing man from the bondage of faith. The industrial revolution which was produced by the freeing of man's mind ended the rule of Attila. This golden age ended too soon, as Rand sees it, due to the decline of the intellectual. She indicts Descartes for reintroducing the Witch Doctor by denying the existence of an objective reality, a mainstay of Rand's philosophical system. Hume continues this slide from reason by describing human consciousness as that of an animal, denying

to humans the ability to draw conclusions from the object of causation. However, it is Immanuel Kant for whom Rand saves the bulk of her venom. It is Kant who gave power to both the Witch Doctor and Attila. The “noumenal” world or higher reality is given to the Witch Doctor whereby the rules of morality are made known by a *feeling*; the “phenomenal” world is a distortion perceived by the mind; it is not only a delusion but a collective delusion. Therefore, reason and science are necessarily limited.

Rand claims that the intellectual’s job should have been to provide a rational morality for the Producer, the businessman. At best she sees them as contributing pragmatism – a new form of “Attilaism.” The intellectual became the enemy of the businessman by portraying him as a looter rather than a producer. Had the intellectuals and businessmen joined forces, as she saw the founding fathers of the United States having done, it would have been shown that “a free mind and a free market are corollaries.”²² Rand concludes by calling for the rise of the new intellectual, one who is guided by reason alone, who values “self” above all else, who refuses to give in to faith or to force and who will give capitalism a firm ethical foundation.

2. *We the Living* (1936)

We the Living is the story of a young woman’s attempts to save her lover in the Soviet State by sleeping with a Communist Party official. Rand felt that it was long rejected because it told the truth of Soviet Russia. Rand says that this story comes closest to her autobiography, more intellectually than historically. This is the first work where we see an embryonic heroic man emerging, although in *We The Living* the heroine, Kira, is the stronger character. Perhaps the only self-sacrifice that Rand approves of is that of a woman who gives herself up to save her lover. The irony of *We The Living* and *Red Pawn* is that the characters who are most admirable are the communists.

3. *Anthem* (1938)

Anthem was unable to find a publisher in America. It was originally published in 1938 in England and printed in the United States in 1948 by Pamphleteer. The narrator, Equality 7-2521, is a man living in a totalitarian state. There is no word, “I,” in their language. Equality 7-2521, taller and smarter than others, is made a streetsweeper because

he selfishly wanted to become a scholar and dared to question the Council of Vocations. *Anthem* is the story of Equality's discovery of the word "I" and the Unspeakable Word, "Ego." Equality takes the name Prometheus from a book he has found in a house built by people from the Unmentionable Times. Certainly the character of Prometheus prefigures Howard Roark in *The Fountainhead* and John Galt in *Atlas Shrugged*. Here we have a stronger example of Rand's repudiation of collectivism.

4. *The Fountainhead* (1943)

The Fountainhead took Rand six years to write. Its central theme is one man against the system. On the surface it is a book concerned with the world of architecture: modernism versus traditionalism. Howard Roark is an architect of innovation subscribing to the ideal that "form follows function." In an age of neo-classicism his skyscrapers are appreciated by few. Roark is the individualist, Peter Keating is the second-hander. Keating continually comes to Roark for ideas and designs, Roark complies with these requests to see his buildings built, but Keating cannot see that they are built to Roark's specifications. The story is enriched with a cast of semi-heroes and heroines and villains all exemplifying the struggle of the individual over the collective, the idea that self-sacrifice breaks a man's spirit, and a man who works for another is nothing but a slave. At his trial for dynamiting the housing project which he designed but gave to Peter Keating to submit, he says,

No man can live for another. He cannot share his spirit just as he cannot share his body. But the second-hander has used altruism as a weapon of exploitation and reversed the base of man's moral principles. . . . The man who attempts to live for others is a dependent. He is a parasite in motive and makes parasites of those he serves. The relationship produces nothing but mutual corruption. It is impossible in concept. The nearest approach to it in reality – the man who lives to serve others – is the slave. If physical slavery is repulsive, how much more repulsive is the concept of servility of the spirit? . . .²³

5. *Atlas Shrugged* (1957)

Rand and her followers consider *Atlas Shrugged* her true masterpiece. It is often referred to as the Objectivist “bible.” Rand herself would refer to John Galt’s speech when asked to summarize her philosophy. This work of fiction has been difficult to categorize: it is both philosophy and fiction, and satire and serious commentary.²⁴ The savage reviews that *Atlas Shrugged* would receive would send Rand into a deep depression lasting for years. Granville Hicks, a socialist, would write in *The New York Times Book Review* that he found both the content and style offensive.²⁵ Whittaker Chambers in the *National Review* would write, “Randian Man, like Marxian Man, is made the center of godless world . . . a voice can be heard from painful necessity, commanding: ‘To a gas chamber – go!’ ”²⁶ It was not the reviews that would so affect her, but rather that no intellectual peer would speak up to repudiate these attacks.

The cast is comprised of four heroes, the dominant being John Galt, and one heroine, Dominique who is finally Rand in good mood. All of the heroes are men of self-interest who eventually join a grand scheme to bring collectivist society to its knees and make the world safe for capitalism. The cast of villains are enemies of individualism and free enterprise. It is a story of the producers of the world going on strike until the world, ever-emerging as a socialist society, destroys itself. The heroes can then leave their secret Utopia to rebuild the world.

6. *The Newsletters* (January 1962 – February 1976)

After the publication of *For the New Intellectual* Rand realized that it was nonfiction that was most natural for her to write²⁷ and soon began *The Objectivist Newsletter*²⁸ jointly with Nathaniel Branden. In it Rand discoursed on Objectivism and how it applied to contemporary culture, politics or ethics. Often there was a guest editor who amplified the cover page editorial.

*The Objectivist*²⁹ was an expanded *Newsletter* with a different format and an ever increasing subscription. It was in the May 1968 issue that she formally broke all ties with and repudiated both Nathaniel and Barbara Branden. All subsequent issues were edited by Rand and coedited by Leonard Peikoff. In this journal Rand set forth the policies which any true “student of objectivism” would follow. She made it clear that

none of her followers should call themselves "Objectivists" lest they twist or modify her philosophy.

After the break with the Brandens and a steep decline in subscriptions, *The Objectivist* became *The Ayn Rand Letter*³⁰ (much shorter and narrower in scope) published fortnightly and addressing the national and international events of the day. In 1975, at the age of seventy, Rand was unable to meet the onerous publication schedule and discontinued *The Ayn Rand Letter*.

7. *The Virtue of Selfishness* (1964)

Rand continued to publish collections of her essays from the *Newsletter* and *The Objectivist* in book form. The first in this format was *The Virtue of Selfishness*, a title surely to garner attention from both supporters and detractors. In the introduction to *The Virtue of Selfishness* she states why she uses the term "selfishness" to denote virtuous qualities of character when it antagonizes so many: "For that reason that it makes you afraid of it."³¹ She proceeded to outline the rationale of her ethics.

Life is the standard by which good can be judged; here she echoes the Aristotelian principle that the primary goal of any organism is the maintenance of its life, its self-interest. Values must be chosen to achieve that purpose, namely, Reason, Purpose, and Self-Esteem with the corresponding virtues of Rationality, Productiveness and Pride. As such, the maintenance of life and the pursuit of happiness are one and the same. In this book and in the space of one paragraph she addresses the age-old relationship between "is" and "ought" and concludes,

In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus that validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity *is*, determines what it *ought* to do. So much for the issue of the relation between "*is*" and "*ought*."³²

The essays contained in *Virtue of Selfishness* respond to many of the altruists' truisms of the day. Rand and Branden attack these popular platitudes in an attempt to show the detrimental effects these cause.

8. *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal* (1966)

In his book, *Ayn Rand*, James Baker suggests that had Rand known G. K. Chesterton's work she might have paraphrased his comment that Christianity (capitalism) has not failed, it has not been tried.³³ Her purpose in *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal* is to instruct Americans on what in her view is the only economic system geared to the life of a rational being. Three articles by Alan Greenspan (then economic advisor to U.S. President Gerald Ford and later the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System) are included in this publication.

Rand claims that capitalism is the only system based on individual rights, especially property rights. A true form of capitalism, as she would describe *laissez faire* capitalism, is one without any government controls. Rand sees this capitalist ideal in shambles due to the altruistic socialism that has brought on such policies as anti-trust legislation.

9. *Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology* (1967)

The essays contained in *Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology* were all published in *The Objectivist* between July 1966 and February 1967 and were intended to give an introduction to what Rand felt was the central issue of philosophy: epistemology and the definition of universal concepts. This book was her first attempt at presenting Objectivism as a systematic philosophy. She instructs readers that the starting point of her epistemology is the validity of man's senses and the axiom: *Existence exists*. This axiom implies two corollary axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists.³⁴

Rand summarizes four schools of epistemological thought: extreme realism as represented by Plato in which universals are real entities *and* exist separately from concrete things, moderate realism represented by Aristotle in which universals exist only in concrete things, nominalism in which universals exist in name only, and conceptualism in which universals exist only as images in the mind. Objectivism accepts Aristotle's moderate realism with the senses as valid transmitters to the brain, the existence of objective reality and that "A is A." Objectivism differs from Aristotle on the nature of essences with Objectivism claiming that essences are epistemological and not metaphysical. The issue of concepts is differentiated from the four schools of epistemological

thought in that Objectivism regards concepts as objective, derived from reality by the human mind and not revealed or invented.

10. *The Romantic Manifesto* (1969)

This book, comprised of articles on aesthetics written between 1962 and 1971, gives a unified vision of the importance of art to human consciousness. Because art solidifies abstractions, images can be provided that integrate an infinite number of concepts. Rand sees art as a means for communicating moral ideals. This is what Rand has done with her fictional characters. Rand describes her style as Romantic Realism in an Aristotelian vein portraying a sense of life that describes things as they should be, thus her heroic vision of man. Rand blames naturalism for inspiring literature that is pessimistic, art that is primitive, and music that is irrational.

11. *The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution* (1971)

This is the first published collection of works written after the break with Branden. Rand wrote and published these articles in response to a request from a graduate student for a compilation of her thoughts on the educational system and the challenges the college students posed to the system. Rand at once both praises and condemns the protesting students. She praises them for rebelling against those in the educational system who taught them to think irrationally; a system which stressed conformity and socialization over conceptual skills. However, she rebukes the students for rebelling against modern technology, they should see the smokestack as a symbol of capitalism.

In a strange twist Rand draws an analogy to the women's movement. She says that there is envy behind protests; and that the women's movement in particular shows women's envy of men. She denounces these protests saying that American women don't appreciate the fact that they are the most privileged women in the world. She goes as far as to call them men-haters.

12. *Philosophy: Who Needs it?* (1982)

This collection of essays was published posthumously, introduced and organized by Leonard Peikoff. *Philosophy: Who Needs It?* contains no new material; most essays were published in *The Ayn Rand Letter* and

tend to preserve the dogma of Objectivism rather than forge new ground. The premise of her title essay is that everyone's actions or inactions derive from a philosophy, either conscious or subconscious. She takes this opportunity to attack the philosophies of Hume, Kant, Plato and Emerson and credits them with influencing modern thought that has come up with such platitudes as, "Don't be so sure – nothing can be known for certain."

In "Kant versus Sullivan" Rand rebukes academicians who publish articles devaluing "the work," propose science without experience and language without words with the example of Helen Keller and Annie Sullivan, then a topical item in the Broadway play, "The Miracle Worker." Keller, blind and deaf, is brought into the world of conceptual awareness by Sullivan through the use of language. Rand sees this as exemplifying the significance of "the word," of language.

13. *The Voice of Reason: Essays in Objectivist Thought* (1988)

This is another collection of Rand's articles and speeches originally published elsewhere. Leonard Peikoff states in the introduction that this is the last collection of Rand's writings he plans to publish. The areas covered include Philosophy, Culture and Politics. It includes the very thoughtful tribute to Marilyn Monroe that Rand had published in her very short-lived newspaper column for the *Los Angeles Times*. The timing of this publication of essays is interesting, arriving not long after Barbara Branden's biography of Rand, and shortly before Nathaniel Branden's memoir. Peikoff is Barbara Branden's cousin and broke all ties with her after the Rand/Branden schism in 1968.

IV. CONCLUSION

Ayn Rand was an original thinker whose early philosophical views were heavily influenced both by her responses to Aristotle, Aquinas, and Nietzsche, and by her personal experiences with the moral bankruptcy of communist philosophy as it was applied in the Soviet state. Although her early career was a literary philosophical one, her greatest literary works, *The Fountainhead* and *Atlas Shrugged* were great precisely because they fulfilled what she viewed to be the proper social role of philosophy: the moral mobilization of the public. By contemporary academic standards, Rand was not well read in philosophy. Yet, she fits well in

the genre of much of twentieth century philosophy. Like twentieth century existentialism and pragmatism, objectivism sought to bring philosophical insight and analysis to bear on the issues that confront *real* people: the possibility of moral existence in the modern, often amoral world.

A difficult, troubled and creative person, Rand may be the only philosopher whose views have made it to Broadway and the silver screen. Perhaps because she so eschewed academic philosophy, and because her works are widely considered to be works of literature, Objectivist philosophy is regularly omitted from academic philosophy. Yet, throughout literary academia, Ayn Rand is considered a philosopher. Her works merit consideration as works of philosophy in their own right.

NOTES

1. In his chapter I shall follow Rand's gendered terminology; she disclaimed being a feminist.
2. Barbara Branden, *The Passion of Ayn Rand* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1986), p. 141.
3. Barbara Branden had occasion to interview Rand at length for the biographical sketch in *Who Is Ayn Rand?* Branden has over thirty-eight hours of taped interviews with Rand discussing her childhood, early womanhood, her early years in America, her courtship with Frank O'Connor, her successes and disappointments. These tapes and her personal interactions with Rand over their twenty year friendship are the basis of her book *The Passion of Ayn Rand*.
4. Barbara Branden, p. 41.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 258.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 269.
13. Nathaniel Branden, *Judgment Day* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), p. 345.
14. Barbara Branden, p. 352.
15. This respiratory illness was undoubtedly exacerbated by her history of lung cancer. Rand's signature cigarette holder almost always carrying a lit cigarette would not bode well for her. She would lose a lung to lung cancer (although this was denied by Leonard Peikoff). Rand's smoking created a stir among the Objectivist movement: despite empirical evidence

that smoking was detrimental to one's health, but Rand refused to renounce the habit and many of her followers continued to imitate her.

16. I was in New York at the time of Rand's death and was one of the curious attending the wake. I credit Rand with piquing my interest in philosophy.
17. James T. Baker, *Ayn Rand* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1987), p. 39.
18. Barbara Branden, p. 52.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 294.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
21. *For the New Intellectual*, p. vii.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
24. James T. Baker, p. 63.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
27. Barbara Branden, p. 322.
28. *The Objectivist Newsletter*, January 1962–December 1965.
29. *The Objectivist*, January 1966–September 1971.
30. *The Ayn Rand Letter*, October 1971–February 1976.
31. *The Virtue of Selfishness*, p. vii.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
33. James T. Baker, p. 81.
34. *Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology*, p. 4.

10. Cornelia Johanna De Vogel (1905–1986)

TH. G. SINNIGE

I. BACKGROUND

In 1945, when Europe was awakening from the nightmare of World War II, in every field of activity a movement set in to reestablish traditional values. In philosophy and in institutional religion what was available were the pre-war traditions. There was still no horizon other than that within which pre-war developments had found a place, and even these had been more or less stagnant. What was ahead in the years to come could not be foreseen or conjectured: profound changes in ways of living and in religious standards. Least prepared of all were the Churches, whose leaders were anxious to maintain morality and tradition.

In the Netherlands the whole of intellectual life was split up into three “pillars” (not just pillars of wisdom), as they were then called: Protestant, Roman-catholic and Humanist. The Catholic part of the population (then about 30%) had lived for centuries as a marginal minority and had begun, from the 1850’s onwards, to gain influence in governmental positions and in the universities.

In 1946 the chair of ancient philosophy in the State University of Utrecht became vacant. This university had been founded in 1636 as the second of the new protestant universities (after Leyden) in the free Republic of the Netherlands. It soon became a bulwark of Calvinism. In the faculty of theology large numbers of students from Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia were preparing for their task as ministers of the newly reformed religion. Remnants of the Calvinistic origins of Dutch universities were still at work even into the nineteen-thirties. In some circles it was thought fashionable to entertain, as a background, a kind of latent antipapism. These and other silent forces broke to the surface when Cornelia De Vogel was unanimously proposed as a

candidate for the chair of ancient philosophy. When the proposal was already on its way to the Queen's cabinet, it became known that a year earlier she had embraced the Catholic faith and had been baptized in the Roman Catholic Church. Many years afterwards I asked a leading figure on the faculty if he still agreed with the criticisms levelled at the time, and he answered: "Yes, for sure, – there should not have been appointed a woman to that chair, let alone a Catholic woman."

II. BIOGRAPHY

Cornelia Johanna De Vogel was born on February 27th, 1905, in the Frisian capital Leeuwarden, where her father was a pharmacist. Having completed the Stedelijk Gymnasium she went to Utrecht University to study Classics (1924–1927), and then to Leyden University (1929–1930). The years of study were interrupted for two years (1927–1929), when she lived in Harderwijk, teaching Classics in the "Christelijk Lyceum," and for longer periods in the years between 1930–1940, because of ill health. She passed the doctoral examination in 1932 in Utrecht. According to the order of studies in Dutch universities, this examination conferred the title of *doctorandus* and the right to present a dissertation for the doctoral degree. (She received her Ph.D. in 1936.)

There is a kind of autobiography up to the year 1974. It takes the form of an interview with a representative of the "Societas Studiosorum Reformatorum." In the interview De Vogel recalls her early years at home and as a student, and describes the atmosphere in which she grew up. There was no trace whatever of any religious conviction in the family. No reading of the Bible, no prayers, an attitude of tolerance, and at times a violent criticism of the arrogance of preachers. The first notion of religion came to her from children's books in the library of the elementary school. At the age of about ten the child had her first awareness of God's presence, and was dominated by the problem that "without God life had no sense." Having entered middle school she was sent to a series of confirmation classes, where a minister explained religion in a rationalistic and Hegelian vein. The person of Jesus was mythologized and Christ did not come into the picture. In the later years of the Gymnasium she made her first acquaintance with philosophical literature, and from what she read she construed for herself "a kind of philosophical religion" (as she called it).

There was a passing interest in the theosophical movement, which she later rejected because it relied too heavily on private revelations. Once a flash of intuition came to her, “a kind of enlightenment, a mystical experience,” as she calls it. The words that follow in the autobiography make it clear that the inner experience was rather a moment of great inner light in the intellectual sense, because she adds: “I had felt the reality of the Spirit, a religious experience. It made me understand Parmenides: Being *is* and not-Being *is not*. The reality of all this was overwhelming, the world here disappeared from sight. I was flooded by transcendent reality.” The wording suggests that rather than mysticism it was a revelation of the power of conceptual thinking. This is confirmed by the whole of her further development. When, in years to follow, she was groping her way towards Roman Catholicism, the written argument in so many books and articles always bore the stamp of *intellectus quaerens fidem*, rather than *fides quaerens intellectum*.

About the year 1926 De Vogel again went through an intense inner experience, this time quite different from the former one because it now was the experience of God’s undeniable presence. She decided to try to find Christ. “I knew that I had to become a member of a Church and be incorporated into what I should find to be the Church of Christ.” In a postscript to her later “*manifesto* to each and every Catholic in the Dutch countries”¹ (1973) she describes these early years as a continued struggle to find a stable and firm footing for her belief in God. She wanted it to be stated clearly that it was Protestant theology, most of all the works of Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, that guided her way to religious belief. In the *manifesto* she writes:

The Church of the Reformation had guided me to Christ and taught me to live through Him with God. – I made a profound study of the doctrine of justification, from Luther up to Cardinal Newman, which took me three years [1937–39]. . . . Three more years [1940–42] were spent in studying early Christian thought, especially Athanasius.²

She considered this period of theological study, together with the two years when she lived in Harderwijk (1927–29) as fundamental to her religious convictions. In *Ecclesia Catholica* De Vogel gave a circumstantial account of her “very personal decision,” she writes: “It was Protestant theology that brought about my decision.”³

Cornelia Johanna De Vogel occupied the Chair of Ancient and

Medieval Philosophy at the University of Utrecht from 1947 to 1974 when she resigned. She continued to write and publish philosophy for many years. In the last year of her life she had hardly any energy left even for correcting the proofs of her final work, *Rethinking Plato and Platonism*. The task was completed by her good friend Professor Van Winden of Leyden University. The work was published within a year of her death and was reprinted half a year later.

III. ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

On entering upon her professional work of teaching the history of ancient philosophy, the first task De Vogel took in hand was writing a new source-book. Eventually it became three volumes. In it the central texts of the great philosophers were printed in the original languages, Greek and Latin, without translations but accompanied by bibliography and notes about modern interpretations. There were earlier books of the kind: Mullach (1860–1867) and the brilliant one-volume work by Ritter and Preller (1838, 10th edition 1934). The new work “should be of a more modern stamp, in touch with the literature on the subject,” as De Vogel states in her Preface. The first volume of *Greek Philosophy*⁴ (Thales to Plato) was published in 1950, the second⁵ (Aristotle, Peripatetics and Academy) followed in 1953, the third volume (Hellenistic-Roman Period) in 1959.⁶ The books have been in use all over the world as long as there were students who could read Greek. The third volume is still indispensable for anyone working in the field of ancient Stoicism, the Middle Academy and, most of all, Neoplatonism. The texts included are for the greater part taken from sources not easy to find, and the selections betray extraordinarily wide reading. At a number of points traditional interpretations are replaced by new views. These new views include: the treatment of the Stoic theory of *oikeiosis*, the statements by Cicero, the importance of Antiochus of Ascalon, the notes on Stoic formal logic, the extensive treatment of Philo and Plutarch as forerunners of Neoplatonism, and, the admission of the Hermetica and Valentinus as sources in their own right for tracing gnostic influences in the development of Neoplatonism.

The publication of the three volumes of *Greek Philosophy* was accompanied and followed by a great number of studies, published in the relevant professional journals.⁷ As was to be expected, the central area of investigations was Plato and Platonism. In her dissertation⁸ (1936) she

had traced the allusions and backgrounds of the mysterious eight paradigms in Plato's *Parmenides*. Reconstructing the Academic context of the discussions she found not only that Plato's *Parmenides* marked a real crisis in the doctrine of Forms (a "keepunt," i.e. a change of direction, a *retractatio*), but she even could trace the first and still vague development of the metaphysical theory which in later centuries was to be characteristic of Neoplatonism.

The development of metaphysical theory had been for its own sake the primary issue for De Vogel in the years when her world-view took shape. She later came to investigate the growth of Plato's theory of Forms and the appearance of new theories in the dialogues and in the unwritten doctrines. Her most central studies in this field were published in *Mnemosyne* (1954),⁹ in the Royaumont Colloquium-volume *Le Néoplatonisme*,¹⁰ (1969), and (as reprints) in *Philosophia I* (1970).¹¹ The results may be seen in *Greek Philosophy I*. From the outset two problems were involved: 1) How far can the neoplatonic interpretation of Plato's theories be accepted as correct? 2) Should the *Demiurge* of Plato's *Timaeus* be seen as an independent hypostasis in the cosmic scale of being equal to the Plotinian *Nous*, or simply as a part of or a faculty of the World-Soul, parallel to human intellect in the human soul? The first of the two problems intertwines with the exploration of Plato's unwritten doctrines, internationally in full course from the 1930s onwards. These investigations were in full swing from the 1930s onwards. The second problem was interwoven with metaphysical considerations which formed the core of De Vogel's own world-view.

In Plato's written work the first hint of a super-transcendent One is found in *Rep. VI*.¹² Leading the way by different arguments, Plato makes Socrates explain that a first principle must be recognized which lies "on yonder side" of being and knowledge (and, by implication, "on yonder side" of the Forms, although in the *Republic* this formula is not found). The argument leading to this conclusion begins with the analogy of sense-perception. The eye can only see the object if both object and eye are illuminated by the sun, and, by analogy, the mind can only see the Forms if there is a superior principle enlightening both. In the realm of pure Forms we must conjecture a first principle over and above the Forms, which makes the Forms visible to the spiritual eye, a principle lying "on yonder side of Being" (509B). In the chronological order of the dialogues this is the first appearance of a super-transcendent principle, later called the Good or the One. De Vogel saw it as the early foundation for the Plotinian theory of hypostases.

The next stage in Plato's development of metaphysical principles is found in the so-called "metaphysical dialogues." The most outspoken statements are those of the *Sophist* and the *Philebus*. The *Sophist* gives the clear formula of the renewed theory of Forms: The world of Forms does not contain only static and perfect patterns, but has life and movement in it.¹³ This statement was, in De Vogel's view, the fundamental text for interpreting Plato's philosophy as a religiously inspired system.

The texts of the *Sophist* and the *Philebus* imply that there is an uppermost and divine realm of being, standing in a causal relation to our world of changing phenomena. The relation between the two worlds is that of a "scale of being," or, in other words, it is a system of hypostases. In addition to the arguments already adduced in *Keerpunt*, both dialogues offer good reasons to consider the Neoplatonic interpretation of Platonism as fundamentally correct. The text of the *Sophist* remained a central issue to De Vogel throughout her career as a historian of Platonism, just for these two reasons: it represents in the form of metaphysical argument the religious core of Plato's philosophy, and it demonstrates the well-foundedness of the view that Neoplatonism had its roots in Plato's philosophy.

As to the second problem, that of the creative Spirit or *Nous*, De Vogel kept a judicious reserve. In the aforementioned study published in *Mnemosyne* (1954) she writes:

The Forms are a kosmos, – and as such must be governed by superior ordering principles. . . . This can hardly have any other meaning than that it is a *NOUS*. . . . The Forms are the eternal thoughts of a divine Spirit.¹⁴

But in the paper contributed to the abovementioned Royaumont Colloquium of 1969, she stresses that:

. . . it is true that Plato nowhere talks in so many words about the whole of intelligible Being as a *Nous*.¹⁵

This was meant as a prudent reserve on textual grounds, for in the same paper she had repeated her earlier view of 1954 that "the eternal Archetype [of this our world] must be a Perfect Living Being, that is a Living and Thinking Being," in other words a *Nous*. The wording comes from the famous passage in the *Sophist* quoted above, the argument is not textual but metaphysical.

The fullest discussion of this problem comes in *Philosophia I*.¹⁶ This book was projected as a survey of the central themes in her work until then, and contained reprints of earlier papers as well as newly written studies. It should have been followed by *Philosophia II*, but this second volume appeared long afterwards and under a different title: *Rethinking Plato and Platonism* (1986).¹⁷ Like the first volume, it consisted of earlier studies and new work, representing the author's views and giving a critical assessment of the latest developments in the field. *Rethinking* was her last great work. It was published posthumously.

In the ninth chapter of *Philosophia I* the question of the place of the Demiurge in Plato's system received fuller treatment. The outline of the argument is essentially as follows: In Plato's world-view there certainly is a *Nous*, most of all in the metaphorical figure of the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*. However, this Intelligence cannot be interpreted as a hypostasis by itself. It represents the function of intelligent and creative thinking in the World-soul, just as in the human organism a living soul must possess intellectual faculties. She states:

In Plato the term *Nous* does not have the character it has in Plotinus: it is not a "hypostasis" nor a kind of substance; it is just a function or activity of the soul.¹⁸

Nevertheless, being taken in tow by her metaphysical turn of mind, she adds: "Logically speaking, at the level of Intelligible Being the 'perfect living Being' can be nothing but a Divine Mind." The expression "logically speaking" indicates that the logic of the system requires us to accept this consequence, though in the texts themselves an unambiguous formula cannot be found.

In the last three or four decades the historiography of Platonism has been revolutionized by the investigation of Plato's "unwritten doctrines." A *consensus* has now been reached as to the existence of an unwritten tradition, but not about its role as a background of the written dialogues. The most important studies are the voluminous works by H. J. Krämer (1959 and 1982) and K. Gaiser (1963) (both of the Tübingen school), J. N. Findlay (1974), and the monumental volume by Giovanni Reale.¹⁹ Reale provides a systematic survey of the entire field of historiography of Platonism, and comes to a very far-reaching set of conclusions. The early work of De Vogel in *Keerpunt* initiated this development and in a number of points anticipated it, as may be seen in *Greek Philosophy I*. The analysis of the metaphysical implications of

the unwritten doctrine had led her to recognize their presence in Plato's later work, the so-called metaphysical dialogues.

There was, however, one point in which she did not share the interpretation according to the new "paradigm," as it is called in the Italian school. From the *Republic* onwards the bulk of Plato's written work offers recognizable traces of and allusions to what must have been an existing background of unwritten doctrines. She had too keen a sense of philological exactness to share the view that even in the very early dialogues we may recognize the presence of the unwritten doctrines. She consistently held that the texts of the early work simply did not allow drawing such artificial conclusions.

De Vogel took a keen interest in the investigations and maintained correspondence whenever one of these voluminous and learned books was published. In Milan a growing interest in her work became manifest from 1989 onward. In that year an exhaustive examination of her views was published by Enrico Peroli,²⁰ and in 1990 Peroli published a complete translation into Italian of her last work: *Ripensando Platone e il Platonismo*.²¹ This Italian edition has a long introduction by Giovanni Reale, which reads more like a summary of objections. It is, however, interesting because it echoes the discussions which had been carried on by correspondence, including the story of the discussions conducted by De Vogel with Krämer and himself. The original correspondence is now in the *Katholiek Documentatie Centrum* of Nijmegen University.

In the above-mentioned article by Peroli, there is an interesting summary of De Vogel's views about the question whether the early origins of Neoplatonic theories can be found in Plato's unwritten doctrines. De Vogel published quite a series of studies on this problem: *Mind* 1953,²² *Mnemosyne* 1954,²³ and the reprints in *Philosophia I* ch. 8, 9, 10 and 16. As Peroli states correctly, the unwritten doctrines and the later dialogues must be considered as the birthplace of Neoplatonism. He adds that De Vogel's contributions to solving the riddle are all the more significant

. . . when we realize that her studies on the continuity of Platonism and Neoplatonism were published in the early fifties.²⁴

Peroli itemizes three important points in De Vogel's work. The first is that of the degrees of reality, descending from the One which is "above being." In this point, when leaving aside the principle of emanation, the Plotinian system clearly corresponds to the Platonic one.

The second point in Peroli's summary touches on a central issue in the debate between De Vogel and Reale. In Plato's unwritten doctrines there are two "first" principles of being: the One and the indefinite principle or *apeiron*. The same first principles are found in Plotinus' *Enneads* and they have a pervasive function in every degree of being. Even in the intelligible realm the presence of the indefinite principle must be recognized. There it is a kind of spiritual matter which is to receive its form from the light of the One. So there is a uniform structure of being in the descending reality from the One downwards. At first sight this may be considered as a quite consistent theory of an all-embracing scale of being. No problems arise as long as no questions are posed about monism or dualism. But if the whole of reality springs from two opposite principles, the way is open to Manichaeism, and there is an independent principle of evil. If that interpretation is to be avoided, the indefinite principle (*apeiron*) must be subordinated to the first One or even incorporated into it, but this does not eliminate the presence of evil within the Godhead. In the *Enneads* both views seem to play their part. In modern interpretation this may be considered as simply an open end in the brilliant architecture of the spiritual world as designed by Plotinus. To De Vogel, however, this was an important problem because of its theological implications. She was inclined on metaphysical grounds to decide the question in the sense of ultimate monism. Her studies can be found in *Philosophia I* and in *Rethinking*.

The third point Peroli makes is whether the *Nous* may be seen as a separate hypostasis in Plato's doctrines. De Vogel has a preference for a metaphysical solution: the *metaphysical system* and not the texts taken separately and analyzed philosophically, is decisive. In Plotinus we have the clear outlines of a theory of *Nous* as a separate hypostasis. In Plato at least the preparatory stage to this doctrine is found.

The discussions between De Vogel and Giovanni Reale were maintained by correspondence in the last three or four years of her life, and focused on this problem: should the Plotinian system be described as an absolute monism or as a subordination of hypostases, that is as emanationism? De Vogel's studies also here predated the studies of the Italian school. In her 1957 article "Het monisme van Plotinus" (*The Monism of Plotinus*)²⁵ she states that:

. . . multiplicity is already contained in principle in the One. The principle of infinity in Plotinus is thus indeed rooted in the one highest Principle . . .²⁶

She adds by way of a cautious reserve that:

. . . we do not know whether Plato himself already in principle withdrew his twoness into the One.²⁷

The discussions between De Vogel and Reale are related by De Vogel in *Rethinking*²⁸ and by Reale in his *Introduzione* to the Italian edition.²⁹ The correspondence dates from 1983–84, which were the years when De Vogel was preparing *Rethinking* and Reale his *Platone*, two philosophers astonished to find themselves in (partial) agreement.

IV. CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

Alongside the discussions about the importance of the unwritten doctrines for the interpretation of Platonism and Neoplatonism, lay another field of problems: the question of the relation between later Platonism and early Christian thought. These problems were discussed in a series of works which were written as early as 1943. And although her inquiries began with the writing of her translation of Athanasius in 1943, that work was not published until 1948, two years following her *Ecclesia Catholica*.

In *Ecclesia Catholica*³⁰ De Vogel sums up what had become her convictions after so many years of religious struggle:

- 1) the arguments about matters of faith can be stated by means of rational concepts. Human language is not senseless when we use it in the world of faith.
- 2) dogma has a real sense as the expression in human language of a truth about God and about His Salvation. It is the best possible expression in words of any truth about God.³¹

The conclusions stated may be considered as somewhat more than only conclusions of an argument. They serve as a guarantee that religious convictions may need expression in philosophical formulas, thereby gaining certainty. On the other hand, De Vogel felt certain that the formation of philosophical systems may have obeyed religious impulses. This double-track method remained fundamental in the whole of her philosophical work that was still to be written in years to come. To the reader it is philosophical argument that is presented and explained, but the driving force for the author of the argument always was that of a personal conviction, as a rule with a religious component. In the way

the arguments are handled the Calvinist heritage comes through. Philosophical argument was valued as a road to certainty. There was often a rather rigid way of arguing when discussing matters of fundamental importance. Among De Vogel's numerous students, of which five have occupied chairs of philosophy, a kind of proverb was current to the effect that you never should go against her pronounced opinions.

The above cited conclusions of *Ecclesia Catholica* are closely related to De Vogel's work in the field of ancient philosophy. The combination of religious convictions and philosophical argument gave her a keen eye and a perfect understanding of what had been the central source of inspiration in the early great philosophical systems. There is no doubt that the religious impulse was foremost, but she kept it hidden behind her professional work as a historian of philosophy in the years when she occupied the chair of ancient and medieval philosophy in Utrecht (1947–1974). In her inaugural address (May 19th, 1947) she states that she had needed long deliberation before accepting the heavy burden which the chair of ancient philosophy was to charge her with. "It seemed to me that problems other than philosophical called for treatment much more urgently, but once I have accepted this responsibility I shall concentrate with all my energy upon this field of scholarship."

The hidden religious impulse emerged when she resigned her chair in 1974. The address on that occasion was published with the title *Aeterna Veritas*.³² The argument starts with a quotation from the *Enneads* of Plotinus (V 1,1):

How does it come about that the souls have forgotten God their Father and, having come from yonder and being parts of yonder and belonging completely to Him, have become ignorant as much of themselves as of Him?

For the 20th century Christian, she says, it is hardly possible in these words not to recognize one's own situation of being divorced from the ultimate source of Wisdom, *Sapientia*. By introducing *Sapientia* she alludes to a long series of discussions and publications on the identification of Plato's *Demiurge* with Plotinus' *Nous*, the second of the divine hypostases. She argues that it is incorrect to consider the One of Plotinus as equivalent to our concept of God, if this transcendent One is taken without *Nous*, the creative Spirit. Athanasius and Augustine correctly understood that the two should be taken together, because, she says, God may not be deprived of his Word, that is of the creative Logos,

incorporated in Christ. In this sense Augustine had a better understanding of Neoplatonic theology, although he needed the Christian faith in order to make the correction. Her conclusion is:

From Augustine onwards the whole of the Christian tradition is in agreement: the God who inhabits an inaccessible light is the same who has come to us in Christ.³³

De Vogel's view implies that the Neoplatonic doctrines can only be seen correctly in the perspective of the later Christian tradition inaugurated by Augustine. This is certainly what had inspired De Vogel in her work as a historian of ancient philosophy.

As mentioned above, De Vogel's first discussion of the relationship between later Platonism and early Christian philosophy was in the long Preface to the book on *Athanasius* dated 1943, but published five years later.³⁴ This was followed not only by the above-mentioned *Ecclesia Catholica*, but also by *Greek Philosophy and The Christian Concept of Creation*³⁵ (1953), and *Plato's Concept of God*³⁶ (1965–66), which were both reprinted in *Theoria*.³⁷ The discussion continued in the short but very dense booklet *Wijsgerige aspecten van het vroeg-christelijk denken* (1970).³⁸ Her further studies in this field appeared in the form of discussions with Professor Dörrie³⁹ in 1983 and again in 1985 in "Platonism and Christianity: A Mere Antagonism or a Profound Common Ground?"⁴⁰ The question whether Platonism and a Platonic world-view did form a coherent whole with the theology of early Christianity was for De Vogel a very central issue, and moreover a question in which she felt herself deeply involved in a personal way. In her early work on Athanasius she had enthusiastically described how a number of fundamental Platonic principles had been adapted and integrated into the dense and coherent system of Christian theology. In her view Platonism had been, together with Scripture, at the root of Patristic theology. Dörrie's position was quite the opposite of De Vogel's. He maintained that the early Christian authors had deliberately opposed any adoption of Platonic views or Platonic theological principles. In the wake of Lutheran theology Dörrie stated that Platonism was not only a philosophy, but a doctrine of salvation, opposed to Christianity and therefore never accepted by Christians. He even denied that Plato had posited a transcendent first God as an absolute principle. In Middle-Platonism, contemporary with the earliest Christian theology, God was seen, according to Dörrie, as a creative Logos, immanent in the universe.

In the discussions with Dörrie the personal involvement of De Vogel recognizably plays a role. The rigid argumentations of Calvinistic theology had left traces in her way of treating philosophical topics and more so when some sort of religious element was mixed up in the problem. In De Vogel's view any theological argument had to produce certainty in the reader's mind, – and metaphysical theories, if well constructed, should procure a reliable foothold for Christian faith. In the discussions on such topics she more often than not is busy redressing all kinds of what to her were errors and misunderstandings. The long drawn-out paper "Platonism and Christianity: A Mere Antagonism or a Profound Common Ground?"⁴¹ (1985) was a kind of summary of her views on Platonism and Christianity.

V. ON THEOLOGICAL ORTHODOXY AND WOMEN

The discussions with Dörrie and the publication of the lecture on *Aeterna Veritas*, delivered when resigning her chair, may be seen as a prelude to her last period, that of a polemic author on questions of Church and theology. The first such book to be published was *Aan de katholieken van Nederland, aan allen* (to the Catholics of the Netherlands, to all of them). She was alarmed at the situation in the Church. In the introduction she states that:

... ministers of the Church have forgotten that we do not go to church to hear about social justice, but to find ourselves in the presence of Christ. Even the hope for a life after death is left aside by the new-wave priests, when they speak about the nullifying function of death. For orthodox believers this is a tragic situation.⁴²

She had tried, without success, to provoke the archbishop, Msgr. Alfrink, into voicing a serious protest "against all those modernistic and modish trends." But no initiatives were taken, and the archbishop sent her an invitation to give a written and more detailed explanation of her point that "the first duty of bishops is to maintain the Catholic faith, and until now the bishops have failed to do so." Her answer to Msgr. Alfrink's invitation occupies sixty two of the one hundred and fourteen pages of *Aan allen*, and is followed by a critical assessment of the Pastoral Synod held at Noordwijkerhout.⁴³ The arguments leave the reader with the impression that the written text was not aimed at "each

and every Catholic," as the title suggests, but at the bishops especially. As an answer to Archbishop Alfrink it missed its point. The papers give vent to a long drawn out series of irritating protests, occasioned by public manifestations where the traditional doctrines were deliberately doubted or denied or given "a new and strange interpretation."

The broadside provoked a short storm in what was left of a Catholic press in Holland, and after that was forgotten until 1980, when a journalist of the Catholic weekly *De Tijd* interviewed professor De Vogel.⁴⁴ The many reactions to this interview were answered by De Vogel in a pocket-size book *Tijdproblemen*⁴⁵ (1981). Here again the theological arguments are rather abstract and conventional, but there are two interesting additions on the question of the specific mission of women in this world, and on the question why women should not be ordained priest in the Catholic Church. Another bishop came under fire.

On the occasion of Mother's Day, May 11, 1980, the Bishop of Rotterdam, Msgr. Simonis, had delivered a radio talk in which he set forth his view as to the "quite special nature which is the privilege of all women." The predisposition to be a mother, he said, determines for every woman the moral character of her being, as well as her mission in life. This mission can be fulfilled just as well by having children and educating them, as by taking care of the quality of life in the world surrounding her. De Vogel took offense at the bishop's tendency to reduce women's capacities to a biological principle and wrote a letter to him pointing out his error. She stressed (more or less describing her own vocation) that teaching and inspiring people in philosophy and religion is a spiritual process, proper to man as well as to woman. This is what is meant by being created in God's image and likeness. It is quite beside the truth to presume that a woman has her capacity of inspiration just only because of her biological disposition.

Bishop Simonis persisted in his point of view and sent an answer in which he wrote the "horrible words:" "nothing is more fundamental than gender," whereupon De Vogel retorted: "nothing is more fundamental than being created in God's image." She added: "nowhere in the Bible it is said that procreation was the one and only task given by God to humans."

The second of the added chapters treats the delicate question of the possibility for women being ordained priests. She writes with tact and with due respect for the ecclesiastical tradition. At the end she adduces the example of the by now many women who are working as missionaries in lonely posts. They provide the complete range of pastoral

services, without being able to administer the sacraments, ordination being requisite. "Should we not ask ourselves whether that is really what our Lord had in view?"

A rather voluminous book was published in 1977. It was projected as an exhaustive refutation of all the new and in her opinion un-catholic developments in the field of theology. Its title, *De grondslag van onze zekerheid*⁴⁶ (The Foundation of our Certitude) is the expression of her complete conviction that the authority of the Church is our absolute guarantee for the truth of dogma and tradition. The book is for the greater part a critical assessment of new theological doctrines and new formulas of liturgy. The new trends are treated one by one, and in each case arguments are given to show that the new theories are built upon erroneous premisses or are the result of a misleading use of method.

There is a marked contrast with her early work *Ecclesia Catholica*, where she had given a very personal account of what had moved her to become a Catholic. The criticism in *Grondslag* blames all the great personalities of 20th century theological thought: Bultmann, Tillich, Bonhöffer, the Hegelians in general, Küng, Schillebeeckx, Schoonenberg and others like them, whereas she stresses that the right method for the interpretation of Scripture had been established once and forever by Erasmus. There were plans for an edition in German, and it was small wonder that the German editor felt obliged, in personal deference to leading theologians, to tone down some of the stronger expressions. When De Vogel learned of this she left by train within days, in order to make it clear to the German editor what she wanted to say. Their conversation had no success and the manuscript was withdrawn. Other plans were for a Spanish edition. As an introduction a theologian, Dr. Naaykens, wrote a study to be published in a Spanish theological review, but the text was in French and too long. To help her, I made a translation into Spanish of a shortened version, which was published (1980) with the title *El Fundamento de nuestra certeza*.⁴⁷ No Spanish editor took an interest in the book.

De Vogel's works on the present situation of Catholic theology moved in a world of by that time old-fashioned theology, of interest only to a small circle of conservative Catholics. The situation, compared to 1946, had changed profoundly. The great loser was the Roman Catholic community. Quite a number of its churches in the Netherlands had to be sold and demolished. The Calvinist and the Reformed churches survived somewhat better.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Professor De Vogel was known as a prolific author on questions of Ancient Philosophy and Patristic Theology. In a long life (in which she stayed unmarried, having made a vow to that effect) all her efforts were dedicated to her work as a historian of philosophy, and, from time to time, to taking part in contemporary theological discussions. Her investigations in the field of Ancient Philosophy and Patristic Theology were intimately bound up with her religious convictions about the Platonic roots within the Western theological tradition. De Vogel was internationally leading in the historiography of Platonism and Neoplatonism. She taught for 25 years in the State University at Utrecht, and, as an invited professor, for some time at New York University, at Tokyo University, and on Taiwan.

As her former student and as a senior lecturer in the same field of studies of Ancient Philosophy, and now the Executor of her literary estate, I am grateful to the editor and publishers for having invited me to write her philosophical biography.

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11. Hannah Arendt (1906–1975)

MARY ELLEN WAITHE

I. BIOGRAPHY

Born in Germany of Jewish parents, Johannah Arendt experienced tragedy young, when, at age seven, she lost her father to syphilis. The best biography of her intellectual development is to be found in Elizabeth Young Breuhl's nearly six hundred page tome, *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World*.¹ Arendt's early teens were a turbulent time, during which she became a voracious reader of German and French literature and philosophy. Her undergraduate education began at the University of Marburg for a year and continued for a year at the University of Freiburg. Her Ph.D. in Philosophy was completed at the University of Heidelberg when she was twenty-two.

It was at Marburg that Hannah Arendt met Martin Heidegger, who was at first, her philosophical mentor, and soon, her lover. At Freiburg Arendt studied under Edmund Husserl, and at Heidelberg she studied under Karl Jaspers. These philosophers, and importantly, her experiences as a Jew and as a woman in academia during the events leading up to the second World War were to have the greatest influence on her philosophical development. Following her release from a week's imprisonment for doing library research on the biography of an eighteenth-century Jewish woman, Rahel Varnhagen,² she and her first husband, Gunther Stern fled to Paris where she lived as a stateless person from 1933–1941. In 1940 she divorced Stern and remarried. Following brief separate internments, Arendt, along with her mother and her second husband, a gentile and a communist named Heinrich Blucher emigrated to the United States. Within a year, she had a part time appointment in History at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York. Soon afterwards she began the nearly decade-long process of writing *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.³

She spent the remainder of her life living in the United States, receiving her American citizenship in 1951.

Her many writings against racism, and particularly against anti-semitism, brought her major honors including a Guggenheim Foundation Grant, the Sonning Prize from the Danish government, and the American Political Science Association's Lippincott Award. She received appointments at major "think tanks" and at American universities. During the mid 1940's Arendt was Research Director of the Conference on Jewish Relations, and much later, received a professorial appointment at the University of Chicago's Committee on Social Thought. Not only did she teach at the above-mentioned Brooklyn College, but also at New Jersey's Princeton University, and in Manhattan at the prestigious New School for Social Research. There she held the rank of University Professor of Political Philosophy. She was invited to give the Gifford Lectures at the University of Aberdeen in 1973 and 1974. There she presented portions of what would be her final works, the first two books of the planned trilogy: *The Life of the Mind*. The work is edited by her friend and literary executor, the writer Mary McCarthy.

Despite her training and her faculty appointments in Philosophy (she had been the first female full professor at Princeton), Arendt denied for many years that she was a "philosopher" preferring, in the tradition of her contemporaries, Beauvoir (see Chapter 12), Sartre and Rand (see Chapter 9) to bring philosophical insights to bear on subjects that well-educated non-philosophers would find relevant to their lives. She wrote numerous short articles for the popular press, and even her more scholarly full-length works were mostly published by non-academic presses.

II. WORKS

Arendt was an original thinker and scholar who wrote philosophical analyses of historical and contemporary moral, social and political issues. Two central concerns permeate her writing: first, what is the nature of human freedom and of impediments to freedom; second, how can human social freedom be exercised in what she described as the "recovery" of social and political life.⁴ Hannah Arendt's subject matters ranged from Immanuel Kant⁵ to racism, anti-semitism and imperialist domination.⁶ She examined at length the moral and political nature of violence,⁷ and wrote a moral documentary of a Eichmann, a contemporary exemplar

of evil.⁸ She looked retrospectively to the moral, social, and political foundations of the Revolutionary War in America⁹ and explored the ideas of the virtue and abuse of labor.¹⁰ In addition, she completed two of three planned volumes on what can only be described as a moral philosophy of mind.¹¹ In addition to being remembered as an original thinker, Hannah Arendt shall also be remembered as a philosopher who commemorated the work of Heidegger,¹² and who edited the work of her friend, Karl Jaspers.¹³ Hannah Arendt was widowed in 1970 and died suddenly in 1975, as she apparently was about to begin the third and final volume (on judging) of her *Life of the Mind*. In what follows, I shall offer brief descriptions of *On Revolution* and of the first two volumes of *Life of the Mind*.

1. *On Revolution*

In *On Revolution* Arendt examines the French, American and Russian revolutions and the central components of each: power, passion and reason. In Arendt's view, the American Revolution epitomized each component in ways that were subtly but crucially different than in the other revolutions. These differences, she claims, account for its unique success. The American Revolution broke with tradition in assuming the "naturalness" of poverty, Arendt claims.¹⁴ Arendt notes that historically, "revolution" has meant "restoration" and since Copernicus at least, has meant in cosmological terms "the orderly and lawful return to the original position." It is this "orderliness" and "lawfulness" of the American Revolution that in Arendt's view distinguishes it from others.¹⁵ Its statement of the "original position" (as John Rawls would also use the term) was a statement of original equality of all and the commitment of all to the orderly establishment of positive law. This was what the Declaration of Independence stated prior to the commencement of the American Revolution: the natural equality of citizens and their natural right to be self-governing and to establish institutions of law. In contrast, the French and Russian revolutions attempted to overthrow existing regimes, but resulted in perhaps even greater chaos, oppression and disorder:

If the new metaphorical content of the word "revolution" sprang directly from the experiences of those who first made and then enacted the Revolution in France, it obviously carried an ever greater plausibility for those who watched its course, as if it were a spectacle, from

the outside. What appeared to be most manifest in this spectacle was that none of its actors could control the course of events, that this course took a direction which had little if anything to do with the willful aims and purposes of men, who, on the contrary, must subject their will and purpose to the anonymous force of the revolution if they wanted to survive at all. This sounds commonplace to us today, and we probably find it hard to understand that anything but banalities could have been derived from it. Yet we need only remember the course of the American Revolution where the exact opposite took place, and recall how strongly the sentiment that man is master of his destiny, at least with respect to political government permeated all its actors, to realize the impact which the spectacle of the impotence of man with regard to the course of his own action must have made. The well-known shock of disillusion suffered by the generation in Europe which still lived through the fatal events of 1789 to the restoration of the Bourbons transformed itself almost immediately into a feeling of awe and wonder at the power of history itself. Where yesterday, in the happy days of Enlightenment, only the despotic power of the monarch had seemed to stand between man and his freedom to act, a much more powerful force had suddenly arisen which compelled men at will, and from which there was no release, neither rebellion nor escape, the force of history and historical necessity.¹⁶

The abject poverty that had once provided the stimulus for the French Revolution was also to be its downfall, for in outrage at the dehumanizing effect of abject, endless poverty, the masses who constituted the French Revolutionaries failed to redistribute the wealth, and instead destroyed it. In the stead of the monarchy there arose *la Terreur*, and an endless, incoherent, series of misguided attempts at constitution-writing. In an attempt to nationalize and centralize the authority of constitutional law, regionalism, with its historical roots in the feudal aristocracy was suppressed in post-Revolutionary France. In the United States, the opposite occurred, as Arendt notes:

For in America the armed uprising of the colonies and the Declaration of Independence had been followed by a spontaneous outbreak of constitution-making in all thirteen colonies – as though, in John Adams' words, "thirteen clocks have struck as one" – so that there existed no gap, no hiatus, hardly a breathing spell between the war

of liberation, and the fight for independence which was the condition for freedom of the new states.¹⁷

The French Revolution assumed that the Declaration of the Rights of Man formed the foundation of any legitimate government; on the contrary, Arendt argues, the American Revolutionaries assumed that the rights articulated in the Declaration of Independence outlined the limits of government control over citizens.¹⁸ What the American founders understood and the French did not, Arendt says, is the need to distinguish the legitimacy of the government, the constituent power (that it rests on the consent of public opinion) from the constitutional authority of government (that it rests on a legitimately written document). The legitimacy of the American Constitution is derived from the consent of the legitimate state governments whose representatives wrote it and whose legislatures then ratified it. The legitimacy of the institutions of government which it created, and the system of lawmaking which it sets in place is more or less permanent. Changes in individual laws which are then written following procedures created by that system are vulnerable to the constituent power's changeable court of public opinion, *but the system of government itself is not so quickly changeable, and therefore is comparatively stable*. The ability to provide for both stability and change was the genius of the American system, in Arendt's view.¹⁹ Yet, in the final chapter, we find her lamenting with Jefferson the inability to avoid the "tyranny of the Constitution" and its consequent suppression of revolutionary spirit. By failing to incorporate the "town meeting" the truly "grass roots" level of representation into the Constitution, Arendt claims, the framers of the Constitution had the "vanity and presumption" to govern beyond the grave. At best, the American two-party system offers some measure of protection against representatives becoming despots; however, it does not give the ordinary person a true opportunity to participate in government. Thus, government tends to involve leaders leading the people rather than leaders emerging from and representing the views of the people. Arendt's views here appear somewhat forced: she does not credit the negative forces within the system that create opportunities for ordinary citizens to seek leadership roles. She ignores for the most part, opportunities for initiative and recall, and seems to forget her own insight that the federal government is a limited government, all powers not granted to it by the states are reserved to the states, and thus may be exercised at the level of state assemblies. She ignores also the fact also that election to the federal House of

Representatives is on the basis of congressional districts, which are re-apportioned each decade on the basis of the census, so that each representative represents approximately the same number of people. i.e., the population of a large township. The House of Representatives was conceived as a constituent assembly to which ordinary citizens, acting within their communities, could aspire to represent their neighbors.

Arendt addresses the question of deriving the ultimate legitimacy of law: what power higher than law legitimizes law itself? The timeless answer has always been "the deity." And even though the American founders of the Constitution were all deists, theirs was the first attempt to establish a new "secular order" where religious freedom was one of the most fundamental guarantees. It is clear that the protection of what would come to be called "godless atheism" was probably far from the minds of the constitution-writers. Nevertheless, the commitment to prohibit the establishment of a "state religion," and to the absolute separation of church and state left a void to be filled. If the state religion or the popular deity was not to be the "higher power" that legitimized the legal order itself, what then would be the "higher power" upon which the government was founded and through which it derived its legitimacy? Arendt wants us seriously to consider that philosophy or rather, philosophical clarity, was the "higher power" substituted by Jefferson for the deity when he wrote: "We hold these truths to be self-evident." It is the inescapable conclusion of reason, even reason resisted by the will, that is the legitimizing higher power behind the legal order. It is because the rights to life, liberty, self-government, equality, freedom, and pursuit of happiness are taken as axiomatic, that those who are capable of reason are compelled to acknowledge the legitimacy of the new secular order.²⁰

2. *The Life of the Mind*

Arendt's last work, *The Life of the Mind* was planned to be a trilogy. Arendt died suddenly, almost immediately after completing the second volume. Volume 1, *Thinking* begins with analyses of phenomenology, rational personhood, and mental activities from thinking, to expressing, to doing. It continues with an exploration of two central questions: "what makes us think?" and "where are we in space and in time when we are thinking?"²¹

In human intellectual life, Being and Appearance coincide, the thinking subject is the phenomenal object to another thinking subject; the perceiver is also the perceived. But thinking involves a withdrawal from the world of appearances into the world of the mind itself.²² Are there really two worlds, the true world of Being and the world of mere Appearance? According to Arendt, the two-world theory, although plausibly corresponding to much of human experience is but one of the great fallacies of philosophical metaphysics.

The world of appearances is *prior* to whatever region the philosopher may *choose* as his “true” home but into which he was not born. It has always been the very appearingness of this world that suggested to the philosopher, that is, to the human mind, the notion that something must exist that is not appearance . . . In other words, when the philosopher takes leave of the world given to our senses and does a turn about . . . to the life of the mind, he takes his clue from the former, looking for something to be revealed to him that would explain its underlying truth.²³

Science suffers the same accident as philosophy, starting with appearances and seeking something that is on a higher epistemological plane than “mere appearance,” reality.

The belief that a cause should be of a higher rank than the effect (so that an effect can easily be disparaged by being retraced to its cause) may belong to the oldest and most stubborn metaphysical fallacies.²⁴

Instead of affirming the value of underlying reality or truth masked by appearance, Arendt affirms a “reversal of the metaphysical hierarchy: the value of the surface.”²⁵ Humans possess a strong urge to display the content of their misnamed “real selves,” their souls, minds, hearts. It is this displaying through which we fit ourselves into the world of appearances, to which we are body-bound. But it is this choosing to reveal oneself, to present an appearance of what appears to us to be our reality that is characteristically human. The exercise of choice is disclosing something about how we appear to ourselves to be (and bringing it to the surface where it becomes an appearance to others) and concealing other things about ourselves. Disclosure may turn out to be mere *semblance*.

Nothing that appears manifests itself to a single viewer capable of perceiving it under all its inherent aspects. The world appears in the mode of it-seems-to-me, depending on particular perspective determined by location in the world as well as by particular organs of perception. This mode not only produces error, which I can correct by changing my location, drawing closer to what appears, or by improving my organs of perception with the help of tools and implements, or by using my imagination to take other perspectives into account; it also gives birth to true semblances, that is, to deceptive appearances which I cannot correct like an error since they are caused by my permanent location and remain bound up with my own existence as one of earth's appearances.²⁶

This then, is the argument that Arendt has to make against mind-body dualism, against those who claim that there is some dichotomy of Reality and Appearance, of Existence and Thought. We cannot exclude from our observation of the world of appearances, our own spacial/temporal vantage point, and its prejudicial perspective, nor our own faculties of observation (and their limitations, inaccuracies), nor can we, in the end, "correct" for these defects. She acknowledges that there are some semblances, some appearances that, like mirages that

. . . will dissolve of their own accord or that can be dispelled upon closer inspection . . . [but other appearances,] . . . like the movement of the sun, its rise in the morning and setting in the evening, will not yield to any amount of scientific information, because that is the way the *appearance* of the sun and earth inevitably *seems* to an earth-bound creature that cannot change its abode.²⁷

After dismissing Kant as over-energetic in his obsession with identifying a thing-in-itself beyond the world of appearances²⁸ Arendt attacks solipsism as "the most pernicious fallacy of philosophy even before it attained in Descartes the high rank of theoretical and existential consistency."²⁹ With tongue-in-cheek she attacks the *cogito*:

His main concern was to find something – the thinking ego, or in his words "*la chose pensante*," which he equated with the soul – whose reality was beyond suspicion, beyond the illusions of sense perception: even the power of an all-powerful *Dieu trompeur* would not be able to shatter the certainty of a consciousness that had withdrawn

from all sense experience. Although everything may be illusion and dream, the dreamer, if he will only consent not to demand reality of the dream, must be real. Hence, "*je pense donc je suis*," "I think, therefore I am." . . . [I]t never occurred to him that no *cogitatio* and no *cogito me cogitare*, no consciousness of an acting self that suspended all faith in the reality of its intentional objects, would ever have been able to convince him of his own reality had he actually been born in a desert, without a body and its senses to perceive "material" things and without fellow-creatures to assure him that what he perceived was perceived by them too. The Cartesian *res cogitans*, this fictitious creature, bodiless, senseless, and forsaken, would not even know that there is such a thing as reality and a possible distinction between the real and the unreal, between the common world of waking life and the private world of our dreams. What Merleau-Ponty had to say against Descartes is brilliantly right: "to reduce perception to the thought of perceiving . . . is to take an insurance against doubt whose premiums are more onerous than the loss for which it is to indemnify us: for it is to . . . move to a type of certitude that will never restore to us the 'there is' of the world."³⁰

In the second chapter of *Thinking* Arendt attacks monistic views of moral personality that required reason to be subjected to willing or passion (Hume) or vice-versa (Plato), denying a hierarchy of the autonomous activities of the mind, thinking, willing and judging. Although there is no hierarchical order, she says, there is an order of priorities. Arendt notes that every mental act requires mental representation of what is not immediately present to the senses (but may recently have been perceived), this faculty of representation through imagination or through intuition is logically prior to thinking, willing and judging. And just as mental representation is logically prior to thinking, so is thinking to willing and to judging.³¹ For these reasons too, thinking is always a withdrawal from the world of sense-experience, it is, as Heidegger said, out of order. Thinking, as an autonomous activity of the mind has been represented by professional philosophers as something essentially at war with "common sense" (which Arendt describes as that "sixth sense that fits our five senses into a common world") precisely because thinking requires a withdrawal from the sensory world.³²

To put it quite simply, in the proverbial absent-mindedness of the philosopher, everything present is absent because some thing actually

absent is present to his mind, and among the things absent is the philosopher's own body. Both the philosopher's hostility toward politics, "the petty affairs of men" and his hostility toward the body have little to do with individual convictions and beliefs; they are inherent in the experience itself. While you are thinking, you are unaware of your own corporeality – and it is this experience that made Plato ascribe immortality to the soul once it has departed from the body and made Descartes conclude "that the soul can think without the body except that so long as the soul is attached to the body it may be bothered in its operations by the bad disposition of the body's organs."³³

Thinking requires language for its outward manifestation, and bodily metaphors like "seeing," "gaining insight" "envisioning" are the usual mode of manifesting thought.³⁴ Willing, according to Arendt, is usually expressed by the bodily metaphor of desire. Here, in what can only be a disingenuous move, Arendt ignores the traditional accounts distinguishing between passion/desire and will/conscience.³⁵ Judgment, she notes, has been discussed in depth only by Kant, whose original title for the *Critique of Judgment* was *Critique of Taste*.³⁶ Thinking is inherently a linguistic act: it needs speech to take place at all, but its language is entirely one of metaphor

. . . which bridges the gulf between the visible and the invisible, the world of appearances and the thinking ego – there exists no metaphor that could plausibly illuminate this special activity of the mind, in which something invisible within us deals with the invisibles of the world. All metaphors drawn from the senses will lead us into difficulties for the simple reason that all our senses are essentially cognitive, hence, if understood as activities, have an end outside themselves; they are not *energeia*, an end in itself, but instruments enabling us to know and deal with the world. . . . The only possible metaphor one may conceive of for the life of the mind is the sensation of being alive. *Without the breath of life the human body is a corpse; without thinking the human mind is dead.*³⁷

In answer to the question "what makes us think?" Arendt surveys the answers given by the Greeks (the desire to immortalize oneself, to find the divine within oneself)³⁸ and by the Romans (the desire to reconcile ourselves to the disunity and chaos of the universe through

understanding and systematizing).³⁹ Arendt instead offers an alternative answer. Arendt is suspicious of all professional philosophers because when professional philosophers like Plato and Epictetus have asked such questions, they have asked them as a matter of professional interest, as though the question was one that came from outside common sense, outside the experience of ordinary living. As “thinking egos” professional philosophers have no urge to appear in the world of appearances, in the real world: they want to hide instead in a world of their own making, the world of the mind separate from that of the real world.

Socrates is the exception. He is the professional philosopher who has, in terms of epistemology, always insisted on living in the real world, the world of appearances. He is a self-described gadfly and midwife, a philosopher with questions and no answers who leaves his auditors paralyzed with confusion – like an electric sea ray.⁴⁰

... Socrates, knowing that we do not know, and nevertheless unwilling to let it go at that, remains steadfast in his own perplexities and, like the electric ray, paralyzed himself, paralyzes anyone he comes into contact with. The electric ray, at first glance seems to be the opposite of the gadfly; it paralyzes where the gadfly rouses. Yet, what cannot fail to look like paralysis from the outside – from the standpoint of ordinary human affairs – is *felt* as the highest state of being active and alive. There exist, despite the scarcity of documentary evidence about the thinking experience, a number of utterances of thinkers throughout the centuries to bear this out.⁴¹

Thus the activity is the act of being fully alive, of being concerned with justice, love and happiness because these terms, “justice,” “love,” “happiness,” express the meaning of what we seek through living. Non-thinking and evil are similarly connected. Thinking and judging something to be morally good or morally evil, are related activities, consciousness and conscience. Judging is the act of manifesting in the world of appearances the contents of the world of thought.

The manifestation of the mind of thought is not knowledge; it is the ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly, and this, at the rare moment when the stakes are on the table, may indeed prevent catastrophes, at least for the self.⁴²

The Greeks, Arendt claims in *The Life of the Mind: Two/Willing*,⁴³ lacked a concept of willing. *Prohairesis* (choice) failed to take into

account the possibility that someone can know the good and can knowingly will to do evil. The Greeks failed to identify a separate psychological faculty, that of *the willing ego* and understood only the knowing ego. It was not until the Christian era with the development of more complex concepts of the ingredients needed for salvation that the faculty of will, and thus the act of willing, began to emerge as a separate moral and psychological construct. Likewise, the Greek stage had been set by the deterministic fates, and questions of the possibility of free will in the face of an all-knowing, all powerful deity remained unaddressed.

Arendt begins with a review of the history of philosophy of willing and examines that history in terms of two concepts: that of the existence of a separate psychological faculty of willing; and that of a free will that exercises choice. The mind's power to recall and to recollect, to bring into the here and now that which is inexorably not now here prompts Arendt to consider the mind as it exists in time. The will, as a faculty of choice deals not with the past and with things that exist, but with the future, with that which may or may not come into existence. Willed acts are contingent. They are that which "I know that I could as well have left . . . undone."⁴⁴ Antiquity identified temporality with cyclical repetitions: that which comes into being has previously potentially but not actually existed. Thus, the concept of willing, of producing a new possibility that may not have existed as a possibility until we willed it, was in large part absent to the ancients. The modern age, with its linear concept of time, and its notion of progress as a causal force in history emphasized the importance of the future – that which has not yet been and which might not be thus and so. From the Christian period through the modern age, the most important philosophical question, Arendt notes, has been whether the omnipotence and omniscience of the deity can be reconciled with the concept of a free, rather than a determined will. Philosophers have wrestled with this problem within the context of religion, so the question "what is the nature of the will" has historically been tied up with the question of salvation.

Arendt credits Bergson with the insight to recognize the power of the past in obscuring our concept of the will. Referring to Bergson, she notes that in

. . . the perspective of memory, that is, looked at retrospectively, a freely performed act loses its air of contingency under the impact of now being an accomplished fact, of having become part and parcel

of the reality in which we live. The impact of reality is overwhelming to the point that we are unable to “think it away”; the act appears to us now in the guise of a necessity that is by no means a mere delusion of consciousness or due only to our limited ability to imagine possible alternatives. This is most obvious in the realm of action, where no deed can be safely undone, but it is also true, though perhaps in a less compelling way, of the countless new objects that human fabrication constantly adds to the world and its civilization, art objects as well as use objects; it is almost as impossible to think away the great art works of our cultural inheritance as to think away the outbreak of the two World Wars or any other events that have decided the very structure of our reality.⁴⁵

The inability to think away the past, to think away that which has happened, makes it difficult to envision thinking away the future, i.e., not willing what we would otherwise will. Here Arendt seems to lack circumspection: after all, doesn’t the entire penal system and the system of justice upon which it is based, depend precisely on the fact that we (albeit retrospectively) do conceive that the felon *could have willed otherwise* and could have acted as he otherwise could have willed? Indeed, the capacity to formulate a will is the *sine qua non* of (at least western) justice systems. We always require, for proof of criminal (and therefore moral) responsibility and guilt, evidence that there was criminal *intent*, i.e., evidence that the way things turned out was in fact as the felon willed them to: that someone was killed, or robbed, etc. Yet, ultimately, it is not the fact that we *assume* the freedom of the will that Arendt is concerned with. Rather, it is the inability to *prove* that the will is, indeed free that concerns her. Compounding the psychological effect of the lack of philosophic proof of the freedom of the will is that of the tension, the “clash” as she calls it, between thinking and willing. Thinking comfortably concerns the what is now or has been; willing stretches the psyche to the very edge of the abyss of the what may become, of the fearful uncertainty of the unknown.

Taking her lead from Hegel’s view of time, Arendt notes that voluntarist philosophy which identifies the self with the willing ego (rather than the thinking ego) necessarily defines self in terms of the future: the self ceases to exist when it faces no more tomorrows. The self ceases to exist when it can no longer truthfully will a state of affairs that is not now and never was present.⁴⁶ Hegel makes the point forcefully: “the Will’s projects take on the appearance of an anticipated past.”⁴⁷

To oversimplify: That there exists such a thing as a *Life* of the mind is due to the mind's organ for the future and its resulting "restlessness"; that there exists such a thing as the life of the *Mind* is due to death, which, foreseen as an absolute end, halts the will and transforms the future into an anticipated past, the will's projects into objects of thought, and the soul's expectation into an anticipated remembrance.⁴⁸

Arendt traces the history of the concept of the faculty of will, beginning with Aristotle's discovery that reason "moves nothing," that the incontinent man follows desire rather than reason, but desire can be moderated by reason: it too is not self-moving. Inserting a new faculty into the reason/desire struggle, Aristotle gave us *prohairesis*, the faculty of choice. Paul the Apostle, and Epictetus the philosopher, respectively found the faculty of choice to be impotent (in choosing which of two conflicting laws to obey) and omnipotent (in creating law unto oneself). Augustine, Arendt notes, is the first philosopher to distinguish the faculty of willing from that of doing.⁴⁹ In Augustine, the Will is the unifying force behind Knowing and Doing, it is that which determines whether and how the knowing self becomes the doing self by "springing into action."⁵⁰ In Duns Scotus, the will is "redeemed" by transforming itself into Love: love of that which God commands. Thus is solved the paradoxical tension between free will and determinism. The will is indeed free, free to embrace and act according to the Law of God (which is what God wills) or not. And God determines the law. God is omnipotent (and can override human will), and has foreknowledge, but does not compel.

In Part Three of *Willing* Arendt explores the connection between the will and the intellect in the thought of Thomas Aquinas (as influenced by Aristotle and Augustine) and Duns Scotus – two near contemporaries, Arendt notes. Scotus' notion of the potent, active free will that creates its truth by inspiring the intellect is at the core, Arendt believes, of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's identification of the will with power. In Scotus the function of the will is to delight in function of willing, i.e., to delight in the transformation of the will into Love. Loving the object that is presented by the intellect to the will, does not cease to be an activity of the will, but rather, a permanent (eternal?) characteristic of "beatitude." And *beatitude* is the "perfect love of God for God's sake" ". . . thus distinct from the love of God for one's own sake," i.e. for the sake of salvation.⁵¹ It is in a life of beatitude that the faculty of will becomes pure activity.

The final, and concluding part of *Willing* reviews German idealism and its constructions of the will. Nietzsche's insight that there are no moral facts, that we cannot know how humans came to exist or how this world came to be frees us from the shackles of an intellect occupied with a never-ending inquiry into cause-and-effect. Free of the need to find a reason for everything in terms of its cause, we are free to ignore the more or less self-imposed temporal perspective of past-present-future. We are free to value all moments as moments of *becoming*, free to repudiate the will and to affirm all that is.⁵² Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, that the will is essentially destructive, and that the only alternative is "letting be," affirms that willing and thinking are inherently opposing faculties of the mind. After a lengthy analysis of Heidegger's metaphysics that I cannot pretend to comprehend, Arendt explores what she identifies as the "abyss of freedom and the new secular order." In this new order, political freedom has its origins in the concept of a free will, a will that can be a law unto itself, or, when viewed collectively, western society has its origin in the concept of collectives of free wills, collectives that can be self-legislating. The idea of free will then, if not a philosophical necessity (or, even, a philosophical possibility) is a political necessity. How well that faculty is exercised depends upon the faculty of *judging*, the subject matter of the ill-fated final work of Arendt's trilogy.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Hannah Arendt was an unusual and original philosopher. Overcoming the multiple obstacles of race and gender, she rose to become one of the leading philosophers of this century. Even those who are less than fully sympathetic to the methods and insights of German phenomenology can appreciate the depth of her analyses of the nature and faculties of human thought. And it was human moral and political thought that captured her imagination the most. Arendt was clearly far more than a mere chronicler and translator of the philosophies of her mentors, Jaspers and Heidegger. She was very much a socratic gadfly: prodding us to inquire into social phenomena we found distasteful, but which nevertheless characterize the century we live in. Her interpretations of the philosophical assumptions of revolution, exploitation, oppression and violence engaged in on the basis of class, race and gender contain forceful, fresh new insights on contemporary morality.

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12. Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986)

JEFFNER ALLEN* and JO-ANN PILARDI**

I. BIOGRAPHY*

Since the publication of *The Second Sex* in 1949 Simone de Beauvoir has been a source of philosophical inspiration for feminists worldwide. Beauvoir was born in Paris, January 2, 1908, the daughter of Françoise Brasseur de Beauvoir and Georges de Beauvoir. She studied philosophy at the Sorbonne and the Ecole Normale Supérieure. After completing the *agrégation* in 1923, she taught philosophy in Marseilles, Rouen, and Paris. In 1944 Beauvoir decided to become a full-time writer. Simone de Beauvoir formed many lasting friendships including, most notably, her life-long friendship with Jean-Paul Sartre, the individual who most influenced her ideas and writing. She traveled widely and was particularly impressed by her visits to China, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the United States of America. She took part in numerous political demonstrations, among which were the opposition to the German occupation of France, to French colonial rule in Algeria, to the war in Vietnam, and to sexism in women's lives. Simone de Beauvoir died in Paris, April 21, 1986.

II. WORKS*

Beauvoir's *mémoires* document her life and times in vivid detail. *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter* contains compelling descriptions of her relationship with ZaZa, her childhood friend, and with Hélène de Beauvoir, her sister, as well as discussion of her rejection of religion and of the family as institution. *The Prime of Life* brings forth Beauvoir's encounter with existentialism, her life with Jean-Paul Sartre, and her own process of becoming a writer. *The Force of Circumstance* highlights Beauvoir's

life during the pre-war and war years, *All Said and Done* moves from the war to the late sixties, *Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre* marks the years preceding the death of Sartre. *A Very Easy Death*, written upon the death of her mother, may well be one of Beauvoir's most enduring essays. Among her highly acclaimed literary works are *She Came to Stay*, *The Blood of Others*, *All Men are Mortal*, *The Mandarins*, which received the Prix Goncourt, *Les Belles Images*, and *The Woman Destroyed*. Beauvoir's best known theoretical works are *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, *The Second Sex*, and *The Coming of Age*.

Early in her life Beauvoir decided that she wanted to be a writer, and not a philosopher. Philosophy may build great systems that enable one to consider oneself abstractly, from a perspective at once universal and infinite. Philosophical reflection may bring a sense of peaceful calm. Nonetheless, Beauvoir argues, there is but one reality and that reality can be thought only from within the world of living people. Once one is "beneath a real sky" philosophical systems are no longer of use. The "metaphysical novel," a philosophical literary work that seeks to evoke the living unity and ambiguity of the subjective and the objective, the relative and the absolute, the historical and the eternal is, for Beauvoir, the greatest accomplishment. When developed in an existential context, the metaphysical novel refuses the consolations of abstract evasion and by bringing readers to ourselves – to our loves, our revolts, our desires – it brings us to the concrete difficulties of choice and action.¹

Beauvoir's work sets forth a supple existentialism that honors experience in its fundamental ambiguity and safeguards the world of human experience from objectifying philosophical systems and oppressive political institutions. "Experience" is defined by Beauvoir as the "inward experience of a subject," the "inwardly-experienced meaning" of our being in the world.² Lived experience can be communicated from the standpoint of each individual's uniqueness but it cannot be known as a universal, philosophical concept. In *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter* Beauvoir shows her experience, for her, was always ambiguous. As a child she desired to express neutral tints and muted shades, she felt that there might be a gap between word and object, she was wary of the assumption, encouraged by grownups, that the definition of a thing expresses its substance:

Whatever I beheld with my own eyes and every real experience had to be fitted somehow or other into a rigid category: the myths and the stereotyped ideas prevailed.³

In *The Ethics of Ambiguity* Beauvoir demonstrates how ambiguity belies essentialism and its reduction of lived experience to static, lifeless categories. She proposes an "existential conversion" by which there is effected a shift from Hegelian systematic philosophy to existentialist lived experience. Just as the Husserlian phenomenological reduction prevents dogmatism by suspending affirmation concerning the mode of reality of the external world, whose existence it does not contest, Beauvoir's existential conversion suspends the will to absolutes, an act by which it makes visible human freedom without suppressing our desires, plans, and passions.⁴ Through the existential conversion we assume our "fundamental ambiguity" and we grasp the "genuine conditions of our life . . . our strength to live and our reason for acting."⁵

Philosophies prevalent in her time, namely, naturalism, psychoanalysis, and Marxism, are studied by Beauvoir and rejected on the grounds that they distance themselves from lived experience and fail to account for the wholeness of human existence. Beauvoir develops instead a critical methodology that articulates the plurality of concrete individuals not as a completed reality, but in its becoming.⁶ Naturalistic explanations, Beauvoir argues, are inadequate insofar as humanity is not a natural, but a historical phenomenon:

. . . nothing that happens to a man is ever natural, since his presence calls the world into question.⁷

Human reproduction, although founded in biology, does not necessitate sexual differentiation; old age goes beyond history, but is not exclusively a biological fate.⁸

Psychoanalysis offers a relatively more comprehensive perspective, Beauvoir writes, in that it posits humanity not as natural objects, but as subjects, or lived bodies, who define ourselves through our emotional life. The psychoanalytic rejection of the concept of choice, and its adherence to a criterion of "normality," or essentialist and prescriptive social custom, gives rise to an inauthentic picture of humanity. The masculine model offered by Freud assumes mistakenly that sexuality is a given. It explains the prestige of the penis by the sovereignty of the father but does not account for the origin of male supremacy. Beauvoir states,

. . . he understood nothing of what women want. Anyone who wants to work on women has to break completely with Freud.⁹

Historical materialism brings to existential analysis the recognition that humanity makes itself what it is according to its material possibilities. A woman is defined not exclusively by her sexuality, but also by the economic organization of the society in which she lives. Beauvoir maintains, however, that historical materialism rejects the concept of choice and therefore can view the subject only as passive. Historical materialism mistakenly infers that the institution of private property, the family, or the division of labor between the sexes, *must necessarily* have involved the enslavement of women. It reduces women to the capacity for labor and does not consider seriously women's work in reproduction and childcare.¹⁰

Beauvoir's critique of the competing philosophies of her day offers a theoretical introduction to existentialism; her analysis of myth as political institution takes a major step in the actualization of a world that valorizes lived experience. "Myth" is described by Beauvoir as the universalization and projection by a society of those institutions and values to which it adheres. Unlike "significance," which is immanent in an object and understood through living experience, myth is a transcendent idea that reifies belief and defies experience. Myth would rob individuals of transcendence, namely, their self-defined projects and goals, and would confine individuals to immanence, that is, to inert being.¹¹ The foundation of modern right-wing ideology is, Beauvoir argues, the myth of "Man," the abstract Man spoken in the name of all.¹² Bourgeois myths of affluence hide the experience of old age, its economic poverty and despair.¹³ All the myths related to motherhood, the idea of the maternal instinct, the feminine vocation, and marriage, enslave women to the home, to housekeeping, and to their husbands.¹⁴ The myth of woman is named by Beauvoir:

Few myths have been more advantageous to the ruling caste than the myth of woman: it justifies all privileges and even authorizes their abuse.¹⁵

Yet, myth, despite its power, is not destined to an eternal life. To name a myth is already to begin its destruction: "As soon as a single myth is touched, all myths are in danger."¹⁶ Once "the conspiracy of silence" concerning old age is shattered, "everything has to be reconsidered, recast from the very beginning."¹⁷ Destruction of the myth of motherhood, which Beauvoir distinguishes from motherhood itself, would completely transform society.¹⁸ Women as free and autonomous beings end the imperialism of consciousness that would posit woman as the Other.¹⁹

Beauvoir's analysis of myth as institution reflects the ethical character of her existentialism. Her existential ethic takes as its point of departure the understanding that humans are free. The life task of each individual is to assume that freedom, and not to flee from it. Freedom is assumed by a constructive movement, by undertaking projects that serve as a mode of transcendence, that is, acting such that one's own freedom is achieved by reaching out toward the freedom of others. Transcendence that falls into immanence, or stagnation, is termed by Beauvoir an "absolute evil" which "spells frustration and oppression" if it is inflicted upon an individual and which "represents a moral fault" if an individual consents to it. Freedom also is assumed by a negative movement that rejects oppression for oneself and others.²⁰

Common to both movements for taking up one's freedom is Dostoyevsky's maxim, which is quoted by Beauvoir in the opening lines of *The Blood of Others*, "Each of us is responsible for everything and to every human being."²¹ Such an ethics is individualistic, for it gives to the individual an absolute value and recognizes in the individual alone the power to lay the foundations for its existence. Beauvoir writes:

If each man did what he must, existence would be saved in each one without there being any need for dreaming of a paradise where all would be reconciled in death.²²

Yet Beauvoir's existential ethic is not solipsistic, for in it each individual is defined only by relationship to the world and to other individuals. The separation of consciousness can be overcome by friendship, love, and the many human emotions, none of which is given in advance, and each of which is to be made.²³

Such an ethics is disquieting because it is demanding. Humanity, the sole source of values, must not follow the lines of least resistance.²⁴ Each individual, as finite, can do only a limited work and that work is never finished. The only politics of value is one in which each individual inscribes actions concretely in the world.²⁵ By refusing the consolations of false idols and of resignation, Beauvoir's ethics avoids moral pessimism and expresses an optimistic confidence in each individual's ability to recover the freedom which is its own.²⁶

Beauvoir's contribution to feminist theory is her situation of woman in an existential context. Beauvoir does not superadd women to an existentialism that has already been set in place by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.

Rather, the specific quality of the existentialism fashioned by Beauvoir, its emphasis on the ambiguity of lived experience and its methodological and conceptual fluidity, enables women to emerge as the subject of discourse. When asked why she took up the study of women which was to become *The Second Sex* Beauvoir replied,

Well, it was because I wanted to talk about myself, and because I realized that in order to talk about myself I had to understand the fact that I was a woman.²⁷

Femininity is a cultural formation that is socially imposed on women. It is not a “natural” fact of life. Beauvoir asserts, in what is perhaps the most discussed passage of *The Second Sex*:

One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. No biological, psychological, or economic fate determines the figure that the human female presents in society; it is civilization as a whole that produces this creature, intermediate between male and eunuch, which is described as feminine. Only the intervention of someone else can establish an individual as an *Other*.²⁸

“To be a woman” is an instance of the dynamic, Hegelian sense of the verb “to be,” namely, “to have become”:

She [woman] would be quite embarrassed to decide what she is; but this is not because the hidden truth is too vague to be discerned: it is because in this domain there is no truth. An existent *is* nothing other than what he does; the possible does not extend beyond the real, essence does not precede existence: in pure subjectivity, the human being *is not anything*. He is to be measured by his acts.²⁹

“Woman,” and “femininity” are used by Beauvoir to refer not to an archetype or changeless essence, but to

. . . the common basis that underlies every individual feminine existence . . . in the present state of education and custom.³⁰

Beauvoir rejects prescriptive demands issuing from notions of “woman’s role” and engages a descriptive inquiry whose aim is to determine whether that state of affairs which is woman should continue – a question which she answers with a resounding NO.³¹ She writes:

The lot assigned to women in the patriarchy, is in no way a vocation, any more than slavery is the vocation of the slave.³²

Woman finds herself in a world where man represents both the positive and the neutral, where she is defined not as an autonomous being, but relative to man and as the negative:

He is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the Other.³³

Woman's situation is not chosen by her,

. . . "no subject will readily volunteer to become the object, the inessential," rather, "men compel her to assume the status of the Other."³⁴

Two different explanations for women's situation are offered by Beauvoir. In *The Second Sex* she maintains that the imperialism of human consciousness necessitates that consciousness set itself up as subject in opposition to object, as fundamentally hostile to all other consciousness. Grounding her claim in Hegelian phenomenology as developed by Levinas and Levi-Strauss, Beauvoir argues that Otherness is a fundamental category of human thought. Woman would not exist as second sex

. . . if human consciousness had not included the original category of the other and an original aspiration to dominate.³⁵

In the early 1960s Beauvoir proposes a materialist explanation of women's situation. She no longer bases the rejection and oppression of the Other on an antagonistic awareness, but upon an economic explanation of scarcity. She notes, however, that this theoretical shift does not modify the argument of *The Second Sex*,

. . . that all male ideologies are directed at justifying the oppression of women, and that women are so conditioned by society that they consent to this oppression.³⁶

In 1982 Beauvoir remarked,

I think it is good for thoughts to be shaped by experience; at any rate, that is the path I have always followed.³⁷

She had dismissed at first Colette Audry's suggestion that she write a book on women, but after World War II Beauvoir took up that project with vigor.³⁸ Whereas in *The Second Sex* Beauvoir wrote that women live dispersed among males and lack the concrete means for organizing themselves into a group, some twenty years later she signed the *Manifeste des 343* and participated in the French feminist campaign for free abortion. In 1972 she decided that socialism alone would not improve women's situation. She named herself a militant feminist and joined the women's liberation movement:

. . . where they [feminists] do differ from my book is on the practical plane: they refuse to trust in the future; they want to tackle their problems, to take their fate in hand, here and now. This is the point upon which I have changed: I think they are right.³⁹

When reconsidering her work in its entirety, Beauvoir noted,

. . . when I was young it would have upset me if my books were called "women's books" and now, on the contrary, I am very happy to think that my books particularly interest women because I feel a solidarity with other women.⁴⁰

III. PHILOSOPHY OF THE SELF**

1. *Background*

Beauvoir asserted in her autobiography that the problem of the Other was her issue, a point that can easily be seen in her first two novels, *L'Invitée* (*She Came to Stay*) and *Le sang des autres* (*The Blood of Others*), as well as in the work she is most famous for, *The Second Sex*. There she analyzes woman's situation as that of Other. However, the problem of the Other can be seen as complementary to the problem of self. It is a problem that Beauvoir derived from two sources: (1) Hegel's conception of the self, where the Other is presented as a negative definition of the self, and (2) Sartre's interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology, which contrasted the self as "for-itself" and the self as ego.⁴¹

The tradition in which Simone de Beauvoir wrote, that of existentialism or existential phenomenology (a term she uses occasionally in *The Second Sex*), does not discuss the self in terms of criteria for personal identity. The emphasis within existentialism, specifically Sartrean exis-

tentialism with which Beauvoir was allied, is primarily in a discussion of consciousness and its “by-product,” the ego, embarking from the Husserlian tradition. The problematic which this tradition presented involved the distinction of two types of being, “for-itself” and “in-itself” (intentional and nonintentional). It is on the axis of intentionality then, rather than identity, reidentification, or individuation that the existentialist-phenomenological problematic of the self developed by Sartre and used by Beauvoir turns. It is also intentionality, understood in an active sense as the transcendence of the for-itself, that Beauvoir later changed by her analysis in *The Second Sex* that woman was a transcendence forced to be an immanence by a patriarchal society. Though this compulsion could not ever be totally effective, i.e., woman could never be reduced to a thing, to in-itself, its presence was the central conflict of woman’s life, she claimed.

The founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, had claimed that consciousness is always “consciousness of something.”⁴² The movement of consciousness toward some thing, toward an object that it is aware of, is the structure of consciousness and is what Husserl called “intentionality,” the ability of consciousness to “in-tend” toward an object that it perceives. Consciousness “has” acts of intention, either of perception or imagination. All else is nonintentional being, what Sartre called “being-in-itself”; this nonintentional being is the being which things have. By contrast, the term “for-itself,” taken from Hegel, was used by Sartre to indicate consciousness as a being with transcendence, distinguished from in-itself, the being of things, imminent being.⁴³

However, Husserl had thought that a “transcendental ego” was necessary to unify and individualize consciousness. Sartre argued in *The Transcendence of the Ego* that in fact such an element would be foreign to the qualities of consciousness: emptiness, nothingness, and spontaneity.⁴⁴ Husserl’s “transcendental ego” might amount to this, but only this, Sartre insisted; consciousness, without content of its own, is an intentional movement but not a content, “for-itself” but not “in-itself.” Because it is not a content, has no substance, consciousness is impersonal, “an impersonal spontaneity”; this is to say, specifically, that it doesn’t come out of an “I” or a “self,” if “self” is taken as a person, an ego-formation. There is no ego inhabiting consciousness, and when an ego can be perceived – and Sartre allows that it can – it is, ironically, not the “owner” of consciousness, one which is derived from consciousness, not prior to it. This problematic of the self is the one with which Beauvoir began: self as for-itself vs. self as ego.

2. *Self and Other in Beauvoir's Early Essays*

The essay *Pyrrhus et Cinéas*, published in 1944 and still not translated into English, was Beauvoir's first published philosophical work. After the novel *The Blood of Others*, it was the second work of what she termed her "moral period."⁴⁵ The essay takes its title from a story told by Plutarch of a conversation between Pyrrhus, one of the greatest generals of antiquity, about to embark on a new military campaign, and Cinéas, his trusted lieutenant who advises against the campaign. Beauvoir defends the military man, Pyrrhus, using him as a prototype of the existentialist hero. His military adventurism is a form of activism and is better than indifference or inactivity. The two figures, Pyrrhus and Cinéas, become symbols of the active and passive aspects of the for-itself, the human subject. At this stage, Beauvoir used the term "subjectivity" to indicate the active component of the self, that is, the for-itself. The self as for-itself, as subject, is not a thing. Further, by acts, will, etc., by its projection through actions, its transcendence, the self creates a bond with others. Movement toward the other is exemplified in certain choices that one makes to value the other; thus, concretely and specifically, *a posteriori*, and not abstractly, generally, or *a priori*, the self finds others valuable because it makes them valuable through its own actions in regard to them.

In this essay, Beauvoir further develops her notion of the human being as for-itself through an argument with Heidegger, specifically against his notion that *Dasein* (the human being) is "being-toward-death." Even though Heidegger argues against the notion of human interiority, his "being-toward-death" notion of *Dasein* carries a claim of interiority or immanence, in regard to the human being.⁴⁶ For Heidegger, the project, "being-toward-death," is the only authentic project; this amounts to a definition by limitation of the human being; yet, to delimit it is to deny its transcendence, to fix it into a preassigned mold. Thus, Heidegger's claim amounts to an assertion that authentic subjectivity is a type of thinghood, an immanence not a transcendence, and is therefore mistaken.⁴⁷ But, subjectivity is not immanence; it is transcendence, an engagement in the world. Thus, Beauvoir is rejecting the notion that the human subject can both have transcendence and yet have a kind of "stability" of self through this one particular and overarching project within which all other projects are subsumed and all transcendence enveloped: being-toward-death.

Following *Pyrrhus et Cinéas*, Beauvoir published two novels and a play. Then in 1947, she published her well-known philosophical work,

The Ethics of Ambiguity. In this work she created an ethics based on the analysis of human existence presented in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*.⁴⁸ In this work she follows the Sartrean distinction between being-for-itself (intentional being, human existence) and being-in-itself. This for-itself is free, i.e., is defined in its core as freedom, and because it is nothing, it is not determined. The freedom that the for-itself has and is moves toward the future, choosing and pursuing ideals – "projects." In so doing, in choosing and pursuing its future projects, the for-itself transcends or surpasses itself; each goal achieved or failed becomes a new point of departure for a new moment of the self. This means that to be a for-itself, a being with transcendence, is already to be free. Beauvoir follows Sartre's notion that the for-itself is a negativity, "carries nothingness in its heart," so that this "surpassing" that is the transcendence of the for-itself exists in the mode of negativity.⁴⁹ Beginning with these basic elements of Sartrean ontology, Beauvoir constructed her ethics.

The for-itself, in that it is a nothingness, a negativity rather than a substance, is marked by a particular characteristic, ambiguity, the central concept of Beauvoir's ethics. It becomes synonymous with the freedom of the for-itself. Ambiguity functions on several levels for Beauvoir. It is the mark of the human condition. This refers to the existentialist claim that human life is not ever fixed, i.e., has no nature; individuals neither participate in a universal human nature nor have an individual, fixed nature. Human existence is ambiguous – uncertain and undefined. It is in this sense that Beauvoir claims that the for-itself does not "coincide" with itself.⁵⁰ Echoing Heidegger's claim that the self is "at a distance" from itself, this is also the claim of a "lack of being" of which Sartre spoke. Here the negativity of the for-itself emerges, since it is nothing, has nature, no content, but is only a distancing, a movement of transcendence.

But this "lack of being" which freedom is can be felt either positively or negatively. Beauvoir describes a set of "archetypes" of human existence: the sub-man, the serious man, the nihilist, the adventurer, the passionate man; these can be seen also as stages, so to speak, on the way to the achievement of an ethical life.⁵¹ She distinguishes each by the manner in which each experiences the ambiguity of existence. For the nihilist, for example, ambiguity of existence is not experienced positively as freedom or transcendence but is rather seen merely as a lack, so that the nihilist's challenge to all given values never allows for an acknowledgment of human freedom.⁵² For the adventurer, by contrast,

this ambiguity is experienced positively. By the adventurer's continual and deliberate choice-making and setting of new goals, human freedom is acknowledged. Though neither nihilist nor adventurer accepts nor is resigned to given values, the adventurer knows that beyond the simple and nihilistic refusal of specific "givens" there is the ongoing acceptance of human freedom itself, as manifested in one's ongoing choices. But what prevents the archetype of the adventurer, for example, from being the ethical hero points to an important element in Beauvoir's ethics, and that is that, in Beauvoir's judgment, adventurism is a form of solipsism. Beauvoirian existentialism, however, insists on the centrality of the me-others bond and is radically nonsolipsistic and radically nonindividualistic, as we shall see.⁵³

The for-itself also desires its own objectification; it wants to be in-itself, a thing, or more completely, "in-itself-for-itself," i.e., God, as Sartre had put it. But neither the objectification of thinghood nor that of divinity are possible for the for-itself, so this desire is doomed to failure. An additional desire, its desire to disclose being, which is really the intentionality of consciousness, manifests itself. By the disclosure of being, of the world, the for-itself acknowledges its negativity and accepts itself as lack of being. In this movement, its nonsolipsism is apparent.⁵⁴

Through Beauvoir's interpretation, this ontological description becomes a moral imperative; the descriptive analysis turns prescriptive in two ways. First, she claims, the self should take up or "assume" its negativity – its distance from itself – and in so doing it assumes its freedom and is ethical; this Beauvoir calls "existentialist conversion."⁵⁵ Further, it should seek via choices of values/projects to "ground itself," to take up its freedom through concrete means.⁵⁶ To will one's freedom in concrete ways is to become moral – to accept and not flee from that nothingness that humans are. By contrast, to refuse to accept it, or worse, to hinder the freedom of others is to be immoral.

Though the individual subject is sovereign and unique, an absolute, the sovereignty of the subject can be "disturbed" in two ways. Both disturbances have to do with the existence of other people, as themselves subjects and as part of a collectivity of human beings. First, the subject can also be an object for others.⁵⁷ Second, the subject, though it is an individual, is also a "*mitsein*," a being-with-others. The radical individuality of the subject in Beauvoir's ethics is combined throughout with a notion that the individual exists within a collectivity.⁵⁸ Thus the freedom of the for-itself is at once also being-for-others.⁵⁹

Combining these two "disturbances" of subjectivity, Beauvoir makes

an argument that is a radical addition to the existential-phenomenological ontology of Sartre that she began with, that is, the me-other relationship is as indissoluble as the subject-object relationship.⁶⁰ She begins with the axiom that human subjectivity, the for-itself, is active, moving toward a project. Thus, subjectivity is the starting point of every project, and subjectivity by definition is a surpassing of itself, a transcendence. But, she adds to the Sartrean ontology two important notions: subjectivity needs justification and it receives justification in the existence of other human beings. A weakness is that she does not provide serious arguments for these points, but merely declares them. Her conclusion and "irreducible truth" is that the relation between one's self and others is an indissoluble one.⁶¹ Since self and other are bound together ontologically, the willing of my own freedom, i.e., the for-itself's affirmatively taking on its own freedom, becomes the willing of the freedom of others.⁶² Thus, the ontological claim has merged with a moral one: the ethics of ambiguity require that the for-itself *will* the disclosure of being which it *is*, but which it may, in a positively moral attitude, *will*. This willing of the disclosure of being is the willing of freedom, of transcendence.⁶³ This willing of freedom is a willing of the freedom of others as well as my own.

In the existentialist problematic called upon by *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, the transcendence of the for-itself is tempered with its facticity. An ontological system which rejects determinism and which virtually equates the human being with freedom, as did Sartrean existentialism, must make at least some concession to the hindrances or resistances which freedom encounters. These factors provide a "coefficient of adversity" to the freedom of the for-itself.⁶⁴ They include: one's place, one's body, one's past, general environment, other human beings, and one's death.⁶⁵

In Beauvoir's famous claim that "ethics is the triumph of freedom over facticity . . .," Beauvoir meant to incorporate political issues into her existentialist ethics, an incorporation seen in several of her novels as well.⁶⁶ Those forces which deny human freedom also attempt to turn the human being into mere facticity. Such "parties of oppression" who perform this reduction of others to immanence, to pure facticity, use that very reduction to claim that those they oppress are *only* facticity, only immanence, to validate the torture or destruction they perform against them.⁶⁷ In making this point, Beauvoir uses the victims of the Holocaust as well as colonialism in Algeria as examples of those who are victimized by tyrannical attempts to reduce the for-itself to an in-self,

to reduce human existence to its facticity and ignore its freedom. The oppressor, intent on turning transcendence into mere immanence, possesses the only freedom not deserving of respect. In asserting its own transcendence, it violently forces others into immanence.

In two articles that appeared in 1948 in *Existentialisme et la sagesse des nations*, a work consisting of four essays, Beauvoir was at pains to defend existentialism, and to emphasize the importance of the for-itself, a term she used interchangeably with "subjectivity."⁶⁸ In the title essay, her explanation revolves around the difference between philosophies (and psychologies) of immanence and those of transcendence. Considering the self, the "me," or ego, to be a thinglike construction of philosophies of immanence, Beauvoir maintains that, for existentialism, it no longer exists.⁶⁹ The self and the for-itself, the subject, are mutually exclusive. Existentialism's claim of the importance of subjectivity is equated with the definition of the human being as transcendence. The self as for-itself, subject, not the self as ego, is "engagement in the world, movement toward the Other"; in contrast, the self posited by philosophies of immanence is one to whom all actions and feelings of the human being turn back. In this latter view, no active subject appears, but a "self," (*moi*) as object in the world, and from this object one's behavior stems. Indeed, this immanent self has needs which are to be satisfied; in fact, one may rationalize that its demands may swallow up one's freedom.⁷⁰

Within that same work, in the essay "Littérature et métaphysique," she connects this central importance of subjectivity within the existentialist school to the use of literary forms, in particular the "metaphysical novel," a form which, at this point in her development, she had employed three times, in *L'Invitée*, *Le sang des autres*, and *Tous les hommes sont mortel* (*All Men Are Mortal*). The connection between the existentialist notion of subjectivity (which is part of "existentialist metaphysics") and literature derives from the importance of presenting metaphysics in a "singular and temporal form," i.e., a novel, the specific, living, concrete experience as opposed to the generalizations and abstractions of classical metaphysics.⁷¹ At this point, Beauvoir interpreted existentialism as a philosophy which indisputably denies the self, i.e., the self as "me" or ego, by affirming subjectivity.

3. *Self and Other in The Second Sex*

In her autobiography, relating the beginnings of the intellectual project that resulted in *The Second Sex*, Beauvoir tells us that she wanted to write

about herself but realized that the first question to come up was, "What has it meant to me to be a woman?" She then turned to the project that became *The Second Sex*. Later, discussing the book's reception, Beauvoir said that upon its publication she became the object of sarcastic attack, her sexuality publicly impugned, her morality questioned, her personhood supposedly "humiliated" by her writing, attacked by those she would have expected and by those she never expected. She was flabbergasted at the strength of opposition the book unleashed and at the personal nature of the attacks.⁷²

Published in two volumes in French, the entire work is initiated with an Introduction, a classic in its own right by now, and ends with a Conclusion, and each volume is organized into parts: four in the first volume and three in the second volume. Within these parts, Beauvoir uses a number of theoretical approaches. She mixes theories of human psychological development with theories of historical materialism, anthropological theory, existentialism, phenomenology, and Hegelianism.

In the Introduction to *The Second Sex*, Beauvoir says that her perspective is that of existentialist ethics: "every subject plays its part . . . through exploits or projects that serve as a mode of transcendence; he achieves liberty only through a continual reaching out toward other liberties."⁷³

Though the notion of the self in *The Second Sex* follows closely in some respects that within the earlier *Ethics of Ambiguity*, there are important additions. The for-itself is a free, surpassing, transcendent being, a subjectivity which exists through projects and which is distinguished from being-in-itself. This being-in-itself is an individual and as such is sovereign, autonomous and unique.

The fundamental problem posed in *The Second Sex* touches directly on the issue of the for-itself; woman, being human, is a subject. She is being-for-itself. Thus, she is a sovereign, a unique individual, and she carries the "essential" quality that all subjectivity carries. Her being is freedom in the mode of negativity, in the mode of transcending. But woman's situation makes her "inessential." The for-itself has been divided according to gender. In the language of *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, the freedom has been abridged, and facticity has been encouraged by "parties of oppression" who maintain woman in a perpetual situation of oppression. Woman, being human, is a subject, i.e., a free and autonomous existent with the ability to make choices. Yet, this transcendence in woman is burdened with a situation which requires her to be a nonsubject, a nonautonomous existent. Compelled into immanence by men,

treated as an object, in fact, forced to live out the status of Other to consciousness, women are ontologically trapped.

The drama of woman lies in this conflict between the fundamental aspirations of every subject – who always regards the self as the essential – and the compulsions of a situation in which she is the inessential. How can a human being in woman's situation attain fulfillment?⁷⁴

Beauvoir analyzed woman's situation as one in which a for-itself is forced to be nonintentional being, an in-itself, a nonsubject. This for-itself has been automatically and perpetually demeaned to the status of an in-itself. This equation of maleness with transcendence and femaleness with immanence is one that runs throughout patriarchy, Beauvoir claims.

Scholars have noted that, in order to use existentialism in *The Second Sex*, Beauvoir had to overcome certain aspects of it that were limitations to her project.⁷⁵ The book mixes a great deal of empirical data with the freedom of the for-itself to the oppression of women and hence places great emphasis on woman's situation and condition. As a spokesperson for a philosophy which focused on the individual and the freedom of the individual, she ran the risk of being accused of validating determinism, which runs counter to the existentialist notion of the human being, particularly the early form of Sartrean existentialism; ". . . man is free, man *is* freedom," Sartre had written in "Existentialism Is a Humanism," in 1946.⁷⁶

Yet, with this background of a philosophy of radical freedom Beauvoir maintains nevertheless, in the Introduction to *The Second Sex*, that women do not assert themselves as subjects because women lack the *concrete means* for doing so. She continues this throughout with an analysis that insists on the enforced condition of immanence, or facticity, to women by "man the subject." By claiming that such conditions exist, and that they are part of a situation of coercion which is external to women's own choices – what she would have called the work of "the parties of oppression" in the *Ethics of Ambiguity* – Beauvoir shifts the weight of subjectivity, this subjectivity of the female, toward the pole of determinism. In so doing, she greatly weakens the existentialist ontology that she herself continues to call upon through the book.⁷⁷ While Sartre had emphasized, in analyzing the facticity of the for-itself, that it was always accompanied by freedom, Beauvoir emphasized that for women the freedom was always accompanied by facticity, because the patriar-

chal system encouraged women's immanence and discouraged their transcendence.

The Second Sex is a work which is certainly existentialist in approach and by announcement, yet Beauvoir combined other theories with existentialism, primarily Hegelianism and structuralism. This is obvious in the Introduction, in which Beauvoir sets out the theoretical foundations for the work, and it continues throughout at numerous junctures in the main text. In an important paragraph in the Introduction, Beauvoir adds Hegelian categories to Levi-Straussian structuralism. The contrasts of duality, alternation, opposition, and symmetry, asserted by Levi-Strauss to be fundamental to all social reality, make no sense, she claims, because they provide no explanation for the negativity often apparent in human relations. One must add to these structures the "fundamental hostility toward every other consciousness" which consciousness itself contains; according to Hegel, "the subject can be posed only in being opposed – he sets himself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the object."⁷⁸ The Husserlian/Sartrean notion of consciousness as intentionality, a neutral zone, is ignored here for the Hegelian one, i.e., that consciousness operates within a contest between two poles, where each pole is a combatant across a battlefield.⁷⁹ This is close to Sartre's discussion of relations with others in *Being and Nothingness* which he defines as strongly conflictual along the lines of Hegel's master-slave dialectic, that dialectic which the French existentialists so appreciated.

According to Beauvoir's brand of Hegelianism, it is due to the "imperialism of human consciousness" that a "one," a subject, becomes "other." Such a claim of a "universal" to human consciousness, and especially the strongly-worded description of this phenomenon that she provides, cannot be deduced from phenomenology, e.g., Heidegger's *mitsein*.

If the original relation between man and his fellow was exclusively a relation of friendship, we could not account for any type of enslavement; but no, this phenomenon is a result of the imperialism of the human consciousness, seeking always to exercise its sovereignty in objective fashion . . . Human Consciousness . . . included the original category of the Other and an original aspiration to dominate the Other . . .⁸⁰

Thus, Hegel is mixed here with history and anthropology; the oppression of woman is due to the characteristic nature of consciousness, to its drive to "other-ize" an other consciousness. Never could woman's

physical weakness nor indeed any empirical fact be reason enough for such oppression. What stands behind empirical, historical oppression is the very nature of consciousness, which is conflictual. Yet, Hegel's notion of consciousness undergoes a bizarre change, as Beauvoir created her own theory. The Hegelian dialectic, with its opposing poles of subject-object, helps her describe the objectification of woman into a nonself, a nonsubject, and nonessential being. But Hegel's dialectic permitted the subject and object status to move from one person to another person. Because of *her* analysis that consciousness is gendered, the Hegelian dialectic freezes, in male-female relations. No movement to subject status is possible for woman. "How is it, then, . . . reciprocity has not been recognized between the sexes, that one of the contrasting terms is set up as the sole essential . . . ?"⁸¹

Underlying and locking up the reciprocal movement of Hegel's dialectic lies, according to Beauvoir's analysis, the *unmoving* structure of patriarchy, a foundation whereby males hold all significant power – familial, religious, and political, and whereby the subject-self, if female, is a nonsubject, a secondary, relative being, an *other*. By so stressing the otherness of woman in *The Second Sex*, Beauvoir qualifies both the existentialist perspective of subjectivity and the Hegelian perspective of reciprocity, i.e., no longer a "freedom," the for-itself as woman is Other, absolute Other, and, thus, never self. The simplicity of the distinction between the for-itself and the in-itself from *The Ethics of Ambiguity* has now been greatly complicated. In *The Second Sex*, moving on from Sartrean existentialism and with the help of Hegel and Levi-Strauss, Beauvoir uncovers a "plot" in all history, we might say, to objectify a for-itself – woman. Unlike other oppressed groups, woman under the situation of patriarchy has been systematically forced into an object, the category being that of otherness – into "the brutish life" of things.⁸²

Woman is caught in a situation of oppression. In *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, Beauvoir established that oppression is the denial of freedom, and freedom is the being of the for-itself; therefore, oppression is the denial of one's being. Thus, female-for-itself can't transcend, due *not* to an *internal* problem, for example, bad faith – Sartre's famous case – but to *external* conditions. Such an "evil," Beauvoir claims, is either a moral fault, if the subject consents, or it is an oppression, if the subject is constrained by others. It is this point that makes Beauvoir claim that woman is doomed to immorality, for the same reason, nearly, that Mary Wollstonecraft claimed that woman was doomed to immorality, yet, the

moral fault was not hers but man's, due to his limitation of her opportunities and his oppression of her.⁸³

The constraints which woman suffers due to social and cultural oppression is a denial of choice, i.e., her own projects, through which the self transcends itself. To be woman is to be other, but it is also still to be subject, even given the subjection under which this particular subjectivity usually functions, for this is never total enough to force the for-itself to give up transcendence.⁸⁴ The result is immanence rather than transcendence, the being of the *en-soi*, not the *pour-soi*. Such is woman's "drama," her conflict. And if she manages to overcome external male-imposed constraints, she is caught in internal conflict, because insofar as she succeeds, she defeats her *feminine* self, as a subject-self.⁸⁵ An autonomous existence for woman conflicts with woman's "objective self," i.e., as Other, for to be feminine is to be nonautonomous passive.⁸⁶

This conflict is incarnated in the body. Within the existential phenomenological perspective where *The Second Sex* is written, the body which the subject is, is not a thing; its existence is never merely factual.

. . . if the body is not a *thing*, it is a situation, as viewed in the perspective I am adopting – that of Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty: it is the instrument of our grasp upon the world . . .⁸⁷

Directly related to the for-itself's existence-as-body is the body as sexual, erotic existence. The contradiction which meets a female-self, in that her success as self means the realization of transcendence, or subjectivity, and at the same time means her failure as a female (other/object), also meets the female-self in sexual experience, but doubly so. According to Beauvoir, erotic experience itself intensely reveals the ambiguity of the for-itself, both as subject and object for another. But the female self begins by feeling itself as object. Hence, its subject status is twice in question in sexuality.

Taking account of *The Second Sex* from one perspective, that of existentialist philosophy, one might say that Beauvoir's notion of the self becomes flawed, philosophically, because of the emphasis she places upon "situation" in that work. Reflecting on those twin existentialist notions so fundamental to Sartrean philosophy, freedom and facticity, one can say that whereas the existentialist philosophy in *The Ethics of Ambiguity* stressed the use of one's freedom and the respect of the freedom of others as the core of morality, the philosophy of *The Second Sex* stresses facticity and shows that, in the historical, sociological, and

cultural long view which traditional existentialism avoided taking with its stress on the individual subject, but which Beauvoir does take in *The Second Sex*, the “situation” of a certain group, women, is so impressed upon the individual as to hamper or prevent the use of freedom, the individual’s transcendence of their facticity. To say as she does in the Introduction to Book II of *The Second Sex*, “It is not our concern here to proclaim eternal verities, but rather to describe the common basis that underlies every individual feminine existence,” is to radically undercut the notion of freedom relative to “every individual feminine existence,” since through that common basis woman is “confined.”⁸⁸ It is also to radically change the focus of the analysis of human existence that existentialist philosophy had made from Kierkegaard to Sartre.

Yet, a general analysis of the commonalities of any *group* of individual existents does not make the use of existentialist categories impossible, by any means, though it does change the emphasis of the analysis. Each individual human being experiences facticity, according to Sartre in *Being and Nothingness*, whether or not one calls this being “confined.” The innovation represented by *The Second Sex* is twofold: not only is the analysis on the facticity, but individual facticity does not remain individual; it is generalized – genderized – since Beauvoir describes the common basis of the lives of all women, a basis provided by education and custom. In addition, though the existentialism and empiricism in *The Second Sex* can never be consolidated into a perfectly coherent argument, this basic “impurity” of approach doesn’t prevent the book from having been enormously useful in the arena of public discourse as a progressive force.

Beauvoir’s notion of the self operates in *both* the traditions of existentialism and phenomenology. She, herself, seemed unaware of the questionable meldings that were required to join these two schools; in this she was not alone. For existentialist philosophy, there is a subject; subjectivity is central. In fact, truth itself is equated with a subjectivity (the early figures, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche bear this out best). The self (*le moi*) doesn’t exist; it is part of the baggage of philosophies of immanence which claim human existence has the status of the *en-soi*, immanence, not transcendence. To claim selfhood is to claim thinghood. Beauvoir’s essays of the later forties explain and defend existentialism, this philosophy of subjectivity. This position was held by others as well, for example, Gabriel Marcel, who also distinguished the subject from the empirical, determined “I.”⁸⁹

By contrast, for phenomenology, the self, as the I, ego, does exist,

but only as a product of consciousness. But the status of subjectivity is questionable. Herbert Spiegelberg's interpretation is that the "older" phenomenological movement (i.e., pre-Husserl) was actually "antisubjectivistic," an emphasis later changed to some extent by Husserl and elaborated upon by Sartre.⁹⁰

In Beauvoir's essay, "Merleau-Ponty et le pseudo-sartrisme," the problems of the coexistence of existentialism and phenomenology become apparent. Beauvoir categorically rejects Merleau-Ponty's reading of Sartrean philosophy, a reading which she labels a "flagrant" falsification, because it claims that Sartrism is a "philosophy of the subject."⁹¹ In her rejection of Merleau-Ponty's "Sartrism," she clarifies the boundaries between existentialism and phenomenology.

Not Sartrism but "Pseudo-Sartrism" is a "philosophy of the subject," i.e., a philosophy that mistakenly equates "consciousness" with "subject," that emphasizes the importance of the subject over the world and others, whereas "true Sartrism" is a philosophy of consciousness, not of the subject. Pseudo-Sartrism assumes that there is a "sense" given or imposed on things by a "decree" of consciousness, that the world and the things of the world hold no meaning other than what consciousness provides to them. In addition, it holds the existence of the Other as unimportant, because the Other is seen as just another object under the "gaze" of the subject. In Sartrean ontology correctly understood, consciousness equals the pure, immediate presence to self; it is "for-itself," while the "subject" is the "ego," the "*soi*," the self. Consciousness is immediate presence to itself (*à soi*).

This self, the ego, is a "transcendent" being, thus, it appears as an object to and for consciousness, i.e., it is intended, not intending. Consciousness, on the other hand, is immediate presence to self (*à soi*); it is, or carries, the mechanism of intentionality. The self is not within consciousness, but in the "distance," as object. Differently stated, this assertion claims that one's consciousness is immediate presence to self, whereas one's subjectivity, the existence of oneself as a subject, requires mediation. The subject and the world reciprocally disclose each other.⁹²

Merleau-Ponty's conception of Sartrean consciousness was that it is coconstitutive of meaning, an actual opposite and coequal to the world, in Merleau-Ponty's phrase, "coextensive to the world." The self is that immanence, that totality, which the for-itself lacks. Merleau-Ponty had claimed that Sartre felt that the subject held a "mastery," a sovereignty, over the world, rather than a partnership with it. In refuting this, Beauvoir insisted that the subject is not *within* consciousness but is an

object to it. The subject is a "transcendent" and not a "transcendental." This would also mean that it is an object that can be surpassed, transcended, through the freedom of consciousness. One is "stuck" with one's consciousness, but not with one's subjectivity, not with one's selfness.

In essence, in this piece Beauvoir is claiming that Merleau-Ponty set up a straw man in his attack on Sartre. He and Sartre agree, as does she, on the secondary importance of the *subject*, on the nonoriginary nature of it, and on the coequal status of the *world* and *consciousness*.⁹³

IV. CONCLUSION**

Although she is commonly judged to be one of the foremost exponents of French existentialism, Beauvoir's own philosophical creativity has been overshadowed by her connection to Sartre. She was partially responsible for that; at numerous places in her autobiography, she denied her own philosophical creativity and her interest in philosophy as her life's work and insisted on Sartre's philosophical preeminence over her. She also took up the defense of his ideas on more than one occasion, as in "Merleau-Ponty et le pseudo-sartrisme," once describing it as a job that "any Sartrean" could have done. Many scholars, biographers, and critics of her work interpret her in that manner. Others, feminist scholars in particular, have tried to establish a claim of her philosophical autonomy from Sartre's thought, in spite of Beauvoir's own assertions. It is too soon after her death (and his) to attempt substantially objective judgments on the extent of her philosophical originality and autonomy from Sartre, or on the influence of her thinking upon his; this latter is a point of view on Beauvoir which most of her biographers and scholars have ignored. Thus, the Beauvoir scholar is faced with what might be called Beauvoir's "Sartrean exterior," particularly in her specifically philosophical writings.

That Beauvoir went beyond Sartrean philosophy, particularly in her *Ethics of Ambiguity* and in *The Second Sex* is clear. And though they are not the subject of this essay, the reader interested in Beauvoir would do well to study also her novels and autobiography for two reasons: first, because Beauvoir defined herself as a writer primarily, and second, because as many of the French existentialists did, she used literary genres to convey her philosophical analyses. Finally, her book, *The Coming of Age*, should be investigated. In that work she presented a study of aging

and the elderly that is analogous to the study of woman in *The Second Sex*, by creating a theory founded in her own unique blend of empiricism and existentialism.

NOTES

1. "Simone de Beauvoir: An Interview," by Margaret A. Simons and Jessica Benjamin, tr. Veronique Zaytzeff, *Feminist Studies* 5 (1979), 330-345, 338; Beauvoir, *L'Existentialisme et la sagesse des nations*, 87, 100, 104; *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, 158, 159.
2. *The Coming of Age*, 399.
3. *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter*, 17.
4. *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, 9.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
6. *The Second Sex*, 38.
7. *A Very Easy Death*, 123.
8. *The Second Sex*, 4, 8, 10, 38; *The Coming of Age*, 13.
9. "Simone de Beauvoir: Witness to a Century," by Helene Wenzel, *Yale French Studies* (Spring 1987). See also, *The Second Sex*, 41, 42, 47, 55, 57.
10. *The Second Sex*, 59, 61, 63-65; *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, 20, 156.
11. *The Second Sex*, 287, 288.
12. "La Pensée de droit, aujourd'hui," *Privileges*, 195.
13. *The Coming of Age*, 2.
14. "Simone de Beauvoir: An Interview," by Margaret A. Simons and Jessica Benjamin, 340-341.
15. *The Second Sex*, 288.
16. *Brigitte Bardot and the Lolita Syndrome*, closing pages, unnumbered.
17. *The Coming of Age*, 2.
18. "Simone de Beauvoir: An Interview," by Margaret A. Simons and Jessica Benjamin, 340-341.
19. *The Second Sex*, xxxiii.
20. *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, 156; *The Second Sex*, xxxiii.
21. *The Blood of Others*, opening lines, unnumbered.
22. *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, 156.
23. *L'Existentialisme et la sagesse des nations*, 35.
24. *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, 154.
25. *L'Existentialisme et la sagesse des nations*, 86.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
27. "Simone de Beauvoir: Witness to a Century," by Helene Wenzel.
28. *The Second Sex*, 301. See also, *All Said and Done*, 449; Monique Witting, "One is not born a woman," *Feminist Issues* 1 (1981), 47-54.
29. *The Second Sex*, 290.
30. *Ibid.*, p. xxxv.
31. *Ibid.*, p. xxvii.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 288.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. xviii, xix.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. xxi, xxxiii.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. xix, xx, 64.
36. "Simone de Beauvoir: An Interview," by Margaret A. Simons and Jessica Benjamin, 345; *All Said and Done*, 448, 449.
37. "Foreword," *After the Second Sex, Conversations with Simone de Beauvoir*, 9.
38. *Simone de Beauvoir, un film de Josée Dayan et Malka Ribowska réalisé par Josée Dayan*, 43.
39. *All Said and Done*, 455. See also *The Second Sex*, xxii; *All Said and Done*, 444–448; *After the Second Sex, Conversations with Simone de Beauvoir*, 32.
40. "Interview with Simone de Beauvoir" by Hazel Rowley and Renate Reismann, *Hecate* 7 (1981), 91.
41. However, she only *directly* argued for a particular concept of the self when she defended Sartre against Merleau-Ponty in "Merleau-Ponty et le pseudo-sartrisme," in *Privilèges* (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), 203–272. This was originally published in *Les Temps Modernes* 10, nos. 114–15 (June–July 1955): 2072–2122.
42. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 109, 223, and undoubtedly elsewhere in Husserl's opus. (*Ideas* was published in German in 1913.)
43. The notion of intentionality had been taken over by Husserl from Brentano for whom every mental phenomenon but no physical phenomenon had intentionality, i.e., a *reference* to a content; thus, "intentionality" became a way to define mental phenomena: mental phenomena were those phenomena which include an object intentionally within themselves.
44. Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, translated and annotated with an introduction by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, undated), 93. The original French version of this piece appeared in 1936–7).
45. She uses this designation in her second work of autobiography, *The Prime of Life*, translated by Peter Green (New York: Meridian Books, 1966), 433.
46. Simone de Beauvoir, *Pyrrhus et Cinéas* (Paris: Gallimard, 1944), 61–2.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
48. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, translated by Bernard Frechtman (New York: Citadel Press, 1970). For her direct comments on the circumstances of the writing of this and on her own evaluation of it, see Simone de Beauvoir, *Force of Circumstance*, translated by Richard Howard (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1964), 66–8. This was originally published in France in 1963.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 10–12, 33, *et passim*. See also Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, translated by Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966) 96 *et passim*.

51. The term "archetypes" was suggested to me by Patrice Maurer.
52. Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, 57–8.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 12 *et passim*.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
57. This point was originally derived by the French existentialists from Hegel's "master-slave dialectic" in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*.
58. *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, 7–9, 72, *et passim*.
59. Sartre had analyzed the for-itself according to three ekstases: (1) the tridimensional one of temporality, (2) the reflective ekstasis, and (3) the ekstasis of the for-itself as being-for-others. See *Being and Nothingness*, 395–400.
60. *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, 72.
61. *Ibid.*
62. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 73 and 135.
64. See Glossary in Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 599–677.
66. Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, 44 *et passim*.
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 100–2.
68. Simone de Beauvoir, *L'Existentialisme et la sagesse des nations* (Paris: Editions Nagel, 1963). This was originally published in 1948; it has never been translated into English. Terry Keefe in his *Simone de Beauvoir: A Study of Her Writings* (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1983), 87, says these essays were first published in *Les Temps Modernes* and actually predate the *Ethics*.
69. "L'Existentialisme et la sagesse des nations," in *L'Existentialisme et la sagesse des nations*, 36
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 35–6.
71. Beauvoir, "Littérature et métaphysique," in *L'Existentialisme et la sagesse des nations*, 101–2.
72. For Beauvoir's discussion of the reaction to this work, see *Force of Circumstance*, 185–93. It is worthwhile remembering here that she not only wrote *The Second Sex* before the current women's movement (it was published in 1949), but she explained the circumstances of its writing, evaluated it, and discussed its reception also before the women's movement, that is, in 1963, with her third volume of autobiography, *Force of Circumstance*. In that acutely perceptive evaluation, she apologized for the book's style and composition, saying that she was discovering her ideas as she was explaining them, admitting that her writing was a bit inelegant and repetitious. But she never disavowed its ideas. Thirty years later, discussing it in an interview with Alice Schwarzer, she was still reeling a bit from the book's reception. In the France of 1949, clearly, this was a revolutionary book. See Alice Schwarzer, *After "The Second Sex": Conversations with Simone de Beauvoir*, translated by Marianne Howarth (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 41–3.

73. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, translated by H. M. Parshley (New York: Vintage, 1974), xxxiii.
74. *Ibid.*, p. xxxiv.
75. Michèle Le Doeuff, "Simone De Beauvoir and Existentialism," *Feminist Studies*, 6 (1980): 227-89.
76. This essay has been traditionally known as "Existentialism is a Humanism," but in a recent collection it is titled "The Humanism of Existentialism." In Jean-Paul Sartre, *Essays in Existentialism*, edited by Wade Baskin (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1974), 41.
77. Le Doeuff, "Simone De Beauvoir and Existentialism," 286.
78. Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, xx.
79. Beauvoir's interest in Hegel's problematic stems at least from her first published work, the novel *L'Invitée* (English title: *She Came to Stay*), published in 1943, which is prefaced by a quote from Hegel: "Each consciousness seeks the death of the other."
80. Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, 64.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. xx-xxi.
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*, p. xxxiii. And see Mary Wollstonecraft, *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, edited with an introduction by C. Hagelman, Jr. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967), ch. 2 *et passim*.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 376.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 316.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
88. *Ibid.*, p. xxxv.
89. Gabriel Marcel, "An Essay in Autobiography," in *The Philosophy of Existentialism* (New York: Citadel Press, 1956), 120.
90. Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 666.
91. Simone de Beauvoir, "Merleau-Ponty et le pseudo-sartrisme," in *Privilèges* (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), 209. This was originally published in *Les Temps Modernes* and has never been translated into English. The title is formed from a word-play on Merleau-Ponty's piece, "Sartre et l'ultra-bolchevisme," ch. 5 in Merleau-Ponty's *Adventures of the Dialectic*, a response to Sartre's *The Communists and the Peace*.
92. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 126-8.
93. "Merleau-Ponty et le pseudo-sartrisme," in Beauvoir, *Privilèges*, 206. In this passage, the cluster of terms she exchanges for "subject" is extensive, including "moi" (me), "je" (I), "ego," "psyche," "soi" (self), and "person;" these terms are substitutable for each other, by and large, and are radically distinguished from "consciousness." Beauvoir overlooked a distinction Sartre made, however. Though he does claim that "consciousness" does not equal "subject" and that "consciousness" does not equal "self," he does want to retain a labored distinction between "subject" and "self." See Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 93-4.

13. Simone Weil (1909–1943)

KATE LINDEMANN

Few who knew Simone Weil remained neutral towards her. Simone de Beauvoir avoided her; her philosophy students revered her.¹ The coroner claimed she starved herself to death; those who tended her found the claim absurd.² De Gaulle thought her “crazy” and gave her a “make work” task; scholars find the result of that “make work” a profound piece of social-political philosophy.³ Some commentators call her “saintly”; others find her behavior merely maladaptive. These counter claims create a perennial interest in Weil’s personal life and many commentators fashion her in mythic rather than descriptive terms.

I. BIOGRAPHY

Simone Adolphe Weil was born to Selma and Bernard Weil on February 3, 1909. At six months her mother suffered appendicitis and this affected Simone who was being breast fed. By the end of her first year, Simone was very ill. She recovered but remained sickly, susceptible to infections and unable to eat normally. Various illnesses and physical indispositions were to plague her through out her life.⁴

Simone’s nuclear family included an older brother, André, and her maternal grandmother. Many aunts and uncles lived in the region and there was a profusion of cousins during family visits. Her father’s family had come from Alsace and most of the men were successful businessmen or merchants. Her mother’s family came from Galacia, lived a while in Russia, and finally went to Belgium where Simone’s grandfather developed a leading import-export firm. Both families were Jewish but Mme Weil’s was not observant. Dr Weil’s parents were religious but he professed to be an agnostic. The children were raised without training in the Jewish religion. Simone is said to have learned the meaning of Jew

and Gentile in school at the age of ten. Later, like many others, she and her family were classified Jews by the Nazi's and she lost her job under the laws proscribing employment for Jews. The Weil's emigrated to America but Simone left for England where she joined the exiled community of Free French.⁵

Simone resembled her father both in physical and emotional characteristics. Dr Bernard Weil, was small, thin and quite handsome. He was taciturn and although he liked to joke he also was inclined to become overwrought and nervous about small things. He was very frank, often more so than the conventions of the day. In his youth he had been sympathetic to anarchist views but later gave his sympathies to the Radical party.⁶

Simone's mother was intelligent, ardent, generous and had a real capacity for happiness. In her youth she had wanted to become a doctor but her father would not allow it. As an adult she found the narrow, fashionable life of the bourgeoisie inane and brought her children up in ways not usual in middle class Parisian families. This was particularly true of Simone who she raised more in accord with the norms of young boys than the restricted role of little girls.⁷

As a child Simone's brother André became her ideal. Mme Weil wrote:

Simone has developed in an incredible fashion. She follows André everywhere, takes an interest in everything he does, and feels, like him, that the days are too short they have and excellent influence on each other; he protects her, helps her crawl over the difficult spots, and often gives way to her, while she, at his side from morning to night, has become livelier, gayer, more enterprising. Whenever the weather permits, we spend our days with them on the large open fields surrounded by pine trees . . .⁸

André was a mathematical genius who later advanced mathematical research and problem solving. This special mathematical gift was apparent even in childhood when he taught himself to solve equations of the first and second order without formal study.⁹ His intelligence sparked Simone on. He taught her to read (the newspaper) as a surprise for their father; together they explored literature memorizing the plays of Racine at age 5, reading *Cyrano*, *Balzac* etc.¹⁰

Nothing was spared in the education of the Weil children. Weil studied at the Lycée Montaigne, the Laval and Lycée Fénelon. She spent 1925–28 at Henry IV and 1928–31 at École Normale where she was known for

her brilliance, her tenacity in argument and her social/political concerns. In *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter* Simone de Beauvoir speaks of being intimidated by Weil during a political discussion and subsequently avoiding the intense, brilliant student.¹¹ Weil took a first in the competitive examinations. She wanted to engage in factory work after graduation but the economic situation did not allow it so she requested a teaching position. She was assigned to Le Puy where her support for local factory workers led to trouble with her employers and the local mayor.¹²

The greatest intellectual influence on Weil, outside her family, was Alain (Émile Chartier) her philosophy teacher at Henri IV. Pétrement states, "I believe that Simone's philosophy was built at the start on Alain's and extends it, even when it appears to be opposed to it."¹³ Those schooled in the Anglo-American tradition need to understand Chartier's content and method if they wish to understand the methodology and interests of Weil. Her incorporation of literature into philosophical work, her notion of "reading situations", her approach to the oppressed are all influenced by Alain.¹⁴

Weil had a penchant for experiential knowledge. She visited Germany in 1932 to investigate "what was really happening" and in 1934 Weil obtained employment at the Renault factory. In 1936 she left for the Republican Front in Barcelona and in 1938, the year anti-Jewish laws were passed in Italy, she visited Italy and Portugal.¹⁵

In 1940 she was dismissed from her teaching position because of the antisemitic laws and in 1941 she met Father Perrin, an important figure in Weil's last years. They corresponded; it is clear he wanted to "convert" her. He also arranged for Gustave Thibon to employ her on his farm at Ardèche.¹⁶ Without Perrin we would not have her powerful *Spiritual Autobiography* which articulates her need for complete freedom to pursue truth and her identification with "outsiders" which kept her from joining any Church or party.¹⁷ This need to pursue truth widely, coupled with her contemplative rather than speculative orientation, may explain her serious pursuit of Hindu and Buddhist thought long before such pursuit became popular in Europe.¹⁸ Her profession of a need for freedom from dogma illuminates not only her refusal of baptism but her critiques of Capitalism, Communism and Fascism.¹⁹ She died at Grosvenor Sanatorium on August 24, 1943.²⁰

II. PHILOSOPHICAL WORK

Weil wrote essays, notes, plays, poems and letters sufficient to fill over a dozen posthumously published volumes. Most of this material is philosophical in content but little of it has made its way into the main stream of philosophy. Weil's major works are available in English language editions. *Lectures on Philosophy*, a translation of Madame Anne Reynaud-Guerithault's notes from Weil's course in philosophy at the lycée in Roanne 1933–4 provides an excellent introduction. Although the notes are schematic, philosophers will recognize the originality in the course. *The Iliad or The Poem of Force* provides an example of Weil's philosophical approach to literature and is a good balance to *Lectures*. Her *Notebooks* provide the reader with a view of her wide ranging and incisive scholarship while works such as *The Need for Roots* shows her social/political analysis.

Weil's work appears unsystematic. She composed most of her essays for small, left-wing French publications and these essays address a variety of specific issues. Her notebooks, lectures and longer essays incorporate traditional philosophy, literature, mathematics and science in ways which can be dizzying to more narrowly trained thinkers. When one reads her work as a whole, however, one finds a pattern of fundamental elements which is evoked and reworked in numerous settings. Central to Weil's philosophy are three elements: form, a grasp of the lived experience of oppressed human beings, and attention.

All Weil's writings reveal a highly contemplative mind which is attracted by essential forms of aesthetics, mathematics, morals and science. At the same time her works articulate, analyze and explain the lived experience of those "at the bottom" of the social order. These antithetical orientations form a tension in her work but it is a tension of balanced harmonies rather than opposing struggles. "Attention", the practice that Weil so often advocates, seems to be the nucleus which keeps these opposing and highly charged elements in balance.

1. *Forms*

Weil's writings are permeated by a concern for the formal, structural relationships among things. She talks a great deal about mathematics but in each instance she knows an interest in mathematical relations or the form of mathematical work. A comment from her *Notebooks* is

revealing, "If contradiction is what pulls, draws the soul towards the light, contemplation of the first principles (hypotheses) of geometry and kindred sciences should be a contemplation of the contradictions."²¹ A discussion of mathematical reasoning is highlighted by, "Let us look for the general characteristics of straight lines, of geometrical figures. Why would one not use the branches of a cedar tree to do geometry?"²²

Weil's reflections on literature go to the "core" of each work to locate the essential form(s) of human relations it embodies. Although Weil is sensitive to language she never engages in merely syntactical literary criticism. Neither does she engage in the social determinism criticism common to Marxists. Even in her "communist" phase Weil avoids the mantle of dialectical materialism.

The Iliad or The Poem of Force is an excellent example of her approach to literature. She goes beyond the mere "wrath of Achilles" and unmasks basic forms of human relations embodied in the work and thus reveals an entire culture's relation to force. The essay is both literary and anthropological. It is also deeply moral. The whole discussion springs from a fundamental stance about right relations. Weil begins the last chapter with a comment on relations:

The relations between destiny and the human soul, the extent to which each soul creates its own destiny, the question of what elements in the soul are transformed by merciless necessity as it tailors the soul to fit the requirements of shifting fate, and of what elements can on the other hand be preserved, through the exercise of virtue and through grace – the whole question is fraught with temptations to falsehood, temptations that are positively enhanced by pride, by shame, by hatred, contempt, indifference, by the will to oblivion or to ignorance.²³

The chapter closes with Weil's *enconium*:

But nothing the peoples of Europe have produced is worth the first known poem that appeared among them. Perhaps they will yet rediscover the epic genius, when they learn that there is no refuge from fate, learn not to admire force, not to hate the enemy, nor to scorn the unfortunate.²⁴

All Weil's moral discussions are permeated by an emphasis on forms, on reality and on human relations. Consider, for example:

The beautiful: that which we do not want to change it, in fact (non-intervention). The true: not to want to change it in one's mind (by means of illusion).

The good – not to want to change what? My place, my importance in the world, limited by my body and by the existence of other souls, my equals.²⁵

Duty, right, virtue and right action are second order moral concepts which follow from the form of relations present in a situation.

The good is not to want (desire, impulse, imagination, passion) to change that which we do not want (metaphysically) about my place, my importance, my limit. Thus ethics involves “reading” each situation; reading the situation to see if it embodies those human relations that are wanted because they express the reality of the appropriate forms; co-existence, co-value and co-limit. Injustice is the absence of these forms:

Human relations. All those which have something infinite about them are unjust. Now, although everything connected with man is finite and measurable, nevertheless, after reaching a certain degree, the infinite comes into play.

e.g. if all the food two men have per day is in the one case 1 lb. of bread and in the other case 18 oz., the difference is finite; if one of them has 1/4 lb. and the other one 6 lb. the difference is infinite, for what is everything for one is negligible for the other.²⁶

The arts are also present in Weil's work, especially the plastic arts. These, too, center on grasping essential forms and their mutual relations. Because much of Weil's use of the arts is illustrative or parenthetical one is tempted to view them as merely incidental. If, however, one takes the aesthetic as foundational to Weil's thought much of what appears dichotomous and disordered takes on both order and meaning.

2. *Limit, Space, Time, Attention*

Taking the aesthetic as foundational in Weil's work, also explains the centrality she gives to certain themes; limit, space, time, necessity, attention.

Every artist confronts limit. To find the bounds on one medium and

one's own powers within that medium is a necessary condition for art. The artist must grow and experiment but not to accept limit is to create disorder. With such an explanation as background, Weil's statements take on new significance. Consider again:

The beautiful: that which we do not want to change. The good: not to want to change it, in fact (non-intervention). The true: not to want to change it in one's mind (by means of illusion).

The good – not to want to change what? My place, my importance, limited by my body and the existence of other souls, my equals.²⁷

Taking the aesthetic as foundational in her work also makes sense of her repeated non-cosmological reflections about time, space and matter. As the artistic stance gives rise to the exploration of limit, the exploration of limit gives rise to reflections about time, space and matter. Finally, her discussions of necessity become natural in this context.

There are two senses of necessity. In the first, necessity is like limit: it is the boundary which one can not transgress and Weil evokes this notion in her discussions of matter. However the artist is also aware of a second aspect of necessity. When contemplating a work of art one is struck by the necessity apparent in the relations between and among the parts. To alter a single relation is to change the work and if it is a great work, such alteration destroys its greatness. This second notion of necessity permeates Weil's philosophy, especially her reflections on right action.

Recognizing this second kind of necessity requires contemplation rather than speculative thought, hence Weil's advocacy of "attention". Grasping this second form of necessity in things, in situations is, as some popular psychologies would say a "right brain rather than left brain" activity. Artists often speak of cutting away the unnecessary to reveal the innate form of things and Weil does also. For Weil, non-intervention amidst necessary forms or the removal of that which interferes with true necessity is at the heart of all real work. But understanding the necessary forms requires contemplative attention.

Although people seem unaware of it today, the development of the faculty of attention forms the real object and almost sole interest of studies . . . If we have no aptitude or natural taste for geometry, this does not mean that our faculty for attention will not be developed

by wrestling with a problem or studying a theorem; it does not even matter whether we succeed in finding the solution or understanding the proof, although it is important to try really hard to do so. Never in any case whatever is a genuine effort of the attention wasted.²⁸

Such attention also requires an enormous dedication to honesty.

We have to bring into the light of open day the monsters within us; and not be afraid of looking them straight in the face. . . . We are completely responsible for the degree of clarity there is in our thoughts; we do not always make the necessary effort to be fully aware of them, but we always have the ability to become so.²⁹

But such attention is, for Weil, the only source of truth . . . and goodness.

3. *Lived Experience of Oppressed Human Beings*

Nowhere in the Euro-American philosophical tradition are there such clear, caring statements concerning the actual experience of oppressed human beings. Not Hegel with his incisive but brief insights, not Marx with his analysis of the forces which bring about and sustain oppression, not even the contemporary South American philosopher, Enrique Dussel with his provocation and strong philosophy of liberation, come near to the actual naming of the world of oppression offered by Weil.

Former factory workers come up at the end of a philosophy class and say, "Yes. Yes. She understands what it is like." Those who have grown up with terror and abuse confide, "She described me on page eight."

At least a suppliant, once his prayer is answered becomes a human being again, like everybody else. But there are other, more unfortunate creatures who have become things for the rest of their lives. Their days hold no pastimes, no free spaces, no room in them for any impulse of their own. It is not that their life is harder than other men's nor that they occupy a lower place in the social hierarchy; no, they are another human species, a compromise between a man and a corpse. The idea of a person's being a thing is a logical contradiction. Yet what is impossible in logic becomes true in life . . . constantly aspiring to be a man or a woman, and never achieving it – here

surely is death but death strung out over a whole lifetime: here, surely, is life, but life that death congeals before abolishing.³⁰

After reading "The Love of God and Affliction," others have declared that during their reading they trembled and were in turmoil because here was some one who truly named their own experience; someone who wrote meaningfully about questions and concerns which they had walled up within themselves because no one seemed to address them correctly.

And for those who have never experienced such dehumanization Weil explains, "Those who have never had contact with affliction in its true sense can have no idea of what it is, even though they may have suffered a great deal. Affliction is something specific and impossible to describe in any other terms, as sounds are to anyone who is deaf and dumb."³¹ However, she does not leave us without hope. One of the reasons one should study is to acquire the discipline of attention, the attention which makes it possible to leave imagination and desire aside so as to see the world as it really is.³² This ability to attend makes one able to meet the real need of those who are afflicted.

. . . The capacity to give one's attention to a sufferer is a very rare and difficult thing; it is almost a miracle; it *is* a miracle. Nearly all those who think they have this capacity do not possess it. Warmth of heart, impulsiveness, pity are not enough³³ . . .

The love of our neighbor in all its fullness simply means being able to say to him: "What are you going through?" It is a recognition that the sufferer exists, not only as a unit in a collection, or a specimen from the social category labeled "unfortunate", but as a man, exactly like us, who was one day stamped with a special mark by affliction. For this reason it is enough, but it is indispensable, to know how to look at him in a certain way.³⁴

Weil's statements about the healing possible through personal relationships should not be construed as an abandonment of the political. Her whole life with its action for and with workers and other dehumanized people attests to her belief in political action.³⁵ She is wary of political parties and political ideologies, however. Ideology leads to abstract solutions and abstract solutions often result in greater oppression for the poor. "One should only advise the oppressed to revolt if it can be successful."³⁶

It is at this point in her work that one sees Weil's move to the formal. Always she joins her real solidarity with the oppressed with her orientation to form. The whole purpose of sociology is to find out which sort of society would be least oppressive in given social conditions.³⁷

Weil's aesthetic orientation keeps her political philosophy grounded in limit. She is no utopian; change must accept limit and appropriate action must be grounded in the specific conditions of each situation. The likelihood of one being able to read the specific situation aright depends on one's ability to attend to the reality of this situation. The three elements are present to her work; form, the lived experience of the oppressed and attention. They exist in shifting patterns but always it is attention which grounds the other two.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Simone Weil is a complex thinker. She combines several traditions: the mystical, the social-political, the wide scope of the humanities and the philosophical tradition of reason.³⁸ As a person she is multidimensional but is grounded in a simplicity and singleness of orientation. Like many intellectuals her daily habits were not very "down to earth." Perhaps if she, like Karl Marx, had the benefit of a devoted spouse who insured the practical, nurturing activities were accomplished, Weil would appear less non-conformist. As it was she did not have such a helpmate, only a mother who from time to time arrived to do such tasks as putting the house in order, cooking nourishing meals and encouraging her daughter to take a vacation or not be "robbed blind" by the help. For those readers not blinded by controversies concerning her daily life, Weil provides a wealth of insightful and original material which is particularly useful to 20th century scholars trying to integrate global traditions, rigorous scholarship and social concern.

NOTES

1. Simone de Beauvoir, *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974) and Leslie Fielder "Introduction" in *Waiting for God*, translated by Emma Craufurd (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).
2. Simone Pétrement, *Simone Weil, a Life*, translated by Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books, 1956), 525-539.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 492.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.
5. *Ibid.*, Chapter 1.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 6, 20.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 12–14.
11. Simone de Beauvoir, pp. 242–3.
12. Pétrement, pp. 73–118.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
14. See: Pétrement, Chapter 4 for a fine summary.
15. Pétrement, pp. 411–2.
16. *Ibid.*, Chapter 15.
17. Simone Weil, “Spiritual Autobiography” in *Waiting for God*, pp. 78–82.
18. Her *Notebooks* give evidence of the depth and breadth of this study.
19. Simone Weil, *Lectures on Philosophy*, translated by Hugh Price (Cambridge University Press, 1978), Chapter 3 offers an excellent summary of these critiques.
20. Pétrement, p. 536.
21. Simone Weil, *The Notebooks of Simone Weil*, 2 vols. translated by Arthur Wills (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956), 1: 34.
22. Simone Weil, *Lectures on Philosophy*, p. 79.
23. Simone Weil, *The Iliad or The Poem of Force*, translated by Mary McCarthy (Wallingford, Pennsylvania: Pendle Hill Press, 1956), p. 35.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
25. Weil, *Notebooks*, I: 38.
26. *Ibid.*, I: 34.
27. *Ibid.*, I: 38.
28. Simone Weil, “Reflections on the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Love of God,” in *Waiting for God*, pp. 105–6.
29. Weil, *Lectures on Philosophy*, p. 98.
30. Weil, *The Iliad or the Poem of Force*, p. 8.
31. Weil, “*The Love of God and Affliction*,” in *Waiting for God*, p. 120.
32. Weil, “Reflections on the Right Use of School Studies”, pp. 112–3.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
35. Pétrement, Chapters 2, 7, 8.
36. Weil, *Lectures on Philosophy*, p. 140.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

14. Twentieth Century Women Philosophers

MARY ELLEN WAITHE

If this final chapter of this final volume of *A History of Women Philosophers* seems unduly long it is only because so many of the twenty-nine women about whom brief profiles are here presented indeed deserve a chapter of their own. It gives me some satisfaction to say what I could not have said with respect to the earlier volumes in this series, namely that there are simply too many women who made significant contributions to philosophy in this century to accord each a chapter of her own. And even in this chapter of “also rans” I have had to cull and choose, omitting some of the more recently-deceased such as Dorothy Emmet, Pepita Haezrahi, Susanne Langer, and my own teacher May Brodbeck, whose works are more accessible than the works of others. I have opted instead, for inclusion of a wide range of generally now-forgotten women philosophers who were well-known in their day, and whose interests in philosophy were varied, as well as a number who are well known, but not well known as philosophers. In addition, I have included a few who published only one or two articles in philosophy, and in some sense had a marginal role in its recent development. I have tried to give the reader what I think is the flavor of women’s presence in the professional field of academic philosophy, as well as in popular philosophical writing outside the academy.

In the Appendix to this Volume is a list of those women who published philosophical writing during this century, whom I believe to be deceased, and whom I have not profiled in this volume. In most cases, their philosophical writings are listed in the Bibliography. In every case, I have collected some archival information about them. Many of the names can be found in Ethel Kersey’s valuable work: *Women Philosophers, a Biocritical Source Book*. The Appendix also includes names of several Polish women philosophers whose names came to my attention through Linda Lopez McAlister, the editor of the feminist

philosophy journal, *Hypatia*. Professor McAlister passed along to me a draft manuscript by Professor Elzbieta Pakszys of A. Mickiewicz University in Poznan (Poland). Unfortunately, that manuscript arrived too late for consideration for fuller treatment here of its named subjects. Readers will perhaps have knowledge of other women who lived and wrote at the turn of the century. Some of those subjects, who perhaps can be said to have lived most of their professional lives in the nineteenth century, will be included instead in a second edition to Volume 3 of this series. The women are presented here in chronological order of birth.

Where date of birth is unknown, I have estimated it at *floruit* twenty-five years prior to a woman's first publication or the first public record of her membership in a philosophical association. As stated in the Introduction to this volume, I have wanted this series to be a history, and to me that meant at the very least that it included only those women philosophers who were deceased, whose productivity as philosophers had come to an undeniably full stop. Unfortunately, there are many for whom dates of death could not have been wrung out of the usual source materials. Although I have had the benefit of research assistance from a competent and enthusiastic staff, nevertheless, it is not the size staff that would permit, for example, searches through public records of birth and death, or correspondence with institutions at which a subject had studied or taught. In determining that a woman philosopher is, in a colloquial sense, "history" I have sometimes resorted to making an *ad hoc* assumption (which in some cases will be wrong) that a century is the longest lifetime that one usually gets. So when there is a date of birth or a *floruit* that is at least a century old, I have felt rather comfortable in assuming that my subjects are at the most, centenarians. This assumption has not always been warranted as I know that some women philosophers including Ellen Bliss Talbot have surpassed this mark, and several others including Antoinette Brown Blackwell (see Volume 3 of this series) have lived until their mid- or late-nineties.

1. *Sophie Willock Bryant: 1850–1922*

Details about Bryant's early education and background are sketchy. From her publications under the style "Mrs. Sophie Bryant, D.Sc."¹ we may assume that she was married. The 1917 membership list of the Aristotelian Society identifies an "Elsie Bryant" as a recently elected member. Whether the latter was Sophie's daughter, another relative, or was not related is not known.

Sophie Bryant received a Doctorate in Sciences from London University before the turn of the century. She served as Headmistress of the North London Collegiate School for Girls for many years. The title page of her work, *Moral and Religious Education* (1920) identifies her as "D.Sc., D.Litt. Late Headmistress of the North London Collegiate School for Girls. . . ." Whether an honorary Doctorate in Literature was conferred on her upon her retirement, or whether the second doctorate was an earned degree, I have not been able to ascertain. Similarly, that title page also indicates that Bryant authored *Educational Ends*, and *Studies in Character*. I have been unable to confirm the existence of either publication. On the frontispiece, no mention whatsoever is made of her other philosophical works: on logic and mathematics,² on metaphysics³ and psychology.⁴ From a review of Bryant's written works in philosophy we see her to have a primary interest in ethics, particularly, in the area of moral education. Her interests in philosophy extended beyond ethics and included such diverse subjects as the logic of algebra,⁵ and of mathematics' relation to logic,⁶ issues of moral psychology, philosophy of mind and theories of moral personality.⁷ Many of her early publications were on the subject of moral character and the moral emotions.⁸ Bryant's "The Relation of Mathematics to General Formal Logic," explores what she claimed was a good deal of the fruitfulness of Boole's idea that the language of mathematics is the most perfect form of the universal language of thought, and that general logic is a quantity-less mathematics. Arithmetic, she describes as

. . . the pure synthetic science *a priori*, neither a condition of experience nor a consequence, but co-incident in origin with experience as a mode of apprehension most powerful for the reduction of experience to system in a science of measurable relations.⁹

Class logic, such as that of Venn, she describes as

. . . at the opposite extreme of experience. It is the whole of things – the total concrete universe – and the operation is the selection from it of things belonging to a given type. The result of the selection is the class of things which, like the original subject-matter itself, is an object surpassing apprehension, a concrete total to be analyzed.¹⁰

After analyzing general symbols of algebraic operation, general and special laws of algebraic operation, and symbolic propositional forms she

defines the logic of inference in terms of propositional equivalence and the assertion or denial of consistency.¹¹ This is where she claims that there is great practical value in Boolean logic: it bridges the gulf between logic and algebra in an important way. The logic of probabilities

. . . exemplifies the conception belonging to general logic of quality [existence, universality, class] and [mathematical] quantity compounded in operation.¹²

At the end of the paper, she urges also, the adoption of the language and symbolism of logic for geometric calculations, particularly for working out problems of *n*-dimensionality.

In an unconvincing, and brief symposium paper in 1895, "Are Psychical States Extended?"¹³ Bryant urges that psychical states are extended, or,

. . . as I would prefer to put it, *extension is a quality – the essential quality – of a certain well-marked class of psychical states or objects*. This answer has been given on the ground that our universe of discourse is psychological, and that, therefore, by extension, we should mean that which the psychologist rather than the physicist means by extension, *i.e.*, the form under which the external world is apprehended in the individual experience.¹⁴

Bryant was also critical of James' views on the nature of the emotions. In "Professor James on the Emotions,"¹⁵ she offers accounts of empirical evidence which, she claims either clearly refute, or call into question James' accounts of the emotions. Bryant takes issue with James' view that emotions co-exist with the physical symptomatology or expression of them as a reaction to stimuli. Quoting James:

If we fancy some strong emotion . . . and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no "mind stuff" out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of perception is all that remains.¹⁶

Grief, she claims, commonly has profound somatic effects. In time those physical symptoms abate, but that does not mean that the grief has been "cured." Indeed,

. . . although in one sense the grief survives the bodily reaction, it does not survive as an actual emotion, but only as a predisposition to the recurrence of the emotion on the lively memory of the circumstances from time to time, and when the emotion does recur it is the bodily disturbance that recurs, and it is as before.¹⁷

Indeed, Bryant says later on, the sympathetic emotions are extensions of our own emotional states to someone else, whose emotions we imaginatively substitute for and feel as our own. These views appear to be a further development of her own views on sympathy and antipathy developed in a paper by that name and published in *Mind* that same year.¹⁸ Still further in her criticism of James, Bryant argues that the more "objective" emotions, such as the experience of beauty, pathos, etc. are often almost entirely intellectual in nature, unaccompanied by intense physical states in one who experiences them.¹⁹

In "Self-Development and Self-Surrender" she addresses the questions whether self-development is a moral duty, and whether self-surrender (self-abnegation) is a necessary means toward the fulfillment of that duty. She argues that:

. . . instead of that idea of duty to self in which good people have sometimes tried to believe, . . . it is a duty to be and to keep one's self in the highest possible state of [moral] efficiency.²⁰

It is a duty to society, owed by members. As such, there is a duty to "surrender one's will and judgment" to appropriate moral influences, in the sense of seeking out appropriate moral influence. Bryant does not argue for a denial of conscience, rather for allowing one's moral conscience to develop to its fullest by seeking the moral influence of good persons. In this way, the natural inclination towards weakness of the will and frailty in judgment can gradually be overcome through training oneself to utilize the considered moral judgment of others and by being open to rationales and arguments they offer.

Sophie Bryant was an early member of the Aristotelian Society and of the Mind Association. In 1895 she, Muirhead, and Stout led a symposium for the Society on whether psychic states were extended.²¹ At around this time, we see a cluster of philosophical issues interesting her. First, there are the metaphysical issues facing the then emerging area we now call philosophy of mind: the nature of psychical phenomena, the ontological status of mental states (whether mental states are also

physical states).²² Second, there are the moral issues raised by these and related questions. "What is the relationship between self-consciousness and moral responsibility?"²³ Is morality anything different than character development? If so, how can moral behavior be taught?²⁴ Her book *Moral and Religious Education*²⁵ addressed the relationship between religious indoctrination, devotional practice, and moral education. In an article appearing in the precursor to the contemporary journal *Ethics* Bryant addressed competing concerns about the idea that the teaching of morality was a function of the virtuous state. *Moral and Religious Education* is written, as the author indicates, "in the belief that, in order to produce the best result over the widest area, the teaching of morality through the development of religious faith and its teaching by direct appeal to self-respect, reason, sympathy, and common sense are both necessary."

Issues of political philosophy and the nature of the just state concerned Bryant also. In 1908 with "the great war" brewing in Europe, Bryant, Stout and W. D. Ross gave a Symposium before the Aristotelian Society on the subject of "The Place of Experts in a Democracy." Bryant's contribution was a discussion of the platonic concept of aristocracy in the modern state.²⁶ Over the course of her professional career, Bryant's work became more and more applied: philosophy written for educators, or for political scientists.

Her 1923 work, *Liberty, Law and Order Under Native Irish Rule*²⁷ was reprinted nearly fifty years following its original issue. In it she synthesizes and analyzes the development of ancient Irish legal philosophy from the Christian revision of the ancient Senchus Mor law under the guidance of St. Patrick. Early in the work she analyzes the concept of "fosterage" the appointment of a father responsible for the education and training of the child. Bryant analyzes conflicts between duties of natural and foster fathers towards children, and conflicting responsibilities of natural and foster fathers for crimes committed by children while in "fosterage." Bryant applies her analysis to how ancient Irish law might assist in resolving contemporary issues. In this regard, she looks at landlord-tenant law, women's rights to family business and to property created through marriage, social contracts and concepts of competency to enter into contracts, tribal rule, taxation, universal health care, community and public property law, law of torts, and the educative function of law. Bryant's view was that ancient Irish law was philosophically sound, that it incorporated positive moral law, was itself morally praiseworthy

and, in the interests of women, children and indigents was socially progressive.

Although her doctoral degree was in science, Sophie Bryant had broad interests in philosophy: from highly technical aspects of mathematical and algebraic logic, to philosophy of law, to ethics and social philosophy. She was a prolific writer in these areas, and was well known and well-regarded in philosophical circles. Despite the highly theoretical and therefore academic level of her philosophical and mathematical acumen, and despite the breadth of her interests in philosophy and higher mathematics, Sophie Bryant's professional life was spent educating pre-college age children.

2. *Julia Henrietta Gulliver: 1856–1940*

Julia Henrietta Gulliver was in the first class of the newly founded Smith College. She received her B.A. in 1879. She was awarded her Ph.D. from Smith College in 1888. Her senior thesis, "Psychology of Dreams", was published in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (April 1888).²⁸ In it, she discusses dreaming in terms of the total separateness of mind and body. The conclusion reached is that sleep is a function of the body and dreaming is a glimpse of what the freed soul may be. Gulliver did post-graduate study at the University of Leipzig from 1892 to 1893.

Gulliver's career began in the 1890's as the Department Head of Philosophy and Biblical Literature at Rockford Female Seminary in Rockford, Illinois. She worked at Rockford for two years before travelling to Europe to study with Wilhelm Wundt. She later translated part of his *Ethics*.²⁹ Gulliver returned to Rockford (now a college) and became its president for 17 years (1902–1919).

Gulliver published only one book (which I have not seen) *Studies in Democracy*. An article, "The Substitutes for Christianity proposed by Comte and Spencer" applied Spencer's test of evolution to Comte's positivism and Spencer's Cosmic Philosophy and Christianity. Gulliver tested Spencer's law of evolution by treating it as universally valid when applied to religious systems. Gulliver proposed to show that Comte and Spencer both developed theories that were defective. Gulliver concludes that Christianity alone meets the needs of the world.³⁰ Very little is known about Gulliver's later years except that she died on July 25, 1940.

3. *Helen Dendy Bosanquet: 1860–1925*

Helen Dendy was the child of the Unitarian minister the Reverend John Dendy of Manchester.³¹ She became a well educated woman, having received the LL.D. at St. Andrews. Her interests included philosophy of mind, logic, psychology, ethics, political philosophy and social theory. These interests culminated in two full-length works on the family and on social work. She read at least German and French well enough to review philosophy books written in those languages and for many years published reviews in *Mind*.³² Dendy's interests in philosophy can best be understood from a brief survey of the chronology of her few written works in philosophy.

The earliest publication in philosophy by Dendy that we have identified is an article, "Recent Developments of the Doctrine of Sub-Conscious Process," which appeared in *Mind* in 1893. In this article she reviews recent developments in the newly emerging discipline of psychology which was as yet not the research and treatment discipline we know it as today. It still had close theoretical connections to work then being done in philosophy of mind, logic, philosophy of language and other sub-specialty areas in philosophy. In this respect, academic psychology closely analyzed concepts of consciousness, of personal identity, of self-awareness, of the nature of sensory experience, memory, etc. In this article, Dendy examines three different emerging theories of personality, all of which assume that a single consciousness, a person, is a plurality of distinct personalities. This school of personality theories was suggested by the immensely popular "psychical" research of the time that investigated empirical psychological data. First, she says are theories that personality

. . . appears to be identical with a "chain of memory"; and again it is implied, if not assumed, that a "primary," "secondary," or "subja-cent" consciousness is equivalent to a distinct and independent personality.³³

But, she criticizes, this form of personality theory is not sufficiently well thought out, and fails to argue, as she says it must, in support of the claim that consciousness is identical to a chain of memory.

She then addresses a second version of the theory. On this account, she says, personality

. . . results from the assumption of different "layers" of consciousness. Here the personalities exist contemporaneously, and we may again distinguish them according as they are known only as the suppositious accompaniments of physical events or manifest themselves in genuinely psychical phenomena.³⁴

It is the third (and then most popular) version of personality theory that is for Dendy most fraught with philosophical difficulties. This is the theory that personality is

. . . *successively* independent trains of memory, where the break between one personality and another might be represented as a break in a straight line, rather than as a distinction between different planes.³⁵

She criticizes this theory of multiple personality on the following grounds: first, she says, it is not sufficient to say that each "personality" has its own independent sensorium, memories, etc. and cannot access those of the other "personality." It is clear, that at least under hypnosis, the alleged existence of these personalities has been brought out that very way: by having the same physical individual connect with and display the personalities in succession. That, she claims is not essentially any different than, for example, forgetting a multiplication table or a piece of poetry and being completely unable to recall them except under extraordinary provocative circumstances (if at all). In such a situation, we would not want to say that I had two personalities; rather, that I had suppressed memories and could not for the life of me recall them. It is rather, she claims, a matter of refocussing attentiveness so that inhibitions are overcome and chains of memory are accessible.

Is there, moreover, anything to be gained by this arbitrary division of Selves? Are we not tempted by it to exaggerate what are no doubt very striking deviations from the ordinary course of mental development, and to close our eyes to the fundamental unity underlying such deviations – perhaps all the more easily because it is so fundamental. And, further, do not the facts of hypnotic suggestion themselves tend to show how close the connection really is between the groups of ideas which have been thus elevated into "personalities"?³⁶

Dendy then examines the psychic phenomenon of automatic action which had been used to prove the existence of multiple personality, summarizing the argument of those who hold the view:

. . . if the body carries out a series of systematic actions while the mind is occupied with thoughts having no reference to that series it is assumed that there must be a secondary consciousness to which the series is present and by which it is controlled. It is assumed, that is, that every physical change in the body must have its psychical counterpart somewhere.³⁷

She points out the consequences: why not claim that every cell in the body has its own memory, and on that account, has its own personality? The mere presence of apparently independent chains of memory cannot be the entire conceptual foundation for a definition of personality. Dendy suggests instead that accidental association of ideas may account for all apparent instances of "unconscious mental processes."³⁸ She gives an example familiar to all of us: we are writing about logic and are searching for just the right word to convey our meaning, but the word won't come to us. We get busy doing something else, and while dusting, move a law text:

Causal! That is the word I want. Am I to suppose an unconscious mental process, a second self, or some dæmonic secretary at work underground and telephoning the word up just when he happens to find it, quite irrespective of my present needs and occupation, or even a purely mechanical interaction of ideas which happens to come to an end just here? . . . Not at all.³⁹

The likelier, and simpler explanation, that accounts both for ordinary forgetfulness and extraordinary capacities (like automatic piano-playing, hypnotic recollection of events and ideas, etc.) is: (a) that there is a single unity of consciousness that constitutes a personality, and (b) that accessing chains of memories requires attentiveness to those memories which present consciousness is too confused, preoccupied or distracted to access without external assistance. Whether that assistance is provided by a chance encounter with related ideas, or by hypnotic suggestion is determined only by a difference in the degree of our inattentiveness.

For the next several years, Helen Dendy Bosanquet published in

Mind reviews of a variety of books which have as their common thread, her interest in philosophical psychology. Through these reviews, we see reflected her own interests in concepts of consciousness and self-identity and the relationship of those concepts to a view of human social action.

Apparently, her first published book review was of a German book by Paulson on the history of philosophy,⁴⁰ followed by a review of Maurice Blondel's philosophical psychology.⁴¹ She is very critical of both works, but highly complimentary of the German book by Sigwart, *Logik*,⁴² and reviews it twice.⁴³ Sigwart addresses a variety of epistemological and psychological aspects of thought and knowledge, e.g., causal inference, consciousness, historical explanation, etc. But during this period of the early and mid 1890's Dendy's interests remained primarily in philosophy of psychology,⁴⁴ in particular regarding questions of personal identity and the nature of conscience. We can see this interested reflected in her review of Robertson's book on the development of conscience.⁴⁵ Here, her primary interest is in the roles played by reason and sentiment in moral judgment: the rational and emotional aspects of moral conscience. She critically evaluates Robertson's account of immediate knowledge (recognition) of the morally good and of evil, as well as his discussion of the nature of moral law and its status in conscience. The last review to be written under her own name was on Emile Boutroux' concept of natural law.⁴⁶ That review appeared in late 1895, so we can assume that her interests were already beginning to tend toward social and political philosophy.

Prior to their marriage in 1895, Helen Dendy and Bernard Bosanquet (a philosopher at Oxford) had both been active leaders in the Charity Organization Society, as was Bernard's brother Charles. Following her marriage, Dendy published under the name Bosanquet. Her interests evolved from the earlier focus on the nature of personal identity and consciousness and other psychological questions, toward an interest in ethics, especially, the nature of conscience, free will and determinism, natural law, moral psychology, and social theories, such as the social philosophy and social psychology of Baldwin,⁴⁷ and the social and economic philosophy of the German philosopher Stein.⁴⁸ Her analysis of socialist and utopian ideas appeared in (what I believe, but have not been able to confirm, was) a jointly authored work *Strength of the People*.⁴⁹ Given these interests, it is perhaps natural that she would gradually tend toward more applied social ethics issues, in particular those concerning the status of women and children. She takes a particularly positive attitude towards

a German work on the psychology of woman (written by a man), although she is critical of parts of it. Her review opens with:

Perhaps one of the most curious psychological differences between man and woman is the fact that while men are never weary of "studying" woman, and publishing treatises about her, no woman, so far as I am aware, has ever attempted to study "man," and the day is probably far off when a treatise on the Psychology of "man" as distinct from "woman" will appear. This is perhaps because it is assumed that man represents the normal mind about which all Psychologists are engaged, in which case of course there is nothing to explain, while woman represents a deviation which calls for special explanation. The truth would perhaps be better represented by assuming that the normal mind of the psychological textbook is neither male nor female, and that man and woman both deviate from it in certain assignable respects.⁵⁰

Bosanquet's critical attitude toward masculist theories notwithstanding, she holds traditional views about women. For example, in this review she accepts the view that women have a lesser capacity for abstract thought.⁵¹ In *The Family*⁵² she claims that accounts of matriarchal societies are overstated. She supports limitations on women in industrial employment, and the authority of the male as head of household. She views the family as the quintessential social unit, without which society would crumble. She claims that the economic needs and contributions of families are under-appreciated by society, and urges a proper acknowledgement of the social and economic contributions made by mothers. In "The Intellectual Influence of Women,"⁵³ she supports the view that the "domination" by women of university life in state colleges in the western United States accounts for reduced scientific investigation at those institutions, while the exclusion of women from the eastern states' ivy league colleges accounts for the higher quality of academic scientific output there. Yet, the article urges the English to recognize women's intellectual potential and the valuable contributions that women, given the opportunity, can make to society. It closes with an appeal for expanding post-graduate opportunities and fellowships for women.

Bosanquet's "English Divorce Law and the Report of the Royal Commission" analyzes some technical aspects of prospective reforms to divorce law and criticizes those aspects of the proposed reforms that would tend to dissuade women from seeking reconciliation with their

husbands, or from seeking alcoholism treatment for their spouses (or themselves) and make it easier to legally separate and then divorce than it would be to work to reconstruct a sound marriage. Her argument is based on her concept of the commitment made by marrying, a commitment that the new law in effect says, according to Bosanquet, is not one that society takes seriously. Nevertheless, for prolonged abandonment, cruelty, non-support and other serious grounds, Bosanquet feels that marriage should be dissoluble. She argues that the present system is discriminatory against poor and uneducated women by making divorce too expensive, and the bureaucracy that administers it too difficult for uneducated women to have reasonable access to.

The final work in Bosanquet's own name was not really a work of philosophy, rather it was an historical analysis of a social work movement. In its earliest conception, social work, founded by Jane Addams was an applied field of practical ethics. Its purpose was founded on two simple ideas about societies. First, societies have moral duties to provide moral leadership by encouraging individuals toward right action. Second, societies have moral duties to compensate for inequities in distribution of wealth, opportunities and rights through a combined system of social reform for the future and the provision of social services to the presently disadvantaged. *Social Work in London*⁵⁴ recounted the history of social and moral principles implemented through the development of social services programs by the Charity Organization Society.

4. Jane Addams: 1860–1935

Jane Addams was born September 6, 1860 and lived 74 years.⁵⁵ More appropriately she is considered a social activist and sociologist, nevertheless some of her works are rightly considered to be works of social philosophy. Addams follows in that tradition of American women like Catherine Ward Beecher⁵⁶ who attempted to reconcile their analyses of philosophical ethics with their social situation as women. Like Beecher and other feminists and pacifists, Addams employed the concept of "righteousness" as a standard not only of personal morality, but of social morality. As such, several of Addams' many works deserve merit as examples of turn-of-the-century American social and political philosophy. On Jane Addams' view, "righteousness" required that we go beyond the mere concerns that in our personal life we uphold the moral law, but seek outside our personal, familial and immediate social circles that which "the time" demands. Thus, a righteous individual looks

also at the social order. To do less is a moral shortcoming of a serious nature:

To attain individual morality in an age demanding social morality, to pride one's self on the results of personal effort when the time demands social adjustment, is utterly to fail to apprehend the situation.⁵⁷

Rather, she applauds those who realize that "righteousness" imposes another requirement. Speaking approvingly of those who use the insights gained by contemplating the nature of personal virtue, she says:

The test which they would apply to their conduct is a social test. They fail to be content with the fulfillment of their family and personal obligations, and find themselves striving to respond to a new demand involving a social obligation; they have become conscious of another requirement, and the contribution they would make is toward a code of social ethics. The conception of life which they hold has not yet expressed itself in social changes or legal enactment, but rather in a mental attitude of maladjustment, and in a sense of divergence between their consciences and their conduct. They desire both a clearer definition of the code of morality adapted to present day demands and a part in its fulfillment, both a creed and a practice of social morality. In the perplexity of this intricate situation at least one thing is becoming clear: if the latter day moral ideal is in reality that of a social morality, it is inevitable that those who desire it must be brought in contact with the moral experiences of the many in order to procure an adequate social motive.⁵⁸

Addams' view was that democracy as a social philosophy required the widest type of accommodation of liberty of individual pursuits. Thus, she held that social institutions must be responsive to the widest range of views. In her view, society must be supportive of the rights and interests of each individual in identifying and pursuing personal goals independent of race, nationality, creed, gender, disability or age. Education in its widest sense was a right of individuals and a responsibility of society.

In an article in the *International Journal of Ethics* in 1898, Addams makes a case for the responsibility to teach moral virtue in a way that respects moral pluralism.⁵⁹ In that article she inquires what the limits

are on the duty to be just when one lives in inherently unjust and oppressive circumstances. The location is a Chicago Ward. The neighborhood is multicultural and therefore morally pluralistic with respect to values. The system of law is profoundly corrupt and the social conditions are profoundly impoverished and oppressive. There is neither social cohesiveness nor significant experience in self-government. The politicians are corrupt through and through. Addams asks how either moral virtue or the extent of the responsibility to obey the law can be assessed under such circumstances. Dismissing assessment of blameworthiness as besides-the-point, Addams focuses instead on the duty of the virtuous (herself, in particular!) to inculcate virtue and respect for law while respecting the plurality of values within the community and taking into account conditions that to some degree may be morally exculpatory.

Addams also had well-articulated views on women and morality. Like Beecher before her, she held that women naturally tend to be caring and nurturant, and that they have moral obligations to set an example of virtuous behavior. In *The Long Road of Woman's Memory*⁶⁰ she urges women to overcome the past myths about women and to strive for self-determination. In her view, women, as victims of social and political oppression, but also as shapers of the consciences of men and of children were uniquely situated and therefore had a unique duty to influence the development and implementation of social ethics. These views are further developed in "Why Women Should Vote,"⁶¹ "Why Women are Concerned with the Larger Citizenship,"⁶² and in "The World's Food Supply and Woman's Obligation."⁶³ In "The College Woman and the Family Claim" (1898) she argued forcefully for recognition of women's rights to college education supported by a social recognition that the educated woman cannot be considered to be shirking her moral duties towards her family if she chooses instead to put her education to use for social good.⁶⁴

An early work, *Philanthropy and Social Progress*⁶⁵ (1893) argued that in order to assure that individuals had opportunities to pursue their own interests, society, in the form of philanthropic and government efforts, needed to establish conditions of free inquiry. This meant the provision of safe living conditions, fair working conditions, protective legislation for women and children,⁶⁶ and life-long educational opportunities in formal school settings for children and through adult education.

Jane Addams' social philosophy applied far beyond the urban domestic spheres of social work. She was an ardent, committed pacifist. *Newer*

*Ideals of Peace*⁶⁷ (1907), *The Overthrow of the War System*⁶⁸ (1915), "Patriotism and Pacifists in War Time,"⁶⁹ (1917), and other writings evidence not only a lifetime commitment to pacifism as a moral duty, but the breadth and connectedness of her philosophical views. From her basic views on the central role that moral "righteousness" played in individual and social ethics and her views on women's special moral virtues and duties, she led the development of a social movement that applied her views on moral, social and political theory in a coherent system of social thought. She left behind a legacy as founder of the field of social work: the practical application of ethical ideals of justice, fairness and respect through personal activism, social reform and the provision of services to the needy and oppressed. That legacy is reflected in the vast bibliography of her own writings, as well as the secondary literature that it has generated. That she lived her moral ideals in part through her remarkable achievements as founder of Hull House, does not detract from the significance of her analysis of the relevance of applying philosophical thought to contemporary events.

5. *Elizabeth S. Haldane: 1862–1937*

Elizabeth Haldane was the only daughter of a wealthy Scottish family. She was tutored at home and always had an interest in philosophy. Despite the lack of a university education, she translated Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*⁷⁰ over a period of ten years in collaboration with Frances Simson. The three published volumes are still the standard English edition. She was the first woman to receive the honorary LL.D. from St. Andrews University.

Haldane wrote a biography of Descartes⁷¹ in 1905. Shortly thereafter Haldane began to work with G. R. T. Ross to provide the first complete English translation of Descartes' philosophical works. Their translation was published in two volumes in 1911 and 1912.⁷² A. E. Taylor commented that "the translation as a whole, may be commended as a faithful, though not always an elegant, reproduction of the original."⁷³ Haldane defended her translation by responding to Taylor's criticisms in *Mind*. There, she argued that Taylor's criticism of the scope of the book was unfounded. She pointed out that certain limitations of text had to be made because including additional text would have meant including the scientific writings in the same volume as the philosophical. Instead, Haldane and G. R. T. Ross chose to create a distinction between the philosophical and scientific portions of Descartes' writings.⁷⁴

According to Kersey, Haldane received recognition for her commitment to the fields of social welfare, nursing services as well as for founding the Auchterarder Institute and library.⁷⁵ Haldane's autobiography, *From One Century to Another: The Reminiscences of Elizabeth S. Haldane*⁷⁶ was published in 1937, the year she died.

6. *May Sinclair: 1863–1946*

Mary Amelia St. Clair Sinclair was born in 1863 near Liverpool, of well-to-do Scottish parents whose business failed when Mary was seven years old. Mary and her mother moved around from one relative to another. Mary apparently received her early education at home, in a narrow, repressive Anglican family that believed that her four brothers merited formal education and that she should learn household management. Mary, who near age thirty will begin to call herself "May," taught herself Greek and German from her brothers' books, and through the secretive collaboration of a neighbor, borrowed the works of Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and other philosophers from the London Library. Grudgingly, at age eighteen, she was permitted to enroll for a year in Cheltenham Ladies College where Dorothea Beale encouraged her to study and to write philosophy. Beale urged Sinclair to train at Oxford, and encouraged her not to confine her writing of philosophy to her novels, but to "give it to us sometimes 'neat.'"⁷⁷ And "neat" it was, in 1893 in "The Ethical and Religious import of Idealism,"⁷⁸ in 1912 in her essay *Feminism*⁷⁹ and in other works listed in the Bibliography, some of which are discussed below.

During World War I, May Sinclair served on the front lines in Belgium, in an ambulance corps. From the records of the Aristotelian Society, we see that Miss May Sinclair was elected in 1917. Her philosophic interests centered around issues related to psychology, metaphysics, epistemology and ethics in the context of mysticism. She credited her friend Evelyn Underhill (see *infra*) with first introducing her to mystical philosophy.

May Sinclair served the Aristotelian Society Executive Committee for four terms from 1922 through 1926. In November of that year she is listed as a discussant for the paper "Objects under Reference" by C. Lloyd Morgan. Her interests in idealism led her to an interest in psychoanalysis as a tool for developing self-consciousness. She joined the Society for Psychical Research and was a founding member of Dr. Jessie Margaret Murray's Medico-Psychological clinic. The development

of Sinclair's writings, including her novels, shows an assimilation of ethical idealism, pantheism, mysticism and psychoanalytic theory in a rejection of Victorian morality and in support of radical feminism.

If May Sinclair's philosophical writings had been her only writings, she would be considered to be a philosopher. However, she was a prolific and highly successful novelist and is known primarily as a woman of letters. Her many literary works include *The Belfry*, *Mary Olivier*, *The Romantic*, *The Three Sisters*, *The Tree of Heaven*, *Mr. Waddington of Wyck*, *The Return of the Prodigal*, *Journal of Impressions in Belgium*, and *Life and Death of Harriet Frean*. Zegger is a reliable source on Sinclair's novels, most of which are strongly philosophical and psychological. Sinclair wrote two full length works of philosophy, *A Defence of Idealism* and *The New Idealism*. She also wrote three philosophical articles, "The Ethical and Religious Import of Idealism,"⁸⁰ "Primary and Secondary Consciousness"⁸¹ and "Gitanjali of Sir Rabindranath Tagore,"⁸² as well as the pamphlet, *Feminism*.⁸³

Feminism, published in 1912, offered an idealist defense of the use of violence as a last resort of women denied legal rights, particularly, the vote. It was a response to a letter to the London *Times* by the influential scientist, Bible scholar and self-educated philosopher, Sir Almwroth Wright. Dubbed "Sir Almost Right" by later critics, Wright's letter to the *Times*, together with a *Times* editorial and letters from other eminent men denounced the breaking of some storefront windows by suffragists. Wright, a famous physician, had identified the violence as medical evidence of a psychological illness that came to be named "suffragist hysteria."

May Sinclair's book *The New Idealism* was reviewed by John Laird somewhat favorably. He comments that she takes on "formidable antagonists" (Whitehead, Russell, James) on their own ground. He praises her critical eye and incredible scrutiny that she even gives her own theory.⁸⁴

Sinclair has a delightful style of writing and a healthy disregard for the pompousity with which early twentieth century philosophy claimed to have found all the answers. For example, in *A Defence of Idealism* she says:

It is, however, a personal misfortune when your choice causes you to differ, almost with violence, from those for whose accomplishment you have the profoundest admiration. You cannot help feeling that it would be safer to share some splendid error with Samuel

Butler and M[onsieur]. Bergson, or with William James and Mr. Bertrand Russell (If the uncompromising virtue of Mr. Russell's logic left him any margin for error) than to be right in disagreeing with any of them.⁸⁵

Sinclair is no apologist for mysticism. She finds idealism in general, and pantheistic mysticism in particular to be personally rewarding, intellectually enlightening, religiously comforting and philosophically superior to the then rampant vogues of realism:

Pan-Psychism has an irresistible appeal to the emotions. I like to think that my friend's baby made its charming eyelashes, that my neighbour's hen designed her white frock of feathers, and my cat his fine black coat of fur, themselves; because they wanted to; instead of having to buy them, as it were, at some remote ontological bazaar. But my emotion doesn't blind me to the possibility that things may not, after all, have happened quite in this way.⁸⁶

Sinclair sees her primary objective as forcing a choice between pluralistic and monistic philosophies. Her question is whether existence can be explained by a single metaphysical principle or whether it requires multiple principles. On her analysis the problem narrows down to a choice between a realism that is pluralistic in nature, or an idealism that is monistic. She gives due credit to Hegelianism and Kantianism, but offers as a serious criticism the observation that nobody thinks of Kant or Hegel as

. . . nice comfortable philosophers whose bosoms they could lay their heads on.⁸⁷

What Sinclair means is that neither philosopher's theories accord with very basic facts about human psychology: the universal desire to form relationships; and the search for spiritual and emotional comfort. It is, however, idealism that she ultimately argues for: an abstract amalgam of ancient and medieval forms of mysticism from eastern and western traditions. "Mystical metaphysics" she says "are an abomination. But metaphysical mysticism is another matter."⁸⁸

Should the preceding give the impression that *A Defence of Idealism* is primarily about mysticism, let me offer a correction. Most of the work involves an analysis of how the dominant philosophies and psy-

chologies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from Kant, Hegel and Bergson to James, McTaggart and Russell fail to offer a unified account of the reason for evolution. Nor can they account for basic facts of human psychology and the human quest for life, for relationships, for religious knowledge and for moral virtue. Sinclair offers humorous but rigorous analyses of the failings of both idealism and realism to adequately account for what appears to be the facts of science (especially evolution and medicine) as well as the facts of human psychology (especially the will to live). She accuses pragmatism of being a “very important branch of casuistry” and of being a long argument *ad hominem* unbridled by the usual precautions philosophical theories take: to preserve consistency, to draw valid conclusions, etc. Her criticisms frequently decry what we might call the *macho* character of pragmatism. She says:

Pragmatism, by its very nature, knows nothing of these precautions. It does not sterilize its instruments before it uses them. It does not *want* to sterilize them. It is courageous. It courts rather than fears infection. It must stand or fall by its appeal to the pragmatic instinct, the business instinct in men, or it would not be Pragmatism.⁸⁹

Sinclair opens her second book *The New Idealism*⁹⁰ with an acknowledgement of its shortcomings, the worst of which were the failure to understand the importance of space-time in the problem of consciousness, and the role of values in morality. She attempts to see what can be said against idealism, as those criticisms are implied in the works of Alexander, Broad, Drake, Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Russell, Santayana, Sellars, Strong and most particularly Whitehead. She acknowledges, too, the defects of earlier forms of idealism in which the universe was considered as a system of thought-relations. Recent philosophers including Wildon Carr claimed that Einstein’s Theory of Relativity supported idealism. Sinclair reluctantly disagreed, noting that

Professor Einstein doesn’t say a word about minds of reference; and if a realist chooses to insist that there is nothing here but the eccentricities of unminded Space-Time it would be hard to refute him out of Professor Einstein’s mouth alone. Professor Einstein is concerned, not with space-time systems as occupying his observer’s consciousness, but with his observer’s body as occupying certain positions in a space-time system.

All the same, there is nothing in his theory which can be used as a refutation of idealism. For idealism each "observer" will carry with him his own space-time system based on his personal perspective; his body of reference will itself be part and parcel of his consciousness; and his consciousness will only not appear in the equation because it already contains the equation and its terms.⁹¹

May Sinclair distinguishes two forms of consciousness, primary consciousness and secondary consciousness. If I understand Sinclair correctly, primary consciousness is tantamount to what we mean by "being conscious," while secondary consciousness begins with "being conscious of" and all subsequent operations of the mind upon the objects in the domain of consciousness.⁹² Primary consciousness is defined in the article "Primary and Secondary Consciousness" as:

. . . all that is present to the subject from moment to moment in one unitary block, or it is the continuous succession of such presences, before reflection, judgment or reasoning have set in; before there is any consciousness of consciousness.⁹³

Secondary consciousness is therefore dependent upon primary consciousness. If Space-Time holds the universe together, what, Sinclair asks, holds Space-Time together?⁹⁴ The answer for her is "ultimate consciousness," God. God unites the personal perspectives of the finite selves, it is only for God that being and knowing are the same. Sinclair suggests a revised pantheism, complaining about the poor press philosophy has given Deistic concepts:

Philosophers have created strange Absolutes. They have seen God as the parish beadle, as the President of the Ethical Society, as a mathematician geometrizing eternally, as a company of snow-white categories. Sir Isaac Newton thoughtfully provided him with the comfort of a sensorium – all space – much as he provided a big hole in the door for his cat and a little one for her kitten. Other philosophers have left God very poorly off in this respect.⁹⁵

May Sinclair argues for a new pantheism, one that avoids the problem of attributing omnipotence and omniscience to God at the expense of attributing moral responsibility to us. She notes that it is difficult to accept that God is manifested in each of us. It is much easier to look at persons as the physicists do: as bits of Space-Time:

So long as we are only bits of Space-Time, our backslidings will not so much matter. A bit of Space-Time bashing in its wife's head with the kitchen poker in a two-pair back; a bit of Space-Time coming drunk out of the Bald-Face Stag; a bit of Space-Time telling an improper story at its club is not so shocking to the religious consciousness as a bit of God doing all or any of these things.⁹⁶

She proposes revising ideas of omniscience and omnipotence so that omnipotence is omnipotentiality, not omniactuality.

But he *is* what is actual. He is the finite selves and the universe of the finite selves. They are parts of God, their consciousness is part of his consciousness, their bodies are parts of God's body which is the universe. He is everything that is. But he is not bound to be anything but what he is.⁹⁷

Free will and the problem of an omniscient God that is necessary evil is taken care of by making omniscience a power, the *ability* to know everything. Whether God chooses to know or not is part of his free will and his perfection. Moral virtues are simply exemplifications of the perfections of God which we are free to strive towards, or not. Ideal states, from a human perspective, are, from a divine perspective, real states. Process and history and creation are to a human perspective what eternity is to the divine perspective. The road to perfect states of secondary consciousness is the road through self-knowledge and knowledge of all things in God. As ultimate consciousness, God has the power to know all, but is not constrained by the need to know all. The perfect exercise of the power that is ultimate consciousness is when God knows himself in us knowing him.⁹⁸

7. *Ellen Bliss Talbot: 1867–1968*

Ellen Bliss Talbot was born in Iowa City, Iowa and earned her B.A. at Ohio State University in 1890. From that time until 1894 she worked as a high school principal, first in Dresden, Ohio and then in Troy, Ohio. She was Sage Scholar in Philosophy from 1895–1897 and Sage Fellow for 1897–1898 while completing the Ph.D. at Cornell University. She continued to teach at Emma Willard School in Troy, New York until 1900, at which time she was appointed Professor of Philosophy at one of the “Seven Sister” schools, Mount Holyoke College in

Massachusetts. She spent the Summer of 1901 engaged in post-graduate studies at the University of Chicago. The Fall of 1904 was spent at the University of Berlin, and the Spring of 1905 at Heidelberg University. By 1904 she had become "Chairman" of the Department of Philosophy and Psychology at Mount Holyoke, a position she retained until her retirement in 1936.

Talbot's primary philosophical interests were in philosophy of mind, and ethics, particularly in contemporary pragmatism and in the work of the German philosopher, Johann Fichte. Her doctoral thesis *The Fundamental Principles of Fichte's Philosophy* was published in the Cornell Studies in Philosophy series in 1906.⁹⁹ In "The Doctrine of Conscious Elements," (1905)¹⁰⁰ Talbot criticizes earlier psychological theories that held that sensation, affection and conation (knowing) was adequately explained by the metaphysical hypothesis that the soul, by virtue of its own nature has the capacity for the activities of knowing, feeling and willing. She identifies what she considers to be four defects of such theories:

- (1) they misunderstand what an "element" is;
- (2) they depend upon metaphysical assumptions concerning the existence and powers of the soul;
- (3) they explain unknown elements of sensation, affection and conation in terms of other undefined unknowns (capacities of knowing, feeling and willing); and
- (4) by positing abstract faculties as though they explained the phenomena of consciousness, they neglect to explain the phenomena themselves.

In "The Philosophy of Fichte in its Relation to Pragmatism"¹⁰¹ Talbot points out the differences and similarities between Fichte's moral philosophy and philosophy of mind, and that of the pragmatists. In particular, she examines both philosophies on the subject of the relationship between the practical aspects of life and the theoretical. She finds, for example that the pragmatists' attempt to overcome the apparent antithesis of theoretical and practical (by claiming that practice gives rise to theory and not vice-versa) is consistent with Fichte's view that human life is characterized by purposive activity. Thought and theory-formation are therefore teleological in nature: they are activities with a practical purpose. In this sense, Talbot claims, Fichte's account of Ego is consistent with James' account of a "will to believe."

In "The Relation of the Two Periods of Fichte's Philosophy,"¹⁰² Talbot

takes issue with views on Fichte articulated by two different groups of scholars: the one who have claimed that Fichte's later works represent a complete abandonment of his earlier views, the other who have claimed that there is no essential difference. Talbot finds herself defending a middle view: that there are differences, but the differences do not amount to Fichte's abandonment of early views. Rather, she claims that Fichte's views on Being, Absolute and God as the ultimate principle of reality in the later works represent a development and not a retraction of his early views on Ego, Idea of Ego or God as the ultimate principle.

In a two part article appearing in the *Philosophical Review*¹⁰³ Talbot considers the role that time plays in assessing the moral and aesthetic values by which we measure human life: goodness, beauty, truth and pleasure. If these values are realized earlier or later in life, or at some particular point in time during a person's life, she asks, are they on that account somehow more or less valuable? Although we are aware of being tempted to value present pleasure over pain, upon reflection, we tend to value pleasure later in life and to conclude that earlier pains are worth the pleasure they will bring in the future. We do not ignore present pain, nor is it always worth the future pleasure it will bring, but generally, when we anticipate that present pain will bring future pleasure we are willing, if we are reflective, to endure the present pain. With respect to morality, we often feel that a person can atone for past misdeeds. From the moral point of view, we likewise feel that a life of goodness is somehow overshadowed by vices or evil deeds that later characterize our actions. In assessing the moral character of a person, we look toward an evaluation of the quality of their character at its greatest maturity, that is, at the end of life. The presence of goodness, truth, beauty and pleasure at the end of life is considered more important than their presence early in life. That is, the value of an individual's life is assessed temporally.

She supports McTaggart's response to authors who have denied the reality of the progress of time and on that account have denied the reality of evil, calling it mere illusion. McTaggart had attempted to reconcile the two doctrines of the unreality of time and the reality of progress and concluded, in his paper "The Relation of Time and Eternity" (*Mind*, N.S. XVIII), that change was unreal. To this Talbot says:

If the time-process is unreal, all the less and more adequate representations of the changeless reality exist eternally. And the existence of the more adequate can in no sense do away with that of the less

adequate. If the time-process is real, such atonement for the earlier by the later – for the less adequate representations by the more adequate – is conceivable; but if it is unreal, the atonement is not conceivable.¹⁰⁴

If we believe in the unreality of time, then we must also commit ourselves to moral systems and theories that deny the possibility of compensating for past moral lapses by exemplifying virtue. Progress, compensation, punishment, salvation, atonement and redemption would be empty moral and religious concepts.

In “Individuality and Freedom” Talbot addresses pragmatist and other philosophical views on three issues: (1) free will vs. determinism, (2) the nature of human individual moral character and (3) the predictability of individual choice. She argues that insofar as each human individual has a unique moral character our understanding of each person’s character is constrained (at best) to knowledge of past acts. We cannot predict with confidence how that individual will act in the future, therefore, we cannot verify whether human acts are determined. In fact, she argues, once we are committed to viewing each human as unique, we are committed to the view that past selves do not determine action, present selves do. In that sense, the “I” always is at the moment of choosing to act. This does not imply that individuals are always free to choose how to act; however, it does imply that we cannot claim with confidence that they are determined either.¹⁰⁵

8. *Emma Goldman: 1869–1940*

Emma Goldman is widely known as an outspoken anarchist, atheist, and feminist. Like Elizabeth Haldane and E. E. Constance Jones and others, she too left an autobiography. That work, *Living my Life* was published in 1931.¹⁰⁶ She was born in Lithuania of Jewish parents and had a harsh childhood with little formal early education. Her family moved frequently, first to Konigsburg (on the Baltic), then to St. Petersburg in Czarist Russia. She became attracted to the political philosophies of the socialist assassins of Czar Alexander II, and was abhorred by the harsh discrimination against Jews and against women. She leaves no doubt that it was her early exposure to oppression and discrimination (rather than her later year as a student nurse in Vienna attending Freud’s lectures and studying Nietzsche) that formed the foundation for her social, political and religious philosophies. When the already sexually-active

Emma was sixteen years old she emigrated (with an older half-sister) to Rochester, New York where she joined another, married, sister.

The press coverage of the 1886 Haymarket bombing in Chicago, coupled with her own exploitation as a factory worker stimulated Goldman's interest in the various activities of labor organizations and trade unions, whose efforts to secure an eight-hour workday were at that time considered radical. Although the identity of the person whose bomb killed several policemen in the Haymarket was never known, the press labelled participants "anarchists," probably because the German anarchist Johann Most had several years earlier recommended violence as an appropriate means of dealing with the exploitation of labor by employers. After the Haymarket affair, Goldman began attending socialist worker meetings in Rochester and began to read Most's newspaper *Die Freiheit*. That then, was her formal introduction into anarchist activism. After marrying, divorcing, remarrying and re-divorcing a family friend, the Ukrainian Jacob Kersner, Goldman moved to New York. There she met Johann Most in 1889.

Most was one of the leading figures of the Social Democratic party (from which he was expelled by the more-powerful Karl Marx) who supported the assassination of Czar Alexander II. He had been among those imprisoned for supporting violence in the Haymarket riots. Most had the poor judgment to reprint a half-century old essay in support of political assassination the day before the assassination of President McKinley (1901) and was re-imprisoned for that. Johann Most fostered Goldman's speaking career, urging her to go on a lecture circuit among radical political groups across the United States. The two became sexually involved, and it was Most's views of Goldman as an obedient mistress and disciple that eventually disillusioned her. However, she continued as a public speaker (in Yiddish) to advocate anarchist causes, and played a large role in planning the assassination of the American millionaire Henry Frick. Following a year's imprisonment for inciting to riot, Goldman studied nursing and English, mastering the language sufficiently to begin lecturing in English throughout the United States. She had founded, in 1906 *Mother Earth* magazine to provide a forum for anarchist views.

Goldman believed that along with political liberation must come sexual freedom. In 1908, Goldman was lecturing and providing information on birth control in support of Margaret Sanger's crusade. Shockingly, for the time, Goldman argued that contraceptives were as necessary for single women as they were for married women. She believed that working

women in particular, in whose 'drab and monotonous existence the only color left is probably a sexual attraction' should not be compelled to stifle their sexuality, nor to face the consequences of abortion or unwed motherhood."¹⁰⁷

In 1911 Emma Goldman published *Anarchism and Other Essays*. Still widely available, this collection covered a range of topics including an analysis of the nature of anarchist political philosophy, the psychology of violence, unethical prison practices and policies, the immoral use of patriotic sentiment, and, discrimination against women and its connection to prostitution, suffrage, and marriage. She continued to advocate the right of single and married women to contraceptive information. In 1915, Goldman seriously confronted the issue of birth control through methods of non-violence and civil disobedience. In 1916 she spent fifteen days in New York's Queen's County Jail for dispensing birth control pills.

In short, Goldman argued for the importance of contraception, but she did so, at least in *Mother Earth*, from a viewpoint as a free speech question and its relationship to the despair of working class mothers over frequent pregnancies. She was concerned only secondarily with contraception as a method of woman's emancipation.¹⁰⁸

The following year she was sentenced to two years in prison for conspiring to help young men avoid the draft. Goldman and Berkman were then deported to Russia and had the opportunity to view the Revolution first hand. Its excesses led to the eventual publication of *My Disillusionment in Russia*.¹⁰⁹ An excellent, but incomplete bibliography of her works can be found in Martha Solomon's *Emma Goldman*.¹¹⁰

9. A. M. (Maud?) Bodkin: b. 1875

I confess to some hesitation in identifying a philosopher who wrote under the style A. M. Bodkin, and who is referred to in the philosophical literature as "Miss A. M. Bodkin" with an author Maud Bodkin who wrote somewhat later on closely related subjects. The date of birth given above is that of Maud Bodkin, who may or may not be the same person as "Miss A. M. Bodkin."

From her works, it can be seen that Miss Bodkin's interests were in the philosophy and psychology of aesthetic experience in art and literature. Her first philosophical publication was a lengthy two part article

in *Mind*, "The Subconscious Factors of Mental Process Considered in Relation to Thought."¹¹¹ In it she looks at "grades of consciousness" ideas, feelings, sensations, etc. that are less than fully present to the conscious mind, yet which are not wholly inaccessible to it through introspection. The mental objects that she wishes to analyze are those elements which

. . . are readily passed over and hard to verify; yet the consideration of them may nevertheless be necessary for a complete account of the structure and development of intellectual life.¹¹²

In her article, she draws a distinction between sentience and the contents of thought, and explores explanations of how sense-data is organized when it is presented to the mind independent of conscious thought processes. She refers to the views of a variety of philosophers and psychologists: Plato, Leibniz, Locke, Kant, Brentano, Mill, Reid, Lotze, Spencer, Bradley, James, Stout, Bosanquet, Sidgwick, and Binet. Through this, she attempts to show that in the subconscious there must be a conceptual structure with which we can organize and relate sensory images that are "the merely felt," "the inexpressible," but which are not yet so organized. This process is related to that of the implicit, unexpressed at the moment, not yet separately felt sensory images that are already organized within the structure of judgment. Prior thought activity provides the linguistic structure for organization at both the subconscious and implicit levels.¹¹³

The question of level of consciousness of sensory imagery is also addressed in Bodkin's article "The Relevance of Psycho-Analysis to Art Criticism,"¹¹⁴ a paper originally presented to the aesthetics section of the British Psychological Society. In it she argues that psychoanalysis should be relevant to art criticism. The art critic can utilize psychoanalytic theory to understand crucial components of the aesthetic experience. First, psychoanalytic theory can inform a critic's understanding of the relationship of observers' subconscious, imaginative and emotional response, as well as their aesthetic sense to the work of art. Second, Bodkin argues, psychoanalytic theory can inform a critic's understanding of the relationship of the artist's subconscious, imaginative and emotional response, as well as *the artist's* aesthetic sense to the conscious development and implementation of the artist's technique and style.

In addition to the foregoing articles, a book review by A. M. Bodkin appears in 1926 in *Mind*. She reviews John M. Thorburn's *Art and*

the Unconscious, subtitled: "A psychological approach to a problem of philosophy." There is then a gap of fifteen years between this publication, and the next we have identified, which appears under the name of "Maud Bodkin." The gap leads me to be wary of considering the authors to be one and the same, however, I am at this point more influenced by the close relationship in subject matter of the publications and am tentatively willing to consider the authors one and the same.

"Maud Bodkin" is known as the author of three full length works which came to my attention as this volume was going to press, and which I have not seen. Those works are: *The Quest for Salvation in an Ancient and Modern Play* (1941),¹¹⁵ *Archetypal Patterns in Poetry: Psychological Studies of the Imagination* (1948)¹¹⁶ and *Studies of Type – Images in Poetry, Religion and Philosophy* (1951).¹¹⁷ If in fact, these works are by the same author, then we can offer the following description of Maud Bodkin's interests in philosophy: Following an early interest in philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology particularly in the workings of the subconscious on sensory images, Bodkin developed an interest in psychoanalytic theory and its potential for illuminating aesthetic experience in art and literature. Her works in this area spanned the first half of the twentieth century.

10. Evelyn Underhill: 1875–1941

Evelyn Underhill was born December 6, 1875 in Wolverhampton, England. She was the only daughter of a distinguished and agnostic family.¹¹⁸ Underhill was educated at King's College in London and was multilingual. In 1922, she became the first woman lecturer to be listed at Oxford University, and later became the first woman to become a Fellow of King's College. Underhill received her Doctorate of Divinity from the University of Aberdeen in 1938.¹¹⁹ In her later writings, Underhill admits to her own mystical experience. Her spiritual life centered around worship; it is ironic therefore, that she died within a place of worship: in the Octave of Corpus Christi church.

Underhill possessed what F. W. H. Myers called intellectual virtues of the mind, "Curiosity, Candor and Care."¹²⁰ In 1907 Underhill took a retreat at a convent in Rome. While there she underwent a religious conversion which convinced her that the Catholic religion was true. She was at that time engaged to her childhood friend Hubert Stuart Moore and although she contemplated ending the engagement and entering the convent, she decided against it.¹²¹ According to Menzies,¹²² Underhill was

an authority on Anglican theology, a poet, a spiritual leader and philosopher of mysticism especially the neoplatonic mystical writers. This discussion will focus on her more philosophical writings. However, it is relevant to include in the Bibliography to this volume those of her works that may be considered devotional in nature.

Underhill's writings focused on two main subjects, God and the Soul. In her writings about God, Underhill emphasized the reality, the supremacy and accessibility of God. She never anthropomorphized God by blurring the distinction between divine and human nature. To Underhill, God was real, an eternal self-substantiating, self-sufficient being. She emphasized both God's transcendence and immanence in mystical experience. She defined mysticism as a practice of the art of union with the ultimate reality of God.¹²³ Many of Underhill's poems, including "His Immanence" and "Veni Creator," reflect her account of knowledge of the truth of God's immanence.

Underhill's first great work is titled simply *Mysticism*.¹²⁴ It first appeared in 1911, was reprinted ten times, revised for the twelfth edition and again repeatedly reprinted. The original edition was very positively reviewed by Alfred E. Taylor.¹²⁵ It remains one of the fundamental philosophical analyses of mysticism. *Mysticism* has two parts, the first and most philosophical analyzes several epistemological and metaphysical issues. For example, she addresses the relationship of mystical experience to the search for ultimate truths, the nature of the self, the nature of sensory perception and the unreality of the sensory illusion, the distinction between emotional and spiritual experience and the knowledge claims of both, the limits of naturalism, vitalism, idealism, and the failure of philosophical systems to provide an adequate account of the mystical aspects of suffering, beauty and their relationship to religious certainty. In her discussion of vitalism, she explores the contributions of Bergson and others to the analysis of the spiritual, physical and psychological characteristics of vitalism. In particular, she examines Bergson's theory of the nature of the intellect and of perception and explores the relationship of his theory to mysticism. She inquires also into the nature of reality, of intuitive knowledge, of transcendence and divine immanence. In a chapter on mysticism and psychology she examines the nature of emotion, of intellect and the demand of the intellect and will for absolute truth. She takes care to distinguish mysticism from hysteria and from genius. The role and purpose of mystical experience is to experience direct communion with transcendent reality. She cites the work of Julian of Norwich,¹²⁶ Mechthild of Magdeburg,¹²⁷ Philo,

Augustine and others and addresses the role that love of the divine plays in mystic contemplation.

In *The Mystic Way*,¹²⁸ (1914) Underhill analyzed mysticism and its relationship to the modernist view of the Gospels which Liberal Protestantism had made popular. *The Essentials of Mysticism*¹²⁹ written in 1920 is an attempt to strip the concept of mysticism of all accidental and cultural attributes and reveal its essential characteristic. The “central fact” of the mystical experience is an overpowering experience of the presence of the divine who is communicating directly with the mystic’s soul. The mystic is conscious of apprehending some essential truth. The experience is one of a feeling of receiving divine love and a sense that the mystic has only experienced a portion of what ultimately could be experienced. The experience of this love creates the desire to return the love by loving the divine. There is a sense of a process, steps that must be taken to achieve the full experience. First, the mind or soul must learn to purify itself so that it is prepared for the promised illumination. Second, illumination or enlightenment must occur. Finally, there is a sense of physical, mental and spiritual union with God.

Following a conversion to Catholicism, Underhill wrote *The Life of the Spirit and The Life of Today*¹³⁰ (1922), and *The Mystics of the Church*¹³¹ (1925). In the latter work, Underhill functions as a historian of religious mystical philosophy and describes the mystical experiences and writings of many church mystics, including several women who are discussed in Volume 2 of this series: Hildegard von Bingen, Julian of Norwich, Catherine of Siena and Teresa of Avila.

In the last four years of her life, Underhill participated in a series of talk shows, which were titled “The Spiritual Life.” In these broadcasts, Underhill outlined the main structure of the human soul.¹³²

Underhill’s life and works are clearly focused on analyzing and explaining what for her was the reality, supremacy and accessibility of God through human consciousness. Although many of her writings are devotional¹³³ even these are analytical. Underhill must be understood as a philosopher of religion, whose primary interests were in religious epistemology and metaphysics: the knowledge of God, the achievement of truth and certainty through the physical and spiritual experience of and communion with the deity. Through spiritual consciousness, Underhill believes we can know God for what He is, and live in the manner in which He created us to live. Although she claims not to be a philosopher, many of her writings are clearly philosophical in nature and amply

demonstrate her knowledge and understanding of ancient and medieval philosophers of religion.

11. *Helen Knight: fl. 1877*

Helen Knight of Newnham College, Cambridge, published two articles on aesthetics in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* in 1902/03.¹³⁴ For reasons I have not been able to determine, she was inactive with respect to publishing in philosophy for the next twenty-five years. Helen Knight was elected a member of the Aristotelian Society in 1922. Thereafter, she was an occasional contributor of papers on aesthetics to the Aristotelian Society in 1931, 1932 and again in 1938. From what I have been able to determine, she wrote at least two book reviews for *Mind*. Among these is a review of Delacroix' *Psychologie de l'Art*¹³⁵ and Odebrecht's *Grundlegung einer aestetischen Werttheorie Band I*.¹³⁶

According to the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Knight presented "Sensation in Pictorial Art" to the Aristotelian Society in March, 1931,¹³⁷ was a discussant of E. M. Whetnall's "Formation of Concepts and Metaphysical Analysis" (with Stebbing and others) on March 7, 1932. Judging from the caliber of co-presenters, discussants and commentators at Knight's papers, her work was admired and taken seriously. For example, she presented with Reid and Joad at a Symposium "The Limits of Psychology in Aesthetic Theory."¹³⁸ Among the discussants of her presentation was Stace. In 1936 she published an article on "Philosophy in Germany" which appeared in *Philosophy*.¹³⁹ In 1938 at a joint meeting with the Mind Association, Knight was one of three symposiasts (Oakeley and Acton were the others) on the topic "Is Ethical Relativity Necessary."¹⁴⁰ Commentors included Ross, Duncan Jones, Stebbing and Ewing.

Helen Knight served the Aristotelian Society well for a number of years acting as a member of its Executive Committee for four successive terms (from 1932 through 1936). Her name drops from the Aristotelian Society membership list after 1942, to be reelected in 1945, this time with an address indicating the Women's Graduate Club at Cambridge.¹⁴¹ According to Alice Ambrose¹⁴² Knight was a friend of John Wisdom, and is believed to have died in Melbourne, Australia during the 1980s.

12. *Grace Mead Andrus De Laguna: 1878–1978*

Grace Mead Andrus De Laguna was professor of Philosophy and prolific publisher of works in philosophy for more than eighty years. She died just seven months short of her 100th birthday. De Laguna was nearly twenty-five before she completed her undergraduate education in 1903 at Cornell University in New York. A Ph.D. from the same university followed in 1906,¹⁴³ the year of the birth of her first child, Frederica (who acquired her mother's interest in anthropology and spent *her* professional life studying native peoples of the Arctic). The birth of her son Wallace (who became a nuclear scientist studying water contamination at nuclear reactor sites) followed in 1910, coinciding with the publication of *Dogmatism and Evolution*, a work written with her husband Theodore De Laguna.¹⁴⁴ When Wallace was two years old, De Laguna accepted an Assistant Professorship of Philosophy at Bryn Mawr. Four years later, in 1916 she was promoted to Associate Professor, a rank that she held until her promotion to full Professor in 1928. De Laguna was co-founder (with husband Theodore) of the Fullerton Philosophy Club in 1925.

De Laguna's primary philosophical interests were in philosophical psychology, particularly as it relates to metaphysical,¹⁴⁵ phenomenological¹⁴⁶ and epistemological¹⁴⁷ issues. Thus, her earlier writings are on sensation, perception, emotion, mental states, mental phenomena and the nature of reality. Her interests later involve issues in philosophy of language,¹⁴⁸ and communication¹⁴⁹ and led to her own book on a theory of speech.¹⁵⁰ Throughout her career, she maintained an interest in philosophy of social sciences, often criticizing either the methodologies or fundamental concepts of psychology, anthropology¹⁵¹ and sociology.¹⁵² For example, in the two-part article "Sensation and Perception" (1916)¹⁵³ she challenges traditional assumptions that psychologists' analyses of infantile sensory development as somehow "genetic" are misguided. Sensations develop meaning for infants as babies engage in the process of differentiation and integration. Sensations themselves lack a direct relationship to behavior. Rather, it is the perception of the objects of sensation, and the analysis of that perception that leads to behavior. No particular behavioral response is implied by the color of an object, by its temperature, taste, etc.

In September, 1918 she criticizes theories of psycho-physical parallelism, claiming that:

. . . the mental and bodily phenomena whose empirical correlation sets us our problem are not phenomena belonging to two distinct orders of nature, but phenomena which actually are, and only can be, individuated and classified by common principles. Both the bodily correlates of mental processes, and the mental processes themselves, are individuated as phenomena only on the basis of their function in adjusting the individual to his environment.¹⁵⁴

Two months later, in "Dualism in Animal Psychology,"¹⁵⁵ she offers a scathing criticism of philosopher-psychologist Margaret Floy Washburn's *The Animal Mind*.¹⁵⁶ Washburn defended herself and De Laguna issued a rejoinder.¹⁵⁷ De Laguna can best be described as a behaviorist who understood emotion and perception to be correlated, but denied that it can be proven that sensory perception is the sole causal factor in generating emotional response. Rather, complex discriminating and integrating processes contribute to the response.¹⁵⁸ Metaphysical interests also absorbed De Laguna. In a discussion of two of pragmatism's competing doctrines on the nature of reality, instrumentalism and immediatism (a form of empiricism), De Laguna sides with the former claiming that both Hegelian idealism and immediatism have failed

. . . to recognize that a general definition of reality can be given only in functional terms. . . . [R]eality means just that content which is regarded as unchanged by the process [of knowing].¹⁵⁹

For the better part of a century, Grace De Laguna taught philosophy to young women and herself inquired into the nature of reality and the potential for philosophy to contribute to the development of the theoretical foundations of the social sciences.

13. *Nima Hirschensohn Alderblum: circa 1882–1974*

Nima Hirschensohn Alderblum lived in New York City and is believed to have been a graduate of Columbia University in Philosophy. From the two publications we have located, it appears that she presented and later published a single work "A Reinterpretation of Jewish Philosophy." The paper was read before the Conference of Former Students of the Division of Philosophy, Columbia University, April 18, 1916 and subsequently published in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*.¹⁶⁰ She also published a book review of an edited translation

of a work by a thirteenth century Jewish philosopher Berachya Hanakdan. The edited translation was by Hermann Gollancz, published by Oxford University Press in 1920. Alderblum's review was published in the *Journal of Philosophy*.¹⁶¹ Nothing further is known of this early twentieth century American Jewish philosopher.

14. *Beatrice Edgell: fl. 1875*

"Miss Beatrice Edgell, M.A., Ph.D.," as she is uniformly referred to, was elected to membership in the Aristotelian Society 1910. I have been unable to determine any facts about her personal life or her education. From her book reviews and her writings it is evident that she knew at least German and French in addition to English, and had an early and sustained interest in psychology, as evidenced by the publication of "On Time Judgment" in the *American Journal of Psychology*.¹⁶² She was an active participant in the Aristotelian Society from 1910 onwards. Her primary interests in philosophy were in philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology, and it is on these subjects that most of her writings focus.

The year following Edgell's admission to the Society she presented "Imagery and Memory,"¹⁶³ in which she inquired what factors must be present if memory is to be considered a cognitive conscious state. After distinguishing memory from retention, she explores Bergson's exploration of "knowing by heart" as a form of memory, that is, as "habit interpreted by memory." The example she uses is that of "the skillful use of the needle" in which "there is no conscious reference to the occasions whereon that use has been practised".¹⁶⁴ After mentioning that memory is sometimes nothing more than recognition, she turns her attention to forms of memory in which imagery is a necessary psychological feature: persistence,¹⁶⁵ reminiscence, suggested recall and recollection.¹⁶⁶ In recognition, she says, "the reference back, the act of remembering, seems hardly distinguishable, and there is no consciousness of imagery."¹⁶⁷

The imagery, then, created by the act of remembering is but the form through which, and in which, consciousness responds to a given situation – a form which is theoretically distinguishable from the act of knowing on the one side and from what is known or the "meaning" on the other. It is that which Professor Stout terms "Presentation" – "a more or less specific modification of the individual conscious-

ness, which defines and determines the direction of thought to this or that special object."¹⁶⁸

Edgell's goal is to determine whether it is possible to distinguish, for the different kinds of memory, the act of remembering, from the image, from that which is remembered. Recognition lacks consciousness of imagery of that which is recognized. "Persistence" by which she appears to mean "a persistent image" seems to be the act of remembering the image and nothing else. "Reminiscence" on the other hand, appears to be a persistent image with reference to a time scheme in which "the act of referring back is clearly recognisable."¹⁶⁹ However, she notes that in recollection and suggested recall there is rarely any imagery present at all.

I leave my room, and when the same question is put to me, "Did you put the gas out?" I am conscious of nothing but reference back and the knowledge, "Yes, I put the gas out." No imagery of any sort arises. I just remember. Suppose the questioner is sceptical, and goes on, "Are you sure?" The referring back may become more conscious, but still there is nothing recognisable as imagery. If upon my answering, "I remember doing it," there should come the further question, "How do you remember that you did it?" I should be reduced to silence – and probably also to going to verify the memory which I could not make explicit by imagery, even though I felt its force. Failure to detect imagery does not, in my opinion, constitute a proof that there is no presentation. Imagery is often of the barest description, a vague sense of bodily position which would seem upon analysis to be images of motor sensations.¹⁷⁰

In 1916 Edgell was a symposiast along with Bartlett, Moore and Carr¹⁷¹ in a discussion of the problems of recognition implicit in Russell's views of sensation and sense-datum. In that article she argued that Russell's theory of knowledge as expressed in a series of *Monist* articles fails. Russell, she argues, attempts to analyze the simplest cognitive experience dualistically: as a mental act and as a physical experience. As a consequence of his dualism, his theory of knowledge fails to account for what we know about human psychology: that definite memories can be distinguished from recognitions. If Russell's theory of knowledge is to be consistent, he must claim that the experience we call "recognition" is illusory because it does not count as a intentional "fact." That

is, on Russell's theory of knowledge "recognition" cannot exist, and therefore the objects of recognition are not objects of knowledge. Edgell refers¹⁷² to Russell's example of a "cinematograph." According to that argument sense-data are like frames on a film: separate and distinct. Each picture is distinct and carries with it no historical data: it doesn't for example say "you've seen this image before." Edgell asks if sense data are like frames on a filmstrip how can there be recognition? On Russell's account, Edgell says, there is no room for recognition. Logically, this may not be difficult to account for. Epistemologically, however, we must be able to account for experience and everyone, even Russell, experiences recognition. The mind has the power Edgell refers to as "retentiveness": the ability to retain knowledge. Psychologically, retentiveness is a different power than perception, and a theory of knowledge that accounts for the perception of sense data must likewise account for the capacity to retain memories.

Beatrice Edgell edited a collection entitled *Psychological Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Bedford College*¹⁷³ that apparently was published circa 1916 and was reviewed by Valentine.¹⁷⁴ I have not been able to locate a copy of that work. That same year she, along with Lizzie Susan Stebbing and Nathalie Duddington was elected to serve on the Executive Committee of the Aristotelian Society, a position she maintained through 1919. The following year Edgell and a "Miss Shields" (probably F. Rosamond Shields) are listed as discussants of Bartlett's "Valuation and Existence" at a February meeting of the Society. The year 1918 had seen the publication of her paper "The Implications of Recognition"¹⁷⁵ in which Edgell criticized Moore's defense of Russell's view against Edgell's criticisms of Russell. During this period of the late nineteen-teens, and early nineteen-twenties, Edgell wrote a number of book reviews for *Mind*,¹⁷⁶ becoming a member of the Mind Association in 1922. Soon afterwards she wrote *Theories of Memory*¹⁷⁷ which was positively reviewed by Carre.¹⁷⁸ Unfortunately, I have been unable to obtain copies of any of Edgell's published books.

Continuing through the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties, Beatrice Edgell remained a regular contributor to the Aristotelian Society, intermittently serving three terms on its Executive Committee.¹⁷⁹ She participated in a 1919 symposium with Hicks, Moore and Broad where she continued to criticize Russell's views on knowledge by acquaintance.¹⁸⁰ In June of 1920 Edgell presented her paper "Memory and Conation"¹⁸¹ in which she reviewed the problem of memory in the context of volitional thought and desire as expressed or implied in the theories

of the philosopher James Ward, psychiatrist Sigmund Freud and biologist Richard Semon. What she wants to determine is does “the faculty of memory imply the existence of conation as a specific mental function?”¹⁸² In this question,

. . . “faculty” belongs to the scheme of terms for analysing and describing minds, “function” to the scheme for analysing and describing experience.¹⁸³

In the end, she supports Freud’s view:

In conclusion, what answer shall be returned to the question as to the faculty of memory and conation? In accordance with Dr. Freud’s theories, it is not memory which implies a specific function of conation, but unconscious conation which implies memory and the laws of unconscious conation which determine many of its manifestations.¹⁸⁴

In “The Structure of Mind”¹⁸⁵ Edgell gives philosophers a history of two branches of psychology, “structural” and “functional,” labels which would be quite misleading to contemporary philosophers unfamiliar with the history of late nineteenth and early twentieth century psychology. The structural branch of psychology would perhaps be better described in contemporary terms as that part of philosophy of mind which includes philosophical psychology: the reduction of laws of the connection of mental processes to their simplest components. As an example of a branch of functional psychology, on the other hand, Edgell mentions a school of psychology in America from which “. . . there has arisen that extreme left wing – Behaviourism without a “u” (and also without an “I”).”¹⁸⁶ After describing the major schools of both types of psychology and their relative inabilities to account for perception, recognition, meaning and thought, she urges closer collaboration between the schools and, therefore, greater interaction between philosophical psychology, philosophy of mind and clinical psychology.

In the symposium on “Immediate Experience,” Edgell criticizes G. Dawes Hicks’ account of immediate experience as feeling. According to Edgell, Hicks fails to show what he set out to show: first, that immediate experience *as experience* is a subjective state that varies in intensity from pleasure to pain. Second, Hicks uses “content” to refer to the character of an act, but he also uses “content” to refer to that which is

apprehended. Third, she claims that Hicks' thesis that immediate experience is entirely devoid of cognition is inconsistent with his views on self-knowledge. Finally, she criticizes Hicks on grounds that his account of immediate experience precludes the knowing subject having any awareness of change thereby rendering his account of continuity of person and unity of the self unintelligible.¹⁸⁷

In 1930 Beatrice Edgell received one of the highest professional honors ever accorded to a woman philosopher. Twelve years earlier, in 1918, Mary Whiton Calkins had been elected President of the American Philosophical Association. In 1930, Beatrice Edgell became the first woman to be elected President of the Aristotelian Society. On November 10, 1930 she delivered the Presidential Address: "Images." Discussants included Brown, Dawes Hicks, Ross, Hannay, Nott and Stebbing.¹⁸⁸ In her address, Edgell analyzed the concept "image" in the light of recent developments in psychology and philosophy. After careful analysis of various versions of the "trace" theory of image,¹⁸⁹ Edgell explores the possibility that Freud's theory of the unconscious may provide a solution to the problems of retention, imagery and association of ideas. She acknowledges the apparent treatment successes of Freudian and later psychoanalytic theory and concludes that theories of unconscious imagery fail to account for the actual imagery-forms of memory and imagination.¹⁹⁰ And then she deplores the "ungracious task" of having offered destructive criticism in the absence of some constructive suggestion. All she has to offer, she claims, is a suggestion of the direction that psychology should be reoriented towards. That direction is toward a "genetic" concept of mind in which memory processes are understood in relation to the processes of sense perception; in which memory is understood as awareness of something other than the image, and (following Stout) in which patterns of sensory perception are regarded as events in the life-story of an individual.

These events bring the individual into communication with the patterns of the world external to his organism. Images will be events in the same sense; they are the patterns determined by past pattern-making, but patterns for which the epistemological implication of the term "reproductive" has no relevance.¹⁹¹

Beatrice Edgell presided over many of the Aristotelian Society meetings that year and through 1931 and was a discussant of Joad's "Modern Science and Religion," of MacMurray's "The Conception of Society,"

and of Helen Knight's "Sensation in Pictorial Art." Edgell's final publication was an essay written in honor of her deceased colleague Lizzie Susan Stebbing. In "The Way of Behavior"¹⁹² Edgell again urges that philosophy of mind, philosophy of logic and philosophy of psychology jointly seek an account of the logic and psychology of thought.

We need a psychology of thinking which shall be a basis for the logic of thought. Without recognition of the subject – object relationship as fundamental for cognition, and as other than the causal relationship, such a psychology seems to me an impossibility. The three old laws of thought, A is A, A is not not-A and A must be either A or not-A, embody profound psychological truth. They are the acknowledgment that sameness can be found and discriminated from differences, that in the progress of knowledge patterns are built up, oppositions and incompatibilities determined. To regard such patterns not as ideas but as ways of behaving, closely as the latter may be associated with pattern formation, is to cut away from the psychology of thinking the character upon which Professor Stebbing declared the ability to think depends, "the power of seeing connexions."¹⁹³

15. *F. Rosamond Shields: fl. 1913*

Very little is known about F. Rosamond Shields. According to membership lists of the Aristotelian Society she received her M.A. in 1910, but it is not clear from what school. Shields, Hilda Oakeley and Lizzie Susan Stebbing were discussants at an Aristotelian Society meeting on April 2, 1917. The topic was "Our Knowledge of Value."

Shields wrote an article titled, "The Notion of the Common Good" which appeared in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* in 1913.¹⁹⁴ In this article Shields argued that the good is a common good. She analyzed two reasons for the non-acceptance of the common good. Firstly, Shields investigated the notion that the good of different individuals is conflicting. Secondly, Shields discussed the two opposing positions: 1) The Good is common, and 2) Whatever is, is right. Shields criticized the view that the common good is a slow process of realization. She states,

On this theory, the common good would be simply the goal, and not in any sense the presupposition of ethical endeavor.¹⁹⁵

Shields concludes that the common good is a primary principle of ethics. However, she admits that the common good is not a concrete answer to all ethical problems nor does it always lead to the expected result.

16. *Katherine Everett Gilbert: 1886–1952*

Katherine Everett received her Bachelor's and Master's degrees from Brown University in Rhode Island (where she studied under Meikeljohn) and her Ph.D. in 1912 from Cornell University in New York (where she studied under James Creighton). She married Allan Gilbert in 1913 and had two children. Two years following her marriage, Gilbert took a position as an editorial assistant to the editor of *The Philosophical Review*, James Creighton. From 1922 until 1930 she was at the University of North Carolina, first as research fellow, then as acting professor and lecturer. The next twenty-one years were spent at Duke, where Gilbert would become its first full professor. In the early 1940s Gilbert was called upon to chair the newly-created Department of Aesthetics, Music and Art, an appointment that she retained until her retirement in 1951, the year preceding her death.

Gilbert's primary interests in philosophy were in aesthetics,¹⁹⁶ including philosophy of art, art criticism, architecture, dance,¹⁹⁷ and literature. While serving as editorial assistant for *The Philosophical Review*, Gilbert published "The Mind and its Discipline" in that journal.¹⁹⁸ In that article she compared the positions of competing philosophies of education: those who claim that individuals have broad, general mental capacities that can be developed through education, and those who claim that individuals have only narrowly defined, specific capacities that must be developed piecemeal. Gilbert argues against what she saw as the deficiencies of education that teaches specific facts and skills, and in favor of classical liberal education to cultivate analytical, creative and communicative abilities.

In 1922 Gilbert presented to the American Philosophical Association a paper called "The Philosophy of Feeling in Current Poetics"¹⁹⁹ which was published the following year. In it, she recited a litany of names of the traditional great poets and the general principles of poetry which they aspired to apply in their writings. Poets, she insisted, ought to be able to leave their readers with a satisfied sense that the familiar has been made more immediate, more "real." Instead, she criticizes contemporary poetry as a literary phenomenon that has embraced principles of obscurity, unintelligibility and bizarreness, leaving readers perplexed and

confused. Instead of making the world more realistic, contemporary poetry makes the world distant, unfamiliar and unrecognizable.

Notwithstanding its title "The Principle of Reason in the Light of Bosanquet's Philosophy"²⁰⁰ discusses Bosanquet's conception of reason in art and regarding action. Gilbert's interest in theories of action culminated in her 1924 book *Maurice Blondel's Philosophy of Action*²⁰¹ which received mixed critical notice.²⁰² Upon the death of her mentor Creighton, Gilbert wrote a commemorative article, praising in part Creighton's aesthetic sensibilities for style in philosophical writing. The paper was read before the American Philosophical Association in 1924 and published in the *Journal of Philosophy*.²⁰³

Gilbert greatly admired the works of Thomas Hardy. In "Hardy and the Weak Spectator"²⁰⁴ Gilbert derides as superficial, the general reader's complaint that Hardy's writings are excessively tragic. Instead, Gilbert explores Hardy's works and finds that they are basically too philosophically challenging for the ordinary reader. In "Hardy's Use of Nature (II)"²⁰⁵ she identifies three levels of complexity in which the theme of nature appears in Hardy's writings. First, nature is simply a backdrop or "foil" for human action in a dramatic situation. Second, humans struggle against nature which now is a central figure in a chapter. Finally, nature is an overwhelming, mechanical, creative action process to which humans lose.

In 1939 Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn wrote *A History of Esthetics*,²⁰⁶ in which Gilbert's contributions drew heavily on her earlier articles on the subject. Among those earlier articles were analyses of the aesthetics of Plato, Aristotle, and Croce, among others. In her article "The Relation of the Moral to the Aesthetic Standard in Plato,"²⁰⁷ she supported Collingwood's view in his "Plato's Philosophy of Art," and criticized views represented by Carritt's analysis of Plato in his *The Theory of Beauty* and by Havelock Ellis in *The Dance of Life*. In this work she sets out her analysis of the relationship of art to education and morality in Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*:

1. The moral quality of a political whole is its most important attribute and quality.
2. To produce high moral quality in the citizenry is, therefore, the most important function of the executive of a state.
3. High moral quality consists in the activity of the following virtues: truthfulness (freedom from illusions about oneself and capacity to place everybody and everything in a correct scheme); benevo-

lence; courage; the undivided mind and temper; a sense of rational pattern and logical order in politics, art, and common affairs.

4. The production of desirable moral qualities necessitates an appropriate theory of education and genetics.
5. The required theory of education must rest on correct psychological principles.
6. The images of art may symbolize and express moral qualities and logical patterns.
7. Artistic images and patterns, absorbed by the plastic human imagination, become vital forces.
8. The unconscious absorption of such charms or forces is more effectual in the production of character than rational notions or information.
9. The executives of the state are therefore primarily under obligation to prescribe a curriculum for elementary schools composed of images of truth, benevolence, courage, and poise, in rhythms and patterns, simple, rational, and attractive.²⁰⁸

Plato, Gilbert reminds us in "Aesthetic Imitation and Imitators in Aristotle,"²⁰⁹ had placed poets and imitators in the sixth class of human beings, for paintings and dramas were, to Plato, "Pale and inert replicas of substantial realities:"

An imitation, it seemed to him, is nothing in and by itself; taken apart from its original, it collapses. And being nothing, it can do nothing. It lacks substance, function, utility.²¹⁰

Aristotle, Gilbert assures us had a different view. Gilbert sees Aristotle's view of aesthetic imitation as a revolt against Plato:

Nature and art, Aristotle says, are the two initiating forces in the world. The difference is that nature has her principle of motion within herself, while "from art proceed the things of which the form is in the soul of the artist".²¹¹

Gilbert wrote sympathetically of the great Oxford professor of aesthetics, Ruskin, showing, how, at the very end of his life, this formidable defender of Plato's aesthetics against much (but not all) of Aristotle's aesthetics was to realize that he had worked out a theory of aesthetics that was, after all, heavily Aristotelian.²¹²

Gilbert had decidedly less sympathy for the views of Benedetto Croce than she had for those of Aristotle, or even Plato. Croce, she felt, despite occasional gifted insights into the nature of beauty, espoused a theory of aesthetics that lacked coherence. Croce, she says:

. . . furnishes us a collection of *aperçus* and images rather than a system of ideas. If “philosophy, like all other genuine sciences, has passed beyond the stage of the merely striking or suggestive treatment of problems, and aims not at an interesting or picturesque results, but at the systematic organization of the facts with which it deals according to some general principle,” then Croce belongs rather to the company of those who make the world interesting than to the company of those who satisfy the mind’s demand for intelligibility.²¹³

In the posthumously published *Aesthetic Studies: Architecture and Poetry*²¹⁴ Gilbert offers an anthology on the relationship between the poetic and the structural imagination. Katherine Gilbert’s works in aesthetics are too numerous to review in detail here. The reader is urged to consult the Bibliography for this volume for a fuller listing of her books, articles and book reviews, and to consult the complete bibliography of her works (compiled by LuLu C. Erwin) in Gilbert’s *Aesthetic Studies: Architecture and Poetry*. For fuller commentary literature, see works by Ames, Boas, and by Nahm, also in the Bibliography.

17. *Una Mirrieless Bernard Sait: 1886–?*

Sait earned her Ph.D. from Columbia University, New York, as World War I was breaking out. She studied under Dewey, but her primary philosophical interest was in the philosophy of Henri Bergson. While a student at Columbia she participated in an extensive Bergson project and prepared a bibliography of Bergson primary and secondary sources. Her doctoral dissertation, written prior to World War I was published as: *The Ethical Implications of Bergson’s Philosophy*²¹⁵ by the Archives of Philosophy of Columbia University in 1914. Sait later was a professor at Claremont Colleges.

Sait tries to demonstrate the way in which Bergson’s philosophy is consistent with moral idealism. In particular she attempts to derive from Bergson’s principles an objective definition of good and evil, and of right and wrong. According to a review by H. Wildon Carr (who would shortly thereafter assume the presidency of the Aristotelian Society) Sait is not

entirely successful in attempting to make Bergson into a solid moral theorist. What he does find of interest, however, is her feminist view. Carr says:

We may call particular attention to the author's views of the part which women are to play in the society of the future. She is under no illusion. "It is in man," she tells us, "that intellect has reached its fullest development." This she considers is not due to the incapacity of women. In the true Bergsonian spirit she conjectures that intellect slumbers in women ready to awaken when artificial restrictions are removed and freedom is attained. It may even be destined to surpass its achievements in man.²¹⁶

Sait's feminism culminates in her 1938 work, *New Horizons for the Family*²¹⁷ which, she says is an attempt to develop a broad philosophy of the family. Her indebtedness to Dewey's principles for achieving social change by identifying the social implications of scientific research is acknowledged in the introduction. Sait begins by tracing the development of the family in western civilization, particularly in England and the United States. However, rather than a chronological account of views of the family, she traces its historical development topically, in terms of social organization, religion, economics, sex and education, preceded by an outline of the processes of social change. Once she has examined the process through which change in the history of family life has occurred respecting each of these topics, she looks at the family of the twentieth century, primarily in the United States, but also in England.

On Sait's analysis, individual and social welfare depend upon whether children become sufficiently well-educated. A good education is defined in terms of "progressive education" as that concept was developed by Dewey.²¹⁸ The social justification, goal and warrant of education is to develop to its fullest individual capacity, social conscience, and analytical abilities. From the first warrant she ultimately derives a social obligation to educate all children, and in particular to educate special needs children: the physically and mentally handicapped and those who are socially handicapped due to illegitimacy, being orphaned or abandoned, or being delinquent children. From the second warrant, the goal of developing social conscience, she derives a social duty to provide cultural understanding and appreciation, as well as a sense of self-esteem in the context of an educational system. The development of critical intelligence, the ability to "think for themselves" implies that education

must be made child-friendly and adopt methods that take advantage of children's natural inquisitiveness, boisterousness and joy of discovery. Children must not be thought what to think, but how to think.²¹⁹ Like Dewey, she advocates the development of a philosophy of education that is firmly based on emerging psychological theories of how children learn. Consequently, education should begin in very early childhood; however, the systems developed and methods used should be scientifically validated and supported by educational research that demonstrates that children learn by those methods, and that the goals of education (mentioned above) are met.

On Sait's view, education that is aimed at such long-term goals that themselves have such far-reaching social consequences cannot effectively occur in the school setting alone. The education of parents, and the "reciprocal function" of home and school is addressed at some length by Sait²²⁰ who recognizes the need for a transitional generation or two during which parental literacy, commitment to child welfare (especially, making financial sacrifices in order to avoid having children enter the work force), and social responsibility will gradually increase to the level needed for progressive education of children to be fully realized.

In a series of chapters Sait examines the conclusions of several White House Conferences on children and notes that the mere physical protection of children from accidents of birth, from disease and from occupational injury and exploitation is inadequate to provide for the needs of children and thus for future society. What is needed also, is protection from social harms. Among those harms are poverty, hunger and inadequate vocational education and training. Children, Sait argues, need stable and happy home lives and social insurance to provide a buffer against orphanage, poverty, hunger, homelessness and other consequences of divorce and family dissolution. She then turns to an examination of women's roles in and difficulties in remaining in contemporary marriages.

Sait has several chapters that provide a summary of the data on changes in women's legal status, in occupations open to women, poverty, the need and desire of women to work outside the home, high birth rates and early maternity. All of these factors contribute to a cycle of social disintegration that can be positively influenced through education, especially sex education.

Here, Sait invokes the ground breaking work of Sanger and many others in support of "conception prevention" as a way of giving women more control over the outcomes of marriage, and society more control over population growth. Instabilities of modern marriages, Sait claims,

can largely be traced to the tensions that high birth rates create for women and their families. In addition to birth control, Sait advocates that sex education in childhood as well as adulthood be used to promote marriage as a mature partnership. In such a partnership, the spouses have an emotionally mature understanding of themselves and of one another and of the realities of their mutual relationship. This results in "The Emergence of a Cooperative Family"²²¹ in which individuals marry freely, for love and companionship, entering into a partnership in which child-rearing is viewed as a rewarding, important, mutual undertaking and in which friendships with members of the opposite sex pose no threat to the mutual, (in her view, ideal) monogamous commitment.

Sait precedes a long section on what would otherwise be called "home economics" with a section on home life. In it she urges the social liberation of both men and women from pre-conceived beliefs about "women's work" and "men's work." Unless the segregation of those traditional occupations can be demonstrated to be scientifically valid, Sait claims, any restriction is premature. Subsequent chapters cover family economic issues such as savings, investments, budgeting, as well as general health and nutrition. She advocates making domestic service a skilled, standardized vocation with contracts covering wages, conditions of working, etc. Sait suggests that such "far reaching changes" will remove the stigma from housework and raise the status of household workers.²²² Families, however, should work out their own ways of managing housework, and to this end she urges labor-saving machinery, electrical appliances, part-time household help and systematic cooperation in housework on the part of all the family members.²²³ Such cooperation is both part of children's education, and a necessary prerequisite for social growth.

The Epilogue which bears the same title as the book notes that

The family has survived through its ability to adjust itself to changing social conditions. . . . But the recent acceleration of social change has subjected the . . . family to such unprecedented strain that its fabric has been torn asunder. From this disruption has emerged a new appreciation of the potential values of family life. . . . For the first time . . . it becomes possible to view the family from a scientific and experimental point of view; deliberately to plan a family pattern designed to facilitate the performance of the family's essential functions, while remaining always alert to modify this pattern on the basis of results and in the light of newer knowledge.²²⁴

Sait blends the methodology of Dewey's pragmatism with a feminist social and moral philosophy. With respect to the former, she urges scientific analysis and experimentation in the pursuit of planned social change. With respect to the latter she urges that scientific analysis and experimentation has yielded no evidence of significant, socially relevant intellectual, moral or physical differences between men and women. She advocates massive social reform and experimentation in several areas: first, the removal of sex-based restrictions on education and employment for women; second, the reconceptualization of the family as a cooperative spiritual adventure initiated by two equals who are mutually free to form a relationship; third, universal sex education and reproductive freedom; fourth, social programs to compensate children and families for natural and social disadvantages. To this end, she urges that society itself be characterized by "the spirit of motherliness:"

The spirit of motherliness, utterly opposed to force and violence is found invaluable in human affairs. As more women become emancipated from ignorance, idleness and the bonds of tradition, we may hope for fuller integration of scientific knowledge in the interests of human relationships, and for the shaping of new instrumentalities of social control.²²⁵

As progressive as were Una Bernard Sait's views regarding the family and social progress, she retained traditional views about male and female characteristics:

But, as the spirit of motherliness is needed in the life of the world, so is there need for a fuller participation of men in family – for a more intensive fatherliness. Manliness with its emphasis on protective strength, reliability, and courage is the correlative of womanliness, from which all trace of immature dependence has gone, but where the emphasis is still upon qualities conducive to the care of life. Where manly men and womanly women also become developed human beings, the cooperative family will more fully emerge as the prevailing pattern of family life. Only then will its consequences for individual happiness and social well-being become apparent.

18. *Helen Huss Parkhurst: 1887–1959*

Helen Huss Parkhurst was born in New York City on January 3, 1887. She received her B.A. in 1911 from Bryn Mawr College and her M.A.

from Cambridge University in 1913. Parkhurst was a fellow at Cambridge University as well as at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. In 1917, Parkhurst was granted her Ph.D. from Cambridge University. Although she started her career as a teacher at Dwight School in Englewood, New Jersey from 1911 to 1912, she lectured on art at Bryn Mawr College from 1915 to 1916. She worked as an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at Barnard College, Columbia University from 1917 until her death, advancing to rank of Full Professor in 1944. She retired in 1952.

Parkhurst was a active member of the American Philosophical Association. In the Nineteenth Annual Meeting she recounted the details of philosophical disputations in Ithaca, New York.²²⁶ She published numerous articles in such notable journals as *Mind*, *Journal of Philosophy*, *Psychology and Scientific Methods* and *The Open Court*. Parkhurst's writing topics focused on art and aesthetics. She wrote "Imageless Beauty" in 1925 and argued that the artist transcends beyond his mere expression in his work to something more. "And yet in no case is the expressed meaning clearly independent of the manner of its expression."²²⁷ For example, the creation of the painter cannot merely be derived through his paintings, but rather through his thought process and the physical product taken together. Parkhurst investigates the composition of that imageless beauty: ". . . beauty of meaning or idea-which is the inalienable and peculiar attribute of the work of the creative imagination."²²⁸ Parkhurst focuses on two considerations, how to reconcile life and art in the first place; and how in the second place to distinguish art and logic?²²⁹ Parkhurst concludes with an eloquent paragraph on our human nature. She states that as humans we are all subject to emotions which control our behaviours and our expressions in art:

A race of beings subject to no fear of terminations, undying and never weary nor defeated, would fashion an art on different laws, with its content and its entire intention different. . . . But so long as we retain our humanhood it is likely that the rhythm of our emotions will remain as it is, and that we shall alternately sip from the cup of fear and hope, of misery and gladness. So long at least as we do, the things which will yield are united intimations of felicity and of regret.²³⁰

"The Obsolescence of Consciousness" which appeared in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*²³¹ investigates the

notion of the subconscious mind. Parkhurst's *Beauty*, written in 1930, interprets art and imagination from the human perspective. "Art is the product of man – perhaps his only genuine and peculiar product."²³² Parkhurst believes that man's very nature is expressed through art. Art represents the only completely free action of man, free of circumstances and outside limitations.

In the art of artistic creation alone does he (man) seem to have shaken loose from the fetters of circumstance and found himself suddenly free and glorious as a divinity, under no compulsion other than his desire to behold, godlike, the unclouded reflection of his own countenance. And of all the things that he has contrived on earth none but art could be called the full expression of himself as a being compounded of flesh and intelligence and spirit.²³³

Parkhurst holds that art represents the only true human expression. The human experience creates the standards for art, therefore if the world or the environment changes: art changes. According to Parkhurst, creativity and artistic expression heal the psychic conflict in humans. Art establishes recognition of and sensitivity to history. Parkhurst concludes *Beauty* with an insightful quote regarding the relation of beauty and art to man's nature and accomplishments.

Our human species have devised architecture, and through its materials of colossal cloven stone we know a means of uniting orderless inert substance and empty space with the eternal order of abstract geometry. And music is our own, a miraculous fusion of goalless movement and disembodied sound with incorruptible rhythm and the wordless language of the spirit. It is in these two arts that man draws nearest to a vision of the ultimate metaphor; it is in these that he very nearly accomplishes the feat of giving utterance to the unutterable.²³⁴

Parkhurst wrote several book reviews, such as, *The Aesthetic Attitude* by Herbert Sidney Langfeld, which criticized Langfeld's notion of aesthetics as elementary.

19. *Sister Mary Patricia Garvey: 1888–1952*

Mary Patricia Garvey was the daughter of Patrick Garvey and Sarah Shanon Garvey. She was born in Ludington (Bay City), Michigan and

attended Michigan State Normal College and Notre Dame University. She served as Principal in her home town at Ludington High School from 1923 until 1935.

Sister Garvey's philosophical interests were in neo-platonism and the early Church Fathers, particularly St. Augustine. While studying for the Ph.D. at Marquette University, she was appointed Professor at Our Lady of Cincinnati College in Ohio where she served from 1937–1940. During that period she was actively writing her doctoral dissertation on St. Augustine, and at the age of 50, she completed her dissertation. It was published as *Saint Augustine: Christian or Neo-Platonist? From His Retreat at Cassiciacum Until His Ordination at Hippo* by Marquette University press in 1939.²³⁵

Sister Mary Patricia was appointed President of Mercy College in 1941, and was actively involved in the National Education Association and the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Her translation of Augustine's *Contra Academicos* was published by Marquette in 1942, and again, posthumously, in 1957.²³⁶

20. Karin Costelloe Stephen: 1889–1953

Karin Costelloe Stephen was born in 1889, christened Catherine Elizabeth (and called Karin). She is described by Barbara Strachey in her teenage years as "hasty, tactless, emotional, and rowdy . . . [but Karin also was] quite outstandingly intelligent . . ."²³⁷ From a very young age she suffered ear trouble and in 1905 she had "numerous" operations that left her deaf and "mildly disfigured."

Her education began at Newnham College in October of 1907, but in 1908 due to hearing problems, depression and family pressure, she left Cambridge to spend a year at Bryn Mawr College.²³⁸ It was at Bryn Mawr that she began studying philosophy and psychology. Karin eventually returned to Newnham, in 1909, to take her the first part of her Tripos in Moral Science. She finished the second part the following year. She received First Class Honors in the first Tripos (1910). It was during this time that Bertrand Russell (Uncle Bertie) became her tutor.²³⁹ By 1911, Karin began to socialize with the emerging Bloomsbury group. She still was being tutored by Russell in preparing for her final Tripos. She received first in her Tripos and was also awarded the "Star" (Distinction in Philosophy), the first ever awarded to a woman at Cambridge. Russell wrote of her that she ". . . has more philosophical capacity than I have ever seen before in a woman. . . ."²⁴⁰

Karin Costelloe was elected to the Aristotelian Society in 1912 where she presented a defense of Bergson, something quite bold, in light of Russell's objections to them. At one point she visited Bergson in Paris where he praised her for "her clarity and powers of comprehension."²⁴¹ She served on the Executive Committee of the Aristotelian Society for several terms.

Costelloe married Adrian Stephen in October 1914, the year she received a fellowship at Newnham. In 1916 she had a daughter (Ann). A second daughter, Judith, was born in 1918. Shortly thereafter she presented a symposium paper on "Space, Time and Material." According to C.D. Broad who reviewed that paper for *Mind*:

Mrs. Stephen's contribution is, as usual, Bergson done much better than Bergson could do it himself. She does not indeed, to my mind, succeed in making the French philosopher intelligible, but her attempts are always amazingly clever and remind the present writer of Dr. McTaggart's relation to Hegel, about which one feels that the disciple is so much better than the master . . .²⁴²

Costelloe and her husband had both been conscientious objectors to World War I. After the war Karin began to pursue her interest in abnormal psychology. She and her husband were told by the director of the Psychoanalytical Society that they would have to qualify as doctors to be able to practice psychoanalysis. They enrolled in a five year medical course at University College. In 1927, they both qualified as physicians. He began to practice analysis and she went to work in a mental hospital in Baltimore. By the Second World War, however, Adrian and Karin were no longer Pacifists and Adrian joined the Army as a psychiatrist. He was posted in Glasgow, where Karin went to be with him and study new techniques in drug therapy and shock treatment. He died in 1948, and she soon after became afflicted with manic-depressive order. She was treated with shock treatment without success. Because she was a physician she self-prescribed morphine in larger and larger doses. In December, 1953 she intentionally overdosed. She had been working on two books at the time of her illness and death, but no trace of the manuscripts has been found. The first was a volume for Leonard Woolf on the "life and importance of Freud" and the second was a book she intended to call "Human Misery."

21. *Phyllis Ackerman: fl. 1893*

Phyllis Ackerman lived in New York City at the turn of the century and to my knowledge she taught at Brown²⁴³ and published only one article in philosophy, "Some Aspects of Pragmatism and Hegel," in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*.²⁴⁴ In this article, Ackerman looks at the conceptual and methodological differences between pragmatism and idealism as represented by Hegelianism. She attempts to save pragmatism and idealism as well from shortcomings in their epistemic views.

. . . knowledge is a thoroughly active process in which each part acts on every other to create a whole, but the whole, since that is what gives meaning to the parts, is prior to the parts even while it is being created. And because knowledge is a completely active process the paradoxical character of it is best exemplified in the judgment of action, the practical judgment. For when we say that we ought to do something our intention determines what we will do, but the act of doing it has to create the fact and modify it. Again whole and parts are mutually prior and constitutive.²⁴⁵

This is where pragmatism ends. It leaves the world in the course of being created into a continuous whole in a series of steps by purposive minds so acting that they can cooperate to construct a trans-individual world.²⁴⁶

. . .

But how can there be the constructive series without some background of fixed determinate structure? . . . To attempt to establish logical relations presupposes that the world is built on a system of logical relations. Professor Dewey's own commentary on the question has only to be generalized to the whole search for knowledge to make the necessary supplementations to the pragmatic theory.²⁴⁷ . . . The process that pragmatism discusses then, presupposes the already real whole that it tries to deny.

. . . Certainly pragmatism must admit determinism for it admits the continuity of knowledge. This continuity is basic to the notion of its process. You dive into the future from the springboard the past has made.²⁴⁸

In Ackerman's view, pragmatism is really dependent upon Hegelian idealism and is merely a modern application of idealism despite its denial of same. Her essay is an important and interesting one, and one that explores some of the philosophical continuity of developments in metaphysics, ontology and logic from late nineteenth century idealism to early 20th century pragmatism. It is worthy of inclusion in any course in which Hegel or Dewey is taught as part of the history of philosophy.

22. *Dorothy Wrinch Nicholson: 1894–1976*

According to Professor Ambrose²⁴⁹ Dorothy Wrinch was one of those rare scholars who excelled in two fields of academic inquiry, physics and philosophy. In physics, which she later taught at Smith College for many years, her primary research interests were in crystalline structures.²⁵⁰ Professor Ambrose recollects that Dorothy Wrinch lost a daughter when her home in Cape Cod burned, and that she went to Woods Hole upon her retirement from Smith. The year following her death, a three day symposium honoring her work was held at Smith.²⁵¹

Dorothy Wrinch was a friend of Bertrand Russell; her correspondence with Russell is in the Russell Archives. Apparently some unpublished biographical materials are extant.²⁵² I have been unable to locate them. Her obituary for Russell's friend Philip Jourdain was published in the *Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society*.²⁵³ Wrinch was apparently a graduate of and/or faculty member at Girton College, Cambridge, according to the membership lists for the Aristotelian Society to which she was elected in 1917. She was a member of its Executive Committee for the year 1925–26.

Although Wrinch is primarily a scientist, she was active during her early years in philosophy, publishing more than a dozen papers in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* and *Mind* during the period 1917 through 1930. Her first two papers, in 1917, were a defense of Russell against Saunders²⁵⁴ and the second criticizing several points made by Moore in *Principia Ethica* and by Rashdall in *The Theory of Good and Evil*.²⁵⁵ A 1919 paper "On the Nature of Judgment" offers an explication of Russell's theory of judgment which enables it to be extended to more complex judgments than those of the form *aRb*.²⁵⁶ A 1920 paper "On the Nature of Memory" offers a discussion of acts of memory which include imagery and which are memories of physical objects or of events.²⁵⁷

Philosophy of science was Wrinch's real *forte*. Her strength appears to be in the ability to render the substance, and more often, the methodologies of the sciences philosophically clear. In "On the Structure of Scientific Inquiry"²⁵⁸ she analyzed the problems of the nature of scientific structure which occur in more advanced sciences, viz., the nature of scientific elements, the nature and role of propositions and hypotheses, the relationship of theory to scientific phenomena. The philosophic import of Einstein's theory of relativity, and of quantum mechanics were of great interest to Wrinch as well as to other early twentieth century philosophers. In two papers on the theory of relativity, "On Certain Methodological Aspects of the Theory of Relativity"²⁵⁹ and "The Idealistic Interpretation of Einstein's Theory"²⁶⁰ she explores the contribution that Einstein's theory of space and time can make to metaphysics. In "On Certain Aspects of Scientific Thought" Wrinch takes a step back from actual physical theories to examine certain aspects of scientific thought that are fundamentally important to early twentieth century physics. She says:

Science at the outset is concerned with the discovery of facts about the external world by means of experiment and observation. These facts are subsequently arranged in groups and by means of probability inference general propositions are suggested for consideration. The second stage in science opens with the statement of these general propositions about physical concepts. A physical concept, refined so as to be significant in science, is a short-hand way of referring to a class of properties. Our field, therefore, at this stage of science, is the body of the general propositions which cover the facts of experience and the general problem is the problem of the relations between properties.²⁶¹

Wrinch's focus is on the conceptual, or second stage of science, and the remainder of her article offers an analysis of the nature of postulates of irrelevancy and invariance, laws of combination, and the process of identifying or constructing truly analogous cases.

In a Symposium on the question "The quantum theory: how far does it modify the mathematical, the physical and the psychological concepts of Continuity?"²⁶² that included Alfred North Whitehead and H. Wildon Carr, Wrinch discussed quantum mechanics in relationship to the logical concept of continuity. In a summary section, Wrinch stated her conclusions:

The discontinuities of the Quantum Theory in themselves cannot be adversely criticized or even discussed by the mathematician. From the continuous set of states considered possible by the classical mechanics, a discrete set has been selected as alone being physically possible. Any criticism of this assumption can only come from a consideration of how far such an assumption is valuable in relating *inter se* facts of the physical universe which have been adequately established by observation and experiment. Any criticisms on the grounds of our intuitive feelings about continuity are out of place and become quite clearly improper and indeed lacking in cogency when they are stated in terms of the logical concept of continuity. Nevertheless, in so far as the assumptions of the Quantum Theory are introduced *ad hoc* and are not part of the fundamental structure of science, they cannot be considered finally satisfactory. The assumptions of the Theory of Relativity, stated in the analytically convincing invariant form, alone in science at the present day have the touch of finality about them. They alone in their grandeur lie too deep for criticism. Our intuitive ideas of the physical universe are there left behind, and in their abstract beauty, they may not be approached with the rough and ready weapons of every-day life. The Quantum Theory in the tremendous success which it has experienced is pointing the way to a further postulate of the same unapproachable severity.²⁶³

Dorothy Wrinch Nicholson's contribution to philosophy of science appeared to be that she had a firm grasp of issues in logic, philosophy of mind, metaphysics and philosophy of language: in short, in analytic philosophy and had the skill to elucidate for philosophers the philosophic import of scientific concepts, laws and methods. She regularly informed philosophers' understandings of the technical (mathematical, physical) content of scientific analyses and theories by explicating highly technical material of science in philosophical terms. She was quick to point out not only the philosophical import of scientific discoveries, but also the contribution that philosophical analysis could make to emerging scientific theories and to emerging sciences. In this vein, she explored the relationships between the principle of conservation of energy, and philosophical accounts of scientific method,²⁶⁴ between electron theory and scientific method,²⁶⁵ between wave mechanics and scientific method²⁶⁶ and between developmental psychology and scientific method.²⁶⁷ Although the latter part of her academic career was spent teaching physics at one of the best women's colleges in the United States,

Smith, many of Dorothy Wrinch's early contributions were to philosophy of science.

23. *Marjorie Silliman Harris: fl. 1913*

Marjorie Silliman Harris received her B.A. from Mount Holyoke College in 1913. She was granted the Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1921 and was awarded the Susan Linn Sage scholarship in philosophy at Cornell.

Harris worked for a brief time as a professor at the University of Colorado in 1921–1922, but most of her career was spent at Randolph-Macon Women's College in Georgia where she taught from 1922–1958. She became the chairperson of the Philosophy department and was granted Professor Emeritus status from 1934–1958.

Harris wrote many articles, mostly about Comte, Bergson and Francisco Romero. In one, "Bergson's Conception of Freedom" she argued that one can only be free in action to the extent that the will is enlightened concerning the goal it wills.²⁶⁸ Harris' commentary article, "If We Have Life, Do We Need Philosophy" defends the importance of philosophy as a discipline against Alexander Herzberg's article "The Chief Types of Motivation to Philosophical Reflection." Herzberg had claimed that the philosopher's quest for truth is conditioned by his or her own life. Harris' commentary article concludes that "The life of reflection is truly the most significant life. In order to have life, we need philosophy."²⁶⁹

Harris discussed Romero's meaning of transcendence in "A Transcendent Approach to Philosophy".²⁷⁰ In 1964, she wrote further on the subject: "Philosophy for Tomorrow" gives a detailed account of Romero's meaning of transcendence.²⁷¹ Harris also wrote several articles commenting on theories of aesthetics referring to the views of Alfred North Whitehead, Auguste Comte and William James. She also discussed Plato's aesthetics in "Beauty and the Good".²⁷²

24. *E. M. Whetnall: fl. 1900*

I have been unable to uncover any personal information concerning a "Miss E. M. Whetnall," although I suspect that she may have been on the faculty at one of the Cambridge women's colleges. I have not been able to verify my conjecture; however, her participation in the Aristotelian Society and the fact that Pitt lists a "(Miss) E. W. (sic) Whetnall" acting

as secretary for a paper given by Russell at the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club in 1926²⁷³ tends to support this view.

The *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* list Miss Whetnall's election to membership in 1925. She was a discussant of a paper by Price ("Mill's View of the External World,") in January of 1927. The following year she published reviews in *Mind* of Andries MacLeod's *Sur Diverses Questions se Présentant dans l'Etude du Concept de Réalité*,²⁷⁴ Henry Bradford Smith's *Symbolic Logic*²⁷⁵ and Boris Bogoslovsky's *The Technique of Controversy*.²⁷⁶

We may assume that she completed her doctorate in 1929, for at this time, her listing among the members of the Aristotelian Society changes to "E. M. Whetnall, Ph.D., B.A." In this year she published the first of two original philosophical writings, "Symbol Situations."²⁷⁷ In the middle of that paper, she offers this summary:

What I have tried to do is to limit myself to a discussion of such assertions as seems to me indubitable. They are as follows: – (1) Commands, questions, sentences, clauses and phrases are all complex symbols, that is to say, all have parts used syntactically. (2) The referends of complex symbols are *things as related*. (3) The structure of a complex symbol seldom, if ever, has a one-one correspondence with the structure of its referend. (4) Complex symbols have parts, some of which, at least, stand for the constituents of the referends of the complex symbols. (5) The referends of the non-demonstrative parts of complex symbols are non-specific universals or else universals to which the distinction between specific and non-specific is inapplicable.²⁷⁸

In Whetnall's view the contexts of signs and symbols are different, with those situations in which symbols occur being social in context (involving speaker and hearer, writer and reader, etc.). The situations in which signs occur are complete with "one experiencing person." Thus, she takes issue with the views expressed by Ogden and Richards in their work *The Meaning of Meaning*. This same year, 1929, E. M. Whetnall published a review of Dewey's *Experience and Nature*²⁷⁹ and of Latta and MacBeath's *The Elements of Logic*²⁸⁰ in *Mind*. She is first referred to in the minutes of the Aristotelian Society as "Dr. E. M. Whetnall" at the end of November, 1931, the year after she edited Welton and Monahan's *An Intermediate Logic*.²⁸¹

Whetnall's second original philosophical article, "Formation of

Concepts and Metaphysical Analysis”²⁸² analyzes the relationship between the nature and process of metaphysical analysis and the psychological formation of concepts. During the early 1930s E. M. Whetnall served on the Executive Committee of the Aristotelian Society for 1931–1932, 1932–1933, 1934–1935, and 1936–1937. Miss Whetnall became librarian for the Society for the term 1933–1934, while Stebbing assumed the presidency of the Association. Whetnall then was reelected to the Executive Committee for 1935–1936, and again for 1936–1937.

E. M. Whetnall was a frequent panel discussant of papers read before the Society during the 1930s, including deBurgh’s “Greatness and Goodness,” Hallett’s “Physical and Metaphysical Reality,” Broad’s “McTaggart’s Principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse,” Woodger’s “Some Apparently Unavoidable Characteristics of Natural Scientific Theory;” Oakeley’s “The Status of the Past,” and Mace’s “Hume’s Doctrine of Causality.” In addition she was a discussant for a symposium by Moore, Joseph, and Taylor on “Is Goodness a Quality?” (Other notable panelists for that symposium included Ewing, Joad, and Stace.) In 1936, Miss E. M. Whetnall served as a panel discussant of Wisdom’s “The Psycho-Centric Conception of Right.” I have been unable to ascertain a date of death, however, she does not appear on the membership lists after 1938 and may have died around that time.

25. *Ruth Lydia Saw: 1901–1983?*²⁸³

Ruth Lydia Saw was born in 1901 and received her early education at the Country School for Girls in Surrey, England. Little is known about her family life, save that she was the child of Samuel James Saw and Matilda Louisa Horner. She had a sister, Grace, who apparently became a mathematician.²⁸⁴ Ruth Lydia Saw apparently graduated from Bedford College of the University of London with a B.A. in 1926, when she is first listed as a member of the Aristotelian Society. She accepted a position as Lecturer in Philosophy at Smith College in Massachusetts from 1927–1934, and apparently completed her Ph.D. while at Smith. She returned to England after completing the Ph.D.²⁸⁵ and became (part-time?) Lecturer in Philosophy at London University in Bedford College.

In 1935 Saw began to play an active role in the Aristotelian Society. In February of that year she gave a paper “An Aspect of Causal Connection,” which was commented on by Stebbing, White and others. She herself commented on Porteous’ “The Idea of the Necessary

Connection" two months later. She continued as Lecturer at Bedford College until 1944, and was also (part-time?) Lecturer at Birbeck College from 1939 until 1946 when she became Reader there.²⁸⁶ Saw served on the Executive Committee of the Society from 1946–1949. In 1950 she became its Treasurer, a position that she held at least until 1962. She was a founding member and chaired the Council of the British Society of Aesthetics in 1960. In 1963 she became Vice-President and in 1969, President. Saw was promoted to Professor of Aesthetics (in 1961) and Head of the Philosophy Department, a position she apparently retained until her retirement in 1964 when she is designated Professor Emeritus. The next year Ruth Lydia Saw became the fifth woman elected President of the Aristotelian Society following in the tradition of Dorothy Emmett, Hilda Oakeley, L. Susan Stebbing and Beatrice Edgell before her.

During the early part of her professional career, Saw's interest was in logic and philosophy of language, particularly on the problems of causal connection and induction in Ockham²⁸⁷ and in Whitehead.²⁸⁸ In the late 1940's however, her interests gradually moved toward modern metaphysics, resulting early the next decade in a paper critical of Russell's views on Leibniz and knowledge of individuals,²⁸⁹ as well as full length works on Spinoza (1951)²⁹⁰ and on Leibniz (1954).²⁹¹ Saw's *Spinoza* is an attempt to synthesize from Spinoza's major works²⁹² coherent accounts of his views on ethics and metaphysics. Saw sees Spinoza as a man of his times, trying to give accounts of what for his contemporaries were *the* problems of philosophy, mathematics, physics and theology. Despite this, there is no account of Spinoza's life, personal or intellectual, in the volume. Saw reconstructs Spinoza's views on these subjects by following what she takes to be his methodology as described in his *Ethics*. According to Saw, for Spinoza the method of obtaining true knowledge is first to

. . . order our lives in such a way that there are no emotional obstacles to the quiet and calm contemplation of the ideas we already possess. We are then making ourselves into a clear mirror from which the ideas of God may be clearly reflected, or a vehicle for the conveying of God's ideas without distortion.²⁹³

Secondly, we must follow an orderly definitional process so that both the ordering and the relationship between ideas will accurately reflect the ordering and relationship of things. This will assure that our ideas coincide with God's.

Saw does not merely offer an exposition of Spinoza's thought, she evaluates the nature and seriousness of what she identifies as shortcomings in his system. For example, she criticizes his position that the soul is passive under the imagination. That position makes it

. . . very difficult to see how Spinoza could distinguish between the accidental associations of ideas taking place in day-dreaming or in dreaming by night, and the active control of imagined ideas taking place in artistic creation. It may be objected that Spinoza has the very practical aim of showing us how to increase our knowledge, and that he should not be criticised because he has not at the same time given an account of artistic creation. He has, however, not merely failed to give an account of such imaginative construction, but he has given such a description of the functioning of the intellect that it is impossible.²⁹⁴

Despite her regularly critical approach to Spinoza, it is clear from Saw's account that she is not trying to impose a twentieth century account of the *desideratum* of any sound metaphysics upon a theory designed for an earlier time. Indeed, she attempts to take Spinoza on his own grounds, showing what is particularly elegant in his ideas (compared, say, to those of Descartes or Newton), and what remains particularly interesting for contemporary philosophy. The introduction and appraisal chapters which frame the book clearly show her attempt to defend her subject against the concerns and objections of Russell and Ayer, among others. Yet, she wants most of all to be Spinoza's mouthpiece, summing up and making sense out of what would otherwise be dense, impossible passages. For example, on his epistemology, she says:

To sum up this account of knowledge, truth and error. Knowledge is the healthy activity of the mind, truth is the property of the ideas which the mind forms when it is thinking well, and it is immediately recognised. A mind in error is a mind thinking confusedly, connecting things that happened to occur together as though they belonged of necessity, and as a consequence, behaving inappropriately towards external objects. This is one consequence which Spinoza takes to be of fundamental importance. It is knowledge and clear thinking that enable men to live together well, so that the search for a satisfactory metaphysics is a search of great practical importance.²⁹⁵

In addition to the chapters on methodology and epistemology, and the closing chapter appraising her reconstruction of Spinoza's views, Saw devotes three chapters to Spinoza's account of God, one to his account of the universe, space and time, one to human nature, and one to a sketch of Spinoza's moral theory.

Saw's *Leibniz* begins with an introduction by A. J. Ayer. Saw presents the philosopher in a manner with which I, as a historian of philosophy have great sympathy. She sees the *corpus* of his works as a living, holistic expression of his response to the great scientific, political and religious issues of his day. In Saw's view, Leibniz considered philosophy and mathematics to be tools with which to reach a systematic response to those issues. Thus, questions like "what is the status of scientific knowledge" "how do we know the nature and structure of the universe" and "how can God have created the universe as a law-like structure while preserving free will for humans" provided the *raison d'être* for the *Theodicee*, the *Monadology*, *New System*, *Discourse on Metaphysics* and other writings. Interestingly, it was to answer just such questions that Emilie du Châtelet demonstrated how Leibniz' metaphysics and Newton's physics could be made consistent with each other.²⁹⁶ According to Saw,

He continually recommended his metaphysical system on the ground that it was compatible with the beliefs of all branches of the Christian Church. Indeed, many of his metaphysical doctrines developed from his attempt to find an account of material substance which would be equally acceptable to Catholic and Protestant theologians.²⁹⁷

Saw correctly notes that the supposed inability of Leibniz's system to resolve inconsistencies such as that between the concept of the universe as a pre-established harmony with the theological doctrine that humans exercise a free will is not peculiar to Leibniz. When his system is properly understood, we see that it deals with these inconsistencies more satisfactorily than did other metaphysical systems.²⁹⁸

In Saw's view, Leibniz's choice of the metaphor of Monad as mirror is incompatible with his theory, and this conceptual confusion is in part what makes Leibniz so difficult for scholars.

At first sight the metaphor appears clear and adequate for the conception which Leibniz has in mind: that is, that changes taking place in one part of space have their counterpart in changes which are going on in another part of space, without there being, in the ordinary

sense of the word, a causal sequence of events connecting the two sets of changes. We can glance quickly backwards and forwards from a mirror to the room and notice the similarity between the real bee, buzzing in a vase of flowers, and its reflection in a mirror. If it moves from one flower to another, there is the reflected movement from one mirror flower to another, but this similarity is for a spectator who is watching the two sets of happenings and noting their correlation. If we are using the mirror metaphor, it is to explain not the similarity of changes for a spectator, but what we should call the correlation of real changes between real events. It is intended to offer us a picture of what happens, for instance when steel is drawn to a magnet. The metaphor is applicable in the sense that changes in one place lead us to expect changes in another place, but it is unsuitable in that mirroring leads us to expect a duplication of appearances in two places, while the state of affairs in the magnet is not duplicated by the state of affairs in the steel.²⁹⁹

The mirror metaphor creates other problems for Leibniz, Saw says.

The fact of the matter appears to be that Leibniz never put together his view of the simple substances mutually mirroring one another, and his view of their possession of properties. If he had, he would have seen that the notion of simple properties, all of them mutually compatible, will not do when we think of them as belonging to unique individuals which together form a series. Simple properties can form nothing but a collection, but a mere collection of properties cannot belong to a subject uniquely determined by its position in a series.³⁰⁰

Saw reportedly later contributed sections on Ockham and Leibniz to a volume called *A Critical History of Western Philosophy*, but I have been unable to verify this.

By the late 1950's Ruth Saw's interests in philosophy again took a turn, this time towards aesthetics. The publication of three articles on aesthetics in the early 1960's coincided with her appointment as Professor of Aesthetics at the University of London, and her founding of the British Society of Aesthetics. Saw's views on aesthetics were influential and were discussed by Smart and Margolis, among others. In "What is a 'Work of Art'?"³⁰¹ Saw addresses conventions for identifying something as a "work of art" or a person as an "artist," and explores the

relationships between such diverse artistry as crafts and athletics. In "Sense and Nonsense in Aesthetics"³⁰² she says:

. . . the proper work of aestheticians is to take note of psychological facts, of historical facts about art and criticism, of the judgments of critics and people in general, and to become clear about what we want to do with these facts. We have to be clear about what kind of question requires a factual answer and about the kinds of questions for which a factual answer would be irrelevant. We have to extract the assumptions implicit in the standards used by artists and critics when they talk about their work. This is a point at which it becomes important to take notice of the facts of the history of art and taste. When art changes its function in society, the standards by which people judge it change too.³⁰³

Art, she claimed, has much in common with language, and a theory of aesthetics would have much in common with philosophy of language. A satisfactory theory of aesthetics, like a satisfactory theory of language would have to account for the "facts" of aesthetic experience (what its constituent parts are), just as philosophy of language must account for what the constituent parts of linguistic experience are. A satisfactory theory of aesthetics must account for the components of a work of art (what counts as a work of art) just as philosophy of language must account for utterances, etc. Saw was, in essence sketching a meta-aesthetics. Her sketch, along with the views of Susanne Langer and Nelson Goodman are discussed by Joseph Margolis, in his "Art as Language."³⁰⁴

Ninian Smart criticized the facts which Saw claimed a satisfactory theory of aesthetics must explain, and showed how, on Saw's account, "aesthetic phenomena and judgements in and about cricket are properly part of the subject-matter of aesthetics."³⁰⁵ In a reply to Smart, Saw conceded the point, urging that it did no harm to her meta-aesthetics. The Smart-Saw exchange generated some secondary literature by Wertz³⁰⁶ and by Best³⁰⁷ on sport as art form in which Wertz defends and Best criticizes Saw's view. In a lengthy paper, "Art and the language of the emotions,"³⁰⁸ she considers the contributions that Gombrich and Fry have made to aesthetic theory and in that context, explores the question how art does communicate emotion.

Ruth Lydia Saw's final publication was "The Logic of the Particular Case".³⁰⁹ In that work Saw argued that a work is a work of art in part

because it is an instance of a "brilliant illumination" of a universal. As such, the definition of a unique person and of a work of art must be understood as comparable formal concepts. Although I have described Saw's professional life as one of evolution from logic and philosophy of language in the early years to metaphysics in middle age and to aesthetics toward the end of her life, it is perhaps more apt to describe her professional life's journey as a cycle. "The Logic of the Particular Case" was, like her first work, in the area of logic and philosophy of language; and, like her first work it was presented before the Aristotelian Society. Unlike her first work, it explored the logic of the language of aesthetic experience, thus bringing together several of her major philosophical interests.

26. *Ivy MacKenzie: fl. 1902*

Ivy MacKenzie was granted her B.Sc., M.A. and M.D. She was a member of the Aristotelian Society. Her interest in medicine is reflected in her two philosophical articles. "Sensation and Attention" explores the nature of organisms which possess sensory organs and react to environmental stimulation. MacKenzie questions the capacity for sensation as we humans understand it in these organisms.³¹⁰ "The Biological Basis of the Sense of Time" discusses the conception of time and space as it is related to theories of memory and evolutionary biology. MacKenzie attempts to look toward the origin of the ideas of time and space.³¹¹ MacKenzie's writings focus on scientific examples and less on philosophical investigations.

27. *Margaret Masterman Braithwaite: fl. 1905*

Margaret Masterman Braithwaite was a student at Girton College in the 1930's.

Masterman married and later published under the name Braithwaite. She participated in a symposium in 1949 with Farrell, and Mace. The symposium was titled "Causal Laws in Psychology" and Masterman identified three questions in her discussion. "These are 1) Scientific prediction, as being the function for which, in science, we have law, and of the necessity of establishing predictiveness in psychology; 2) That of causality, i.e., of the causal nexus and what its status is in science, and, more particularly, how indispensable it is in psychology; 3) that of the general scientific status of psychology."³¹²

Masterman's other works focused on language and the exploration

of the field of psychology. She seemed particularly interested in the place of psychology in the realm of science. Masterman published "The Psychology of Levels of Will" in 1948 and "Words" in 1954. According to Alice Ambrose, Masterman recently died of a degenerative disease.

28. *Margaret MacDonald: fl. 1907–1956*

Margaret MacDonald was an abandoned child. As an adult, MacDonald never married, devoting herself instead to philosophical pursuits. She received her Ph.D. from Bedford College with the financial assistance of Lizzie Susan Stebbing.³¹³ MacDonald was made a Cambridge fellow at Girton College in 1932. During 1933–1935, MacDonald studied under Wittgenstein and Moore at Girton College. During the year 1934–1935, Alice Ambrose and MacDonald shared notes taken during Wittgenstein's lectures. Wittgenstein absolutely forbade his students to take notes in his class. MacDonald and fellow student, Alice Ambrose, secretly took notes during Wittgenstein's lectures by hiding their notes in their skirts. MacDonald and Ambrose felt that the lectures were an important contribution to academic philosophy and later successfully convinced Wittgenstein to allow them to continue writing his lectures down. Ambrose compiled a draft of these notes several years later. Mr. Rush Rhees had offered the original draft of MacDonald's notes to Ambrose for her compilation.³¹⁴

Ambrose later published two volumes of Wittgenstein's Lectures and the books were referred to as the blue and yellow books to reflect the color of the skirts where they hid their original notes.³¹⁵ Ambrose wrote that "In addition to taking notes of lectures of 1933–1934, Ms. MacDonald and I took notes of his informal discussions in the intervals between dictation when, as he thought, and sometimes regretted, no record had been made of what he said. Subsequently, explicit permission was given us to continue with notetaking of his informal discussions."³¹⁶

MacDonald edited the philosophical journal, *Analysis* for several years. From 1932 until her death in 1956, MacDonald was very active in academic philosophy. Her early published works focus on criticisms of several contemporary philosophers in an effort to develop her own views of the criterion of significance in philosophical discussion. In "Verification and Understanding" MacDonald criticizes C. S. Peirce's notion that "the rational meaning of every proposition lies in the

future.”³¹⁷ MacDonald does not believe that verifiability requires either that a proposition is tautologous, or that the proponent of a (true) proposition is, when uttering that the proposition is true, really asserting that when in the circumstances described by the proposition, the person uttering the proposition will undergo certain sensory experiences as described by the proposition.

In 1937 Margaret MacDonald was a symposiast at the joint meeting with the Mind Association along with Ryle and Berlin on the subject “Induction and Hypothesis.” Discussants included Ewing, Ayer, Moore and Stebbing.³¹⁸ At that meeting, she also served as a discussant along with many of the same participants at a symposium by Stebbing, Ayer and Duncan Jones “Does Philosophy Analyse Common Sense?” We may assume that she received her doctorate around 1938 as she is first referred to as “Dr. Margaret MacDonald” in May 1938, when she presented her paper “The Philosopher’s Use of Analogy,” which was discussed by Max Black and others.³¹⁹ The paper explored the burden of philosophers in their quest to arrive at convictions of belief and meaning. The scientist implements a method to prove his convictions, while the philosopher must rely on his own reasoning and opinions. MacDonald points out that there is no accepted criterion for the method of the philosopher.³²⁰ MacDonald concludes that perhaps “philosophical problems can be solved by understanding how language is ordinarily used, how certain uses of it have provoked these problems and how it has been misused in many alleged situations.”³²¹

In 1938, MacDonald began teaching at St. Hilda’s College, Oxford. She was a discussant at a December, 1938 meeting of Max Black’s “Some Problems Connected with Language,” along with Ayer, Stebbing, Mace, Acton and others. In 1940 she was a discussant at Christchurch Oxford (with the Oxford Philosophical Society) of Katkov’s “The Pleasant and the Beautiful.”

MacDonald’s later works focused on aesthetics. In “Art and Imagination” published in 1953, MacDonald rejected the general answer to questions regarding art, preferring instead to explore the complexities of discourse about art, and the logic of language. MacDonald suffered from a heart condition and in 1956 had surgery at St. Thomas Hospital in London. She died on January 7, 1956 during her recovery from surgery. Her obituary for the journal *Analysis* which she had edited was written by Ruth Saw.

29. *Helen M. Smith: fl. 1907*

Miss Helen M. Smith of Kelso, Scotland became a member of the Aristotelian Society in 1932 and gave a paper, "Mr. Bertrand Russell on Perception." She was inactive for several years until her presentation at a joint session with the Mind Association and Scots Philosophical at St. Andrew's in 1936 where she gave a paper on the subject "Is there a Problem of Sense Data?" She served as a discussant along with Stebbing, Black and Ayer on Mace's "Physicalism" in 1937. In 1938 at a joint meeting with the Mind Association she was a discussant along with Ewing, Ross, Price, Ayer, Ryle, Wisdom and others of H. A. Prichard's paper "The Sense Datum Fallacy."

NOTES

1. Bryant, Mrs. Sophie, D.Sc. "Professor James on the Emotions," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Old Series 3, No. 2 (1895-1896), 52-64, as well as numerous other publications indicating marital status and degrees earned.
2. "The Relation of Mathematics to General Formal Logic," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series 2 (1901-1902), pp. 105-143.
3. "Are Psychical States Extended?," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 3, No. 2 (1894-1895) (Part II, pp. 90-93 by Sophie Bryant).
4. Bryant, Sophie, "Professor James on the Emotions," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Old Series 3, No. 2 (1895-1896), pp. 52-64.
5. Bryant, Sophie, "On the Nature and Function of a Complete Symbolic Language," *Mind* XXIII (1888), pp. 188-207.
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Appendix

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Elizabeth Lane Beardsley	Susanne Knauth Langer*
Eugenia Ginsberg Blauasteinowa**	Thelma Lavine
May Brodbeck*	Cornelia Geer LeBoutillier
Lucinda Pearl Boggs	Dorothy Lee
Sarah H. Brown	Anna Forbes Liddell
Mary Lowell Coolidge*	Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaumowa**
Isabel Payson Creed	Maria Kokoszynska-Lutmanowa**
Agnes Cuming	Helen Merrel Lynd
Adela Curtis	Millicent Mackenzie
Izydora Dambska**	Flora I. MacKinnon
Margaret Drummond	Margaret McFarlane
Nathalie Duddington	Susan Miles
Savilla Alice Elkus	Maria Niedzwiecka Ossowska**
Dorothy Emmet	Miss C. E. Plumtre
Irena Filozofowna**	Seweryna Liszczewska-Rohmanowa**
Mary Gilliland	Halina Sloniewska**
Kate Moore Gordon	Ethel Sabin Smith
Daniela Tennerowna Gromska**	Ella Harrison Stokes
Pepita Haezrahi	Marie Collins Swabey*
Olga Hahn	Anna Tumarkin
Frances Hamblin	Dorothy Walsh
Louise Robinson Heath	Margaret Floy Washburn
Anna T. Kitchel	Marie Williams

Augusta Klein
Martha Kneale
Janina Korarbinska**
Mary Shaw Kuypers

Helen Wodehouse
Mary Hay Wood
Helen Zimmern

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